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Introduction and Overview
Ging Wong
Privy Council Office, Government of Canada
Garnett Picot
Statistics Canada

This is the first of two volumes of selected papers presented at the
conference on “Changes in Working Time in Canada and the United
States,” which was held in Ottawa, Ontario, on June 13–15, 1996, and
was jointly sponsored by the Canadian Employment Research Forum
(CERF), the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, and Statistics Canada. It reflects a renewed interest in recent years in the
empirical evidence for changing labor supply—both hours of work and
labor market participation—and the implications for employment,
income support benefits, and taxation policies and programs.
To place this policy and research issue in a Canadian context, a February 1995 Parliamentary Committee report on Social Security reform
called for initiatives to better understand and make policy recommendations regarding the redistribution of working time. What was clear to
policymakers was that employment and income security policies,
including unemployment insurance and welfare reform, needed to
address significant changing patterns of work arrangements. At the
same time, policymakers were handicapped by the absence of a knowledge base in this area. The research literature made sporadic references
to the growth of a contingent workforce, flexible working arrangements, and nonstandard employment, but there was a lack of focus that
pulled together the relevant concepts and empirical evidence.
This myopia is understandable. Through the 1980s, hours of work
received little attention by academics and policy analysts, at least compared with issues such as unemployment (in Canada) and wage inequality (in North America). Average hours worked had declined slowly
over many decades and then stabilized. This stasis produced little
excitement. Labor supply topics received considerable attention during the 1970s, but this work also waned through the 1980s.
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During the 1990s, however, researchers observed that although
average hours worked changed little, the manner in which the economy
distributed working time was being transformed. Hours were becoming more polarized; some workers were working more hours, others
fewer. This held implications for earnings inequality, unemployment
and underemployment (for some), and overwork (for others). Many
began to wonder what had happened to the promise of increased leisure. Paradoxically, within the context of high unemployment in Canada and Europe, many analysts were concerned about overwork and
increased time-stress among a significant portion of the population.
Work sharing or short-time compensation was seen as one response to
the unemployment problem in Europe and Canada.
Issues regarding hours of work among women in particular also
materialized. Often related to the conflict between work and family
responsibilities, these concerns led to research on “flexible hours,” job
sharing, and other ways of providing increased flexibility in hours. The
impact on worker performance and firm productivity of this potentially
increased working-time flexibility also came to the fore. These and
other events refocused the limelight on working time and resulted in
the conference from which chapters in these volumes were selected.
The conference was international in coverage, in recognition that
the same economic trends leading to pressures for changing employment relationships were present in Canada, the United States, and other
industrialized countries. Noted researchers such as Richard Freeman
have identified this issue to be of central importance in understanding
how labor markets are evolving. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) also recognized the transformations taking place in Michael
White’s Working Hours: Assessing the Potential for Reduction.1 A
more recent and more provocative piece in the U.S. literature is Jeremy
Rifkin’s The End of Work.2
The purpose of this book and the companion volume is to describe
and place this transformation in a comparative and historical perspective, as well as to examine some of the new research and policy issues
that have emerged in its wake. Most of the chapters in these volumes
examine the situation in Canada or the United States, though some also
look at working-time issues in western Europe and Australia. The
essays in this volume present no central thesis, although there are
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recurring themes. It should be noted that the original conference
papers have been revised for this collection.
The three chapters in Part I offer statistical overviews and analyses
of the trends in working hours for Canada and the United States.
Michael Sheridan, Deborah Sunter, and Brent Diverty provide empirical evidence on the Canadian trends in weekly hours of work from
1976 to 1995. Drawing on data from the monthly Labour Force Survey
(LFS) and the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, they quantify
the perceived shift away from the standard workweek (35–40 hours).
Specifically, the analysis assesses movements in weekly hours as they
relate to key labor market indications, including class of work, age,
sex, education, occupation, and industry. The data support the concept
that, while working hours are in flux, the distribution of hours has
polarized over time. Evidence from the last 20 years suggests that
hours have shifted from standard to both long (41 hours or more) and
short workweeks (34 hours or less). The shift to shorter workweeks
appears to have been triggered by the recessions of both the early
1980s and 1990s, while most of the growth in the share of long working time appears to be a more recent occurrence. Over the period, the
10.7-percentage-point decline in the proportion of people working
standard hours was coincident with increases of 7.6 percentage points
in short hour weeks and 3 percentage points in long hours. Further,
this primarily unidirectional shift toward the hours distribution poles is
evident when workers are grouped by various characteristics. The
hours polarization persists, though to a lesser extent, when special
groups such as the self-employed, multiple jobholders, young workers,
and managers are removed from the analysis.
The chapter by Philip Rones, Jennifer Gardner, and Randy Ilg supplies a parallel analysis of trends in hours of work in the United States.
Like Canada, the United States has experienced a sizable increase in
the fraction of workers working very long hours, though, unlike Canada, the United States has not seen an increase in the fraction working
short hours. The growth in the share of workers working 49 or more
hours per week accounted for a modest increase in average weekly
hours worked from 1976 to 1993. Interestingly, growth in the fraction
working very long hours occurred among both men and women and
within all major occupational categories.
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Even more striking has been the growth in annual hours worked by
women since the 1970s. From 1976 to 1993, average annual working
hours among prime-age working women (25–54 years old) increased
by 45 percent. This large increase was due both to the increase in labor
force participation among women and to the fact that, when they join
the labor force, women are more likely to work year round. Average
annual hours worked by men has changed little since the 1970s.
Linda Bell and Richard Freeman placed the discussion of hours
worked within an international context by asking why U.S. and Canadian workers work harder (i.e., more hours per year) than their European counterparts. During the past two decades, the gap between time
worked by employed North Americans and employed western Europeans increased noticeably. So too did earnings inequality. This chapter
puts forth the hypothesis that higher inequality in outcomes (earnings)
induces workers to work harder (i.e., longer). In Europe, where pay
differences are relatively small, workers will gain little by working
harder (or lose little by not working harder). In high-inequality countries, where pay differences are larger, often employment is less secure
and unemployment benefits more modest; thus, there is much more of
an inducement to work harder.
In support of this hypothesis, the authors observe that the greater
work ethic in North America is fairly recent. From the 1950s to the
1970s, workers in the United States worked fewer hours than those in
many European countries; by the 1980s and 1990s, they were working
substantially longer hours than workers in all European countries. It
seems unlikely that cultural differences alone could explain this
change. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita cannot explain the
differences either. In some “wealthy” countries, such as Germany,
employees work relatively few hours, while in others, such as Japan
and the United States, they work very long hours. A corollary to this
observation is that GDP per capita has some shortcoming as a measure
of labor productivity and welfare. Productivity will be overestimated
in countries with longer working hours, as will welfare. The additional
leisure achieved by workers in countries with shorter working hours
would add to a worker’s utility, but this is ignored in the measure.
Turning to U.S. data on full-time workers, Bell and Freeman use a
regression framework and find a clear positive association between
wage inequality and hours worked. When part-time workers are
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included, this association is weakened. In sum, the authors argue that
in the United States, and to a lesser extent in Canada, employees work
hard because they face a “carrot” for doing so, and a substantial “stick”
if they do not. This holds implications for labor supply models,
because an inequality measure is not often included in labor supply
equations.
In the research and debate on the rising earnings inequality in Canada and the United States, working time has been largely ignored. Earlier studies by Burtless (1990) and Moffitt (1990) concluded that the
rise in earnings inequality in the United States is associated primarily
with an increased dispersion in hourly wages, not hours of work.
There appears, however, to be an association between a polarization in
hours of work and that of annual earnings in Canada. In Part II, Garnett Picot reviews the evidence for this in the Canadian research literature and extends the analysis to determine whether it is changes in
weeks worked per year or hours per week that explain the changing
distribution of working time and its impact on earnings inequality. A
series of special household surveys are used to construct comparable
data on weekly hours and hourly wages over the period 1981–1993,
including the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Survey of Work History, the Survey of Union Membership, the Labour Market Activity
Survey, and the new Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.
The chapter finds that the rise in inequality among prime-age
males, and the decline among their female counterparts, is associated
primarily with changes in hours of work, while changes in the distribution of hourly wages played a much smaller role. While changing
hours plays an important role in rising inequality in general, it does not
have the same effect for younger workers. Rather, declining real and
relative hourly wage adjustment appears to be concentrated among the
young.
Within the context of increasing wage inequality and male joblessness in the United States, Robert Haveman, Lawrence Buron, and
Andrew Bershadker ask whether one can devise a more encompassing
and informative measure of labor market performance than, say, the
unemployment rate, or any other existing single indicator. They focus
on the underutilization of male labor in the United States over the
1975–1992 period. Changes in total annual hours worked are central
to their measure of underutilization. Potential earnings is defined as
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the amount that individuals would earn if they worked full time, all
year long; this is based on a predicted hourly wage. The difference
between this potential and actual earnings is defined as foregone potential earnings (FPE), the primary measure of interest in the chapter.
The FPE indicator is a more encompassing measure of changes in
economic performance than the unemployment rate or changes in
wages because it includes multiple dimensions of change (i.e., changes
in the participation rate, the unemployment rate, hours worked, and
wages paid). Furthermore, change in FPE can be decomposed into reasons, such as unemployment, illness/disability, retirement, voluntary
part-time work, and housework/child care.
The authors find a declining utilization of the stock of male human
capital over the 1975–1992 period. This trend was concentrated
among very young workers, older workers, those with the lowest education levels, and nonwhites. In the aggregate, FPE associated with
exogenous constraints (i.e., unemployment, discouraged worker effect,
and illness) fell over the period, but this was more than offset by a rise
in FPE due to individual responses to incentives, such as retirement,
voluntary part-time work, and family responsibilities.
In a chapter concerned with spatial as well as temporal change in
labor market conditions, Bob Gregory and Boyd Hunter focus on the
growth of income and employment inequality in Australian cities
between 1976 and 1991. Their data, which cover just over a third of
the Australian population, reveal a dramatic change in that society. In
an era of rising individual income inequality in Australia, inequality
among neighborhoods (areas containing 200–300 dwellings) increased
significantly. Among the 5 percent of neighborhoods with the lowest
socioeconomic status (SES), average household income fell 23 percent;
among the 5 percent of neighborhoods with the highest SES, income
increased 23 percent over the period. Most of this rising spatial inequality was associated with employment changes. In 1976, employment was more or less equally distributed across neighborhoods, no
matter where they fell on the SES scale. By 1991, employment in the
lowest SES neighborhoods had fallen 37 percent; it was much more
inequitably distributed among neighborhoods. The authors ask
whether it matters if undesirable outcomes such as declining employment opportunities and falling incomes are concentrated spatially.
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They suggest that greater economic polarization in our cities will
increasingly lead to the emergence of “bad neighborhood” pathologies.
The chapters in Part III examine issues related to labor supply and
hours constraints. To improve our understanding of labor supply
changes, Richard Mueller conducts a detailed analysis of hours worked
per day and days worked per week. He essentially moves beyond the
traditional approach to labor supply issues, which is based on hours per
week and weeks per year, and asks whether further disaggregation to
hours per day and days per week makes any difference. He concludes
that using weekly hours or more aggregated labor supply measures
masks important differences in the labor supply decisions of individuals. His analysis shows, for example, that the reduction in female labor
supply associated with having young children occurs more along the
days dimension than hours per day. This suggests that the costs associated with these women supplying labor are borne more on a daily
rather than an hourly basis. This would be missed in a more aggregate
model. He also finds interesting associations between hours and days
worked, and job change. He concludes that many job-changers desire
increased flexibility. Not only do job-changers show more variability
in their hours and days worked in their initial jobs, but this variability
increases when they move to their new jobs.
Overall, Mueller notes that in spite of the heightened concern over
“flexibility” of working time, the overwhelming norm is rigidity in
weekly work schedules, particularly in days per week. He concludes
that, taken together, the evidence suggests that workers desire more
flexibility in their choice of hours and days worked, particularly days
worked. He argues that to carry such research forward, it is necessary
to disaggregate the analysis of labor supply decisions (including constraints) into its days and hours components.
Kevin Lang and Shulamit Kahn consider, both theoretically and
empirically, workers’ survey responses on the number of hours they
would prefer to work at the same hourly rate compared with how much
they actually do work. They observe that hours are constrained given
the gap between preferred hours and actual hours, especially in Canada
and the United States. By studying how hours constraints may determine working hours, the chapter urges caution regarding mandated
hours reductions such as work sharing without first understanding why
both hours constraints and unemployment exist.
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The extent of hours constraints is investigated using the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, which provided the data on the relation
between desired and actual hours for U.S. workers over the period
1968–1987. Results for similar surveys in Canada and the European
Union are compared. To inform the empirical analysis, four primary
theories in the literature are presented that may explain why workers
are constrained to work more or less than they desire. These include
theories on long-term contracting, hedonic wage/hours locus, fixedwage contracts, and hours as a screening device. The analysis suggests
that hours constraints are best understood in the context of the imperfect matching of wages and hours as predicted by a hedonic model.
Such an imperfect matching model would allow hours policies to be
evaluated in circumstances where unemployment as well as vacancies
can arise. The main conclusion from their empirical analysis is that
mandated hours restrictions to increase work sharing would tend to
increase unemployment and lower welfare.
Part IV focuses on “short-time compensation (STC) programs.”
Karen Needels and Walter Nicholson study the programs’ effect on
how firms adjust their labor forces during cyclical downturns. Shorttime compensation (sometimes called a work sharing agreement)
involves providing the equivalent of unemployment insurance (UI)
benefits to workers who have not been completely laid off but whose
hours of work have been reduced. An evaluation of such programs
needs to know what effect they have on unemployment levels, the tendency of firms to turn to hours adjustments rather than layoffs, whether
they increase or decrease the total amount of compensated unemployment, and whether these programs represent an effective use of benefit
payments. The authors find that neither theory nor current empirical
methodologies are up to the task of providing definitive answers to
such questions. Much of the theory is based on “stylized” versions of
the UI and STC programs and do not allow for the complex interaction
that in fact takes place between the two.
Empirical methodologies relying on self-reporting by firms of
the impacts of STC often reach implausible conclusions. Methodologies that use statistical matching methods (matching similar firms in
similar economic environments that do and do not use STC programs)
hold more promise, as used in Canadian evaluations of work sharing.
In their own study of U.S. firms based on this methodology, the authors
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reached two conclusions: 1) firms that use STC programs also make
extensive use of layoffs, and 2) selectivity effects (i.e., unmeasured differences between firms that participate in the STC programs and those
that do not) pose major, and possibly insurmountable, problems in statistical inference. Given the difficulties facing research on the effects
of STC, the authors argue for more innovative use of aggregate data,
random-assignment experiments, or carefully designed case studies.
To further improve the evaluation of short-time compensation initiatives, Alec Levenson draws attention to the need to account for the
incidence of private short-time work (STW) arrangements in the
absence of formal UI-funded work sharing programs. Based upon
data drawn from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the March
Annual Demographic Files, and the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group
Files, his analysis shows that, compared with the very low STC take-up
rates, STW was a prevalent phenomenon in the United States for the
period 1968–1993. The data suggest the STW rate ranges from 50 to
70 percent of the layoff rate. The study concludes that analyses that
ignore the role of STW most likely overstate the potential for layoff
reductions under STC or work sharing and, as a corollary, understate
the degree of public subsidy provided by such UI programs to firms
that already use STW. It is recommended that existing patterns of
STW be used to provide baseline estimates in future work sharing evaluations to determine the program impact on employment versus hours
adjustment in the United States.
In a policy evaluation chapter on short-time compensation, Tom
Siedule, Ging Wong, and Carol Guest turn to the Canadian Work Sharing Program, first implemented in 1981. They review a 1993 evaluation of the program and conclude that it clearly avoided layoffs. The
evaluation suggested that about two-thirds of the layoffs that one might
have expected the program to avert were in fact prevented. The program appeared to benefit both workers and firms, but it was more
expensive to run (i.e., it was a bigger draw on the UI fund) than the
comparable layoff alternative.
In extending this work, the authors ask whether the demand for
work sharing is sensitive to changes in economic activities. If so, it is
conceivable that the increased demand would create financial hardships
for the UI fund during a severe economic downturn. To test this, they
first estimate the likelihood of a firm participating in the program as a
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function of the change in the unemployment rate and of various firm
characteristics. They find that work sharing is sensitive to the change
(rather than the level) of economic activity and that participation is
higher among firms with highly skilled workforces. Based on a macroeconomic simulation of a high-unemployment counterfactual for the
1987–1990 period, they then estimate the additional number of firms
that would have used the work sharing program during this period had
a more depressed economic scenario existed. They assess the additional cost of this increased demand for the program. The authors conclude that the “reasonable” depressed economic scenario chosen,
which was driven by reduced exports, would have led to a 1.5-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate by 1990. This, in turn,
would have resulted in a 9 percent increase in work sharing, at a cost of
$14 million. Work sharing represents such a small portion of the total
UI budget (0.43 percent in 1990), such an increase (to 0.53 percent)
would not be a financial burden. However, they also note that the cost
of extending work sharing to all potential layoff situations could be
prohibitive.

Notes
1. White, Michael. 1987. Working Hours: Assessing the Potential for Reduction.
Geneva: International Labour Office.
2. Rifkin, Jeremy. 1995. The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force
and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons.

Part I

1
The Changing Workweek
Trends in Weekly Hours of Work
in Canada, 1976–1995
Mike Sheridan, Deborah Sunter, and Brent Diverty
Statistics Canada

There is a perception that the hours worked in the Canadian labor
market have shifted away from a standard workweek. This perceived
shift has been characterized as a polarization, a situation in which
workers get pushed into short or long hours as the middle shrinks.
The demand for information on work hours is now greater than
ever before. Economists and policymakers are interested in the relationship between the distribution of work and unemployment, particularly in light of employer reactions to legislated payroll taxes and
training costs. In an economy that seems pressed to create new jobs,
some observers have proposed that hours of existing jobs be redistributed to combat unemployment. Others, concerned with workplace and
family stress, would like information on the joint and individual work
hours and schedules of family members, who are working more weekly
hours than ever before simply to maintain their standard of living. The
data presented in this chapter underline the complexities involved in
the development, implementation, and monitoring of policy solutions
for the hours inequality and polarization phenomena.
We examine and attempt to quantify the movements away from the
standard workweek by providing an analysis of Canadian trends in
weekly hours of work for 1976 through 1995. Attention is devoted to
1976, 1980, 1985, 1989, and 1995 in order to eliminate, to the degree
possible, discontinuities of recessions and expansions. Specifically,
the analysis assesses movements in weekly hours as they relate to a
number of key labor market indicators, including class of worker, age,
sex, education, occupation and industry. The actual labor market factors and conditions leading to such changes are complex and remain
the subject of much hypothesis, speculation, and debate.
13
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The data presented in this chapter support the concept that, while
hours worked are in flux, the distribution of hours has polarized over
time. Underlying the overall trend, however, are complex and primarily unidirectional shifts in the distribution of hours, evident when
workers are grouped by various characteristics. “Hours polarization”
is defined here as a decline in the proportion of people working standard hours (a 35- to 40-hour week) and an increase in both the proportion working long hours (41 or more) and those working short hours
(34 or less). Likewise, “hours inequality” is defined as a unidirectional
shift in the distribution of hours, characterized by a decline in the proportion of people working standard hours and a corresponding increase
in the proportion working either long or short hours (but not both).

BACKGROUND—HISTORY OF HOURS WORKED
IN CANADA
At the turn of the century, workers typically put in near 60-hour
weeks spread over six days (Figure 1). By the 1960s, the workweek
had been reduced to 37–40 hours over five days—a standard that has
changed little since (Reid 1985). Increased productivity and growth in
real wages spurred the trend to the shorter workweek. Workers and
their employers could afford a shorter week.
The average workweek has remained fairly stable since the mid
1960s, partly because some workers have opted for nonwage benefits
instead of shorter weeks. However, averages mask recent changes in
the distribution of hours, especially since the 1981–1982 recession. By
1995, only 54 percent of workers in all jobs put in standard hours (35–
40 hours per week), down from 65 percent in 1976. This decline
occurred despite the fact that average weekly hours fell only 3 percent,
from 39.0 to 37.9 hours, over the same period.
The decline in the proportion of people working standard hours
was coincident with increases in the proportion of people working both
long and short hours (Figure 2). As the proportion of standard hours
fell (by 10.7 percentage points from 1976 to 1995), the share of workers whose usual weekly hours were less than 35 grew from 16 percent
to nearly 24 percent, and that of those with 41 or more, from 19 percent

The Changing Workweek

Figure 1 Standard Weekly Hours in Canada, 1901–1981

SOURCE: Reid (1985).

Figure 2 Overall Employment Hours 1976 and 1995
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to 22 percent. The overall distribution of usual weekly hours polarized
between 1976 and 1995. The full effect of this is not evident, however,
until these movements are disaggregated by specific groups of workers.
Furthermore, regardless of the changes taking place, for most industries standard hours are still the norm. What is being discussed here is
changes in the poles of the hours distribution.
Men and women tend to have very different work schedules, and
this is borne out in their respective hours distributions. While a
roughly similar proportion of men and women worked standard hours
in 1995 (55.7 percent and 52.3 percent, respectively), 2.6 times as
many women than men worked short hours (35.4 percent versus 13.7
percent), while nearly 2.5 times as many men worked long hours (30.6
percent versus 12.3 percent). Despite differences in their overall distributions of hours in the poles, the two groups have faced similarly
sized changes over time; that is, both groups are experiencing polarization of hours.
What has caused this apparent shift of weekly hours to the poles of
the distribution? Three labor market phenomena of the 1980s and
1990s may have contributed to these changes, and to the decline in the
importance of the standard workweek.

THE EFFECT OF MOONLIGHTERS, SELF-EMPLOYMENT,
AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT ON HOURS
Growth in multiple jobholding may have led to increases in the
upper tail of the hours distribution, growth in self-employment could
have contributed to polarization into both the upper and lower tails, and
soaring school attendance rates for youths coupled with growth in parttime jobs during school could have increased the share of below-standard hours. Since these are important aspects of Canada’s changing
labor market, each warrants examination in any discussion of trends in
work hours.
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Moonlighters
Not surprisingly, moonlighting contributes to the incidence of long
workweeks when hours per person are measured rather than hours per
job. Since moonlighters accounted for a larger share of employment in
1995 (5 percent) than they did two decades earlier (2 percent), their
tendencies to work long hours have contributed to the growth in the
upper tail of the hours distribution over the period. But this influence
may be on the wane. In 1995, only 64 percent of all moonlighters had
above- standard workweeks, down from 70 percent in 1985 and 80 percent in 1976. The drop is explained by the fact that moonlighters in
1995 were more likely to be young persons holding down two parttime jobs that may not have added to even a standard workweek. In
contrast, moonlighters 20 years ago were much more likely to work
standard hours at their main jobs, so the second job was bound to push
them into the long-hours category.
The Self-Employed
The second trend that may have contributed to overall hours polarization, especially to the growing share of long workweeks, is the
growing prominence of self-employment, up from 12 percent of
employment in 1976 to 16 percent in 1995. Moreover, its growth in the
proportion of employment shows the same ratchet-like movement as
overall hours polarization, with spikes during the last two recessions
followed by plateaus.
The self-employed were more than twice as likely as paid employees to work long hours in 1995 (44 percent versus 15 percent). Only 3
out of 10 (compared with 6 out of 10 paid employees) worked standard
hours, so their added numbers increased the upper tail of the hours distribution. On the other hand, they were also somewhat more likely to
work short hours (29 percent compared with 24 percent), a tendency
that has increased in the last few years. This has contributed to the
lower tail of the hours distribution.
However, as with moonlighters, the self-employed have been moving away from long hours; their share of standard hours has remained
stable, while that of short hours has grown considerably. The downward shift is particularly evident for those in agriculture and trade, with
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movement toward both standard and short hours, and for those in construction and business services, mostly into short hours.
The long-term effect of growth in self-employment on the overall
distribution of hours is difficult to assess. Since much of the increase
in the short-hours pole coincided with the recession of the early 1990s,
that phenomenon may not persist. Furthermore, women, whose relatively small share of self-employed positions is growing, are shifting
up into standard and long hours. (The overall downward trend for selfemployed hours is influenced predominantly by men.)
Youths
How have youths (ages 15 to 24) affected the overall hours distribution? All movement for this group has been into the short-hours tail
of the distribution. This may be largely a function of increased school
attendance, since full-time students tend to work part time in order to
balance work and school demands. School attendance has increased
sharply since the early 1980s, rising from about 43 percent in 1984 to
57 percent in 1995.
However, short workweeks have become more common within
both the student and nonstudent groups, at the expense of standard
hours. In fact, 3 out of 10 employed youths who had left school worked
short workweeks in 1995, triple the proportion of 1976. The change in
the hours distribution for nonstudents has followed a somewhat disturbing pattern, with sharp drops triggered by the recessions and little or no
gain during the recovery and expansion periods (Table 1).
The trends for these “special” workers—multiple jobholders, the
self-employed, and youths—affect the overall distribution of hours and
contribute to the observed polarization. However, while these groups
do influence the overall trend away from standard hours, they are far
from the whole story: when they are removed from the analysis, hours
polarization persists. The remainder are paid employees who are at
least 25 years of age and working only one job, defined here as “adult
employees.” This group, making up 70 percent of the total workforce
in Canada in 1995, is important not only because of its size but also
because of the limited scope many of its members have for controlling
the hours they work.
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Table 1 Distribution of Usual Weekly Hoursa for Youths Aged 15–24 (%)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

81.4

86.6

88.2

90.3

92.2

+10.8

35–40

16.4

11.6

10.3

8.6

6.7

–9.7

41+

2.2

1.8

1.5

1.1

1.1

–1.1

1–34

9.8

12.3

19.7

16.7

28.6

+18.8

35–40

76.4

74.1

66.6

68.8

57.6

–18.8

41+

13.8

13.6

13.6

14.5

13.8

0.0

Group/weekly
hours
Student

Nonstudent

a

September to April averages.

ADULT EMPLOYEES
Even after the groups who commonly work nonstandard hours are
removed, polarization exists (Figure 3). In fact, these special groups
account for only a small part of the decline in the number of people
working standard hours. (Note that the difference between Figure 3
and Figure 2 is very small.)
A growing number of adult employees (that is, age 25 and over, not
self-employed, and without a second job) are working short and long
hours, with emphasis on the short hours. Of the 8.1-percentage-point
decline in the proportion of adult employees working standard hours
between 1976 and 1995, 5.6 points were picked up in short hours and
just 2.5 points went to long. Growth in the short-hours group was
steady over the period, while most of the growth in the long-hours
group occurred after 1985.
Polarization has been somewhat stronger for men than for women
(Table 2). The share of workers with standard hours dropped 8.5 percentage points between 1976 and 1995 (compared to 5.1 points for
women), with 5.3 points moving into long hours and 3.2 points into
short hours. The shift is also more skewed toward long hours for men
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Figure 3 Employees Aged 25 (1976 and 1995)

60
1976

Employees (%)

50

40

30

20

10

0
1-14

1995

15-29

30-34

35-39

40

41-49

50+

Usual weekly hours

than for women, whose shares of short and long hours increased in
similar proportions (up 2.4 and 2.7 points, respectively). The largest
part of the shift for men occurred after 1989, indicating that polarization has occurred more recently and more quickly for them than for
women.
Age
Do changing demographics make a difference to the distribution of
hours among adult employees? The workforce has aged over the last
two decades, as “baby boomers” have moved into their forties. Theoretically, this results in a larger share of the workforce that is wellestablished and highly experienced than when boomers were taking
their first jobs in the 1970s.
While the age pyramid may indeed be influencing the degree of
overall polarization, analysis suggests that polarization is occurring for
male adult workers of all age groups, while the trends are somewhat
different for adult women.
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Table 2 Distribution of Usual Weekly Hours,a by Sex (%)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

3.9

4.4

5.2

5.2

7.1

+3.2

35–40

77.1

77.5

75.0

73.4

68.6

–8.5

41+

19.0

18.0

19.7

21.4

24.3

+5.3

1–34

27.7

29.9

30.9

29.3

30.1

+2.4

35–40

66.4

64.5

62.6

63.4

61.3

–5.1

41+

5.8

5.6

6.5

7.3

8.6

+2.7

Group
Men

Women

a

For employees 25+ years of age.

Results show that hours polarization has occurred for men in all
selected age groups (Table 3). Between 1976 and 1980, the hours distributions changed very little; however, after 1980, standard hours
declined steadily in each age group. The shift out of standard hours
was distributed into both long and short hours, although in all cases the
shift into long hours was slightly larger.
The largest shift out of standard hours was in the 55 and over
group—10.9 percentage points between 1976 and 1995— although
each group saw at least a 5.8-point decline in standard-hour workers.
Employees in the 45–54 and the 55-and-over groups experienced the
largest shifts into long hours over the period. This finding is consistent
with the fact that members of these groups are most likely to be managers and/or to have seniority, both of which are increasingly associated
with long hours. Growth in the proportion working short hours was
largest in the 25–34 and the 55-and-over groups, where workers with
short hours are more commonly found.
Unlike men, whose proportion of workers in standard hours
between 1976 and 1980 changed little, women experienced significant
changes during this period (Table 4). The proportion of women working a standard workweek declined for all age groups from 1976 to
1995, but the drop was greatest for those in the 25–34 and 55-and-over
groups (7.1 and 11.0 percentage points, respectively). Hours for the
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Table 3 Distribution of Men’s Usual Weekly Hours,a by Age (%)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

3.7

4.3

5.5

5.3

8.3

+4.6

35–40

76.8

77.1

74.3

72.4

66.8

–10.1

41+

19.5

18.6

20.3

22.3

24.9

+5.4

1–34

2.7

3.0

3.8

3.5

5.0

+2.4

35–40

76.4

77.3

75.8

74.7

70.6

–5.8

41+

20.9

19.6

20.4

21.8

24.4

+3.4

1–34

2.0

2.9

3.8

3.3

5.2

+3.2

35–40

79.4

78.9

76.0

74.6

70.2

–9.2

41+

18.5

18.2

20.2

22.0

24.6

+6.0

1–34

9.1

9.2

9.7

12.1

14.2

+5.2

35–40

75.4

77.1

74.1

71.0

64.5

–10.9

41+

15.5

13.7

16.3

16.9

21.2

+5.7

Group/weekly
hours
25–34 years

35–44 years

45–54 years

55+ years

a

For employees 25+ years of age.

25–34 group have become more polarized, while for the older group
short hours have become more common.
For the 35–44 and 45–54 groups, considerably less polarization
has occurred, with an initial shift toward short hours between 1976 and
1980, and a movement into long hours since then. The absence of a
substantial movement out of standard hours for these two groups is
likely due to the large number of women moving from marginal to
career jobs over this period.
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Table 4 Distribution of Women’s Usual Weekly Hours,a by Age (%)

1976

1980

1980

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

25–34 years

23.8

25.8

26.8

25.2

27.8

+4.0

35–40

70.5

68.7

67.1

67.6

63.4

–7.1

41+

5.8

5.5

6.1

7.2

8.8

+3.0

1–34

30.4

31.0

31.8

29.7

30.2

–0.2

35–40

63.8

63.3

61.1

62.7

61.6

–2.2

41+

5.8

5.7

7.2

7.6

8.1

+2.3

1–34

28.8

33.0

33.8

31.0

29.3

+0.5

35–40

65.3

61.3

59.8

61.7

61.4

–3.9

41+

5.8

5.7

6.4

7.3

9.2

+3.4

1–34

32.1

36.1

39.0

41.4

41.8

+9.7

35–40

62.0

58.3

55.1

51.9

51.0

–11.0

41+

5.9

5.6

5.9

6.8

7.2

+1.3

Group/weekly
hours

35–44 years

45–54 years

55+ years

a

For employees 25+ years of age.

Education
As with most labor market outcomes, level of education plays an
important role in success and, by association, exerts a very heavy influence on hours worked. Education has a strong influence on hours distribution. The higher the educational qualifications, the greater the
degree of polarization; the lower the education, the higher the incidence of low hours.
It should come as little or no surprise, then, that men and women
with no completed postsecondary school qualifications have experienced the greatest increase in the short-hours tail of the distribution.
The incidence of short workweeks has traditionally been relatively
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high for women without a completed formal postsecondary education,
and that relationship has intensified (Table 5). The 5.2-percentagepoint decline in the proportion of women working standard hours
moved almost entirely to short hours, pushing the share of the latter up
from 28 percent in 1976 to 32 percent in 1995. Men in the same educational group saw even greater losses in the 35–40 hour category over
the period, with a decline of 9 percentage points in these standard
hours (Table 6). However unlike those of their female counterparts,
men’s losses have been distributed equally between long and short
hours (both up 4.6 percentage points).
At the other end of the formal education spectrum, university graduates have experienced a unidirectional shift toward long hours since
1976. Women with degrees have seen virtually no change in short
hours, and men have seen only a very slight increase. Between 1976
and 1995, women in this group added about 5 percentage points to the
number of long hours they worked, while men increased theirs by more
than 6 full points, from 25.3 percent to 31.8 percent. It seems that long
hours are part of the baggage of a higher education, especially for men.

INDUSTRY
Looking at the hours distribution across industries is another way
to help shed some light on both the extent and complexity of polarization and inequality in the workplace. It may be that changes in the distribution of hours reflect structural change, with disproportional growth
in industries that tend to use part-timers and in those that require long
hours. Alternatively, some industries may be making increased use of
short-hours workers only, while others are becoming more reliant on
long workweeks. Finally, changes in the hours distribution may be
spread fairly evenly within all or most industries, suggesting pervasive
and systemic factors that are economy-wide.
For men working in the goods-producing sector, the shift is toward
long hours (Table 7; for detailed industry data, see Appendix Table
A1). Of the 10.1-percentage-point shift out of standard hours over the
1976–1995 period, 8.3 points moved to long hours while only 1.8
moved to short hours. The proportion of standard-hours workers fell in
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Table 5 Distribution of Women’s Usual Weekly Hours,a
by Education (%)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

28.0

30.4

31.6

30.9

32.0

4.0

35–40

66.8

64.8

63.6

63.7

61.6

–5.2

41+

5.1

4.8

4.9

5.5

6.3

1.2

1–34

28.7

31.5

33.5

29.8

31.2

2.5

35–40

66.3

64.1

61.1

64.2

62.6

–3.7%

41+

5.0

4.4

5.5

6.0

6.1

1.1

1–34

23.7

24.8

24.9

22.6

23.9

0.2

35–40

63.7

62.9

60.3

61.6

58.3%

–5.4

41+

12.7

12.3

14.8

15.8

17.9

5.2

Highest level of
education
Less than
postsecondary
certificate, diploma,
or degree

Postsecondary
certificate/diploma

University degree

a

For employees 25+ years of age.
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Table 6 Distribution of Men’s Usual Weekly Hours,a by Education (%)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

3.4

3.8

5.2

5.2

8.0

4.6

35–40

78.2

79.0

76.5

75.1

69.0

–9.2

41+

18.4

17.2

18.3

19.8

23.0

4.6

1–34

3.8

4.3

4.7

4.1

5.9

2.1

35–40

80.7

80.3

78.2

76.6

72.8

–7.9

41+

15.5

15.4

17.0

19.3

21.4

5.8

1–34

6.8

7.4

5.8

6.2

7.2

0.4

35–40

67.9

68.8

66.7

64.8

61.0

–6.9

41+

25.3

23.8

27.4

28.9

31.8

6.5

Highest level of
education
Less than
postsecondary
certificate, diploma,
or degree

Postsecondary
certificate/diploma

University degree

a

For employees 25+ years of age.

Table 7 Distribution of Men’s Usual Weekly Hours,a by Industry (%)

Industry

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

Goods-producing
1–34

1.5

1.9

2.4

2.3

3.3

+1.8

35–40

82.2

82.2

79.9

78.3

72.1

–10.1

41+

16.3

15.8

17.7

19.4

24.6

+8.3

Service-producing

a

1–34

5.8

6.3

7.2

7.2

9.5

+3.7

35–40

73.1

74.0

71.7

69.9

66.4

–6.7

41+

21.1

19.7

21.1

22.9

24.1

+3.0

For employees 25+ years of age.
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every goods-producing industry over the period, with the exception of
agriculture. Primary industries (mining, forestry, and fishing) in particular have seen a dramatic increase in the proportion of long-hours
workers (up 19.5 percentage points between 1985 and 1995). Manufacturing and utilities have also been using proportionately more longhours workers. Hours have been polarizing in construction and have
been shifting from long to standard in agriculture.
Within the service-producing industries, the shift for men has been
into both short and long hours. Polarization has been greater here than
in the goods-producing sector. The 6.7-percentage point decrease in
the proportion of standard-hours workers since 1976 has been evenly
divided between short and long hours. Hours in transportation, storage, and communication; trade; and business services have been polarizing. The share of short hours in health and social services;
accommodation, food, and beverage services; and other services has
grown as has that of long hours in finance, insurance, and real estate
(FIRE); educational services; and government services.
As with men, the hours distribution for women working in goodsproducing industries has shifted toward long-hours workers (Table 8;
for detailed industry data, see Appendix Table A2). Overall, the proportion of women working standard hours declined 4.9 percentage
points between 1976 and 1995, 4.0 points of which went to long hours.
The increase in the proportion of long-hours workers occurred in all
goods-producing industries with the exception of agriculture.
Table 8 Distribution of Women’s Usual Weekly Hours,a by Industry (%)

Industry
1976
1980
Goods-producing
1–34
13.7
15.0
35–40
80.5
78.8
41+
5.8
6.2
Service-producing
1–34
31.1
33.4
35–40
63.1
61.2
41+
5.8
5.5
a For employees 25+ years of age.

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

16.1
77.5
6.4

15.8
77.1
7.0

14.5
75.6
9.9

+0.9
–4.9
+4.0

33.8
59.7
6.5

31.9
60.7
7.4

32.8
58.8
8.3

+1.7
–4.3
+2.5
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Service-producing industries have experienced polarization, with
the 4.3-percentage-point decline in the proportion of standard-hours
workers being picked up by short and long hours (1.7- and 2.5-point
increases, respectively). Despite an apparent overall polarization, no
single industry in this group has increased its proportion of both short
and long hours. Polarization is the net effect of women tending toward
long hours in transportation, storage, and communication; trade; FIRE;
business services; educational services; and government and other services, plus a shift toward short hours in health and social services and
accommodation, food and beverage services.
The decline in standard weekly hours holds generally across all
industries for both sexes, but increases in short and long hours are not
always of a similar magnitude: polarization is not widespread within
industries. Thus, the overall observed polarization masks underlying
unidirectional changes in the hours distribution within industries, with
some tending exclusively toward long hours, and others exclusively
toward short hours. One clear trend for both men and women is a shift
toward more long hours in goods-producing industries and a polarization in service-producing industries.

OCCUPATIONS
The number of hours worked is heavily dependent on the type of
work performed. Variation in hours worked across occupations may be
caused by many factors: the level of responsibility of the position, the
skill level required, the cost of training new employees, the opportunity
for paid overtime, and the prospects of promotion.
For men, the proportion of employees working standard hours has
been shrinking in all 10 occupational groups (Table 9). Instead of
widespread polarization, however, a shift in one direction is more
likely, depending on occupation. White-collar1 and blue-collar2 occupations, for example, have experienced growth mainly in the proportion of workers with long hours. The largest shift out of standard hours
between 1985 and 1995 occurred in the managerial category, an 8.2percentage-point decline in standard-hours workers and a corresponding 8.1-percentage-point increase in the proportion of long-hours
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Table 9 Distribution of Men’s Usual Weekly Hours,a by Occupation (%)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point
changeb
1985–95

1–34

3.2

3.1

2.6

2.4

2.7

0.1

35–40

77.0

75.2

68.3

64.9

60.0

–8.3

41+

19.7

21.7

29.1

32.7

37.3

+8.2

1–34

7.5

8.1

7.0

8.0

9.6

+2.6

35–40

73.5

74.0

73.0

70.8

67.2

–5.8

41+

19.0

17.9

20.0

21.2

23.2

+3.2

1–34

4.7

5.2

5.9

6.3

9.9

+4.1

35–40

88.2

87.7

86.9

85.6

80.7

–6.1

41+

7.0

7.1

7.2

8.1

9.3

+2.1

1–34

3.6

5.3

7.7

5.7

9.7

+2.0

35–40

63.9

65.8

63.5

64.2

62.2

–1.3

41+

32.5

28.9

28.9

30.2

28.1

–0.8

1–34

7.3

8.3

12.0

11.7

17.2

+5.1

35–40

72.1

73.1

71.5

70.8

66.3

–5.2

41+

20.7

18.7

16.5

17.5

16.5

0.0

1–34

4.4

4.0

5.5

4.9

6.9

+1.4

35–40

60.9

64.5

60.3

60.7

53.9

–6.4

41+

34.7

31.6

34.3

34.4

39.3

+5.0

Occupation/
weekly hours
Managerial

Professional

Clerical

Sales

Service

Primary
occupations

(continued)
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Table 9 (continued)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point
changeb
1985–95

1–34

1.0

1.4

1.8

1.9

2.3

+0.5

35–40

84.8

85.5

84.9

83.6

79.2

–5.7

41+

14.2

13.1

13.3

14.5

18.5

+5.2

1–34

2.0

2.0

3.6

3.0

5.4

+1.8

35–40

83.6

85.2

82.9

78.9

74.9

–8.0

41+

14.4

12.7

13.6

18.1

19.7

+6.1

1–34

5.8

6.2

8.2

8.4

9.6

+1.5

35–40

63.6

64.4

59.5

58.4

52.4

–7.1

41+

30.6

29.5

32.4

33.2

38.0

+5.7

1–34

2.3

3.0

5.4

6.0

7.7

+2.3

35–40

86.1

86.1

83.5

80.8

78.0

–5.5

41+

11.6

11.0

11.1

13.2

14.4

+3.2

Occupation/
weekly hours
Processing,
machining &
fabricating

Construction trades

Transport operator

Material handling
& other crafts

a

For employees 25+ years of age.
1984 reclassification of SOC codes included a new definition of managers, which
meant that more people were classified as such. As a consequence, meaningful comparisons can be made only as far back as 1985.

b The
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workers. Clerical, sales, and service jobs, on the other hand, experienced growth in the proportion of short-hours workers, with little or no
growth in the long-hours tail.
Those occupations in which long hours have become more common for men have either a high level of responsibility (white-collar
jobs), or regular opportunities to work paid overtime (blue-collar). In
the case of blue-collar occupations, given administrative and overhead
considerations, it may be more cost-efficient for employers to pay
overtime wages than to hire and train new employees. White-collar
workers, especially managers, may be working longer hours because of
increased responsibilities in the wake of corporate downsizing, or simply to keep their jobs in an increasingly competitive employment market. By contrast, those occupations in which short hours have become
more common (clerical, sales, and service) are often low-paying and/or
part-time.
Unidirectional shifts, as opposed to polarization, have also taken
place in women’s distribution of hours (Table 10). These shifts are
generally not as strong as those for men. The proportion of standardhours workers has declined, however, in six out of eight occupational
groups.3 Similar to the situation for men, female white-collar managers and professionals have seen growth in the long-hours tail of the distribution, while blue-collar, clerical, sales, and service occupations
have exhibited no distinct pattern.
Of all occupational groups considered here, both male and female
managers experienced the largest growth in the long-hours tail. It is
not surprising to find that managers work long hours, nor that weekly
hours increase with the level of management. Indeed, according to
recent data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID),
nonmanagerial employees averaged 36 hours per week, while lower
managers averaged 39, middle managers 40, and senior managers 42.
This pattern has become more marked over time. Managers’ expanding work hours, and their growing numbers in the labor market—16.7
percent of adult employees identified themselves as managers in 1995,
up from 14.1 percent 10 years earlier—may be a driving force behind
the overall movement into long workweeks. To determine to what
extent this is the case, the hours distribution of nonmanagerial adult
employees is examined here.
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Table 10 Distribution of Women’s Usual Weekly Hours,a
by Occupation (%)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point
changeb
1985–95

1–34

12.6

11.6

12.0

11.5

12.2

+0.2

35–40

81.4

80.9

76.1

75.2

72.8

–3.3

41+

6.1

7.5

11.8

13.3

15.0

+3.2

1–34

28.2

31.8

32.8

32.8

33.2

+0.4

35–40

64.0

61.1

57.9

57.3

55.8

–2.1

41+

7.8

7.1

9.3

9.9

11.1

+1.7

1–34

25.2

27.8

28.3

28.2

30.0

+1.7

35–40

72.6

69.9

69.6

69.2

67.1

–2.5

41+

2.2

2.3

2.1

2.7

2.9

+0.7

1–34

44.6

43.4

49.6

41.2

41.6

–8.0

35–40

47.3

48.7

42.2

49.0

50.7

+8.5

41+

8.1

7.9

8.2

9.8

7.6

–0.5

1–34

41.0

44.3

49.0

45.8

48.8

–0.2

35–40

50.5

48.5

44.7

47.4

43.9

–0.8

41+

8.5

7.2

6.3

6.8

7.4

+1.0

1–34

42.7

46.9

40.7

41.7

34.8

–5.9

35–40

32.3

31.8

35.8

36.5

44.1

+8.3

41+

25.0

21.3

23.5

21.8

21.1

–2.4

Occupation/
weekly hours
Managerial

Professional

Clerical

Sales

Service

Primary
occupations
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1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point
changeb
1985–95

1–34

7.4

8.3

9.6

9.6

9.2

–0.4

35–40

86.7

85.1

84.3

84.4

81.9

–2.4

41+

5.9

6.6

6.1

5.9

8.9

+2.8

1–34

13.6

16.5

20.0

18.6

23.6

+3.6

35–40

82.8

79.5

76.0

76.2

69.5

–6.5

41+

3.6

4.0

4.0

5.2

6.9

+3.0

Occupation/
weekly hours
Processing,
machining &
fabricating

Material handling
& other crafts

a

For employees 25+ years of age.
1984 reclassification of SOC codes included a new definition of managers, which
meant that more people were classified as such. As a consequence, meaningful comparisons can be made only as far back as 1985.

b The

Even after the managerial group has been removed from the analysis, a small amount of polarization remains (Figure 4).4 The decline in
the proportion of standard-hours workers is 4.5 percentage points, with
2.1 points going to short and 2.3 to long. Remaining increases in the
proportion of long-hours workers are for the most part in the goodsproducing industries, especially nonagricultural primary. That the shift
into long hours in these industries persists even after managers have
been removed indicates that overtime work by blue-collar workers is a
contributing factor. Conversely, since increases in the proportion of
short-hours workers are generally in the service-producing industries,
with no corresponding increase in long hours, it may be concluded that
growth into long hours in these industries was exclusive to managers.
Polarization still exists for men, while it is virtually non-existent for
women (Table 11).
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Figure 4 Work Hours for Nonmanagerial Employees Aged 25+
(1976 and 1995)

Table 11 Distribution of Usual Weekly Hours for Nonmanagerial
Employeesa(%)

Group/weekly
hours

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point
changeb
1985–95

Men
1–34

4.0

4.6

5.8

5.7

8.0

+2.2

35–40

77.1

77.9

76.4

75.0

70.4

–6.0

41+

18.9

17.5

17.9

19.3

21.6

+3.7

1–34

28.5

31.2

33.2

31.8

33.6

+0.4

35–40

65.7

63.4

61.0

61.7

59.1

–1.9

41+

5.8

5.5

5.8

6.4

7.3

+1.5

Women

a

For employees 25+ years of age.
b The 1984 reclassification of SOC codes included a new definition of managers, which
meant that more people were classified as such. As a consequence, meaningful comparisons can be made only as far back as 1985.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Are there major changes in the work hours of Canadians? Specifically, is the work “pie” becoming more unevenly divided between
those with short workweeks and those with long hours?
Evidence from the last 20 years suggests that hours have shifted
from standard to both long and short workweeks, especially since the
early 1980s. This phenomenon persists, though to a lesser extent,
when special groups such as the self-employed, moonlighters, and
young workers, as well as managers, are removed from the analysis.
The picture is not an even one. Workweeks seem to have polarized for
both sexes, though somewhat more so for men, as women increasingly
opt for standard or long workweeks. Evidence by age group suggests
that polarization is widespread, although the shift from standard to
long hours is more marked for those aged 35 to 54 than for those in the
younger or older age groups. This is especially so for women.
In terms of timing, the shift from standard to short workweeks
appears to have been triggered by the economic downturns of both the
early 1980s and 1990s, while most of the growth in the share of long
workweeks appears to be primarily a recent phenomenon.
Not surprisingly, education is strongly related to the length of the
workweek, with long hours a frequent occurrence among those with
higher credentials. Trends in the distribution of hours have also differed by educational level. Both male and female university graduates
are increasingly likely to work long hours at the expense of standard
hours. Women without any postsecondary qualifications are increasingly likely to work below standard hours, while their male counterparts are experiencing a growth in both short and long hours.
Change in the distribution of work hours is not simply a structural
phenomenon. There have been measurable shifts out of standard workweeks in most industries, although the result is not always polarization.
As one might expect, almost all service-producing industries have
tended toward a shorter workweek, while many goods-producing
industries, particularly manufacturing and other primary, have tended
to long workweeks. Only a few demonstrate a clear trend to polarization: construction; transportation, storage and communication; trade;
and business services.
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Occupation plays a strong role in determining a weekly work
schedule. There has been a marked trend toward long hours for managers, especially during the 1990s. But they are not the only ones for
whom the week has grown longer. Factory workers and those in primary occupations are also increasingly likely to work more than 40
hours a week. In contrast, hours for those in sales and services are
increasingly likely to be below standard.
The link between managers and the trend toward long hours has
warranted closer examination. One distinguishing feature of a manager’s job is supervisory responsibility, which means that hours of
work will likely be above standard. In fact, it appears that the workweek lengthens as the number of persons requiring supervision
increases.
Since managers are a growth occupation within almost all industries, their removal from the analysis of industry trends helps illuminate how much influence they have on overall patterns. Interestingly,
when managers are removed, the direction of shifts in the hours distribution holds for most industries, although the magnitude toward long
hours tends to be somewhat less. In contrast, the shift to short hours
tends to strengthen in their absence.
The shift from standard hours continues to have deep and lasting
implications for employers, workers, and the unemployed. Why are
weekly hours becoming more unevenly distributed? While this chapter
has not revealed any one causal factor, the findings are at least consistent with a number of popular hypotheses. First, the data support the
contention that many employers in a variety of industries are relying
more on a core group of highly educated, experienced workers—primarily managers but also those skilled in trades. Expectations for performance may be increasing in the difficult labor market of the 1990s,
and core workers may simply be putting in extra hours on a regular
basis to stay afloat, or as an investment in future reward through the
internal promotion ladder. Second, hours are heading down in a number of industries. Most are distinguished by a requirement for relatively unskilled workers for whom job-specific training can be
minimal. In this situation, workers may be treated as roughly interchangeable.
Perhaps the most important issue to emerge from the hours polarization/inequality debate is the question of the potential to redistribute
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hours in the labor market. One of the key questions in this debate has
been, and will probably continue to be, how many of these long hours
could be redistributed to those who are currently underemployed or
unemployed? In the “tough labor market” conditions of the 1990s, do
employees who work long hours get overtime compensation, or are
they in fact doing more for the same paycheck in order to keep a job?
If so, can unpaid hours be redistributed?
The other key question in this debate concerns workers at the other
pole of the hours distribution. Do short-hours workers possess the skill
mix and portability to assume jobs normally associated with longer
hours, and should this transfer of work be achieved by squeezing the
long-hours side of the pole? Without some sort of restructuring of
hours, these workers may become stuck in low-end, poor-paying jobs.
Further, these jobs may continue to move further in the direction of the
short-hours pole.

DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Data in this chapter are derived from two sources: the majority are
annual averages derived from the monthly Labour Force Survey. Data
on hours worked by supervisory and management responsibilities have
been drawn from the 1993 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.
Usual hours: the number of hours usually worked by a respondent
in a typical week, regardless of the nominal schedule and regardless of
whether or not the hours are paid.
Polarization: a decline in the share of standard hours (35 to 40 per
week) with roughly equal gains in the share of short (less than 35
hours) and long (41 and over) workweeks.
Standard hours: 35 to 40 hours per week. Coincides with a notion
of adequate employment: lower than legislated thresholds for overtime
pay, but high enough to assure eligibility for benefits.
Self-employed: includes all working owners, whether or not they
are incorporated or have paid help. Also included are family members
who work for a family business without pay.
Inequality: refers to a unidirectional shift in the distribution of
hours from standard to long or short.
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Notes
1. Managers and professionals.
2. Nonmanagerial employees in primary occupations, processing, machining, fabrication, construction trades, transport operation, and materials handling.
3. Occupational groups such as construction trades and transport operations were
dropped due to small sample sizes.
4. The amount of polarization is likely to be understated somewhat because it is
being measured from 1985 instead of 1976. As mentioned previously, a change in
the definition of manager in 1984 has created a break in the data series by occupation.

Reference
Reid, F. 1985. “Reductions in Work Time: An Assessment of Employment
Sharing to Reduce Unemployment.” In Work and Pay: The Canadian
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17. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 141–169.
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Table A1 Distribution of Men’s Weekly Hours Worked,a by Industry (%)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

9.5

12.0

10.4

12.4

11.8

+2.2

35–40

28.6

29.4

33.1

32.1

40.3

+11.8

41+

61.9

58.6

56.5

55.5

47.9

–14.0

1–34

1.0

1.1

1.7

1.5

2.0

+1.1

35–40

79.6

77.9

73.4

71.7

58.9

–20.6

41+

19.5

21.0

24.9

26.9

39.0

+19.5

1–34

1.1

1.5

1.8

1.8

2.3

+1.2

35–40

85.5

84.9

83.4

81.9

76.1

–9.4

41+

13.4

13.5

14.8

16.3

21.5

+8.2

1–34

1.9

2.8

4.6

3.9

6.6

+4.7

35–40

76.6

77.6

72.2

71.3

65.2

–11.4

41+

21.5

19.6

23.2

24.9

28.2

+6.7

1–34

1.0

1.5

1.0

1.6

1.8

+0.8

35–40

93.9

92.4

93.2

90.5

85.8

–8.1

41+

5.2

6.1

5.8

7.9

12.4

+7.3

4.6

4.2

5.6

6.5

7.3

+2.8

35–40

78.1

78.0

75.2

71.7

66.4

–11.7

41+

17.3

17.8

19.2

21.9

26.2

+9.0

3.1

3.5

5.5

4.5

7.4

+4.3

Industry/weekly
hours
Agriculture

Other primary

Manufacturing

Construction

Utilities

Transportation,
storage, and
communication
1–34

Trade
1–34

(continued)
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Table A1 (continued)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

35–40

68.4

71.0

69.5

68.9

64.7

–3.7

41+

28.5

25.4

25.0

26.6

27.9

–0.6

1–34

6.2

7.2

6.8

5.9

6.7

+0.4

35–40

69.6

69.1

65.3

64.5

65.1

–4.5

41+

24.2

23.7

27.8

29.6

28.2

+4.0

1–34

5.4

4.9

6.5

5.2

7.8

+2.5

35–40

74.7

74.5

70.0

69.3

66.2

–8.4

41+

20.0

20.6

23.5

25.5

25.9

+6.0

11.4

11.9

10.8

11.4

13.5

+2.1

35–40

66.9

67.8

65.1

63.2

59.4

–7.5

41+

21.7

20.4

24.1

25.4

27.2

+5.5

Industry/weekly
hours

Finance, insurance,
and real estate

Business services

Educational
services
1–34

Health and social
services
1–34

7.0

8.4

10.3

12.1

14.5

+7.5

35–40

67.9

70.8

70.6

69.5

68.1

+0.3

41+

25.1

20.8

19.1

18.4

17.3

–7.8

8.1

11.1

15.0

15.2

21.8

+13.7

35–40

55.1

58.2

56.7

55.9

54.6

–0.5

41+

36.8

30.7

28.3

28.9

23.6

–13.2

Accommodation,
food, and
beverage
services
1–34
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1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

10.1

11.9

14.6

14.7

17.2

+7.1

35–40

64.6

66.0

60.4

56.9

59.5

–5.1

41+

25.4

22.0

25.0

28.4

23.3

–2.0

Industry/weekly
hours
Other services

Government
services

a

41

1–34

5.0

5.4

4.3

4.3

4.9

–0.1

35–40

86.0

85.7

85.2

84.5

81.7

–4.3

41+

9.0

8.9

10.5

11.2

13.4

+4.4

For employees 25+ years of age.

42

Sheridan, Sunter, and Diverty

Table A2 Distribution of Women’s Weekly Hours Worked,a
by Industry (%)
Industry/weekly
hours

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

1–34

47.4

50.8

48.2

49.1

40.8

–6.7

35–40

30.3

26.9

31.9

34.2

41.7

+11.4

41+

22.3

22.3

19.8

16.8

17.6

–4.8

1–34

19.3

15.0

12.1

18.1

17.3

–2.0

35–40

75.4

79.8

80.9

70.1

67.7

–7.7

41+

5.2

5.2

7.0

11.7

15.0

+9.7

1–34

9.6

10.3

10.9

10.8

10.5

+0.9

35–40

85.6

84.3

83.7

82.8

80.1

–5.4

41+

4.9

5.4

5.4

6.4

9.4

+4.5

1–34

34.6

45.1

45.4

38.9

35.2

+0.6

35–40

60.3

49.3

47.7

55.5

56.8

–3.5

41+

5.1

5.6

6.9

5.6

8.0

+3.0

Agriculture

Other primary

Manufacturing

Construction

Utilities
1–34

11.3

5.0

8.9

7.5

9.2

–2.1

35–40

87.1

94.4

90.7

90.6

84.8

–2.3

41+

1.7

0.6

0.4

2.0

6.1

+4.4%

1–34

28.0

28.8

25.5

23.9

25.0

–3.0

35–40

68.6

66.7

70.3

71.3

68.2

–0.4

41+

3.4

4.4

4.2

4.9

6.9

+3.5

Transportation,
storage, and
communication
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1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

40.7

43.5

43.6

39.0

40.3

–0.5

35–40

54.1

51.7

51.0

54.4

52.3

–1.9

41+

5.2

4.8

5.4

6.5

7.5

+2.3

1–34

21.6

19.7

18.8

19.7

20.6

–0.9

35–40

73.2

75.2

74.5

73.0

72.0

–1.2

41+

5.2

5.2

6.7

7.3

7.3

+2.1

1–34

26.9

26.7

25.1

23.4

22.1

–4.8

35–40

70.8

68.7

68.5

69.0

68.5

–2.3

41+

2.2

4.6

6.4

7.6

9.4

+7.1

1–34

32.0

35.1

32.3

31.9

32.3

+0.2

35–40

56.8

54.8

54.0

53.4

50.1

–6.7

41+

11.1

10.1

13.7

14.7

17.6

+6.5

Industry/weekly
hours
Trade

Finance, insurance,
and real estate

Business services

Educational services

Health and social services
1–34

26.2

33.1

38.3

38.6

39.4

+13.2

35–40

70.3

63.6

58.3

57.3

56.2

–14.1

41+

3.5

3.2

3.4

4.0

4.5

+0.9

39.8

42.6

48.2

41.9

46.1

+6.2

35–40

49.6

48.8

43.2

48.1

44.7

–4.9

41+

10.6

8.6

8.6

10.0

9.2

–1.3

1–34

46.8

44.1

41.6

37.5

38.2

–8.6

35–40

45.8

48.1

47.5

50.9

50.3

+4.5

41+

7.5

7.8

10.9

11.6

11.5

+4.1

Accommodation,
food, and
beverage
services
1–34

Other services

(continued)
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Table A2 (continued)

1976

1980

1985

1989

1995

Percentage
point change
1976–95

1–34

14.7

15.2

16.8

15.2

15.0

+0.3

35–40

83.5

82.7

80.6

81.0

80.7

–2.8

41+

1.8

2.1

2.7

3.8

4.3

+2.5

Industry/weekly
hours
Government services

a

For employees 25+ years of age.
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Trends in Hours of Work
in the United States
Philip L. Rones, Jennifer M. Gardner, and Randy E. Ilg
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor

Efforts to shorten and standardize the length of the workweek were
at the forefront of labor market issues in the first four decades of this
century, culminating in the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938. After long and hard-fought legal and political battles, the act
allowed for a maximum workweek of 44 hours, to decline to 40 hours
in the third year after enactment (Elder and Miller 1979). Although
employers could still demand longer workweeks, hours worked beyond
the legal maximum would require time-and-a-half pay.
While workweek issues have fallen from the fore in recent
decades, they still touch many key labor market topics and trends. For
example, arguably the two most dominant trends in the post–World
War II work world have been the influx of women, particularly mothers, into the job market, and the steady decline in the retirement age.
Women have increased their numbers in the workforce, and they have
also shifted their work schedules toward year-round, full-time employment. In addition, as work activity among older men was declining,
those left working were increasingly likely to work part time.
The key labor issues of the day in the 1990s were most likely
worker displacement and the quality of jobs. These issues, too, have
workweek components. Even as the overall U.S. employment numbers
have risen substantially, millions of jobs have been lost each year to
corporate and government restructuring. A common perception is that
those spared such job loss, particularly those in managerial and professional jobs, have been compelled to work even harder—longer—to
protect their jobs. As for the quality of jobs, new jobs created often are
stereotyped as part-time, low-wage, poor-quality jobs.1
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This chapter examines work-hour trends from two perspectives.
First, trends in the average workweek and changes in the distribution of
hours worked since the mid 1970s are examined. Then, the focus is
expanded to estimate annual work hours. This figure is affected by the
extent to which people work at all and the number of weeks they work
during the year, in addition to the length of the workweek. Lastly, the
appendix provides a discussion of the differences in hours data collected following the redesign of the Current Population Survey (CPS),
which was implemented in January 1994, from those obtained prior to
1994. Because of the effect of those changes on work-hour estimates,
trend data in the chapter are restricted to the period through 1993.2

MEASURING HOURS OF WORK
Estimates of the length of the workweek can be obtained from
workers themselves or from their employers. Employer-based surveys
count the total number of jobs held by workers, so average hours calculated from those data are reported per job, not per worker. Workers, of
course, can work at more than one job. Also, workweek estimates from
employers generally are for hours paid (including paid annual and sick
leave) rather than hours actually worked. Another shortfall of
employer-based surveys for this analysis is that they typically lack
demographic information—such as age, gender, and education—that
are critical to understanding workweek trends. Thus, if the focus is on
workers and their work schedules, employer surveys will not suffice.3
For those reasons, data obtained from individuals will be used in
this analysis. The CPS provides comprehensive and consistent hoursat-work and employment time-series data that can be obtained for
many demographic characteristics.4 Respondents to the survey are
queried on their usual and actual hours at work. Additionally, respondents surveyed in March are asked about their work experiences in the
prior year, including their typical work schedules and the number of
weeks worked. The analysis generally is limited to nonagricultural
wage and salary workers.5
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AVERAGE HOURS AT WORK
In 1995, the average workweek for nonagricultural wage and salary workers was 39.2 hours. That average varies considerably across
worker groups, however. For instance, the average workweek for men
was 42.1 hours compared to 35.8 hours for women, and persons aged
25 to 54 typically work longer than do younger and older workers
(Table 1). In addition, the length of the workweek varies by marital
status. Married men have the longest workweek and, in 1995, worked
an average of eight hours per week more than married women.
Reflecting their younger age, both men and women who were never
married worked the shortest workweek.6
Average hours at work changed little over the period from 1976 to
1993, only increasing by 1.1 hours, on net, to 39.2 hours.7 But during
this period, the age distribution of the U.S. working population
changed substantially and in a way that influenced the length of the
average workweek. By 1993, the baby boomers—those born between
1946 and 1964—all had moved into the central working ages of 25 to
54. Meanwhile, workers in the younger and older age groups, which
include many students and retirees, comprised a declining share of
employment. Workweeks typically are the longest for workers aged 25
to 54, and part-time (and part-year) employment is most common
among younger and older workers. These shifts in the age distribution,
then, would tend to increase the length of the average workweek, all
other things being equal.
To determine the effect of the shifting age distribution of the
employed on the change in the average workweek for men and women,
it is necessary to calculate average hours in 1993 assuming that the age
distribution of those at work had remained unchanged since 1976.8 As
Table 2 shows, after removing the effect of the shifting age distribution,
men had virtually no rise in their average weekly hours (edging up
from 41.0 to 41.2 hours), and women’s average workweeks rose by
only an hour.
The small changes in the length of the workweek, whether on an
age-adjusted or unadjusted basis, reflect (and mask) offsetting
increases and decreases in the hours-at-work distribution. As shown in
Figure 1, between 1976 and 1993, the proportion of nonagricultural
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Table 1 Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Workers at Work and Their
Average Hours, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin,
1995 Averages
Average hours
Total at work
(000)

Total at work

Persons who
usually work
full time

107,656

39.2

43.0

16 to 24 years

17,282

32.6

41.3

25 to 54 years

78,682

41.0

43.3

55 years and over

11,692

36.7

42.3

Men, 16 years and over

57,362

42.1

44.5

16 to 24 years

8,989

34.7

42.3

25 to 54 years

42,124

44.1

44.9

Characteristic
Age and sex
Total

55 years and over

6,250

39.6

43.7

50,294

35.8

40.8

16 to 24 years

8,293

30.4

40.0

25 to 54 years

36,558

37.4

41.0

5,442

33.3

40.3

Women, 16 years and over

55 years and over
Race and Hispanic origin
White, 16 years and over

90,997

39.3

43.2

Men

49,114

42.4

44.8

Women

41,883

35.6

40.9

12,162

38.3

41.2

Men

5,826

40.0

42.3

Women

6,336

36.7

40.1

9,645

38.5

41.5

Men

5,688

40.5

42.4

Women

3,956

35.6

39.9

Black, 16 years and over

Hispanic origin, 16 years and
over
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Table 2 Average Weekly Hours of Work for Men and Women,
1976 and 1993
Average hours

Age-adjusted hours

1976

1993

1993

Men, 16+ years

41.0

42.0

41.2

Women, 16+ years

34.0

36.0

35.0

wage and salary workers who reported that they were at work exactly
40 hours per week declined, while the share working 49 hours or more
rose. (A more detailed discussion of the shift among workers into the
long-hours worked category is presented later in the section “Long
Workweeks.”) The proportions working fewer than 40 hours and 41–
48 hours remained fairly stable.
Age and Sex
Since the changing age distribution affects workweek trends, it is
useful to look at more homogeneous groups of workers over time.
Between 1976 and 1993, the average workweek for 25- to 54-year-old
men and women were both up on net. The increase was much greater
for women, whose average workweek rose by nearly two-and-a-half
hours (Figure 2). During that 17-year period, however, the workweek
fluctuated substantially with the business cycle. Men’s hours were curtailed more severely in conjunction with the downturn of the early
1990s, and, even by 1993, they had not yet regained their prerecession
peak. Adult women, in contrast, experienced only a small dip in their
average workweek, and that series quickly returned to its upward trend.
The slight increase in average hours worked between 1976 and
1993 reflects the greater share of both men and women who worked 49
hours or more per week (Table 3). For men, there was a corresponding
decline in the share who worked exactly 40 hours per week, while
among women the shift into the longer workweek occurred from the
part-time category (1–34 hours) and from the 35- to 39-hour group.
Younger Workers
In contrast to workers aged 25 to 54, the average workweek for
those who are younger edged down, on net, between 1976 and 1993.

50
1976
1985
1989
1993

Percent

40

30

20

10

0
1 to 34

35 to 39

40
Hours

41 to 48

49 or more

50

Figure 1 Distribution of Hours at Work of Nonagricultural Wage and Salary Workers, Annual Averages, Selected
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Figure 2 Average Hours Worked for Wage and Salary Workers in
Nonagricultural Industries, by Sex and Age, Annual Averages,
1976–1993

NOTE: Shaded areas represent recessions.
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Table 3 Percent Distribution of Nonagricultural Wage and Salary
Workers, by Sex, Age, and Hours of Work, Annual Averages,
Selected Years, 1976–1993a
Characteristic

1976

1985

1989

1993

1–34 hours

34.1

35.9

36.7

40.2

35–39 hours

5.1

5.4

5.6

6.2

40 hours

38.5

36.3

35.6

33.0

41–48 hours

11.3

9.9

9.3

8.2

49 hours or more

11.1

12.6

12.8

12.4

1–34 hours

10.4

9.8

9.1

10.7

35–39 hours

4.3

4.2

4.0

4.1

40 hours

48.9

46.6

43.7

42.7

41–48 hours

14.2

13.8

14.2

13.3

49 hours or more

22.2

25.7

29.0

29.2

1–34 hours

18.3

19.1

21.4

23.0

35–39 hours

4.7

5.0

4.9

4.6

40 hours

50.7

46.6

43.5

41.9

41–48 hours

11.5

11.2

10.6

9.9

49 hours or more

14.7

18.1

19.7

20.6

43.3

44.5

46.1

50.5

Men
16 to 24 years

25 to 54 years

55 years and over

Women
16 to 24 years
1–34 hours
35–39 hours

9.8

9.1

8.4

8.1

37.8

34.1

32.8

29.4

41–48 hours

5.9

6.9

6.7

5.9

49 hours or more

3.2

5.3

6.0

6.0

1–34 hours

31.4

28.2

26.1

26.5

35–39 hours

11.6

10.5

9.7

9.4

40 hours

25 to 54 years
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Characteristic
40 hours

1976

1985

1989

1993

43.8

43.5

43.3

42.4

41–48 hours

7.5

8.9

9.9

9.8

49 hours or more

5.7

8.9

11.0

12.0

1–34 hours

38.4

39.4

39.5

40.4

35–39 hours

11.8

11.5

11.4

9.9

40 hours

38.5

37.5

35.3

35.2

41–48 hours

6.5

6.0

6.7

6.5

49 hours or more

4.9

5.6

7.1

7.9

53

55 years and over

a

Detail may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.

In 1976, 16- to 24-year-olds worked an average of 33.6 hours a week
compared to 32.5 hours in 1993. While average hours at work were
higher for young men than for young women (34.2 and 30.8, respectively, in 1993), the cyclical and long-term trends were nearly identical.
The overall decline in hours worked among youth partly reflected
changes in their school enrollment status. As shown in Table 4,
between 1976 and 1993, the proportion of all 16- to 24-year-olds who
were attending school—either high school or college—increased from
45 percent to 50 percent. The rise in school enrollment occurred
among both high school and college-aged youth.9
In addition to rising enrollment rates among the college-age population, more college students were working in 1993 than in 1976—53
versus 45 percent. This rise in employment occurred entirely among
full-time college students, who averaged about 20 hours a week. Thus,
the shift toward shorter workweeks among the young largely reflects
their increased tendencies to be students. However, even among nonstudents, average hours edged down slightly.10
Table 4 School Enrollment of 16- to 24-Year-Olds in the
United States (%)
College
Year

Total

High School

Part time

Full time

1976

45.2

24.9

3.0

17.3

1993

50.0

23.7

4.4

21.9
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Hours distribution data reinforce the contention that the decline
noted in the average workweek among younger workers is due, in part,
to an increase in school activity. The proportion of younger workers
who work part time (1–34 hours per week) has increased since the mid
1970s, while the share of those working 40 hours per week declined.
Older Workers
As with workers aged 25 to 54, men aged 55 and over work an
average of about six hours more per week than their female counterparts. The average workweek for both men and women 55 years and
older changed little between 1976 and 1993, and their averages seem to
have been less affected by the business cycle than were those for other
age groups. For older men in particular, the unchanged average workweek, on net, reflects increases in employment at both ends of the
hours distribution (Table 3). Apparently, a growing share of those still
in their “career jobs” are working very long workweeks, as was the
case for workers aged 25 to 54. At the other end of the hours distribution, work activity among retirees (those receiving pensions) is on the
rise, and these workers tend to work part time.11 In fact, between 1984
and 1993, the proportion of pension recipients who worked rose from
31 to 39 percent.

LONG WORKWEEKS
Who Is Working Longer Workweeks?
It is a simple arithmetic truth that persons who work longer workweeks earn more, on average, at equivalent hourly pay, than those who
work shorter workweeks. For example, persons working 48 hours per
week at $10 per hour would earn $80 more, before taxes, than those
working 40 hours per week at the same hourly rate. In addition, survey
data from the CPS clearly show those with the highest earnings are
quite likely to work very long hours12 (Figure 3). What is not obvious
from mathematical computations and survey data is which comes first:
do the high earnings associated with longer workweeks simply reflect
the greater hours worked, or is there a more basic difference between

Figure 3 Proportion of Full-Time Men in Each Earnings Category Who Work 49 Hours or More Per Week,
1995 Annual Averages

NOTE: Intervals reflect the upper bounds of the earnings categories.
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jobs that demand (or encourage) long workweeks and those that do
not?
Figure 4 shows the share of workers in different occupations who
work 49 hours or more per week in 1985 and 1993. Professionals and
managers are among those most likely to work very long workweeks.
This may reflect the considerable responsibilities associated with many
of these types of jobs, but also the fact that employers often are not
required by law to pay them overtime premiums, as they must do for
most hourly paid workers. Workers in these occupations also are
among the highest paid: professionals earned $682 per week and managers $675 in 1993, compared with the median for all occupations of
$463.13
In contrast, sales and transportation workers also have long workweeks, but they are not, on average, highly paid. In these cases, a large
percent of workers may work 49 hours or more a week due to the direct
effect on earnings—that is, the more they work, the more they earn. For
example, commissioned sales workers clearly have an incentive to work
long workweeks. Indeed, full-time workers employed by motor vehicle
dealerships averaged nearly 47 hours per week in 1995. In contrast,
workers in department stores, where commissions are a less common
form of pay, worked less than 41 hours.14 Likewise, in the transportation industry, both trucking and taxicab services have among the longest workweeks of any industry, averaging more than 47 hours each.
To better understand the link between hours, occupations, and
earnings, data for more specific occupations need to be examined. For
example, even within the occupational groups where the overall share
of workers employed 49 hours or more is small, there may be some
types of jobs in which such schedules are common. Such an analysis,
however, is outside the scope of this overview. The discussion presented here suggests that there are several factors that distinguish occupations with long workweeks, and that these jobs may be intrinsically
different from other types of jobs.
1985–1993 Occupational Shift
Does the increasing share of workers who report that they are at
work for more than 48 hours reflect a shift in employment toward highhour occupations? For both men and women, the share in every major
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Figure 4 Share of Workers on Full-Time Schedules Working 49 Hours
or More Per Week, by Occupation, 1985 and 1993
Annual Averages
Men
Managers
Professionals
Technicians
Sales
Administrative
1985
1993

Service
Skilled blue-collar
Operators
Transportation
Laborers
0

10

20

30

40

50

Percent

Women
Managers
Professionals
Technicians
Sales
Administrative

1985
1993

Service
Skilled blue-collar
Operators
Transportation
Laborers
0

5
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Percent
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40
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occupational group that worked such a schedule increased between
1985 and 199315 (Figure 4). As stated above, the prevalence of long
workweeks varies considerably by occupation. Such schedules are
more highly concentrated in the managerial, professional, sales, and
transportation occupations, and the rate of increase during the 1985–
1993 period was not consistent among all occupations. The following
tabulation shows the distribution of growth in long-workweek employment across the occupational mix effect, the within-occupation shift
effect, and the employment growth effect.16
As Table 5 shows, the number of persons working long work
schedules increased considerably (5.1 million) over the eight-year
period. Nearly half of this gain (2.4 million for both sexes combined)
can be attributed to the overall expansion in employment over the
period—the employment growth effect. The shift into occupations in
which long workweeks are the most prevalent—such as managers, professionals, sales, and transportation—accounted for about 400,000, or
8.1 percent, of the gain for men and women combined. This occupational mix effect, however, was much larger for women than men, 12.7
versus 5.1 percent. The rest of the increase is due to the rise in the
share of long workweeks in every occupation for both men and
women, shown as the within-occupation shift effect.

Table 5 Growth in Employment of Persons Working 49+ Hours per
Week, by Reason
Total
(000)

Men
(000)

Women
(000)

1985

16,787

13,006

3.781

1993

21,909

16.093

5,816

+5,122

+3,087

+2,033

+416

+158

+258

Within-occupational shift effect

+2,341

+1,259

+1,082

Employment growth effect

+2,365

+1,670

+695

Number at work 49 hours or more

1985–1993 change
Occupational mix effect
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NONAGRICULTURAL SELF-EMPLOYED AND
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
Although a growing share of nonagricultural wage and salary
workers have long workweeks, most still have a workweek that is
fairly close to 40 hours. In contrast, the majority of the self-employed
have either very short or very long workweeks (Table 6). The proportion of the self-employed who work at least 49 hours per week declined
between 1976 and 1993—although it is still nearly double that for
nonagricultural wage and salary workers—while the share who worked
part time (1–34 hours per week) rose. In contrast to the trend for men,
who comprise the majority of the self-employed, the proportion of
women who work a longer workweek increased since the mid 1970s,
and the share working 1–34 hours per week declined. As with the selfemployed, agricultural workers are heavily concentrated at both ends
of the hours distribution and their share of workers in the 49+ hours
Table 6 Percent Distribution of Persons at Work, by Class of Worker and
Hours of Work, 1976 and 1993 Annual Averagesa
Hours of work
Class of worker

1–34

35–39

40

41–48

49 or more

24.5

7.3

44.6

10.6

13.0

1976
Nonagricultural
workersb
Wage and salary
Self-employed

27.4

4.4

22.8

9.0

36.4

Agricultural workers

30.7

4.8

14.4

8.2

42.0

Wage and salary

24.0

6.7

40.3

10.6

18.5

Self-employed

31.0

4.9

23.3

7.0

33.9

Agricultural workers

29.3

4.8

22.1

7.6

36.2

1993
Nonagricultural
workersb

a

Detail may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.
unpaid family workers.

b Excludes
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group declined substantially between 1976 and 1993, as the share
working exactly 40 hours rose.

ANNUAL WORK HOURS
We have seen that the change in the average length of the workweek has been quite small since the mid 1970s, although a shift toward
a growing share of workers putting in very long workweeks has been
noteworthy. But rephrasing the question from, “What has been the
trend in the length of the workweek?” to the broader, “What has been
the trend in hours at work over an entire year?” brings in additional
variables that may identify more dramatic shifts. Indeed, data on
annual work hours, rather than the average workweek, most often are
used in intercountry comparisons of work hours. This allows for the
differences in vacation time allowed and used between, say, Germany,
Japan, and the United States to be factored into the work-hours discussion.
Two factors other than the length of the typical workweek can
affect the total amount of time people spend working: the extent to
which people work at all during any particular year and the number of
weeks that people work during the year. In the previous calculation of
average weekly hours, workers are only included when they worked;
they were “out of scope” when they did not work at all; that is, they are
in neither the numerator nor the denominator of an average weekly
hours calculation. Yet we know that changes have taken place in the
amount of time during the year that workers are spending on the job.
Bureau of Labor Statistics analysts recently reported that work activity
is becoming less and less seasonal (more year round), and that finding
is consistent across industries and demographic groups (see Rydzewski, Deming, and Rones 1993). Data collected each March in the
CPS also show that U.S. workers, particularly women, have increasingly been working year round, as shown in Figure 5. Indeed, more
dramatic than any shift toward either full- or part-time work is the trend
toward year-round employment. The following shows the effect of
changes in the share of the population working and the extent of their
work activity during the year on work hours.

Figure 5 Work Schedules of Women Aged 25 to 54, 1976 and 1993 Annual Averages
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The average number of hours the average worker is at work during
the year is calculated using the following formula:
Average
Number at
Average
Number at
annual hours = work in an × weekly hours × 52 weeks ÷ work during
at work
average week
at work
the year

The aggregate number of hours worked during a week is the product of the number of persons at work in an average week (an annual
average) and their average hours at work. That number is then multiplied by 52 weeks to obtain an estimate of the aggregate number of
hours worked during the year. The divisor—the number at work at any
time during the year—was obtained from the “work experience” questions asked each March in the CPS supplement.17 In those questions,
CPS respondents are asked to recall their work activity during the previous calendar year, including the number of weeks in which they
worked and their usual hours. Thus, aggregate hours worked during
the year 1993, for example, obtained from the basic monthly CPS, are
divided by the number of persons who worked at all in 1993 (that number is obtained from the March 1994 survey). This produces an excellent measure of average hours worked for each worker during the year
and a long time series for comparisons. Results for men and women
are shown in Figure 6.
The annual hours estimate rose steadily for women until the late
1980s and has grown more slowly since then. The lack of sensitivity to
the business cycle is somewhat surprising given the fact that women,
like men, are subject to cyclical swings in unemployment, which is a
major determinant of the number of weeks worked during the year.
The hours series for men is higher than that for women both because
men work longer average workweeks and they are more likely to work
year round. Men’s annual hours have risen much less than women’s
and appear to be more sensitive to the business cycle.
As shown in Table 7, working women worked an average of nearly
20 percent more in 1993 than in 1976, adding 233 hours to their average workweeks. But, as shown with the weekly hours data, the age distribution of the working population has changed substantially over this
period; a much smaller share are now in the older and younger ages,
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Figure 6 Average Annual Hours at Work for Men and Women,
1976–1993

NOTE: Shaded areas indicate recessions.

where both workweek length and weeks of work tend to be relatively
low. Adjusting for this age shift reduces modestly the 1976–1993
change. Men’s hours, after age-adjustment, were up 3 percent over the
period; women’s, up 15 percent.18
These calculations still leave one important trend identified earlier
unaccounted for: the change in the likelihood of an individual to work
at all during the year. Men have become less likely to work, largely
due to earlier retirements, expansion of the Social Security disability
program, increased school enrollments, and an increase in wives’
employment. Women, alternatively, have become dramatically more

Table 7 Average Annual Work Hours for Men and Women,
1976 and 1993
Men

Women

1976

Year

1,805

1,293

1993

1,905

1,526

1976–1993 change

+100

+233

Age-adjusted change

+62

+193
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likely to work (Figure 7). Hence, using the population as the denominator in an annual hours calculation, rather than those who worked,
should considerably affect the change in hours between 1976 and 1993.
The population-based estimate duplicates the numerator in the
equation above but uses the civilian noninstitutional population as the
denominator, not those who worked. As shown in Figure 6, the series
for men did not change at all. In fact, the line is flatter than the
employment-based series since men, on average, have become somewhat less likely to work at all over time. The population-based series
for women is at a much lower level than is the employment-based
series. The increases, though, have been quite large, particularly on a
percentage basis. Allocated across the population of women aged 16
and older, each individual worked one-third longer in 1993 than in
1976.
Looking at the more homogeneous (in terms of work schedules)
group of 25- to 54-year-olds has two advantages: it avoids the need to
age-adjust the data, and it eliminates the younger and older workers
from the calculation, the two groups with particularly low annual
hours. For that group, between 1976 and 1993, average hours per
woman per year rose 45 percent, from 888 to 1,290. The average for
men was virtually unchanged at just over 1,900 hours (see note 18).
Figure 7 Employment-Population Ratios for Men and Women, Annual
Averages, 1976–1993
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SUMMARY
This chapter attempted to track the course of working hours in the
United States using the Current Population Survey, a large, representative national sample of households from which comparable data can be
obtained for a long period of time. The survey estimates suggest that
the average length of the workweek for most groups has changed little
since the mid 1970s, although the distribution of work hours has
changed. The most noteworthy difference between the 1970s and the
1990s is in the increase in the share of persons who are working very
long hours—those who are exceeding the old “standard” workweek of
40 hours by more than a full eight-hour day. This increase is pervasive
among occupations, and the long workweek itself seems to be associated with high earnings and certain types of occupations.
More dramatic has been the increase in the work year, a measure
more commonly used to compare different countries (Americans tend
to work more during the year than most Europeans but less than the
Japanese, for example). Women’s increasing likelihood of working at
all and, when they do work, of working year round, has had a noteworthy effect on the number of hours that women work during the course
of the year. In order to analyze trends in either weekly or annual work
hours over an extended period of time, it is important to allow for
changes in the overall measures that occurred solely because of
changes in the age distribution of the population. Alternatively, the
analyst can examine trends for specific population groups separately.

Notes
1. See Ilg (1996) for a discussion of the industries and occupations that experienced
job growth in recent years.
2. This trend analysis ends in 1993 due to the introduction of a redesigned Current
Population Survey (CPS) in January 1994. The new CPS asked different questions to obtain average hours data from the pre-1994 survey, rendering the data
not strictly comparable. See the appendix for a discussion of changes in the CPS
and its effect on work hours. Data for 1995 are presented, however, in the overall
description of between-group differences in work hours.
3. An additional limitation of the Current Employment Statistics survey, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ survey most commonly used for average workweek data, is
that the universe is restricted to private nonsupervisory workers on nonagricul-
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4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
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tural payrolls. The excluded groups—agricultural workers, the self-employed,
and many supervisory and professional workers—tend to have very different levels of work hours than do those who are covered.
The CPS is a monthly survey of 50,000 (at present) households conducted by the
Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Another source of data
on work time comes from time diaries. This approach is discussed in Robinson
and Bostrom (1994).
The restricted group is presented because those excluded—nonagricultural selfemployed and agricultural workers—have very different workweeks. Those differences are discussed later in the chapter. In addition, the workweek decisions
are conceptually very different for the self-employed than they are for “employees,” who must match their own preferences with those of employers.
Marital-status data are for all workers in nonagricultural industries, not just wage
and salary.
In 1995, full-time workers aged 25 to 54 worked an averaged of 44.1 hours a
week, about three hours longer than the average for all workers that age. The
long-term trend in the workweek for full-time workers is similar to that for all
workers; that is, fluctuating with the business.
To “age-adjust” the length of the workweek, first the age distributions of men and
women at work in 1976 were applied to the 1993 employment total for each gender to generate a new 1993 distribution. Aggregate hours then were computed by
multiplying the new employment figures for each age by the average hours
worked in 1993. The aggregate hours for the age groups were then summed individually by sex to get total aggregate hours for men and women. These totals
were then divided by male and female employment in 1993 to obtain an ageadjusted workweek that uses the age distribution of 1976 and the age-specific
hours worked in 1993.
The share of 16- to 24-year-olds who are enrolled in high school appears to have
fallen, according to the tabulation. That is so only because this population group
has shifted substantially toward the college ages over that period. In 1976, 51 percent of 16- to 24-year-olds were teenagers; by 1993, that share was only 43 percent. In fact, the enrollment rate for 16- to 19-year-olds in high school was 48
percent in 1976 compared to 55 percent in 1993.
Hours data for nonstudents were available only for 20- to 24-year olds. In 1979,
their average workweek was 40.4 hours compared to 39.7 hours in 1993.
See Herz (1995) for a discussion of several possible reasons for the increased
work activity of pension recipients.
The data shown are for men but the relationship applies to women as well.
Earnings data presented are for full-time (35 hours or more a week), wage and salary workers. Earnings data are not available for self-employed sales workers or
for those earning commission.
These data are for industries, not occupation; data on hours at work by detailed
occupation are not produced regularly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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15. These dates were selected because the occupational classification system used
prior to the early 1980s was quite different from the one put into place in the CPS
in 1983. Data beyond 1993 were affected by the redesign of the CPS introduced
in January 1994. Each year selected is more than two years after the end of the
prior recession, so estimates of change should not be influenced by the business
cycle. These data do include the self-employed.
16. The employment growth effect is a measure of the change that would have
occurred simply as a result of the overall growth in employment. Thus, it gives
the 49+ group its “fair share” of the overall 1985–1993 growth. The occupational
mix effect is derived by estimating the number of persons who would have worked
49+ hours in 1993 if the occupational mix had been the same as it was in 1985.
The within-occupation shift effect reflects the extent to which the change in 49+
employment over the period are due to the changes in the share in each occupation
who work 49+ hours, as shown in Table 4. It applies the share in each occupation
who worked such schedules in 1985 to the actual occupational employment distribution in 1993.
17. Such an estimate cannot be derived from the basic monthly CPS.
18. The basic CPS data include a break in the population (and employment) series
between 1990 and 1991. Data from 1990 forward have been adjusted to 1990
census estimates, adjusted for the undercount. March work-experience data, however, have not been so revised. Thus, a slight inconsistency exists between the
numerator and denominator in the average annual hours calculation when pre- and
post-1990 data are used. The effect on the data is minimal, particularly when
long-term comparisons such as the 17 years used here are made. See Robert J.
McIntire, “Revisions in Household Survey Data Effective February 1996,”
Employment and Earnings, March 1996, pp. 8–14, for a discussion of the revisions to the population series.
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Appendix: Changes in CPS Questionnaire
Concerning Hours Worked
Current Population Survey (CPS) data for January 1994 and forward are not
strictly comparable with data for earlier years because of the introduction of a
major redesign of the questionnaire and collection methodology. The principal
reasons for the redesign were to obtain more accurate information on the labor
market in general, and to expand the use of computer technology in the data
collection process. Among the questionnaire changes were alterations to the
questions on the number of hours actually worked during the reference week.
The questions were modified to help respondents recall the exact number of
hours they worked on their main jobs in the prior week. This appendix describes the differences in the questions asked to obtain hours-at-work data in
the pre- and post-1994 surveys. In general, the changes emphasized the importance of precision in recalling the prior week’s work activity, but they do not
alter the concept of hours at work.
In an effort to obtain more precise hours-at-work data, beginning in 1994,
respondents to the new CPS are first told that the following questions focus on
the exact number of hours they worked in the prior week. They are then asked
if they lost or took off any hours from their jobs for any reason in the prior
week. If yes, they are queried about the number of hours. Respondents are also
asked if they worked extra hours at their jobs that they do not usually work and,
if so, how many. It is not until these prompts are completed that respondents
are asked how many hours they actually worked at their jobs, and, in addition,
for multiple jobholders, how many hours they actually worked at their other
jobs.
Prior to 1994, the questions pertaining to actual hours were slightly different, as was the ordering of those questions (see questions below). Data on actual hours were obtained by first asking the number of hours worked at all jobs
last week. Then questions were asked about taking time off and working extra
hours. The onus was placed on the interviewer to correct the original answer
of hours worked, if necessary, based on responses to these questions. Also,
nothing in the interview communicated the importance of precision to the respondent. In the pre-1994 survey, hours data were collected for all jobs combined
Comparing pre- and post-1994 data suggests that the implicit recall strategy
associated with the new questionnaire does provide more accurate data on actual hours (see Appendix Table 1). For instance, the proportion of persons who
reported working exactly 40 hours per week—a common, almost reflex, response—declined substantially between 1993 and 1994. In fact, this decrease
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was greater than the cumulative effect of the long-term downward trend between 1973 and 1993. In addition, during the 1973–1993 period, the share of
survey respondents reporting that they worked between 35 and 39 hours or 41
and 48 hours had decreased. In 1994, with the revised questions, this trend was
reversed, indicating that respondents now are giving different, and apparently
more precise, answers to the questions on hours actually worked.
The following questions were used to obtain data on actual hours worked in
the new and old CPS:
New CPS

Old CPS

Lead-in: Now I have some questions
about the exact number of hours you
worked last week.

How many hours did you work last week
at all jobs?

Last week, did you lose or take off any
hours from (work/your main job), for
any reason such as illness, slack work,
vacation, or holiday?

Did you lose any time or take any time off
last week for any reason such as illness,
holiday, or slack work?

(If yes) How many hours did you
take off?

(If yes) How many hours did you take
off?

Last week, did you work any overtime
or extra hours (at your main job) that
you do not usually work?

Did you work any overtime or at more
than one job last week?

(If yes) How many additional hours did
you work?

(If yes) How many extra hours?

So, for last week, how many hours did you
actually work at your (main) job?

Interviewers are instructed to correct
original answer if lost time was not
already deducted or if extra hours were
not included.

(For multiple jobholders) Last week, how
many hours did you actually work at
your other job(s)?
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Table A1 Percent Distribution of Persons at Work, by Sex and Hours of
Work, 1993 and 1994 Annual Averagesa
Characteristic

1993

1994

Difference

1–4

0.4

0.7

0.3

5–14

2.6

2.4

–0.2

15–29

8.1

8.4

0.3

30–34

5.7

6.3

0.6

35–39

4.5

5.3

0.8

40

41.1

37.1

–3.9

41–48

12.1

14.3

2.2

49 or more

25.5

25.5

–0.1

1–4

0.8

1.1

0.4

5–14

5.1

5.4

0.3

15–29

16.5

17.3

0.9

30–34

9.8

10.2

0.4

Men (hours)

Women (hours)

35–39
40
41–48
49 or more
a

9.2

10.2

1.0

39.4

35.1

–4.3

8.8

10.3

1.6

10.5

10.3

–0.3

Detail may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding.
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There is considerable variation in the hours worked and in the
reported devotion to work of persons among advanced Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Americans, the Japanese, Australians, and New Zealanders put in lots of
hours on the job. Relatively many Americans and Canadians report
that they want to work more hours than they do. By contrast, western
Europeans enjoy long vacations and considerable leisure while
employed, and in many European Union countries work sharing is
encouraged as a method for dealing with unemployment. During the
1980s and 1990s the gap between time worked by employed Americans and Canadians and time worked by their western European comrades increased noticeably.
There is also considerable divergence in earnings inequality among
advanced OECD countries, with inequality higher in the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom than in most OECD-Europe countries. During the 1980s and 1990s, moreover, inequality also grew
much more rapidly in the United States, the United Kingdom, and to a
lesser extent Canada than in continental western European countries
(Freeman and Katz 1994).
To what extent, if at all, are these two patterns related? Does high
earnings inequality induce workers to work longer hours and work
harder? Has increased inequality contributed to the rising gap in time
worked between workers in the United States and Canada and those in
Europe? How does the greater work time of Americans affect compar-
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isons of economic performance between the United States and other
OECD countries?
This chapter presents the basic facts about “working hard” in the
United States and Canada relative to other advanced OECD countries.
It sketches out the hypothesis that inequality in outcomes increases
work activity and offers some preliminary evidence from the United
States regarding this hypothesis. The empirical evidence reveals a positive relationship between the hours worked within detailed occupation, industry, and region cells, and the inequality in hourly wages in
those cells is consistent with the hours-inequality hypothesis.

NORTH AMERICANS AS WORKAHOLICS
Hours Worked and Preferences
Table 1 presents estimates of annual hours worked and changes in
annual hours worked in major advanced OECD countries. Column 1
records annual hours worked per employed person as reported by the
OECD. The sample of employees includes part-time as well as fulltime workers. Annual hours are higher in the United States than in the
major European countries, although workers put in many hours in several other countries as well, most notably Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, and Finland. Hours worked by employed Canadians are 3
percent lower than hours worked by employed Americans, but they are
still above the hours worked in most advanced OECD-European countries. Annual hours per employed person does not, however, capture
the full difference in working time among countries because there are
also sizable differences in the ratio of employees to the adult population, due in part to labor force participation decisions and in part to differences in rates of unemployment across countries. In 1994, for
example, the employment/population ratio for 16–64 year olds was
73.2 in the United States, 64.2 in Canada, and 58.2 in OECD-Europe
(OECD 1995). Column 2 of Table 1 records employee/population
ratios for the various countries for which we have annual hours data.
Multiplying the annual hours per employed person by the employment/
population ratios gives the annual hours worked per person of working
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Table 1 Differences in Annual Hours Worked among Advanced
OECD Countries, 1994

Country
United States

Annual hours
Employment
per employee, population ratio
1994
(ages 15–64)

Estimated
change in annual
hours per
Annual hours
employee,
per adult
1970–1999a
(ages 15–64)

1,780

73.2

1,303

–121.5

Canada

1,719b

63.8

1,097

–148.5

United
Kingdom

1,717b

66.5

1,142

–120.8

Norway

1,415

72.7

1,029

–346.0

Sweden

1,544

70.3

1,085

–65.9

Germany

1,578

62.6

988

–389.0

Finland

1,780

60.1

1,070

–204.0

France

1,631

59.0

962

–320.4

Netherlands

1,395

63.7

889

–361.3

Australia

1,882

67.0

1,261

—c

New Zealand

1,843

68.2

1,257

—

1,965d

74.2

1,458

–236.0e

Japan

SOURCE: Column 1, OECD (1995, Table C); column 2, OECD (1995, Table A); column 4, calculated from OECD (1996, Table 3).
a Based on estimates of annual average change in hours from trough to trough over
three time periods, as given in OECD Employment Outlook, 1996. Exact time periods by country as follows: 1) United States, 1970–71; 2) Canada, 1970–92; 3) United
Kingdom, 1971–93; 4) Norway, 1970–92; 5) Sweden, 1972–93; 6) Germany, 1971–
94; 7) Finland, 1971–93; 8) France, 1971–93; 9) Netherlands, 1972–93.
b 1993 data.
c A dash implies that data for these countries were not provided in the OECD table.
d 1992 data.
e Based on change in actual hours per employee (1973–93), as reported in OECD
Labor Force Statistics.
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age in column 3. The differences between the United States and western Europe in hours worked per adult are on the order of 30 percent,
whereas those between Canada and western Europe are relatively modest. To the extent that hours worked per adult are a measure of “working hard,” Americans work harder than Canadians and western
Europeans.
There are two additional pieces of evidence that support the claim
that Americans are more devoted to work than are western Europeans.
In its 1989 World of Work module, the International Social Science Programme (ISSP) survey1 of workers in different countries contained the
following question: Which of the following statements best describes
your feeling about your job? 1) I work only as hard as I have to, 2) I
work hard but not so much that it interferes with the rest of my life, 3) I
make a point of doing the best work I can, even if it interferes with the
rest of my life. Figure 1 compares the proportion of workers who gave
Figure 1 Percentage of Workers Who Work Hard
“Even if It Interferes with the Rest of Their Life”

SOURCE: Bell and Freeman (1995, Table 5.7).
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the third response—working hard even if it interfered with their lives—
among the advanced OECD countries covered by the 1989 survey. The
figure shows that U.S. workers were the most likely to work hard at the
expense of the quality of their lives, followed by persons in other
English-speaking countries. Germans, Norwegians, and Austrians, on
the other hand, were the least likely to sacrifice for their jobs.
The second piece of evidence comes from surveys that ask individuals to choose between working more or fewer hours than they currently do. These questions are a bit tricky, because by specifying the
hypothetical differently, one can readily induce different but valid
responses. We focus on questions that ask people about the desire to
work fewer or more hours at the same rate of pay, as opposed to questions that ask about the desire to work more hours at an overtime rate
or about preferences between increases in pay for the same hours of
work versus the same pay for reductions in hours worked.2
For the United States, data on preferences come from the May
1985 Current Population Survey (CPS) Supplement. The specific
question analyzed is: If you had a choice would you prefer to work: 1)
the same number of hours and earn the same money, 2) fewer hours at
the same rate of pay and earn less money, or 3) more hours at the same
rate of pay and earn more money? For Canada, the June 1985 Canadian Labour Force Survey asked a more detailed and complicated question that also specified that the employees would be paid the same rate,
while at the same time indicating that all other conditions of work
remained the same (see Kahn and Lang 1988). For European countries, the March 1991 European Economy reports results from a European Economic Community (1991) survey that asked the question this
way: Assuming that your present hourly rate remained unchanged,
would you like to work less, as long, or longer? For Japan, the 1992
Employment Status Survey (Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa) asked a question comparable to the May 1985 CPS question.
Table 2 summarizes the results from these diverse surveys. It
shows a striking difference in preferences for more or less work
between Americans and Canadians and western Europeans, and
between Americans and Canadians and the Japanese as well. While in
all countries the majority of people are satisfied with their current
hours at work, the proportion wanting to work more hours than they
currently do is higher for Canadians and Americans than for Europeans
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Table 2 Preferences for More or Fewer Hours of Work

Country

Prefer fewer
Prefer same
Prefer more
hours and
hours and
hours and
more earnings same earnings less earnings

Differences
between
columns
1 and 3

Canada (1985)

35

50

15

20

United States (1985)

27

65

8

19

Japan (1992)

3

68

30

–27

Germany (1989)

4

55

38

–34

United Kingdom (1989)

4

65

30

–26

Europe

9

51

37

–28

SOURCE: Canada—tabulated from data in Kahn and Lang (1988).
United States–May 1985 Current Population Survey, as reported in Bell and Freeman
(1995).
Germany– European Economic Community (1991, Table 2).
United Kingdom–British Social Attitudes Survey.
Europe–European Economic Community (1991, Table 22). Data include Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. In the E.U. study,
U.K. figures are 12 percent for more hours/earnings, 50 percent for the same, and 12
percent for less, giving a difference of –21.

or Japanese, and the proportion who want to work fewer hours is lower
for Americans and Canadians than for Europeans and Japanese. The
differences in preferences among countries are well-summarized by
the final column of Table 2, which shows the differences among countries between the proportions of individuals wanting more and less
work. The fact that North Americans work more hours than Europeans
and at the same time have a greater preference for additional hours
worked than Europeans is particularly noteworthy. By contrast, the
Japanese, who also work many hours, want to work fewer hours than
they currently do and, in preferences if not actual hours worked, more
closely resemble the Europeans.3
In sum, on the basis of all three statistics—hours worked, willingness to sacrifice for work, and desire to work more—Americans appear
to be working harder than Europeans. As in many other statistics, Canada falls somewhere between the United States and Europe, showing
high preferences for additional hours of work in surveys of preferences
but not actually working all that much more than Europeans.
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Changes in Hours over Time
Has the hours difference between North Americans and western
Europeans always existed, or is this a relatively recent phenomenon?
The evidence in column 4 of Table 1 shows that the greater work activity by North Americans developed in the 1970s–1980s. According to
the OECD estimates, in 1970 (adding column 4 to column 1), North
Americans worked fewer hours than Europeans. This finding is not
unique to the OECD data; it is found in other statistics as well. Data
gathered by Maddison (1995) for instance, show a similar pattern in
hours worked per capita from 1950 to 1992. In 1950, Americans
worked 24 percent fewer hours per capita than Germans, 18 percent
fewer per capita than the French, 15 percent fewer than the British, and
8 percent fewer than Italians. By 1973 these differences narrowed
greatly, as Europeans took much of their increased prosperity in leisure. By 1992, Americans worked 6 percent more hours than Germans, 22 percent more than the French, and approximately 12 percent
more than the British or Italians. Between 1950 and 1992, hours
worked per person in the United States was roughly constant, while
hours worked per person in Europe fell by 17 percent (Italy) to 33 percent (France). Data from Japan provided annually by the Japan Productivity Center also show a drop in hours worked per employee of 4
percent from 1980 to 1991 compared to an increase in hours worked
per employee in the United States of 11 percent. The Japan Institute of
Labor (1994–1995) reports a fall in hours actually worked, including
overtime, from 203 hours per month in 1960 to 159 per month in
1993—a 22 percent fall. While most hours series still show that the
Japanese work more hours than Americans, the once-immense hours
gap has diminished greatly. In Japan, the decline in hours is presumably linked in part to changes in national legislation intended to reduce
hours to a 40-hour workweek by 1997 (OECD 1996), and for this reason it will likely continue.
Evidence on the amount of overtime hours worked—for which
covered U.S. workers receive time-and-a-half overtime pay and for
which workers in other countries often receive less premium—also
shows a trend upward in U.S. overtime hours versus Germans and the
Japanese (Figure 2). Whereas in 1994 overtime hours in the United
States were at a post–World War II peak, overtime hours in Germany

78

Bell and Freeman

Figure 2 Trends in Overtime Hours

SOURCE: OECD (1996, Table 3.7).

were much below those in the early 1970s. Overtime hours in Japan
were also considerably lower than in the 1970s, with the most significant overtime hour declines in the last several years. The OECD data
in Figure 2 show Americans with the highest amount of overtime of the
three countries. While data from the Japanese Institute of Labor show
that Japanese workers still put in more overtime than Americans, it also
confirms that the difference in overtime hours has diminished greatly
with the trend downward in overtime hours in Japan.
The fact that North Americans worked more hours than western
Europeans in the 1990s and worked fewer hours than Europeans in the
1970s makes it difficult to explain cross-country differences in work
time in terms of diverse culture or national psychology. The fact that
the increased preferences of North Americans for greater work relative
to Europeans seems to be a recent phenomenon (Bell and Freeman
1995) supports this as well. Instead of focusing on cultural differences,
we direct our attention to differences and changes across countries in
the economic incentives that induce workers to work many hours.
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Hours Worked and GDP Per Capita
How does working hard relate to national income per capita?
From a production function perspective, one might expect additional
employment per adult (more properly, employment per capita) to be
associated with higher GDP per capita—more input means more output. From a labor demand perspective, one might also expect a positive GDP per capita/labor input association: if higher GDP per capita
reflects higher capital per capita, this would produce greater demand
for labor and thus greater employment per capita. But a labor supply
perspective suggests the opposite: falling time worked with higher
income due to the income effect. Indeed, the labor supply–driven story
is the usual one given for the long-term downward trend in hours
worked, and would seem to fit the drop in hours in western Europe
post–World War II.
Figure 3 rejects the notion that either production/demand or supply
side forces dominate the relation between hours worked by employees
Figure 3 Annual Hours Worked per Employee vs. GDP Per Capita,
by Country

SOURCE: Annual hours, OECD (1995, Table C). GDP per capita from U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Statistical Abstract 1995, Table 1374.
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and income per capita (measured in purchasing power parity) among
countries. There are high per capita income countries where employees put in lots of hours, such as the United States and Japan, and low
per capita income countries where employees also work many hours,
such as New Zealand. While Canadians and Norwegians have similar
per capita incomes, they have very different annual hours worked, and
although Germans have a relatively high income per capita, they work
relatively few hours. Indeed the message from Figure 3, if any, is that
an English heritage (save for Japan), not national income per capita,
determines worktime across countries.
The lack of any clear relation between hours worked and GDP per
capita notwithstanding, the wide variation in annual hours worked per
adult among advanced OECD countries (Table 1, column 2) suggests
that GDP per capita, unadjusted for differences in work time among
countries, may be a seriously misleading indicator of national productivity and well-being in cross-country comparisons. On the productivity side, GDP per capita will understate the productivity of labor in
countries where adults work fewer hours and overstate it in countries
where adults work more hours. GDP per working hour arguably offers
a better measure of productivity (Freeman 1995), although it is by no
means perfect.4 Measured by GDP per hour worked as opposed to
GDP per capita, the sizable lead that the United States has in national
productivity diminishes greatly. In GDP per capita, for instance, in
1993 the United States had a 31 percent advantage over Germany. In
GDP per hours worked, by contrast, the United States and Germany
had virtually identical productivity (Figure 4). But since Americans
are working more hours than employees in these countries, we are
potentially further down the marginal product of labor curve and thus
are probably still more productive. Without measures of capital and
other input, it is not possible to go much beyond the basic statement
that the United States isn’t as far ahead of others as initially appears to
be the case.
On the welfare side, fewer hours worked by the employed implies
greater leisure, which presumably adds to a worker’s utility. Similarly,
persons who choose not to participate in the workplace produce valuable goods and services at home and/or enjoy greater leisure. The nonwork hours of the unemployed, by contrast, is more difficult to assess:
with good benefit programs and high reservation wages, one cannot

SOURCE: Calculated as described in the text with hours per adult from Table 1; GDP per capita in purchasing power parity units from
the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1995, Table 1374); adults per capita from OECD, Historical Statistics (1992, Table 2.1). Adjusted GDP
per capita assumes valuation of Leisure = GDP/Hours Worked in U.S.
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Figure 4 GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Hours, and GDP Adjusted for Leisure
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value unemployed hours at zero, but evidence that the unemployed are
less “happy” than others (Clark and Oswald 1994) clearly implies that
their time should be given a lower valuation than that of others. In any
case, standard neoclassical analysis suggests that adults in countries
with fewer hours worked will be better off relative to those in countries
with more hours worked at the same level of GDP per capita.
In Figure 4, we pursue this logic by adjusting GDP per capita
(measured in purchasing power parity units) for differences in hours
worked per adult among countries. We take U.S. GDP per capita and
hours worked per adult as the numeraire and estimate a leisure-augmented GDP per capita for other countries (x), based on their hours
worked versus those in the United States using the following formula:
(Aug. gdp/cap)x = gdp/capx + (leisure hrsx(per adult)
– leisure hrsus(per adult) )
× (adults per capitax)(valuation of leisure)
The difficult component of the equation is the value attached to the
greater leisure of adults in other countries versus the United States.
One possible valuation is to set the value of leisure at GDP per hour
worked in a country, and in this case the equation simplifies nicely to:
(Aug. gdp/cap)x = gdp/capx [1 + (workhrsus – workhrsx)/workhrsx]
Another alternative is to value leisure in country x at GDP per hours
worked in the United States, giving us a more conservative estimate of
augmented GDP per capital, which takes U.S. work hours as the base.
This valuation simplifies to
(Aug. gdp/cap)x = gdp/capx [1 + (workhrsus – workhrsx)/workhrsus]
In Figure 4 we report the results of the more conservative calculation.
We take GDP/capita in purchasing power parity units from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1995, Table 1374). We estimate the additional
leisure that adults in country A have versus the United States by taking
the difference between hours worked per 15- to 64-year-old in the
United States and hours worked per 15- to 64-year-old in country X
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from Table 1 of this chapter. We obtained values for adults/capita from
OECD Historical Statistics (1992), table 2.1.
Even with this conservative estimate of the value of leisure, our leisure augmented GDP per capita substantially compresses the position
of the United States as the top country in the OECD league tables and
considerably lowers the standing of Japan. More sophisticated analysis, valuing the nonwork hours of different people differently, would
presumably produce somewhat different estimates but in the same
direction, reducing the position of the North American hard-working
countries. Because we work so hard, standard GDP per capita country
comparisons indicate that we aren’t as well off as our European compatriots.
Factors in Employee Work Time
What factors underlie the gap in hours worked or its complement,
hours of leisure per employee, among advanced OECD countries?
The gap in hours worked and thus in hours of leisure per employee
between the United States/Canada and western Europe may be due to
the potential contribution of three factors, namely, differences in the
proportion of workers who are part-time, differences in weeks of vacation (and holiday to a much lesser extent) time, and differences in
hours worked per week by full-time workers.
Table 3 records the proportion of workers in various countries who
are part-time. Even though European labor markets are less flexible
along some dimensions than North American labor markets, the proportion of jobs held by part-timers is higher in many European countries than in the United States, although it is lower in both Germany
and France than in the United States. Indeed, part-time working stands
out as the sole major form of nonstandard working that has shown a
substantial increase since 1970 in the majority of European OECD
countries (OECD 1996).
Given reasonable estimates of the difference in hours worked
between part-time and full-time workers, however, it is difficult to
explain much of the hours gap among employees between the United
States and other countries in terms of part-time work, even for the
European countries with very high part-time rates. Consider, for example, the case of the Netherlands, where 35 percent of workers are part-
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Table 3 The Role of Part-Time Work in Hours Worked in Advanced
OECD Countries, 1994
Change attributable to

Country

Share of
part-time
workers
(%)

Change
Overall yearly in share of
part-time
change in
workers
work
(%)
(hrs.)

Change
in work of
full-timers
(hrs.)

Change
in work of
part-timers
(hrs.)

United States

18.9

—a

—

—

—

Canada

17.0

—

—

—

—

Belgium

12.8

–7.5

–4.9

–2.5

0.2

Denmark

23.3

–6.6

1.4

–7.1

–0.9

Italy

6.2

–3.7

–0.9

–3.0

0.4

United
Kingdom

23.8

–1.5

–0.5

3.8

–0.5

Norway

26.5

—

—

—

—

Sweden

24.9

—

—

—

—

Germany

15.1

–10.9

–3.9

6–.1

–0.9

Finland

23.3

—

—

—

—

France

14.9

–4.1

–4.4

0.4

0.7

Netherlands

35.0

–6.6

–11.3

0.0

3.2

Australia

24.4

—

—

—

—

New Zealand

21.6

—

—

—

—

Japan

21.4

—

—

—

—

SOURCE: Column 1, OECD (1995, Table E; 1993 for Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Denmark; 1992 for Japan). Columns 2–5, OECD (1996, Table 3.2).
a A dash implies that data for these countries were not provided in the OECD table.

time. The hours gap among employees in Table 1 between the United
States and the Netherlands is 485 hours. Assume that the hours worked
by part-timers are 60 percent of those worked by full-timers. Let dP be
the difference between the proportion of Dutch and American workers
who are part-time; according to Table 3, this is 16 percentage points
(35–19 percent). Then, if the Dutch had the same proportion of parttime workers as Americans, their average hours worked would increase
by 0.4/[1 – 0.4 (0.35)] dP, or by 7.4 percent.5 This would bring Dutch
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hours to 1,498, closing the hours gap by 103 hours, or 21 percent. For
the other countries, the effect of increasing the part-time proportions to
U.S. levels would be markedly smaller, while for Germany and France,
the calculation works in the opposite direction: the low levels of parttime work imply that the adjustment would increase the difference in
hours worked. The vast bulk of the difference in annual hours worked
between North Americans and Europeans is evidently attributable to
differences in the hours of full-time workers.
While part-time work cannot explain much of the U.S.–Europe
hours gap, the increase in part-time work does help explain the 1980s–
1990s fall in hours worked among European countries. Column 2 of
Table 3 records the overall average yearly change in annual hours
worked in European economies from 1983 to 1993 (with slight variation among countries due to differences in the data). Columns 3–5
decompose that change into the part due to changes in the share of parttimers in employment and in the hours worked of full-time and parttime workers. There is wide variation in the decomposition. In France
all of the 1983–1993 drop in hours is due to an increased share of parttimers. In Germany, by contrast, the bulk of the decline in annual
hours is due to falling hours of full-time workers. In the Netherlands,
the increase in part-timers “overexplains” the fall in hours; the compensating factor is an increase in the hours of part-timers. In the
United Kingdom, the hours worked by full-time employees works in
the opposite direction to the change in part-timers. Additional data for
other European countries also show considerable variation in the
importance of part-time work to changes in annual hours.
If differences in the pattern of part-time work among countries do
not explain the bulk of the U.S.–European work hours differences,
what does? Table 4 reverts back to this issue by considering the contribution of differences in weekly hours and vacation/holiday time in
explaining the hours of full-time workers. The data in Table 4 relate to
full-time employees in manufacturing because that is the only sector
for which we have readily available internationally comparable data.
However, scattered information for workers in other sectors (for
instance, from the Union Bank of Switzerland study of prices and earnings around the globe) tells a similar story. Indeed, because many
countries legislate vacation time or determine it through national col-
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lective bargaining, differences among sectors within a country tend to
be modest.
Column 1 of Table 4 gives the annual hours worked of full-time
manufacturing workers in the various countries. Column 2 of the table
records the amount of vacation and holiday time in each country measured in five-day weeks. Column 3 gives standard hours per working
week and is measured exclusive of overtime hours. Note that there are
substantial differences in vacation and holiday time, due almost
entirely to vacations—in the United States the typical worker has a 2.4
week vacation compared to 5.1 weeks for the typical European. Hours
worked per week differ much less, with Germany and Norway having
the lowest scheduled hours.
Column 4 calculates the difference in annual hours worked
between each of the countries and the United States. The differences
are large: the 261-hour difference in annual hours of full-time workers
in manufacturing between the United States and Germany is 6.5 full
Table 4 The Contribution of Vacation/Holidays and Weekly Hours
to Differences in Annual Hours Worked per Full-Time
Employees in Manufacturing

Country

Vacation/
holiday
Annual
(5-day Work per
work (hr.) weeks) week (hr.)

Differences U.S.A. (hr.)

Overall

Due to
vacation/
holidays

Due to
hours

United States

1,904

4.6

40.0

France

1,763

7.0

39.0

141

94

48

Germany

1,643

8.5

37.6

261

147

114

Italy

1,764

8.1

40.0

140

140

0

Netherlands

1,709

8.3

38.9

195

144

52

Norway

1,718

6.4

37.5

186

68

119

Sweden

1,784

7.6

40.0

120

120

0

United
Kingdom

1,769

6.6

38.8

135

78

57

Europe average
(unweighted)

1,736

7.5

38.8

168

113

57

SOURCE: Tabulated from Bell and Freeman (1995, Table 5.2), using data from the
Federation of German Employer’s Association.
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weeks of work, and the 120-hour difference between the United States
and Sweden is 3 full weeks of work. Column 5 gives our estimate of
the contribution of vacation and holiday time to the difference in
annual hours between the United States and other countries. Column 6
gives our estimate of the contribution of hours worked per week to the
difference in annual hours between the United States and other countries. In both of these calculations we take the United States as the
base and calculate the annual hours worked in other countries as if they
had U.S. vacation and holiday time, or as if they had U.S. weekly
hours.
The numbers in columns 5 and 6 show that much of the observed
difference in annual hours worked between the United States and other
countries is attributable to the low vacation and holiday time in the
United States. With the sole exception of Norway, the annual hours
difference due to differences in vacation and holiday time are larger
than the differences due to hours worked. In the case of Italy and Sweden, where scheduled hours are the same as in the United States, all of
the difference is due to vacation and holiday time. In Germany and
Norway both vacation and holiday time and hours worked per week
contribute substantially to the annual hours gap with the United States.
For the other countries, the differences in vacation and holiday time
dominate the observed difference between U.S. annual hours and the
country’s annual hours.
The final line in Table 4 presents a crude summary of the factors
underlying country work hour differences. It gives unweighted averages of annual hours, vacation and holiday time, and hours worked for
the European countries covered in the table. It also shows the contribution of vacation and holiday time and hours worked to the difference
between the average annual hours and hours in the United States.
Approximately two-thirds of the gap between annual hours of full-time
workers is attributable to differences in vacations and holidays and
one-third to differences in hours per week.
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WHY WORK SO HARD?
Standard labor supply analyses link individual work hour decisions
to wages and nonlabor income. In standard analysis, changes in market wages have an ambiguous effect on work time or effort because
these changes have both an income and substitution effect typically
illustrated in textbooks with an indifference curve diagram. Only in
the case of the pure substitution effect can responses to changes in
wages be signed, holding income/utility fixed, wage changes should
induce individuals to substitute hours in the same direction as the
change in wages. Nonlabor income has an unambiguous effect on
work hours, with increases in income reducing time worked if leisure is
a normal good. Changes in nonmarket productivity or wages will also
have an unambiguous effect on time worked in this model, since higher
nonmarket opportunities increase total income and induce substitution
of work time to nonmarket time. Note that in standard labor supply
presentations, inequality of earnings opportunities does not enter the
supply decision in any obvious way. Instead, the standard model
focuses on the effect of a change in individual wages without considering changes in the distribution of wage opportunities in the market.
In marked contrast, analyses of labor supply concerned with
designing contracts to motivate workers place great stress on the shape
of the opportunities frontier facing workers and thus on the distribution
of opportunities. Piece rate or incentive pay schemes link rewards to
effort measured in terms of output. Tournament pay systems link
rewards to relative effort. In linking hours worked to the dispersion of
opportunities in the relevant market, our analysis of differences in
hours worked across countries or among persons in different markets
within a country builds on the insights from these types of models.
Consider, for example, two workers, each of whom faces a differently shaped earnings opportunities set due to differences in the distribution of pay in the labor market, differences in job security
provisions, or differences in unemployment insurance or other safety
net provisions. Hans works in Germany, where pay differences among
firms or within a firm among workers are relatively modest, where
there is considerable job security, and where unemployment benefits in
any event are high and relatively long-lived. Hank works in the United
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States, where there are large pay differences among firms or within a
firm among workers, where employment at-will produces a high
degree of job insecurity, and where unemployment benefits are more
modest and relatively short-lived. Who is more likely to work more
hours and put in more effort on his current job? If Hans doesn’t work
that hard he doesn’t lose all that much, and if he works hard he doesn’t
gain all that much either. But if Hank doesn’t work hard he can lose his
job and suffer painful unemployment or a sizable fall in pay at a new
job. On the other hand, if he works hard, Hank can rise in the highly
unequal pay distribution and make much more money.
Expressed differently, if the percentile position of a worker in the
earnings distribution in his market (either through the firm that
employs him, promotions within that firm, or pay within a job grade in
that firm) depends on his hours worked/work effort, greater inequality
in pay will induce greater work effort. For U.S.–Europe contrasts, our
hypothesis can be decomposed into three steps:
1) For an incremental hour of work/effort, employees improve themselves in the relevant earnings distribution commensurately in
terms of percentile position in the United States and Europe (if
U.S. workers’ earnings rise more,6 this simply augments our
story).
2) Any given change in the distribution of earnings translates into a
larger difference in earnings in distributions with greater dispersion of pay, and therefore American absolute earnings are more
dependent on percentile position than European absolute earnings.
3) Individuals respond to differences in the return to hours/effort
with greater hours/effort.
Expressed somewhat differently, the hours-inequality argument is
that a mean-preserving spread of wages raises effort/hours. The correct incentive variable in a labor supply equation is not the current
wage (as in many labor supply analyses), but the incremental change in
the lifetime-expected stream of income due to an increment in effort/
hours today—the derivative in lifetime income streams with respect to
an additional hour/effort at work. Because we believe that this derivative is positively affected by pay inequality, we expect higher inequal-
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ity to be associated with greater hours/effort. To the extent that the
level of the wage an individual receives affects the percentile position
and therefore the expected return to hours/effort, wage levels matter as
well.
Empirical Evidence
Is pay inequality, in fact, related to hours worked?
Bell and Freeman (1995) showed a positive rank correlation
between the variance of ln (earnings) and mean weekly hours among
full-time workers across nine countries in the 1989 ISSP survey, which
is suggestive of just such a relation. Specifically, using data on earnings and hours worked from nine countries including the United States,
Germany, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Ireland,
Northern Ireland, and Norway, the correlation analysis performed by
Bell and Freeman (1995) showed a strong association between the
hours-worked ranking of a country and the variation in ln earnings
ranking in that country, but no significant association between the
hours-worked ranking and the mean-earnings ranking, as might follow
from standard labor supply analysis.
Using data from the May 1985, 1989, and 1991 CPSs, we build on
evidence of within-cell variation among occupations, industries, and
regions in hours worked and test the role of wage variation in explaining these hours patterns.
Specifically, we grouped workers into categories of noncompeting
markets by detailed industry, detailed occupation, detailed industryoccupation, detailed industry-region, and detailed occupation-region as
defined within the CPS. The rationale for this decomposition is to
arrive at labor market cells that reasonably contain the distribution of
wages relating to an individual worker’s future opportunities. Exploiting the fact of significant hours differences across cells, we attempt to
explore the role of differences in the derivative of lifetime opportunities with respect to hours/effort in explaining the hours patterns.
Absent such measures, we estimate the incentive for workers to put in
more hours/effort by the dispersion of pay in the job market in which
they work.
Throughout the bulk of our analysis, we concentrate on full-time,
private nonagricultural workers (working 35+ hours).7 Using the two-
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digit categorizations of industry and occupation in the CPS and limiting the data to private nonagricultural workers gave us 42 potential
two-digit industries and 41 potential two-digit occupation cells to use
for our calculations. The hours figures used in this analysis are “usual
hours worked per week,” as reported in the CPS. In calculating the
hourly earnings of nonhourly workers, we divided usual weekly earnings by usual hours worked. The hourly earnings of hourly workers are
self-reported in the CPS.
For each detailed industry and/or occupation-region cell, we calculated four statistics:
1) the mean hours worked in the relevant cell,
2) the mean ln (hourly earnings),
3) the standard deviation in ln (hourly earnings), and
4) the 90/10 percentile ln earnings spread of full-time workers.
Appendix Table A1 shows the calculated statistics of mean hours, pay,
and inequality in pay by industry for each year. Appendix Table A2
shows the resultant estimates by occupation for each year. We note sizable variation in mean hours worked across both industry and occupation in these tables.
Table 5 summarizes the basic relationship in these data in terms of
the correlation coefficients between hours worked and the level and
dispersion of pay across the relevant cells. In each of the three years
analyzed, we obtain a positive and in most cases significant correlation
between hours worked and the dispersion in hourly earnings, measured
by either the standard deviation or the 90/10 percentile spread in ln
(hourly wages). The strong positive relationship between hours
worked and wage variability is more robust than the cross-section relation between hours worked and the level of pay—work hours are
higher in higher paid occupations but lower in higher paid industries in
two of the three years.
How robust is the empirical relation between inequality of pay and
time worked? As shown in Table 5, changes in the measure of inequality of pay do not noticeably affect the relationship nor do changes in
the cell categories.8 However, in order to provide a further check on
the basic relationship, we regressed hours worked by an individual in
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Table 5 The Correlation between Hours Worked and the Level
of Variance of Wages, by Detailed Industry, Occupation,
and Region Cells as Indicateda
Cell category

Mean ln (hourly Std. ln (hourly
earnings)
earnings)

90–10 spread

May 1985 CPS Data
Detailed industry n=41

0.200

0.111

Detailed occupation n=42

0.380**b

0.399**

0.411**

Detailed industry—occupation
n=721

0.105**

0.061

0.072

–0.249**

0.096

0.166**

0.179**

0.328**

0.346**

Detailed industry
n=42

0.240

0.118

0.035

Detailed occupation
n=43

0.425**

0.457**

0.285

Detailed industry—occupation
n=829

0.214**

0.082**

0.000

Detailed industry—region
n=164

0.145**

0.240**

0.194**

Detailed occupation—region
n=166

0.293**

0.224**

0.261**

0.225

0.239

Detailed industry—region
n=160
Detailed occupation—region
n=161

–0.220

May 1989 CPS Data

May 1991 CPS Data
Detailed industry
n=42
Detailed occupation
n=42

0.249

0.591**

0.486**

Detailed industry—occupation
n=866

0.158**

0.070**

0.070**

0.080

0.143

0.541**

0.266**

Detailed industry—region
n=167
Detailed occupation—region
n=164
a
b

–0.120

–0.199**
0.178**

For private nonagricultural workers, 35+ hours.
** Indicates statistical significance at greater than 0.05% level.
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the 1991 May CPS sample on a set of measures of personal characteristics, family income, and the wage, together with our measures of market inequality: the standard deviation of ln (hourly earnings) in an
occupation-industry cell; the standard deviation of ln (hourly earnings)
in an occupation cell; and the standard deviation of ln (hourly earnings)
in an industry cell. Table 6 records the results of these calculations.
The results are clear: all of the measures of inequality are estimated to
have a positive effect on hours worked. Since (as is common in crosssection calculations like these) family income obtains a positive coefficient while the hourly wage has a negative coefficient in the hours
regression, we would not interpret the equation as a labor supply relation, but rather as a check on the robustness of the inequality-time
worked correlation that we argue is a more appropriate measure of the
incentive to work hard than standard wage measures.
While we regard the results from Table 5 and 6 as supportive of the
hours-inequality hypothesis, we note that this result is sensitive to one
change in specification, namely, the inclusion of part-time workers in
the sample. With part-timers included, the significant positive correlation between inequality of pay and hours worked disappears. Among
industries, the correlation became negative in two of our three years
whereas among occupations it remains positive but insignificant. One
reason for this pattern is that there is considerable measurement error
in the pay and possibly hours of part-timers that produces a large standard deviation in pay. Part-time work is associated with spurious inequality in pay, and, by definition, with fewer hours worked in a cell.
This will bias the correlation of inequality to hours downward. Appendix Table A3 shows, however, that even with this bias, excluding parttimers who report working less than 10 hours per week, we obtain
regression results with part-timers that are weaker than those in Table 6
but still support the basic hours-inequality hypothesis.
The hours-inequality hypothesis would, of course, be strengthened
by evidence from other countries that workers respond to the incentives
brought about by greater pay inequality by changing their actual work
hours, as well as evidence that pay inequality affects desired work
hours. While we lack detailed household data from other countries, the
1989 ISSP data allow us to evaluate worker preferences across countries. Ideally, we would want to analyze individual responses to two
types of questions: how important individuals believed hours/effort to
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Table 6 Hours Regressions, May 1991 CPSa
Dependent variable: ln (usual hours worked per week)
Independent variables
ln (hourly wage)

0.013
(0.003)

–0.020
(0.003)

–0.007
(0.003)

–0.020
(0.003)

–0.019
(0.003)

–0.016
(0.003)

–0.009
(0.003)

–0.014
(0.003)

–0.011
(0.003)

–0.007
(0.003)

ln (family income)

0.011
(0.002)

0.082
(0.002)

0.010
(0.002)

0.008
(0.002)

0.008
(0.002)

—

0.009
( 0.002)

0.009
(0.002)

0.009
(0.002)

—

0.159
(0.013)

0.323
(0.014)

0.103
(0.014)

0.020
(0.015)

—

0.019
(0.015)

—

—

—

—

Std. dev. If ln (hourly
wage) (occ. cell)c

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.402
(0.021)

0.326
(0.021)

0.327
(0.023)

0.333
(0.022)

Marriage dummy

—

0.011
(0.003)

0.017
(0.003)

0.012
(0.003)

0.011
(0.003)

0.012
(0.003)

—

0.015
(0.003)

0.015
(0.003)

0.015
(0.003)

Female dummy

—

–0.051
(0.003)

–0.052
(0.003)

–0.049
(0.003)

–0.049
(0.003)

–0.048
(0.003)

—

–0.056
(0.003)

–0.051
(0.003)

–0.050
(0.003)

Less than high school

—

–0.032
(0.008)

–0.014
(0.008)

–0.005
(0.008)

–0.007
(0.007)

–0.007
(0.004)

—

–0.013
(0.007)

–0.014
(0.007)

–0.015
(0.007)

Some high school

—

–0.010
(0.007)

–0.011
(0.007)

–0.010
(0.007)

–0.010
(0.007)

–0.011
(0.006)

—

–0.012
(0.007)

–0.011
(0.007)

–0.013
(0.006)

Some college

—

0.002
(0.005)

0.005
(0.005)

0.003
(0.005)

0.003
(0.005)

0.004
(0.005)

—

0.001
(0.005)

0.003
(0.005)

0.004
(0.005)

Std. dev. of ln (hourly
wage) (ind. occ.
cell)b

College graduate

—

0.026
(0.004)

0.034
(0.004)

0.028
(0.004)

0.027
(0.004)

0.027
(0.004)

—

0.026
(0.004)

0.029
(0.005)

0.029
(0.004)

College plus

—

0.053
(0.006)

0.071
(0.006)

0.056
(0.006)

0.055
(0.006)

0.053
(0.006)

—

0.054
(0.005)

0.061
(0.006)

0.059
(0.005)

Union dummy

—

–0.012
(0.004)

–0.023
(0.004)

–0.015
(0.004)

–0.015
(0.004)

–0.017
(0.004)

—

–0.016
(0.004)

–0.020
(0.004)

–0.022
(0.004)

Region dummy

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industryd

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

dummy

Occupationd

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

R2

dummy

0.0287

0.139

0.110

0.150

0.151

0.147

0.050

0.103

0.125

0.122

N

8,615

8,615

8,615

8,615

8,820

9,926

8,820

8,820

8,820

9,445

a

For private, nonagricultural workers, 35+ hours. Standard errors are in parentheses.
deviation in ln (hourly wage) in detailed industry/occupation cell.
c Standard deviation in ln (hourly wage) in detailed occupation cell.
d Detailed occupation and industry dummy variables.
b Standard
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be in determining pay/promotion/status within their work, and an individual’s current hours and desired hours of work.
The 1989 ISSP data offer some valuable insight in this regard.
Workers were asked to comment on “how important the quality of their
work” was in determining their pay. An individual had the choice to
respond in one of three ways: very important, somewhat important, or
not very important. To the extent that the quality of an individual’s
work reflects work effort or hours, as it reasonably might, our theory
would predict that individuals who respond that quality is extremely
important would work more hours. As Figure 5A makes clear, we find
precisely this relationship in the data for all countries. Figure 5B
cross-tabulates responses to this question and to the question on how
hard an individual works. Note that individuals who believe quality is
extremely important in determining pay are more likely to “work hard
even if it interferes with the rest of their lives” than are workers who
believe quality to be relatively unimportant. Once again, with the
exception of Austria, these results are uniformly true among countries
in the sample. In sum, evidence from the ISSP offers additional support to the hours-inequality hypothesis with respect both to actual and
desired hours of work, and suggests that workers in other countries
respond similarly to workers in the United States in their hours preferences.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has documented the fact that Americans, and to a
lesser extent Canadians, work hard, putting in more hours—and wanting to put in even more—than employees in many other advanced
countries. It has shown that taking account of differences in the
amount of time worked across countries alters the position of the
United States in standard comparisons of GDP per capita. It has presented calculations of the relationship between inequality of pay and
hours worked within U.S. occupation and industry job markets that
suggest inequality of pay contributes to hours worked. In sum, in the
United States we work hard because we face a good “carrot” for putting out time and effort, and because we also face a substantial “stick”
if we do not.
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Figure 5A Average Weekly Hours and Feelings about Importance of
Work Quality for Pay

Figure 5B Workaholicsa and Feelings about Importance of Work Quality
for Pay

SOURCE: ISSP 1989.
a Workers who work hard even if it interferes with the rest of their lives.
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Notes
1. The ISSP is a program of cross-national collaboration carried out with research
institutes that conduct annual surveys of social attitudes and values. The virtue of
the survey is that it seeks to ask similar questions in identical form in the participating nations.
2. In the ISSP there is a question about preferred hours of work that asks: Think of
the number of hours you work and the money you earn on your main job, including overtime. Bell and Freeman (1995) analyze the responses to this question. It
shows that Americans are more likely to want more hours and more pay than
Europeans, but by much smaller amounts than are shown by questions that
exclude overtime. The European Economic Community has asked workers about
their preferences between increases in pay (for all hours of work) and reductions
in hours worked that would maintain their real income in a collective bargaining
session. The responses show that people prefer increases in pay, consistent with
the hypothesis that most workers are in equilibrium in their choices about current
hours of work.
3. Preferences for hours worked appears to be very closely linked to age in Japan,
according to various work hour surveys (see Public Opinion Survey on Working
Hours and Five-Day Workweek, for example), with younger Japanese disproportionately predisposed to shorter working hours than their more senior colleagues.
4. The problem is that with the same capital stock, fewer hours worked (due, say, to
unemployment) implies higher labor productivity. Thus, Spain will have a relatively high productivity when employment falls—hardly an indicator of a good
economic performance. All partial economic indicators are potentially misleading.
5. Let H = annual hours; F = hours of full-time workers; and p = proportion of workers who are part-time in the given country. Assume part-timers work 0.6F hours.
Then H = (1 – p)F + 0.6pF = (1 – 0.4p)F. A change in p thus changes H by
0.4Fdp. Dividing by H to get percentage changes in annual hours, we get DH/H =
0.4/(1 – 0.4p)dp.
6. Data from the 1989 ISSP suggest that at least with respect to perceptions, this
may be true. U.S. workers (87 percent) are far more likely to indicate that “the
quality of their work is important in determining their pay” than are German
workers (47 percent).
7. There are two compelling reasons for concentrating our empirical analysis on
full-time private nonagricultural workers. First, the theory that we build on to
explain the wage-inequality link is based on a significant amount of future job
attachment that is less likely to be an important component of the marginal decisions of part-time workers. Second, measurement error problems are likely to be
exacerbated among workers reporting very low numbers of usual weekly hours.
8. Small numbers of observations in individual cells imply that estimates are sensitive
to extreme values of hours or wages (either true or measured with error). Correlation estimates by major industry-occupation cells produced a qualitatively similar,
although less strong relationship between hours worked and wage variation.
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Table A1 Mean Weekly Hours and Wages in Nonagricultural Industry,
Full-Time Workers Onlya
Weekly
hoursb

Std. dev. ln
(hours)

Hourly
wages

Std. dev. ln
(hourly
wage)

Mining

47.1

0.217

13.87

0.526

Transportation

45.1

0.180

10.71

0.484

Private household services

44.8

0.245

3.56

0.596

Petroleum and coal

44.6

0.134

12.64

0.300

Industry

Wholesale trade

44.1

0.140

11.10

0.487

Other professional services

43.8

0.170

12.75

0.623

Non-electrical machinery

43.5

0.122

12.71

0.467

Rubber and plastics

43.2

0.130

9.47

0.439

Repair service

43.2

0.140

8.75

0.436

Tobacco manufacturers

43.0

0.166

16.80

0.593

Motor vehicles and equipment

42.8

0.120

12.86

0.434

Food and kindred products

42.6

0.130

9.26

0.480

Business services

42.6

0.133

10.85

0.574

Stone, clay, and glass

42.6

0.097

11.40

0.410

Insurance and real estate

42.5

0.136

11.19

0.510

Fabricated metal

42.5

0.104

10.76

0.420

Chemicals and allied products

42.5

0.110

15.32

0.491

Education services

42.4

0.143

10.51

0.541

Electrical machinery

42.4

0.111

12.85

0.513

Retail trade

42.3

0.136

7.73

0.504

Leather and leather products

42.3

0.112

8.62

0.539

Entertainment and rec. services

42.3

0.136

8.61

0.518

Toys, amusements, and sporting

42.3

0.133

8.41

0.531

Aircraft and parts

42.3

0.104

12.97

0.458

Other transportation equipment

42.3

0.106

13.75

0.382

Primary metals

42.2

0.111

11.52

0.404

Utilities

42.2

0.113

14.00

0.425

Textile mill products

42.2

0.106

8.11

0.436

Construction

42.2

0.117

11.45

0.471

Paper and allied products

42.1

0.097

10.81

0.414

Communications

42.0

0.119

13.51

0.454
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Weekly
hoursb

Std. dev. ln
(hours)

Hourly
wages

Std. dev. ln
(hourly
wage)

Professional and photo
equipment

41.9

0.098

11.60

0.479

Lumber and wood, except
furniture

41.9

0.096

8.40

0.339

Social services

41.8

0.150

8.41

0.555

Personal services excluding
household

41.6

0.128

6.86

0.461

Printing and publishing

41.6

0.107

10.54

0.481

Hospitals

41.6

0.115

10.91

0.434

Banking and other finance

41.6

0.108

11.70

0.501

Furniture and fixtures

41.3

0.070

8.50

0.346

Miscellaneous manufacturing

41.2

0.078

7.92

0.509

Health services excluding
hospitals

41.1

0.118

9.00

0.459

Apparel

40.2

0.057

6.56

0.448

Industry

Full-time workers are defined to be workers with usual weekly hours ≥ 35.
b Usual weekly hours at main job.
a
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Table A2 Mean Weekly Hours and Wages in Nonagricultural Detailed
Occupation, Full-Time Workers Onlya

Industry

Weekly
hoursb

Std. dev. ln
(hours)

Hourly
wages

Std. dev. ln
(hourly
wage)

Health diagnosis

57.0

0.197

16.79

0.527

Lawyers and judges

46.7

0.157

22.39

0.473

Motor vehicle operators

46.5

0.189

8.83

0.410

Supervisors, proprietors, and
sales

46.3

0.165

11.25

0.507

Executives, administrators, and
managers

45.2

0.154

14.73

0.546

Teachers, college

44.9

0.178

17.68

0.523

Other professional specialties

44.3

0.187

12.07

0.582

Sales reps, finance, and business
services

44.2

0.148

12.36

0.562

Sales reps, commodities,
excluding retail

44.1

0.133

13.79

0.516

Natural scientists

44.0

0.130

15.20

0.529

Private household services

43.8

0.211

3.25

0.586

Other transportation and
material moving

43.8

0.166

10.51

0.431

Engineers

43.3

0.122

19.28

0.325

Mechanics and repairers

43.1

0.129

11.08

0.405

Construction laborers

43.1

0.134

8.81

0.445

Other precision production

43.0

0.129

11.41

0.455

Teachers, except college

43.0

0.144

8.94

0.570

Mathematical and computer
scientists

43.0

0.117

17.74

0.372

Management

42.7

0.113

14.44

0.449

Supervisors–administrative
support

42.5

0.122

11.63

0.432

Engineering and science
technicians

42.1

0.100

12.62

0.415

Engineering and science

42.0

0.105

14.75

0.500
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Hourly
wages

Std. dev. ln
(hourly
wage)

0.110

9.49

0.424

0.114

11.61

0.450

41.7

0.114

7.38

0.432

Health assessment and treating

41.5

0.117

13.16

0.356

Machine operators, excluding
precision

41.3

0.092

8.13

0.423

Food service

41.3

0.148

5.31

0.426

Personal services

41.2

0.118

7.18

0.467

Weekly
hoursb

Std. dev. ln
(hours)

Fabricators, inspectors, and
samplers

41.8

Construction trades

41.7

Handlers, equip. cleaners,
laborers

Industry

Personal service occupations

41.1

0.118

6.49

0.518

Protective services

41.1

0.093

6.48

0.391

Sales related

41.0

0.034

11.19

0.151

Health technologists and
technicians

40.9

0.093

10.14

0.329

Freight, stock, and material
handlers

40.7

0.092

7.03

0.381

Health service

40.6

0.123

6.71

0.366

Computer equipment operators

40.6

0.075

9.33

0.420

Financial records, processing

40.4

0.070

7.96

0.318

Main and message distributing

40.4

0.041

7.87

0.430

Other administrative support,
clerical

40.4

0.075

8.63

0.395

Cleaning and building services

40.3

0.078

6.46

0.346

Secretaries, stenographers, and
typists

40.0

0.058

8.36

0.355

SOURCE: May 1989 CPS.
a Full-time workers are defined to be workers with usual weekly hours ≥ 35.
b Usual weekly hours at main job.

104

Table A3 Hours Regressionsa
Dependent variables: ln (usual hours worked per week)
Independent variables
ln (hourly wage)

0.147
(0.005)

0.101
(0.006)

0.085
(0.006)

0.059
(0.006)

0.141
(0.005)

0.080
(0.006)

ln (family income)

–0.007
(0.004)

0.004
(0.004)

0.003
(0.004)

–0.002
(0.003)

–0.002
(0.004)

0.002
(0.003)

Std. dev. of ln (hourly age)b
(ind–occ cell)

0.062
(0.021)

0.044
(0.021)

0.076
(0.022)

–0.080
(0.024)

—

—

Std. dev. of ln (hourly wage)c
(occ cell)

—

—

—

—

0.374
(0.033)

0.374
(0.035)

Marriage dummy

—

0.030
(0.006)

0.023
(0.006)

0.013
(0.006)

—

0.022
(0.006)

Female dummy

—

–0.121
(0.005)

–0.100
(0.006)

–0.089
(0.006)

—

–0.097
(0.006)

Less than high school

—

–0.012
(0.014)

–0.025
(0.014)

–0.008
(0.014)

—

–0.027
(0.014)

Some high school

—

–0.117
(0.013)

–0.119
(0.012)

–0.110
(0.012)

—

0.117
(0.012)

Some college

—

–0.094
(0.009)

–0.087
(0.009)

–0.085
(0.008)

—

–0.087
(0.008)

College graduate

—

0.017
(0.008)

0.026
(0.008)

0.018
(0.008)

—

0.020
(0.008)

College plus

—

0.015
(0.010)

0.040
(0.011)

0.020
(0.011)

—

0.026
(0.011)

Union dummy

—

0.005
(0.008)

–0.010
(0.008)

0.010
(0.008)

Region dummy

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Industryd dummy

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Occupationd dummy

—
–0.007
(0.008)

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

R2

0.088

0.152

0.217

0.217

0.098

0.181

N

10,344

10,344

10,344

10,344

10,344

10,540

a

For private, nonagricultural workers, including part-time workers, standard errors are in parentheses.
b Standard deviation in ln (hourly wage) in detailed industry/detailed occupation cell.
c Standard deviation in ln (hourly wage) in detailed occupation cell.
d Detailed occupation and industry dummy variables.
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Part II

4
Working Time, Wages, and Earnings
Inequality among Men and Women
in Canada, 1981–1993
Garnett Picot
Statistics Canada

The increasing polarization of employment earnings in Canada has
been well documented (Myles, Picot, and Wannell 1988; The Economic Council of Canada 1991; Morissette, Myles, and Picot 1994;
Burbidge, Magee, and Robb 1993; Beach and Slotsve 1996; Richardson 1994). Various dimensions of this rising polarization of earnings
have also been explored, including the declining real and relative
wages of young workers (Myles, Picot, and Wannell 1988; Davis 1992;
Betcherman and Morissette 1994), and the relative stability of the education wage premium in Canada as compared to the United States.
(Freeman and Needels 1991; Bar-Or et al. 1993; Morissette, Myles,
and Picot 1994). In most of the work on rising earnings inequality,
changes in the distribution of working time have been largely ignored.
Yet the distribution of hours of work has changed significantly in the
1980s and early 1990s for a variety of reasons.
The shifts in labor demand often discussed in the earnings inequality literature could well be reflected through changes in hours of work,
as well as through relative wages. Decreased demand for less-skilled
workers due to the introduction of skill-biased technology, changes in
trading patterns, or for any other reason could be reflected in declining
relative wages for the less-skilled (a price response), declining relative
hours of work (a quantity response), or both. Furthermore, if the
demand shifts resulted in declining wages among the less-skilled, it
could lead to a supply side response on the part of workers. They could
withdraw some amount of labor at the lower wage rate, as has been
suggested by Freeman (1994); Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991); and
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Kuhn and Robb (1996). These possibilities would lead to declining
hours of work among lower paid, less-skilled workers relative to the
higher paid.
Such a possibility has been addressed in earlier work in Canada by
Picot, Myles, and Wannell (1990); MacPhail (1993); Morissette,
Myles, and Picot (1994); and Morissette (1995). They found that the
polarization in hours worked did increase through the 1980s. More
workers were working longer hours, more were working shorter hours,
and fewer were working the number of hours one would expect to see
in regular full-time jobs. Furthermore, they observed that the increasing polarization was such that it would tend to increase inequality in
annual earnings; that is, the more highly paid were working relatively
longer hours, and the less paid relatively shorter hours. There appears
to be an association between a polarization in hours of work and that of
annual earnings in Canada. This possibility has received less attention
in the United States, where the rising inequality in employment earnings has if anything been greater than in Canada (Freeman 1994; Kuhn
and Robb 1996). Earlier studies by Burtless (1990) and Moffitt (1990)
concluded that the rise in earnings inequality in the United States are
associated primarily with an increased dispersion in hourly wages, not
hours of work.
The goal of this chapter is to extend this work in a number of ways.
First, we update the earlier work, which focused exclusively on the
1980s, by using data from the new Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics (SLID) for 1993. This is the only data source in Canada
with hourly wage rate data, a central variable for this analysis. Given
the anecdotal stories related to the potential causes such as those listed
above, the polarization in hours worked may be increasing in the
1990s. The second goal is to determine whether it is changes in weeks
worked per year or hours per week that play the major role in the
changing distribution of working time and its impact on earnings inequality. This has not been previously done.
The chapter finds that the rise in inequality among prime-age
males and the decline among their female counterparts during the
1980s appears to be largely associated with changes in hours worked.
Changes in the distribution of hourly wages played a much smaller
role. This supports the earlier work that reached a similar conclusion.
Changes in weeks worked (particularly for women) and, more impor-
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tantly, in hours worked per week were both part of this phenomenon.
Extending the analysis into the 1990s suggests that the same basic conclusion holds; the smaller observed change in annual earnings inequality is associated primarily with changes in hours of work, although
changes in hourly wages do play a role. However, the rise in annual
earnings inequality among males slowed over the 1984–1993 period
compared with the 1981–1989 period. Annual earnings inequality
among prime-age men and women combined is seen to change little
over the past decade. Other work (OECD 1996; Zyblock 1996) also
suggested that earnings inequality in Canada and a number of other
countries stopped increasing during the 1990s. The exceptions are the
United States and the United Kingdom, where rising inequality continues.
This chapter also asks to what extent changes in hours worked are
associated with one of the more striking dimensions of earnings change
in Canada, the declining real and relative earnings of young workers.
Here, changing relative hours play a minor role.
Declining relative annual earnings among the young are associated
with a decline in real and relative hourly wages among young males,
and with both declining relative wages and declining relative weekly
hours worked among young women. There has been a substantial
downward adjustment in wage rates among younger workers in Canada
during the 1980s and early 1990s.

THE DATA AND APPROACH
The Data
Two sets of data are employed. First, the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) for the period 1981 to 1993 is used to decompose the
change in annual earnings inequality into that associated with changing
weeks worked and changing weekly earnings. Ideally, one would use
this source to assess the role of weekly hours worked and hourly wages
as well, but such information is not available in the SCF for the reference year.
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To further decompose changes in weekly earnings into that associated with hours worked per week and hourly wages, a series of special
surveys are used. These are the Survey of Work History (SWH) for
1981, the Survey of Union Membership (SUM) for 1984, the Labour
Market Activity Survey (LMAS) for 1986 and 1989, and the SLID for
1993. While the content of these surveys differs substantially, they all
collect the variables in which we are primarily interested—hours
worked per week and hourly wages—in a similar manner. More is said
throughout the chapter regarding the similarities and differences
among these surveys. The series of special surveys is the only source
of comparable data over a reasonable period of time on hourly wages
in Canada.
The Population
Since we are concerned with changes in hours worked and wages,
we include workers who worked at any time during the year in the SCF
sample. To maintain comparability with earlier studies, persons with
self-employment earnings are excluded.1 Other studies have restricted
the population to full-time, full-year workers, but to do so would
remove changes that have been taking place in weeks worked per year
or in hours per week among much of the population. The analysis in
the first section is restricted to prime-age workers (aged 25–54), however, to exclude possible events such as increasing part-time employment among students2 and increasing early retirement rates among
older workers. This chapter focuses on events occurring to workers in
their prime working years.
As noted, we include only those persons who worked at some time
during the year. Ideally the population should include everyone in the
labor force, i.e., working or seeking work. Changes in hours of work
should ideally include the increase or decrease in the number of persons working zero hours per year but wishing work. This is the group
of workers unemployed all year, or unemployed for some portion of the
year but not working during the year. These people have not been
included in the sample because they do not have an observed wage
rate. The significance of this omission depends upon the size of this
group and whether it represents an increasing or declining share of the
labor force.
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In 1986, 1.4 percent of the male labor force were unemployed all
year, and an additional 1.3 percent were unemployed part year but did
not work. By 1989, these numbers had fallen to 0.7 percent and 0.9
percent as the economic expansion continued. In the recessionary
period of 1993, they rose to 2.6 percent and 1.3 percent. Thus, the proportion of the labor force excluded from the sample that might have
legitimately been included ranged from 1.8 percent to 3.9 percent,
fairly small numbers. Most unemployed persons work at least part of a
year, and hence are in our sample.3
The Time Frame
The dispersion of wages, hours, and earnings all vary significantly
over the business cycle. Hence, years were selected that had comparable unemployment rates. The results are presented for two periods,
1981–1989 and 1984–1993. In terms of unemployment, these pairs of
years are almost identical. Unemployment was at 7.6 percent and 7.5
percent respectively in the 1981–1989 period, and at 11.3 percent and
11.2 percent, respectively, in 1984 and 1993. Years prior to 1981 are
excluded because data comparable to that from the special surveys are
not available for the earlier years. However, other studies have shown
that most of the increasing polarization in earnings occurred following
1981 (e.g., Morissette, Myles, and Picot 1994), so we are focusing on
the period of most change.

HOURS, WAGES, AND INEQUALITY AMONG PRIME-AGE
MALE WORKERS
The Rising Inequality of Annual Earnings: Associated with
Changes in Weeks Worked per Year or Weekly Earnings?
The familiar increase in the earnings gap between the low and high
earners is evident in the SCF data. Between 1981 and 1989, among 25to 54-year-old prime-age males, real average annual earnings in the
bottom three deciles fell 15 percent to 22 percent while rising 5 percent
in the top decile (Figure 1). The gap in real earnings between high and
low prime-age male earners opened considerably over this period.
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Figure 1 Percent Change in Annual Earnings, Weeks Worked, and
Weekly Earnings, by Decile,a Men, 25–54
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SOURCE: Survey of Consumer Finances.
a Deciles based on annual earnings; in Canadian dollars.
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The majority of the change in earnings was associated with
changes in weekly earnings, less was related to changes in weeks
worked. This can be seen in Figure 1, as the percentage change in
annual earnings for different deciles between 1981 and 1989 largely
reflects the change in weekly earnings. For example, workers at the
bottom of the annual earnings distribution worked an average of 31
weeks per year in 1981 and 28.7 weeks by 1989, a decrease of 7 percent. However, weekly earnings among this lowest earning group fell
fully 14 percent. The decline in these two variables resulted in the
overall drop of 22 percent in real annual earnings. The number of
weeks worked changed little in the middle and upper deciles; all of the
change was in weekly earnings.4
Thus, among prime-age males during the 1980s, both changes in
weeks worked and weekly earnings were associated with the rising gap
between the bottom and the top of the earnings distribution, although
changes in weekly earnings tended to dominate.
An alternative means of demonstrating this is to turn to a summary
measure of the degree of inequality or dispersion in a distribution, the
variance of the logarithm. The advantage of this measure is that it is
decomposable. Annual earnings is a product of weeks worked and
weekly earnings. The total dispersion in the distribution of annual
earnings can be decomposed into that due to the dispersion in weeks
worked, that due to the inequality in weekly earnings, and a term indicating the covariance between these two factors.
Among prime-age male earners, the variance of the log of annual
earnings rose almost 30 percent between 1981 and 1989 (Table 1)—a
very significant increase in inequality. Fifty-three percent of this rise
was due to the increased dispersion in weekly earnings, and another 23
percent to the increasing covariance between weekly earnings and
weeks worked. The tendency for full-year workers to have higher
weekly earnings and part-year workers to have lower weekly earnings
increased during the 1980s. Only 23 percent of the rise in earnings inequality was due to an increasing dispersion of weeks worked.
Thus, over the 1980s, for prime-age males, the considerable
increase in polarization in earnings was largely associated with
changes in weekly earnings rather than weeks worked per year.
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Table 1 Change in Variance of the Log of Annual Earnings, Weekly
Earnings, and Weeks Worked, Prime-Age Mena
Change
Variable
Annual earnings

1981

1984

1989

1993

1981–89

1984–93

0.468

0.702

0.605

0.771

0.137

0.069

(23%)b

0.050 (72%)
0.021 (30%)

Weeks worked

0.119

0.199

0.151

0.249

0.032

Weekly earnings

0.297

0.379

0.370

0.400

0.073 (53%)

2 × covariance

0.052

0.124

0.084

0.122

0.032 (23%) –0.002 (–3%)

SOURCE: Survey of Consumer Finances.
a In Canadian dollars.
b The number in parentheses indicates the percent distribution.

The 1984–1993 period tells a somewhat different story.5 Inequality
in annual earnings increased relatively little among prime-age males.
The variance of the log rose by about 10 percent (0.069 points), compared to the 30 percent increase between 1981 and 1989, the business
cycle peaks. The major rise in earnings inequality, and the associated
decline in earnings of lower paid workers (see Figure 1), occurred
largely in the very early 1980s. Other evidence suggests that the
upward trend in earnings inequality may have ceased in the 1990s, at
least among full-time full-year workers (OECD 1996; Zyblock 1996).
The slower rise in annual earnings inequality between 1984 and
1993 is associated with a slowdown in the growth of inequality in
weekly earnings. Inequality in this variable rose only 6 percent, compared to 25 percent over the 1981–1989 period. The rise in inequality
in weeks worked was about the same in the two periods, roughly 25
percent as measured by the variance of the logs. Thus, changes in inequality in weekly earnings played a dominant role in annual earnings
inequality among prime-age males.
The Rising Polarization in Weekly Earnings: Associated with
Changes in Hours per Week or Hourly Wages?
Weekly earnings can be thought of as a function of two factors:
hours worked per week and hourly wage rate. To try to decompose the
observed changes in weekly earnings, we turn to new data sources.
The Survey of Consumer Finances, used in the previous section, does

Working Time, Wages, and Earnings Inequality in Canada

117

not include data on hours per week or hourly wages for the reference
year. Thus we turn to a series of special data sources6 that collected
information on wages and hours worked per week. Weekly earnings
are computed for these data sets simply by multiplying hourly wages
by hours per week. The hours and earnings data refer to the major job
held by the worker in December, as this was the only information available on the 1984 survey.7
This same question—“Is the rise in weekly earnings inequality
associated with changes in hours per week or hourly wages?”—was
addressed by Morissette, Myles, and Picot (1994) and Morissette
(1995) for the 1980s. Both studies concluded that most of the change
in weekly earnings during that decade was associated with changes in
hours per week, and increasing covariance between hours worked and
wages. We revisit that question and extend the analysis to the early
1990s.
First, hours worked. There was a substantial increase in the polarization of hours worked per week over the 1980s. Labour Force Survey (LFS) data suggest that between 1981 and 1989, for example, the
proportion of men working 35–40 hour weeks in their main jobs fell
from 77 percent to about 73 percent and continued to fall to around 69
percent by 1993.8 The proportion working longer hours (more than 40)
increased from 18 percent in 1981 to 22 percent in 1989, and 24 percent in 1993.9 The proportion working shorter hours (under 35) also
rose, from 4 percent in 1981 to 5 percent in 1989, reaching 8 percent by
1993. Thus, fewer men were working regular 35–40 hour weeks, and
more were working both shorter and longer hours. These trends are
presented in more detail in Morissette and Sunter (1994).
The distribution of prime-age male workers by hourly wage,10 the
other major determinant of weekly earnings, presents a very different
story. There has been relatively little change in this distribution over
the 1980s and early 1990s. The distribution of workers by their hourly
wage, in constant 1993 dollars, is shown in Table 2. The change in the
distribution between 1981 and 1989 shows no systematic shift toward
the top or bottom. The same is observed for the 1984–1993 period.
The variance of the log is used to decompose the rise in the inequality in weekly earnings (Table 3). The results for prime-age males
over the 1980s suggests that the majority of the rise in inequality in
weekly earnings was associated with the rise in inequality in hours
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Table 2 Distribution of Prime-Age Men, by Hourly Wage in
Their Jobsa (%)
Change
wageb

Hourly
($)

1981

1984

1989

1993

1981–89

1984–93

0–7.00

5.1

3.2

3.6

4.5

–1.5

+1.3

7.01–8.80

5.2

4.3

4.3

4.4

–0.9

+0.1

8.81–10.80

8.2

6.6

6.9

5.8

–1.3

–0.8

10.81–12.90

8.9

9.5

10.2

9.2

+1.3

–0.3

12.91–14.90

10.7

12.1

12.1

10.0

+1.4

–2.1

14.91–16.90

12.3

9.8

11.0

10.6

–1.3

+0.8

16.91–19.10

12.9

13.6

12.3

12.3

–0.6

–1.3

19.11– 21.90

12.3

14.4

12.7

15.4

+0.4

+1.0

21.91–27.60

14.6

17.2

16.0

16.4

+1.4

–0.8

> 27.60

9.7

9.3

10.8

11.6

+1.1

+2.3

SOURCE: Survey of Work History (1981); Survey of Union Membership (1984);
Labour Market Activity Survey (1986, 1989); Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993).
a Major job held in December.
b In constant 1993 Canadian dollars.

Table 3 Change in the Variance of the Log of Weekly Earnings, Hours Per
Week, and Hourly Wages, Prime-Age Mena
Change
Variable

1981

1984

1989

1993

Weekly earnings

0.250

0.258

0.287

0.310

Hours per week

0.054

0.064

0.086

Hourly wage

0.222

0.194

0.214

–0.026

0.000

–0.012

2 × covariance

1981–89 1984–93
0.037

0.052

0.099

0.032

0.035

0.198

-0.008

0.004

0.013

0.014

0.013

SOURCE: Survey of Work History (1981); Survey of Union Membership (1984);
Labour Market Activity Survey (1986, 1989); Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993).
a In Canadian dollars.
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worked per week (0.032 of a total increase of 0.37 in the variance of
the log), while hourly wages played little or no role.11 The findings are
similar for the 1984–1993 period. Among prime-age males, weekly
earnings inequality rose 20 percent, and of this increase, two-thirds
was related to changes in the distribution of hours worked per week;
hourly wages played only a minor role.
Thus, the data from the special surveys suggest that inequality in
hourly wages has risen only marginally when comparable points in the
business cycle are used. Changes in the inequality of weekly earnings
appear to be largely associated with changes in hours worked per week.
This result was observed in earlier studies for the 1980s, and it would
seem that it holds for the 1984–1993 period as well.12,13

HOURS, WAGES, AND INEQUALITY AMONG PRIME-AGE
FEMALE WORKERS
Polarization of Annual Earnings: Associated with Changes in
Weeks Worked per Year or Weekly Earnings?
Not surprisingly, the trends are very different for men than for
women, since their underlying employment and earnings trends are
very different. The earnings gap between men and women has been
closing in Canada, and an increasing share of women are working,
whereas among men the share working has been falling.14
Annual earnings have not fallen among women at the bottom of the
earnings distribution as they have among men. In fact, they have
increased quite dramatically. Between 1981 and 1989, annual earnings
among the lowest paid women rose 35 percent, largely because they
were working more weeks per year in 1989 than in 1981. Weeks
worked rose 19 percent among this group, whereas average weekly
earnings did not change at all (Figure 2).
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Figure 2 Percent Change in Annual Earnings, Weeks Worked, and
Weekly Earnings, by Decile,a Women, 25–54

a

Deciles based on annual earnings, in Canadian dollars.
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With such a large rise in earnings among low paid women, not surprisingly annual earnings inequality declined among prime-age
females during both the 1981–1989 period (declining 0.154 as measured by the variance of the log); and the 1984–1993 period (declining
0.037) (Table 4). In both cases this was associated with a decline in the
inequality of weeks worked (i.e., lower paid women working relatively
more weeks per year). During 1981–1989, two thirds of the decline in
annual earnings inequality was associated with a decline in the inequality of weeks worked; during 1984–1993 it was 59 percent. There was
little change in the inequality of weekly earnings. This is in contrast to
men, where there was relatively little change in weeks worked, but a
rise in inequality of weekly earnings.
Changes in Hours Worked per Week and Hourly Wages
among Women
Like men, a smaller share of women are working a regular 35–40
hour week. According to the Labour Force Survey, the proportion of
women working 35–40 hours per week fell from 68 percent in 1981 to
65 percent in 1989, and 61 percent in 1993 (Morissette and Sunter
1994).15 There are slightly more working fewer hours (the share working under 20 rose from 20 percent in 1981 to 22 percent in 1993), and
more working longer hours (over 40 hours rose from 5 percent to 8 percent). Thus, there has been an increase in the polarization of hours
Table 4 Change in Variance of the Log of Annual Earnings, Weekly
Earnings, and Weeks Worked, Prime-Age Womena,b
Change
1981

1984

1989

1993

1981–89

1984–93

Annual earnings

1.077

1.057

0.923

1.020

–0.154

–0.037

Weeks worked

0.362

0.340

0.262

0.319 –0.100 (65%) –0.022 (59%)

Weekly earnings

0.571

0.552

0.530

0.552 –0.041 (26%)

2 × covariance

0.144

0.164

0.132

0.150

Women 25–54

0.000 (0%)

–0.012 (8%) –0.015 (41%)

SOURCE: The Survey of Consumer Finances.
a In Canadian dollars.
b The numbers in parentheses indicates the percent distribution.
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worked among women, just as there has been among men. Such a
polarization in hours worked does not necessarily lead to increased
polarization of earnings, however, since it depends upon whether high
or low wage earners are increasing their hours of work.
Unlike for men, the hourly wage distribution has changed quite
significantly among prime-age women (Table 5). A larger share of
women are earning higher hourly wages. For example, the proportion
of women earning over $17.00 per hour rose from 24.6 percent in 1984
to 31.2 percent in 1993. Among men there was virtually no change,
although a larger share of men than women still earned over $17.00 per
hour in 1993 (55.7 percent against 31.2 percent). Among women there
was a corresponding decline in the proportion earning low hourly
wages.

Table 5 Distribution of Prime-Age Women, by Hourly Wage in
Their Jobsa (%)
Change
wageb

Hourly
($)

1981

1984

1989

1993

1981–89

1984–93

$ 0–7.00

14.0

11.6

11.8

11.3

–2.2

–0.3

7.01–8.80

12.1

12.9

10.5

8.6

–1.6

–4.3

8.81–10.80

14.6

13.3

13.3

10.7

–1.3

–2.6

10.81–12.90

14.2

15.9

16.7

14.3

+2.5

–1.6

12.91–14.90

12.7

13.5

13.3

13.1

+0.6

–0.4

14.91–16.90

9.0

8.3

8.7

10.9

–0.3

+2.6

16.91–19.10

7.1

7.9

7.9

8.0

+0.8

+0.1

19.11–21.90

6.3

7.4

7.0

9.0

+0.7

+1.6

21.91–27.60

6.0

6.5

6.4

8.8

+0.4

+2.3

> 27.60

3.9

2.8

4.3

5.4

+0.4

+2.6

SOURCE: Survey of Work History (1981); Survey of Union Membership (1984);
Labour Market Activity Survey (1986, 1989); Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993).
a Major job held in December.
b In constant 1993 Canadian dollars.
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The decomposition of the variance of the log displays the association between these changes and weekly earnings inequality among
prime-age women (Table 6). Overall, the story is one of little change.
Weekly earnings inequality among prime-age women has changed little, as noted earlier, particularly during the 1981–1989 period. During
the 1984–1993 period, where inequality does rise marginally according to the special surveys data (but with no change registered in the
SCF data), this is largely driven by the changing distribution of hours
worked. Thus, overall there is little change in weekly earnings inequality, and where it is observed, it is related to changes in hours
worked.
Inequality in Earnings, Hours, and Wage for
All Prime-Age Workers
Different trends among men and women begs the question of
whether the labor market has been redistributing earnings to prime-age
workers as a whole in a fundamentally different manner in the late
1980s and early 1990s compared to earlier periods. And if so, what is
the role of changes in working time and hourly wages.
Based on the variance of the log, annual earnings inequality among
prime-age men and women combined has changed relatively little over
the 1980s or early 1990s (Table 7). If anything, these data suggest that

Table 6 Change in the Variance of Log of Weekly Earnings, Hours Per
Week, and Hourly Wages, Prime-Age Womena
Change
1981

1984

1989

1993

1981–89

1984–93

Weekly earnings

Variable

0.470

0.471

0.472

0.526

0.002

0.055

Hours per week

0.229

0.224

0.206

0.290

–0.023

0.066

Hourly wage

0.250

0.228

0.241

0.220

–0.009

–0.008

–0.009

0.020

0.026

0.016

0.035

–0.004

2 × covariance

SOURCE: Survey of Work History (1981); Survey of Union Membership (1984);
Labour Market Activity Survey (1986, 1989); Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993).
a In Canadian dollars.
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Table 7 Change in the Variance of the Log of Annual Earnings, Weekly
Earnings and Weeks Worked, All Prime-Age Workersa
Change
Variable

1981

1984

1989

1993

1981–89

1984–93

Annual earnings

0.910

0.969

0.855

0.956

–0.055

–0.013

Weeks worked

0.233

0.264

0.206

0.283

–0.027

0.019

Weekly
earnings

0.529

0.540

0.523

0.531

–0.006

–0.009

2 × covariance

0.148

0.165

0.125

0.142

–0.023

–0.023

SOURCE: Survey of Consumer Finances.
a In Canadian dollars.

earnings inequality declined slightly between 1981 and 1989 (6 percent), as well as between 1984 and 1993 (1 percent). These are, however, relatively small changes.
As noted before, the two sets of data, SCF and the special surveys,
provide somewhat different results regarding the change in inequality
in weekly earning. There is little change in the SCF, and a small
increase in the special surveys (from 7 percent to 10 percent). In the
special surveys this increase is due to changes in the inequality in hours
worked per week, or the increasing covariance between hours and
wages.16 The inequality in hourly wages changes little over either
period for prime-age workers (Table 8).
Table 8 Change in the Variance of the Log of Weekly Earnings, Hours
Per Week, and Hourly Wages, All Prime-Age Workersa
Change
Variable

1981

1984

1989

1993

1981–89

1984–93

Weekly earnings

0.416

0.432

0.444

0.478

+0.028

+0.046

Hours per week

0.144

0.149

0.156

0.209

+0.012

+0.060

Hourly wage

0.254

0.235

0.248

0.223

–0.006

–0.012

2 × covariance

0.017

0.048

0.040

0.046

+0.023

–0.002

SOURCE: Survey of Work History (1981); Survey of Union Membership (1984);
Labour Market Activity Survey (1986, 1989); Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993).
a In Canadian dollars.
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Given this relative stability in inequality among prime-age workers,
what has happened to the real earnings of workers earning lower wages?
Basically, the annual earnings of prime-age workers at the bottom of the
distribution have risen in both periods because of the tendency of
women to work more weeks per year during the 1980s. There have been
significant declines in the annual earnings of workers in the middle of
the distribution over both periods, with small increases at the top.

SUMMARY OF THE ROLES OF HOURS WORKED AND
WAGES IN EARNINGS INEQUALITY
Overall, most of the significant changes in earnings inequality
among both men and women were associated with changes in working
time, either weeks worked per year or hours per week, rather than
changes in hourly wages. More specifically:
1) Inequality in annual earnings among prime-age males rose significantly between 1981–1989 (29 percent), and less so over 1984–
1993 (10 percent). Other work (OECD 1996) indicates that
among full-time, full-year workers annual earnings inequality fell
slightly during the 1990s in Canada and numerous other countries, after having increased substantially in the 1980s. Annual
earnings inequality among prime-age women fell during both
periods.17
2) During both periods, the increase in male annual earnings inequality was associated with rising inequality in hours worked per
week and weeks per year. Little of the rise was associated with
rising inequality or polarization in hourly wages. Similarly, during both periods the decline in earnings inequality among women
was largely associated with increasing weeks worked among
women with low annual incomes.
3) Prime-age male workers at the bottom end (bottom three deciles)
of the earnings distribution saw their annual earnings fall dramatically over the 1981–1989 period. This was associated with a
decline in both weeks worked per year, and weekly earnings. The
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change in the latter was largely associated with changes in hours
worked per week. Prime-age women at the bottom of the earnings distribution saw their annual earnings rise, largely because
they were working more weeks per year.
During the 1984–1993 period annual earnings fell among male
workers in the bottom three deciles, but not so dramatically. This
was largely due to a decline in weeks worked, as weekly earnings
fell only marginally. Women at the bottom of the distribution saw
their annual earnings rise as a result of working more weeks per
year, but again the increase was not as dramatic as during the earlier period.
4) Both prime-age men and women at the top of the earnings distribution (top three deciles) saw their annual earnings rise during
both periods due to an increase in weekly earnings, which was in
turn associated with a substantial increase in hours worked per
week, and some increase in hourly wages.
5) Among all prime-age workers (men and women combined), inequality in annual earnings, weeks worked, weekly earnings, and
hourly wages has been quite stable over both periods, and where
there have been changes, they are relatively small. Inequality in
annual earnings and hourly wages has changed little.
Thus, changes in working time, primarily hours per week but also
weeks per year, have been associated with the rise in earnings inequality among prime-age males and a decline among prime-age women18
over both periods, although the change was much larger in the first than
the second period. The best available data on wages (from the special
surveys) suggest that while changes in hourly wages have played some
role in the rise in earnings inequality, it is in no way dominant.

THE RISING EARNINGS DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE
YOUNG AND THE OLD—IS IT WAGES- OR HOURS-BASED?
A major dimension of the rising inequality story has been the
increasing gap in annual earnings between younger and older workers,
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particularly among men. This has been largely due to declines in real
earnings among young workers and has been well documented in Canada (Myles, Picot, and Wannell 1988; Betcherman and Morissette
1994; Morissette, Myles, and Picot 1994; Beaudry and Green 1996),
and for other industrialized countries (Davis 1992). Our goal is to
determine the extent to which this rising gap is associated with changes
in hourly wages on one hand, or hours worked (either changes in weeks
per year or hours per week) on the other. We focus on all workers,
including part-time and full-time. This is necessary if one is to capture
all the changes taking place in patterns of working time.
Changing Annual Earnings among Young Males
The much discussed decline in real average annual earnings among
very young males (aged 18–24) occurred largely in the early 1980s,
between 1981 and 1983 (Figure 3). Of the 36 percent drop in earnings
between 1979 and the early 1990s, over 70 percent of it occurred in and
around the 1981–1982 recession. There was little recovery during the
late 1980s, and a subsequent smaller decline during the recession of the
1990s. Among 25- to 34-year-olds, whose earnings have fallen about
14 percent since 1979, most of the decline was in the 1980s recession,
again with no recovery through the 1980s. These results included all
young workers, full- and part-time. There have been significant
changes in the number of young people working part-time over this
period. However, the same general pattern is observed for full-time,
full-year workers (Figure 3).
The approach here is to simply examine the relative values of four
variables: annual earnings, annual weeks worked, hours per week, and
hourly wage rate. The ratios computed are the average value of the
variable for younger workers (under 35) relative to those for older
workers (over 35). The change in these relative values over time will
inform us as to which variables are associated with the decline in relative annual earnings among young male workers.
For men, the ratio of the average annual earnings of workers under
35 to those of workers over 35 fell from 0.64 in 1981 to 0.57 in 1989,
and 0.55 in 1993 (Figure 4). Was this decline associated with a fall in
relative weeks worked, hours per week, or hourly wages? The answer
appears to be hourly wages. Relative weeks worked changed little over
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Figure 3 Indexed Real Annual Wages and Salaries of Male Earners,
1969–1994 (1969=100)
All male earners

Full-year full-time male workers

SOURCE: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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Ratioa

Ratioa

Figure 4 Relative Measures of Earnings and Hours: Workers under 35
Relative to Those over 35

a

For example, for annual earnings this is the ratio of average annual earnings among
17- to 34-year-olds to the earnings of 35- to 64-year-olds.
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the period (at around 0.87), as did relative hours worked per week (at
0.95). Relative hourly wages, however, fell from 0.84 in 1981 to 0.71
in 1989, and to 0.67 in 1993. This would suggest that virtually all of
the decline in relative annual earnings among the young between 1981
and 1989 was associated with falling relative hourly wages.
To ensure that this result is not specific to this particular way of
grouping younger and older workers, this same approach is used for
other combinations of workers, and results compared for two periods,
1981–1989 and 1984–1993. Two separate younger age groups, 17–24
and 25–35, are compared with the central age group of older workers,
those 45–54 (Table 9). Generally speaking, changing relative wages
dominate the other variables.19 Overall, however, the decline in relative (and real) annual earnings among the young appears to be associated with changing relative hourly wages, not changing relative hours
worked per year.
Changing Annual Earnings among Young Women
As with the men, the real annual earnings of young women fell
between 1977 and 1983 (about 21 percent), recovered somewhat during the 1980s, and fell again in the 1990s recession and beyond. The
fall between the late 1970s and the mid 1990s was 29 percent. This
was for all workers. Among women working full-time, full-year, the
story was one of a decline in the early 1980s, followed by recovery in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, so that there was little change overall
during the entire period (Figure 5). Average earnings among older
women (over 24) rose in all age categories, but more so among the
older than younger workers, so that the relative annual earnings of 2534-year-olds fell from 0.8 in 1981 to 0.7 in 1993. The relative decline
was greater among full-time, full-year workers.
Were these declines in the relative earnings associated with declining relative wages or working time? The answer is both. Relative
hourly wages have fallen among women under 35 (relative to those
over 35), from 0.9 in 1981 to 0.8 in 1993. But relative hours worked
per week have fallen as well, from 1 to 0.9. Thus, both have contributed to the decline in relative annual earnings. This is true for other
populations as well (Table 10).
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Table 9 Earnings and Hours Ratios of Younger Relative to Older Male
Workers, Selected Yearsa
Annual
earningsb

Weeks
workedb

Hours per
weekc

Hourly
wagesc

1981

0.638

0.865

0.955

0.843

1984

0.584

0.845

0.937

0.743

1989

0.571

0.867

0.954

0.713

1993

0.550

0.849

0.919

0.673

Change 1981–89

–0.067

0.002

–0.001

–0.130

Change 1984–93

–0.034

0.004

–0.018

–0.070

1981

0.392

0.743

0.871

0.703

1984

0.320

0.711

0.840

0.540

1989

0.316

0.731

0.840

0.508

1993

0.255

0.697

0.742

0.441

Change 1981–89

–0.076

–0.012

–0.031

–0.195

Change 1984–93

–0.065

–0.014

–0.098

–0.099

1981

0.827

0.971

01.003

0.966

1984

0.764

0.944

0.992

0.851

1989

0.712

0.942

1.016

0.812

1993

0.682

0.935

0.987

0.741

Change 1981–89

–0.115

–0.029

+0.013

–0.154

Change 1984–93

–0.082

–0.009

–0.005

–0.110

Age groups
17–34 relative to 35–64

17–24 relative to 45–54

25–34 relative to 45–54

a

In Canadian dollars.
of Consumer Finances.
c Survey of Work History (1981); Survey of Union Membership (1984); Labour Market
Activity Survey (1986, 1989); Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993).
b Survey
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Table 10 Earnings and Hours Ratios of Younger Relative to Older
Female Workers,a Selected Years
Annual
earningsb

Weeks
workedb

Hours per
weekc

Hourly
wagesc

1981

0.787

0.878

1.009

0.900

1984

0.751

0.874

0.983

0.863

1989

0.729

0.898

0.982

0.838

1993

0.686

0.870

0.917

0.803

Age groups
17–34 Relative to 35–64

Change 1981–89

–0.058

0.020

–0.027

–0.062

Change 1984–93

–0.065

–0.004

–0.066

–0.060

1981

0.621

0.802

0.972

0.815

1984

0.540

0.780

0.919

0.700

1989

0.492

0.780

0.899

0.662

1993

0.382

0.741

0.759

0.572

Change 1981–89

–0.129

–0.022

–0.073

–0.153

Change 1984–93

–.0158

–0.039

–0.016

–0.128

1981

1.009

0.947

1.028

1.069

1984

0.983

0.949

1.029

1.042

1989

0.902

0.959

1.038

0.997

1993

0.836

0.933

0.979

0.909

Change 1981–89

–0.107

0.012

0.010

–0.072

Change 1984–93

–0.147

–0.016

–0.050

–0.133

17–24 Relative to 45–54

25–34 Relative to 45–54

a

In Canadian dollars.
of Consumer Finances.
c Survey of Work History (1981); Survey of Union Membership (1984); Labour Market
Activity Survey (1986, 1989); Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (1993).
b Survey

Overall, the decline in annual earnings of the young appear to have
more to do with changes in relative wages than in working time. This
is unlike the story for changing inequality as a whole, where changes in
working time play a major role. We address possible reasons for this in
the concluding remarks.
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Figure 5 Indexed Real Annual Wages and Salaries of Female Workers,
1969–1994 (1969=100)
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DISCUSSION
The Association between Hours and Earnings
For hourly paid workers, the association between hours worked
and annual earnings is direct; one works an extra hour and one’s annual
earnings rise accordingly. A rise (or fall) in hours of work causes a
change in annual earnings. This may apply to approximately one-half
of all paid workers. Other workers are paid on some other basis, such
as an annual salary. How does one interpret an apparent association
between changing hours of work and changing annual earnings for
these workers. Changing hours of work do not necessarily cause a
change in annual earnings among, say, managers or professionals,
although over the long run there is an observed association in the
changes between the two. It may be that the same economic forces that
cause the relative annual earnings of these workers to rise also cause
their relative hours worked to increase. If they move together, relative
hourly wages would not change. Thus, for some workers it is not that
changes in hours worked directly cause a change in annual earnings,
but rather that forces are brought to bear on the two variables so that
they move in the same direction.
Interpreting the Results in a Supply/Demand Framework, and
Differences with the United States
These observations suggest that the labor market adjustments to
economic forces that led to rising earnings inequality have been at least
as much through a quantity (hours worked) as through the price (wages
paid) adjustment; probably the quantity adjustment has dominated.
This seems to be true for the early 1990s as well as the 1980s, although
increases in earnings inequality do not appear to be as significant in the
1990s as the 1980s.
Forces on both the supply and demand side of the labor market can
contribute to the change in earnings inequality. In their study of rising
earnings inequality in a number of countries, Freeman and Katz (1994)
conclude that “changes in the supply and demand for labour skills substantially alter wages and employment of different groups of workers in
the manner predicted by economist’s supply and demand market clear-
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ing model.” That is, the supply–demand model works. They go on to
note, however, that supply and demand factors by themselves cannot
explain all of the differing changes in inequality among advanced countries. They note that demand factors are probably more or less the same
in the developed countries, as they compete in the same global market
with the same technologies. Supply factors may differ somewhat more,
as demographics may be different and the development of the education and training systems may vary across countries.
They also argue, however, that something beyond supply and
demand is needed to understand significant changes in labor markets.
Knowledge of labor market institutions, which vary across countries, is
also necessary. They note that “the stronger the role of institutions in
wage determination, the smaller the effect of shifts in relative wages
and, as a consequence, the greater will be their effect on relative
employment.” Earlier studies have noted that the evidence that is available suggests that in the United States, the rise in earnings inequality
was associated more with changing relative wages than hours worked.
In Canada, changing hours appear to dominate. This may be related to
the larger role played by institutions in the Canadian labor market.
Unionization of the U.S labor force fell significantly during the
period of interest here, while the change was much less significant in
Canada (Card and Freeman 1994; Riddell 1993). Lemieux (1993)
found that the difference in the unionization trends were associated
with the lower rate of increase of labor market inequality in Canada
than the United States. These same trends may also be associated with
the tendency for changes in hours to play a more important role in Canada. Pressures for adjustment to changes in relative demand for labor
may be reflected more through a redistribution of hours worked rather
than hourly wages in a relatively stronger unionized setting.
But hours worked and wages paid respond to supply side influences as well. As noted in Freeman and Katz (1994), more generous
income maintenance or unemployment insurance benefits may allow
workers to be more rigid in the face of potential wage cuts, and reduce
their willingness to take lower wages to obtain work, thus reducing
supply-side pressures for wage cuts. This could contribute to the result
that the adjustment is more on the hours than wage dimension.
In a related work, Kuhn and Robb (1996), when looking for an
explanation of the rising unemployment gap between Canada and the
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United States, noted that over the 1977–1992 period, the work behavior
(in terms of weeks worked among prime-age males) changed very differently in the two countries. They observed that over this period work
behavior changed such that Canadian men reduced their weeks of
work, while Americans increased theirs. Some of this difference may
be due to the fact that the 1990–1992 recession was much more severe
in Canada than the United States, but it may also be reflective of differences in the changes in working time in the two countries.
In a simple supply–demand model, if labor demand for, say, lower
paid and skilled workers decreases, shifting the demand curve to the
left, one might expect to see an adjustment in both hourly wages paid
and hours worked. The extent to which such a demand shift is reflected
in one or the other would depend in part on the institutional arrangements in the country, as noted above. If there was a shift to the right in
the demand for more highly skilled and paid workers, one would
expect to see both their hours and wages rise. Data presented here suggest that both may have occurred, with the emphasis on changes in
hours worked.
Other Factors Influencing Hours of Work
But aside from institutional arrangements, it may not be too surprising that the effects of decreases in demand for labor for, say, lessskilled and lower paid workers are reflected in changing relative hours
of work. Economists have noted the reluctance of wages to adjust
downward for some time. Hall (1995) talks about the unwillingness of
employers to renegotiate wages of their workers to save jobs (or hours
of work). He refers to work by Benley (1994) that documents the
absence of renegotiation of wages in a depressed local labor market.
By far the most common reason given by employers for this practice is
that lowering wages would reduce morale, and hence presumably productivity. The notion that wages do not easily adjust downward,
requiring a quantity response, is not new.
There are other incentives that employers may have for adjusting
hours of work. For example, there is much talk of the desire for
increased flexibility of employment levels in the face of changing product demand. Employers may use more part-time, contract or temporary workers, which would allow employment (and hours) levels to be
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more easily adjusted when the company faces a downturn, thereby
reducing labor costs. This would influence weeks or hours worked,
and earnings of many workers, increasing polarization of the hours
variables. While it is not known to what extent this is actually occurring, it could be part of the explanation of these findings. Another
often discussed incentive relates to the impact of fringe benefits and
payroll taxes on hiring practices. At higher wage rates, the marginal
cost to the firm in terms of UI or Q/CPP payroll taxes of longer hours
of work is zero. However, engaging a new employee or extending the
hours of lower paid employees does have a cost. Similarly, extending
hours of work (and annual earnings) does not increase the cost of many
fringe benefits, and this may be particularly important among the more
highly paid. These possibilities may also encourage employers to
adjust hours worked.
The Declining Relative Wages among the Young
While changing hours may play an important role in rising inequality in general, it does not do so for one particular dimension of the
inequality story, the declining real and relative annual earnings among
younger workers. This does not mean that there were not significant
changes in hours worked among the young men. It means that changes
in hours worked were very similar among younger and older workers,
and hence relative values did not change. But relative wage rates did
decline among younger workers.
Why would changing working time play a significant role in rising
earnings inequality in general, but hourly wages dominate the increasing earnings gap between younger and older workers? We are discussing changes in relative earnings (or inequality) among groups, in this
case by age. Changing relative earnings among age groups is one part,
but only a small part, of the overall rise in earnings inequality. Increasing disparity within groups (defined in various ways) plays a larger role
(Levy and Murnane 1992; Morissette, Myles, and Picot 1994; Richardson 1994).
These results indicate that there is real wage adjustment taking
place in the Canadian economy. It may be observed more among
young workers than elsewhere for a number of reasons. The first
relates to relative education levels. Traditionally the young have
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enjoyed much higher levels of education than older workers. Recently
this advantage has largely disappeared, as the educational attainment of
older workers has risen quite rapidly. This is a result of the aging of the
more highly educated “baby boom” generation. This decline in relative educational level among the young (relating to older workers)
seems to account for around 30 percent of the earnings gap between the
young and the old (Kapsalis, Morissette, and Picot 1997). Falling relative education levels would be associated with decline in wages.
A second reason relates to where labor market adjustment takes
place. Adjustment of almost any type is typically more concentrated
among younger workers. This includes migration, adjusting to changing regional economic circumstances, changes in skill acquisition in
the face of changing demand, and wage adjustment. Among workers
in general, the reluctance of wages to adjust downward was noted.
This unwillingness on the part of both employees and employers to see
wages adjust downward would be particularly strong among older
employees, where an implicit contract with no expectations of downward wage adjustment may have developed over many years between
the employee and the employer. Seniority provisions may also make
such adjustment more difficult. And if downward wage adjustment,
when it does occur, takes place in the open labor market (as opposed to
internal labor markets in a company), this would have more impact on
the young, as they are more frequently exposed to the pressures of the
open labor market as they separate from firms more frequently.
It is likely easier for companies to adjust the wages of entry- (or
near entry) level jobs downward in the face of decreased labor demand
than it is to adjust the wages in jobs filled by experienced workers for
reasons given above. This would influence the wages of predominantly
younger workers.
For all these reasons, older workers are likely to be relatively
immune to the downward adjustment of wages, at least relative to
younger workers. Thus, when confronted with decreased labor
demand for some particular group (say, less-skilled workers), companies may choose in general to adjust hours of work (and wages to a
lesser extent) for a variety of reasons. These might include institutional factors, efficiency wage arguments, and the desire not to reduce
moral and productivity, and the desire to have more flexibility in working time to keep labor costs low in the face of decreased product
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demand, and possibly incentives associated with the structure of payroll taxes. But some wage adjustment obviously takes place, and it
appears to be concentrated among the young.

Notes
The author thanks Wendy Pyper for her usual excellent research assistance in preparing
this paper.
1. Calculations were made with the self-employed who have employment earnings
left in the sample, and the influence on the results were minimal.
2. Students could not be excluded from all of the data sets.
3. Since we do not have data for comparable points in the business cycle, we do not
know if the excluded population is increasing in size. If it were, we would be
underestimating the change in the distribution of hours worked. The increase in
the share of labor force members at the bottom of the hours worked distribution
would be underestimated, as would the impact of changes in hours worked on
earnings inequality. Given the magnitude of the estimated population, however,
we do not believe including this group would significantly change the findings.
4. In the upper deciles there can, of course, be little increase in weeks worked, as the
average is very close to 52 weeks. Any increase in hours worked per year must
come through increases in hours per week, not weeks per year. No decline in
weeks worked was observed in the upper deciles.
5. Any difference in observed patterns between this period (1984–1993) and the earlier 1981–1989 period really reflects differences in the patterns of inequality in
trends in the two recessions. This is because the expansionary period, 1984–
1989, is common to both periods.
6. See the earlier section “The Data” for a listing of these surveys.
7. The major job is that with the most hours per week in the month of December.
Data on weekly earnings, hours per week, and hourly wages were also computed
using all jobs held during the year, weighted according to the number of hours
worked in each job (for all years except 1984). A comparison was made between
the distributions and the change in the distributions observed using only the
December job and all jobs held during the year, and the trends were the same for
both approaches.
8. This is usual hours worked per week on the LFS, which includes unpaid overtime,
and overtime worked on a regular basis. Similar data are obtained from the special surveys used here, including the SWH, SUM, LMAS, and SLID. In these
surveys, usual hours worked as also collected (in SLID and LMAS the reference
is paid usual hours). Data are collected for usual hours per day, and days per
week, except for the 1993 SLID survey, which collects data on the usual hours per
week directly. These surveys also show a decline in the proportion of males
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working regular (35–40) hours, from 75 percent in 1981, 72 percent (84), 71 percent (86), 67 percent (89), and 66 percent (93).
This increase in the share of men working longer hours was not observed in the
LMAS/SLID data. This is likely due to the differences in the manner in which
people reported hours worked in the two surveys. The LFS is a consistent source
and likely more reliable.
When a respondent is asked, “What was your usual wage of salary before taxes
and other deductions from this employer,” they can respond in terms of wages per
hour, week, month, or year. In the special surveys, from 36 percent (SWH) to 53
percent (SUM) reported hourly wage directly. For the remainder, hourly wage is
computed by dividing earnings over the period (for example per week or per year)
by the usual hours worked.
Among all males, the result is not quite as striking. Inequality in weekly earnings
rose 14 percent between 1981 and 1989, according to these data, and 37 percent
of this increase was associated with the change in hours per week, an additional
53 percent by the covariance term, which implies that the tendency of higher paid
workers to work longer hours increased over the period.
It should be noted, however, that the rise in the inequality of weekly earnings
observed in these data sets for this 1984–1993 period is not reflected in the SCF
data, where weekly earnings inequality does not increase significantly over the
1984–1993 period. In the SCF data, inequality in weekly earnings, after increasing 25 percent among males in the 1981–1988 period, is seen to rise little over the
1984–1993 period. This leveling is not observed in the special surveys data.
Weekly earning inequality rises around 15 percent during the 1980s (comparable
to the SCF results), but 15–20 percent over the 1984–1993 period, which is much
higher than in SCF, where virtually no increase was observed. As a time-series
measure of weekly earnings, the SCF has a major advantage, it is a consistent
series of measures from the same survey vehicle. The special surveys, which are
similar in the way in which they treat hours and wages, do differ in some ways.
This is particularly true for the 1993 observation from SLID. Hours per week are
measured in a slightly different manner (SLID measures usual hours per week
directly, while the previous survey measured usual hours per day and days per
week). It seems likely that the consistent series from the SCF would be a more
reliable source of trends in weekly earnings than that observed in the special surveys.
Trends in the change in average weekly earnings were somewhat different from
the two sources. The decline in average weekly earnings at the bottom end of the
distribution observed for the 1981–1989 period in SCF (Tables 2 and 5) is evident
in the data from the special surveys for all males, but not for prime-age males.
The change in the distribution of weekly earnings is similar to the two sources
(both show rising inequality), but the change in the level is different. This is probably because the level of weekly earnings in the 1981 SWH appear to be low relative to the other special surveys. This would cause the growth to be overestimated
between 1981 and 1989. Average weekly earnings from the special surveys were
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compared with those from SCH. For all males, for example, the ratio of weekly
earnings in the special surveys compared to those in SCF was in the 97 percent to
101 percent range for all years (84, 86, 89, 93) except 1981, when it was 93 percent. A similar pattern was observed for prime-age males. Average weekly earnings appear to be underestimated in the 1981 SWH.
For example, among men 25–44, the employment/population ratio fell from 90.4
percent in 1981 to 88.2 percent in 1989, and 83.3 percent in 1995. Among women
of the same age, the trend was up through the 1980s from 60.8 percent in 1981, to
70.8 percent in 1989, to 70.6 percent in 1995.
The special surveys data also show a decline in the share of prime-age women
working a regular 35–40 hour week, from 65 percent in 1981, to 63 percent in
1989, and 60 percent in 1993.
That is, those with lower wages are increasingly working shorter hours, and those
with higher wages are increasingly working longer hours.
Earlier work shows that among full-time, full-year, female workers, earnings inequality rose in the 1980s, and declined somewhat in the 1990s (Morissette, Myles,
and Picot 1994; OECD 1996).
Earlier work for the 1980s showed that among women working full-time, fullyear earnings inequality rose, but when part-year and part-time working women
are included, it fell (Morissette, Miles, and Picot 1994).
The one exception is among the 17- to 24-year-olds during the 1984–1993 period,
where relative hours worked per week (relative to 45- to 54-year-olds) decline 12
percent compared to a decline in hourly wages of 18 percent.
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Fundamental changes in labor market patterns among U.S. primeage men over the past two decades have been the focus of numerous
recent research studies and media accounts. Increases in wage inequality and in male joblessness are the most important of these changes;
assertions of an increase in part-time and “contingent” work have also
been made. In addition, there is evidence of a more general decline in
the total annual hours of market work of the typical working-age male.1
In this chapter, we use a new statistical indicator, foregone potential earnings (FPE), to measure the extent to which the prime-age male
population (civilian nonstudent 18- to 64-year-old males) underutilizes
its human capital. We define the annual value of an individual’s human
capital2 to be the amount that an individual would earn if he worked
full time, full year (FTFY); that is, 52 weeks per year and 40 hours per
week. This amount is the individual’s potential earnings. FPE is the
gap between an individual’s actual earnings and his potential earnings
and is thus an indicator of the underutilization of human capital.3
We use our FPE indicator to examine trends in human capital
underutilization for the entire population of working-age males, and
for various population subgroups, during the 1975–1992 period. We
also examine trends in the reasons given for the failure to fully utilize
human capital. We find that over the 1975–1992 period, per capita FPE
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increased by almost 3 percent for all working-age males. This increase
stems from a 12 percent decrease in real per capita earnings and a 10
percent decrease in the real per capita potential (or FTFY) earnings of
these individuals. When we aggregate the reasons given for underutilization into exogenous constraints on working and individual preferences for not working, we find that the share of FPE attributable to the
former has declined, while FPE attributable to the latter has risen. This
shift is particularly pronounced for older, less educated, nonwhite men.
Our FPE indicator provides a more complete picture of economic
performance than other statistical measures of labor force activity, such
as the unemployment rate. Whereas the unemployment rate simply
indicates the percent of individuals in the labor force looking for work,
our FPE indicator applies to individuals in and out of the labor force,
quantifies in dollar amounts the level of underutilization, and identifies
the sources of underutilization. For example, our FPE indicator demonstrates the increased importance of retirement relative to unemployment as a source of underutilization. Similarly, it can be used to
measure the effect of policy changes. For example, what happens to
underutilization due to illness and disability when federal health care
policy changes? It can also be used as a supplemental indicator for
assessing the macroeconomic performance of the economy, measuring
both the extent and composition of slack in the utilization of the
nation’s labor resources. In essence, FPE provides the first measure
that values in monetary terms the level and trend of human capital
underutilization.

TRENDS IN HOURS WORKED, 1975–1992
Figure 1 shows the trend in average annual work hours for the
white, nonwhite, 4 and total male working-age population over the
1975–1992 period, as reflected in the March supplement to the annual
Current Population Survey (CPS).5 For both racial groups, mean annual
hours decreased during the 1980–1983 recession; the subsequent recovery failed to return this value to its pre-1980s level for either racial
group. Over the entire period, the trend of annual work hours is slightly
negative for all working-age males and for the two racial subgroups.
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Figure 1 Mean Annual Hours Worked, 18- to 64-Year-Old Males,
1975–1992

Table 1 indicates the reason for the decrease in this average value.
It shows the percentage of the sample in four annual hours-worked categories for the paired recession years of 1975 and 1991 and the paired
cyclical peak years of 1979 and 1989. The most noteworthy change is
the 26 percent increase in the proportion of jobless males (those with
zero work hours) over the 1975–991 period—an increase from 7.7 to
9.7 percent of the working-age population. However, the share of
working males employed less than 2,080 hours per year decreased by
about 6 percent for the paired recession years and 12 percent for the
paired peak years. The share of prime-age males working exactly at
capacity declined 5 percent over the recession years and remained constant over the peaks, while the share working in excess of capacity
increased by about 6 percent for both pairs of years. Over the sets of
paired years, then, there has been a hollowing out of the middle of the
annual hours distribution, with an increase in the mass at both
extremes.6 These hours-worked trends suggest substantial shifts in
labor supply and demand over the period. Although the pattern of
changes in the mean and variance in male earnings have been extensively studied, including changes in the level and distribution of both
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Table 1 Percentage of 18- to 64-Year-Old Males in Annual Hours Worked
Year

0 hr.

1–2,079 hr.

2,080 hr.

>2,080 hr.

1975

7.7

31.1

34.6

26.6

1991

9.7

29.2

32.8

28.3

2.0

–1.9

–1.8

1.7

1979

7.4

29.7

34.2

28.7

1989

8.8

26.1

34.7

30.4

1.4

–3.6

0.5

1.7

Recession years

Change (1991–1975)
Peak years

Change( 1989–1979)

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, March 1976, 1980, 1990, 1992 CPS.

wage rates and hours worked, the sources of the observed shifts remain
little understood.7

HUMAN CAPITAL UNDERUTILIZATION OF
WORKING-AGE U.S. MALES
The Concept and Estimation of FPE
We define the earnings associated with full use of human capital as
potential earnings (PE) and measure this value as the product of an
individual’s predicted wage rate8 and 2,080 hours. The individual’s
earnings are measured as the product of the actual number of hours that
the person works in a year and his predicted wage rate. FPE, then, is
the number of dollars that an individual’s earnings fall short of PE.9 It
can be thought of as weighted foregone hours—hours worked less than
the norm—where the weight is based on an estimate of the value of the
person’s productive capabilities in the labor market. For any group of
working-age males, I, we measure FPE as an average value,

FPEI =

∑ Potential Earningsi

iεI

N

−

∑ Earningsi

iεI

N

,
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where N is the number of individuals in I. So defined, FPE measures
the extent to which the utilization of human capital deviates from a
socially accepted norm of full-capacity utilization; in this case, 2,080
hours per year.10
Our measure of FPE neglects the role of important nonmarket
activities in two ways. First, we assume that human capital is utilized
only through paid market work. While human capital is also utilized
through nonmarket activities, our purpose is to analyze trends in potential and foregone potential earnings. Since nonmarket activities are, by
definition, unpaid, they cannot contribute to the realized earnings of an
individual; hence, we neglect them here.
Second, we ignore the fact that certain nonmarket activities, such
as child care, must be performed. If the individual does not perform
them, he or she must obtain services from someone else, perhaps by
purchasing them. Thus, FPE may not represent the net increase in
either individual realized earnings or in aggregate earned income when
the individual moves to full utilization.11
FPE of Working-Age Males
We begin our examination of FPE with Table 2, which shows the
trends in various earnings measures for the working-age U.S. male
population.12 Over the 1975–1992 period, aggregate real earnings
increased from $1.26 trillion to $1.47 trillion, or 17 percent.13 During
this same period, the total male working-age population grew from
about 52 million to about 69 million, or 32 percent. Hence, per capita
earnings for working-age males fell nearly 12 percent over the period,
from about $24,000 to $21,000, which is consistent with other estimates of sagging mean earnings of male workers.
We estimate that over the same period, aggregate potential earnings of all working-age males in the United States rose from $1.48 trillion to $1.77 trillion, an increase of 19 percent. However, because of
the 32 percent growth in the size of the working-age male population
over this period, per capita potential earnings fell from $28,206 to
$25,494, a decrease of 9.6 percent.
By comparing the level of per capita earnings to per capita potential
earnings, we can measure the extent to which working-age males fail to
utilize their stock of human capital. Over the 1975–1992 period, the gap
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between aggregate earnings and aggregate potential earnings (aggregate
FPE) increased from $.22 trillion to $.30 trillion, or 36 percent. In per
capita terms, FPE increased nearly 3 percent, from $4,201 to $4,313.14

THE REASONS FOR FOREGONE POTENTIAL EARNINGS
Self-Reported Reasons for FPE
Table 2 shows that per capita real FPE ranged from about $3,800 in
1978 to over $5,000 in the recession year of 1982. From respondents’
Table 2 Per Capita Earnings Measures, 18- to 64-Year-Old Malesa
Foregone potential
earnings
Earnings
Potential earnings
($)
Year
($)
($)
1975
24,004
28,206
4,201
1976
24,630
28,780
4,150
1977
24,367
28,261
3,893
1978
24,966
28,801
3,836
1979
24,849
28,634
3,785
1980
24,039
28,725
4,236
1981
22,996
27,335
4,339
1982
22,380
27,424
5,045
1983
22,303
27,295
4,992
1984
22,919
27,448
4,529
1985
23,011
27,310
4,299
1986
23,892
28,329
4,437
1987
23,793
28,101
4,308
1988
23,373
27,317
3,944
1989
23,333
27,153
3,820
1990
22,285
26,176
3,891
1991
21,450
25,613
4,163
1992
21,181
25,494
4,313
Change 1975–1992 (%)
–11.8
–9.6
+2.7
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, March 1976–1993 CPS.
a All dollar amounts are adjusted to 1993 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 cost index.
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answers to questions regarding why they work less than the FTFY
norm, per capita FPE for each year can be decomposed into the following comprehensive set of “reasons”:15
• work is not available (unemployed),
• discouraged from seeking work,
• illness/disability,
• retirement,
• voluntary part-time work,
• housework, including child care, or
• other.
The level and trend of these components of per capita FPE are presented in Figure 2 for the 1975–1992 period. The vertical sum of the
component values for each year equals per capita FPE.
With the exception of the late 1970s and late 1980s booms, a lack
of employment opportunities for those seeking work is the largest component of FPE. This unemployment component peaked during the
recession of the early 1980s, when it accounted for nearly $2,200 per
person of FPE, and was at its lowest at the end of the expansion of the
late 1980s, when it fell to less than $1,000 per person. Over the period,
per capita FPE due to unemployment shows a slight downward trend of
about $120 per decade.16
The second component of FPE is labeled “discouraged workers,”
and it too reflects macroeconomic conditions. The value of this discouraged worker effect ranged from a low of about $100 per person (or
about 2 percent of total FPE) at the end of the 1970s, to a high of nearly
$400 (nearly 6 percent of the total) during the early-1980s recession.
While this value declined during the expansion of the 1980s, it never
fell below $200 per person, and rose to over $300 by the end of the
period. Due to this discouraged worker effect, per capita FPE showed
an upward trend over the period of about $140 per decade.
Illness or disabling health conditions forms the second most
important reason for FPE, and accounted for a per capita value of about
$1,000 to $1,300 per year over the period. The trend in FPE due to this
factor is clearly downward, however, at about $150 per person per
decade. This downward trend in foregone earnings due to illness/dis-
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Figure 2 The Per Capita Gap between Earnings and Potential Earnings,
18- to 64-Year Old Males, by Reason

ability contradicts a growing incidence of illness/disability problems
among the working-age population reported in other studies.17
Retirement is the third most important reason for FPE, and
accounted for $500 per capita to nearly $1,000 per capita. This source
of FPE is the most rapidly growing among the set of reasons given by
working-age males for the failure to fully use human capital. Per capita FPE due to retirement has grown about $190 per decade, or nearly
$350 over the 1975–1992 period.
The remaining reasons for FPE (housework, voluntary part-time
work, and other) account for a relatively small share of total FPE per
person—ranging from 14–23 percent of the total over the period.
Aggregate FPE attributable to this set of reasons has crept up slowly
over the period.
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Underutilization Due to Exogenous Constraints
and Individual Response
The underutilization of human capital due to exogenous constraints
placed on individuals carries quite different social and policy implications than that due to voluntary, individual choices. For this reason, we
have divided per capita FPE into two components—that arising from
individual responses to incentives (retirement, voluntary part-time
work, and housework), and that stemming from exogenous constraints
on the utilization of human capital (work not available, discouraged
from seeking work, and illness).18
Figure 3 shows the level of per capita FPE due to exogenous constraint and individual response reasons for the working-age male population. An upward trend for individual response reasons is observed,
while the trend for exogenous constraint reasons is negative. At the
beginning of the period, FPE due to individual response reasons was 23
percent as large as exogenous constraint reasons for FPE; by the end of
the period, the individual response reasons had grown to over 36 perFigure 3 Exogenous Constraint and Individual Response Reasons for
Foregone Potential Earnings, 18- to 64-Year-Old Males
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cent of the value of the exogenous constraint reasons. Over the 1975–
1992 period, per capita FPE attributed to individual response reasons
increased by about $240 per decade, while per capita FPE due to exogenous constraint reasons fell by about $130 per decade.

FOREGONE POTENTIAL EARNINGS PATTERNS AMONG
RACE, AGE, AND EDUCATION SUBGROUPS
The overall patterns of working-age male human capital underutilization described above conceal substantial differences among race/
age/education subgroups. In this section, we summarize a few of the
more prominent of these differences.19 We begin with a discussion of
racial differences and then present differences among age and education subgroups.
Racial Differences in FPE
Over the 1975–1992 period, the ratio of nonwhite to white potential earnings fell from 0.74 to 0.71. The earnings potential of the mean
white male fell by an average of $1,104 per decade; that for the mean
nonwhite male fell by $1,188. As a result, the racial gap in potential
earnings increased slightly over the period.20 Table 3 shows 1975 levels of PE and FPE for both nonwhites and whites, along with the reasons for FPE in that year, and the constraint/response breakdown in the
causes for FPE. It also summarizes trends in all of these categories
expressed in “dollars of average per decade change” over the 1975–
1992 period.
The most striking pattern is the decline in per capita FPE for nonwhites over the period, in contrast to virtually no change in per capita
white FPE. The difference in the “Per decade change” columns
implies that the racial gap in the FPE indicator of labor underutilization
narrowed by nearly $240 over the 1975–1992 period—or by more than
one-fifth of its initial level of about $1,170.
While the contribution of unemployment to underutilization or
FPE decreased over the period for both racial groups, the decrease in
the unemployment reason for FPE was larger for nonwhites than for
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Table 3 Foregone Per Capita Potential Earnings, 18- to 64-Year-Old
Males, by Racea ($)
Nonwhites
1975
Level
Potential earnings
Total FPE
Unemployment
Discouraged

Whites

Per decade
change

1975
Level

Per decade
change

21,663

–1,188

29,400

–1,104

5,190

–129

4,021

3

2,163

–264

1,569

–118

174

240

59

102

1,838

–196

1,167

–163

Housework

74

46

55

27

Retirement

230

130

551

229

Illness

Voluntary P/T

120

14

138

24

Other

592

–103

481

–98

424

190

744

280

4,174

–216

2,795

–180

Individual response FPE
Exogenous constraint FPE

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, March 1976–1993 CPS.
All dollar amounts are adjusted to 1993 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 cost index.

a

whites. The failure of the economy to perform at full capacity appears
to have taken a smaller toll on nonwhites (relative to whites) at the end
of the period than it did at the beginning.
FPE due to being discouraged from seeking work is quantitatively
small relative to FPE due to unemployment. However, this discouraged-worker FPE was three times larger for nonwhites than for whites
at the beginning of the period, and increased at twice the rate for nonwhites relative to whites over the period.
For both racial groups, a large share of the decrease in capacity utilization is attributable to the increase in pre–age-65 retirement. Per
capita “early” retirement FPE for whites was double that for nonwhites
at the beginning of the period and increased more rapidly over the
period. Primarily because of the more rapid growth in FPE due to
retirement for whites, the individual response reasons for FPE grew
more for whites over the period than for nonwhites.
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Age Differences in FPE
Table 4 shows the trends in potential earnings and FPE for the
youngest (ages 18–24) and oldest (ages 55–64) groups, as most of the
interesting patterns are concentrated in these groups. Per decade, the
earnings potential of 18- to 24-year-olds fell by $2,700, while mean
potential earnings of older working-age males decreased only $960.
Over the entire period, the ratio of the potential earnings of the youngest group to that of the oldest group fell from 0.64 to 0.52—a radical
drop of 12 basis points.
FPE is higher for the older group than for the younger group,
which is not surprising given the substantially higher potential earnings
of the older group. Moreover, the old-to-young gap in FPE has been
rising over time. Over the entire 1975–1992 period, per capita FPE for

Table 4 Foregone Per Capita Potential Earnings for the Youngest and
Oldest Age Groupsa ($)
Age 18–24

Age 55–64

1975
Level

Per decade
change

1975
Level

Per decade
change

17,645

–2,700

27,725

–960

4,207

–379

7,369

1,130

2,592

–503

1,133

–29

Discouraged

218

193

62

126

Illness

283

7

2,985

–602

Housework

27

39

71

11

Retirement

1

7

2434

1,562

Voluntary P/T

357

19

235

129

Other

729

–142

448

–67

385

66

2,740

1,702

3,093

–303

4,181

–506

Potential earnings
Total FPE
Unemployment

Individual response FPE
Exogenous constraint FPE

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, March 1976–1993 CPS.
a All dollar amounts are adjusted to 1993 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 cost index.
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youths fell by almost $700, while per capita FPE for the group of older
workers rose by over $2,000.
For youths, the $700 drop in FPE has been driven by a decrease of
more than $500 per decade in FPE attributable to reduced unemployment-generated nonutilization. However, the sizable increase in FPE
among youths due to the discouraged worker effect—about $350 over
the period, a twofold increase—is disturbing and runs in the opposite
direction to the unemployment effect. The very large increase in FPE
for the older age group—over $2,000 during the 18-year period—is
more than explained by the rapid increase in retirement over the period.
However, the retirement-induced increase in FPE for this older group
was offset by a substantial decrease in the amount of foregone earnings
due to illness/disability; from an average of about $3,000 per year in
FPE at the beginning of the period, to about $2,200 by the end of the
period.21
Education Differences in FPE
Table 5 summarizes the pattern of potential earnings and the utilization of this potential over the 1975–1992 period for the two lowest
education groups—dropouts and those with a high school degree but
no college. Over the 18-year period, potential earnings for both groups
fell dramatically. The average per decade decrease in potential earnings is $4,265 for dropouts and $3,571 for high school graduates. Of
the four education groups, only college graduates showed an increase
in potential earnings over the period (not shown in table). The increasing return to years of schooling is clearly seen in the widening gap in
potential earnings among the education groups, even between high
school dropouts and those with a terminal high school degree.
Per capita FPE for the high school dropouts decreased slightly over
the period, by about $80 per decade, while FPE for those with a high
school degree increased about $200 per decade. The reasons for the
level of and change in FPE for these low-education groups are dominated by unemployment, discouragement over finding work, and illness. Earnings foregone due to unemployment decreased for both loweducation groups over the period. However, per capita FPE due to the
discouraged worker effect increased by $264 per decade for the group
of dropouts and by nearly $100 per decade for those with a high school
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Table 5 Foregone Per Capital for Those with No Collegea ($)
High school dropouts
1975
Level
Potential earnings

Per decade
change

High school graduates
1975
Level

Per decade
change

22,280

–4,265

27,491

–3,571

5,901

–81

3,865

202

2,023

–137

1,787

–132

103

265

84

154

2,548

–302

905

85

73

40

46

37

Retirement

550

138

481

147

Voluntary P/T

104

7

110

5

Other

500

–91

452

–94

727

185

636

189

4,674

–175

2,777

107

Total FPE
Unemployment
Discouraged
Illness
Housework

Individual response FPE
Exogenous constraint FPE

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, March 1976–1993 CPS.
a All dollar amounts are adjusted to 1993 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 cost index.

degree. A large increase in underutilization due to retirement is also
recorded for both groups.

FOREGONE POTENTIAL EARNINGS PATTERNS
FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS
The patterns discussed in the previous section reveal substantial
variation in human capital underutilization among subgroups of the
male working-age population. In general, nonwhite youths and older
males—especially those with low schooling levels—have the highest
levels of underutilization. These same groups display the largest
increases in human capital underutilization over time. Here, we focus
on the youngest and oldest nonwhite groups with the lowest schooling
levels, and compare their FPE patterns with those of the average male in
their age group and the average working-age male, irrespective of age.
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Low-Education Minority Youths
Consider, first, low-education minority youths (Table 6). The top
row of the table, potential earnings, shows vividly the declining prospects of low-education minority youth. Over the 18-year period, real
potential earnings fell by 16 percent per decade for both nonwhite
youths who dropped out of high school and those with a terminal high
school degree. This compares with a 15 percent decadal drop for all
youths and a 5 percent drop for all males.
For both low-education groups of minority youths, FPE fell over
the period. However, the decrease in FPE must be interpreted in the
context of a decreasing level of potential earnings. The ratio of per
capita earnings to total potential earnings, which reflects the percent of
potential earnings utilized, fell over the period for both low-education
minority groups, by over 3 percentage points for the dropouts and 4
percentage points for the terminal high school graduates.
For all of the groups, unemployment accounted for the largest portion of unused earnings potential. Although this share fell over the
period for all four groups, discouragement over finding work
accounted for an increasing share of FPE. For all the groups, the individual response reasons for FPE increased over the period.
Older, Low-Education Minority Males
Table 7 shows that potential earnings decreased substantially for
older, low-education minority workers (by 9 percent for dropouts and 6
percent for high school graduates, per decade), relative to both all older
working-age men (3 percent) and all males (5 percent).
Similarly, our indicator of the underutilization of human capital—
FPE—is very high for older, low-education minority males, especially
relative to their earnings potential. At the beginning of the period,
these groups utilized only about 60–65 percent of their earnings potential, compared to 73 percent and 85 percent for all older workers and
all males, respectively. However, compared to low-education minority
youths, FPE for the older, low-education minority workers rose substantially over the 1975–1992 period.
The reasons for FPE among nonwhite, low-education, older males
are dominated by unemployment, retirement, and illness. For both

Nonwhite dropouts,
ages 18–24

Nonwhite high school
degree, ages 18–24
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Table 6 Foregone Per Capita Potential Earnings, 18- to 64-Year Old Malesa ($)
All males, ages 18–24

All working-age males

1975
Level

Per decade
change

1975
Level

Per decade
change

1975
Level

Per decade
change

1975
Level

Per decade
change

Potential earnings

14,210

–2,221

16,475

–2,607

17,645

–2,700

28,206

–1,518

Total FPE

6,134

–721

4,846

–455

4,207

–379

4,201

17

Unemployment

3,085

–877

3,090

–717

2,592

–503

1,661

–122

Discouraged

719

324

323

332

218

193

76

140

Illness

793

–91

365

52

283

7

1,271

–150

Housework

90

77

63

38

27

39

58

32

Retirement

0

15

0

1

1

7

502

189

Voluntary P/T
Other
Individual response
FPE
Exogenous
constraint FPE

212

10

316

1

357

19

135

19

1,236

–179

688

–162

729

–142

499

–91

302

102

379

40

385

66

695

240

4,597

–643

3,778

–333

3,093

–303

3,008

–132

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, March 1976–1993 CPS.
a All dollar amounts are adjusted to 1993 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 cost index.

Table 7 Foregone Per Capita Potential Earnings, 18- to 64-Year-Old Malesa ($)
Nonwhite dropouts,
ages
55–64

Nonwhite high
school degree,
ages 55–64

All ages, 55–64

All working-age males

1975
Level

Per decade
change

1975
Level

Per decade
change

1975
Level

Per decade
change

1975
Level

Per decade
change

Potential earnings

17,607

–1,610

24,977

–1,626

27,725

–960

28,206

–1,518

Total FPE

7,201

134

8,019

1,438

7,369

1,130

4,201

17

Unemployment

1,261

–131

1,673

–143

1,133

–29

1,661

–122

30

228

0

248

62

126

76

140

4,616

–598

3,158

96

2,985

–602

1,271

–150

111

–4

110

43

71

11

58

32

Retirement

770

686

2,111

1,387

2,434

1,562

502

189

Voluntary PT

161

27

255

121

235

129

135

19

Other

252

–74

712

–314

448

–67

499

–91

1,042

709

2,476

1,551

2,740

1,702

695

240

5,906

–501

4,831

201

4,181

–506

3,008

–132

Discouraged
Illness
Housework

Individual response
FPE
Exogenous
constraint
FPE

161

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, March 1976–1993 CPS.
All dollar amounts are adjusted to 1993 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 cost index.
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groups—and for all older males—illness is the single largest reason for
FPE; in 1975, it accounted for nearly two-thirds of FPE for the dropout
group, and 40 percent of FPE for the older workers with a terminal
high school degree.22 For the dropout group, FPE attributed to illness
declined over the period, as it did for the two comparison groups. For
all of the older groups, retirement accounted for an increasingly large
share of FPE over the period, while unemployment as a reason for FPE
declined. It is noteworthy that nonwork due to the discouraged-worker
effect accounted for very little of FPE for the nonwhite, low-schooling
older group at the beginning of the period; however, this source of FPE
grew rapidly over the period for this vulnerable population.
Largely because of the increase in retirement, individual response
reasons for FPE grew for all of the older groups. This growth, in combination with the decrease in potential earnings, caused the percentage
of potential earnings realized by older, low-education minority males
(not shown) to fall substantially over the period, by 14–16 percentage
points for the two low-schooling groups, compared with decreases of 9
percentage points for all older males and 1.6 percentage points for all
males.

EXOGENOUS CONSTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE
REASONS FOR FPE
The patterns of underutilization described here raise the question
of the extent to which the reduction in human capital utilization has
derived from changes in the exogenous constraints that people face or
in their individual responses to incentives. As we noted above,
underutilization of human capital due to exogenous constraints placed
on individuals carries quite different social and policy implications
than that due to voluntary individual choices.
Over the 18-year period, an upward trend in individual response
reasons for underutilization is observed, while the contribution of
exogenous constraints to underutilization appear to be decreasing. At
the beginning of the period, individual response reasons accounting for
FPE were about 23 percent as large as those associated with exogenous
constraints. However, by the end of the period, individual response
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reasons were 36 percent as large as the exogenous constraint reasons.
Over the 1975–1992 period, per capita individual response reasons for
underutilized human capital increased by about $240 per decade, while
per capita exogenous constraint reasons fell by about $130 per decade.
Our calculations allow an even deeper assessment of these
response/constraint sources of human capital underutilization among
various age/race/education subgroups. In Table 8, we break the gap
between earnings and potential earnings into the two components of
individual response and exogenous constraint reasons, and show the
ratio of these two values for the subgroups, for 1975 and 1992. We
also show the percentage change in this measure over the two years for
each of the subgroups. Overall, and for each of the subgroups, the
individual response/exogenous constraint ratio increased rapidly over
the 1975–1992 period. For all working-age males, the ratio rose by 57
percent. For the oldest individuals, the ratio increased by 122 percent,
indicating the increasing importance of individual retirement decisions
in explaining the growth in foregone potential earnings. Large per
decade increases in this ratio are also recorded for older, nonwhite high
school dropouts and graduates, and for young, nonwhite high school
dropouts.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have defined a new indicator of the level of
human capital, potential earnings, and a new indicator of labor
underutilization, foregone potential earnings. FPE is the gap between
the norm of full time-full year work and the hours a person actually
works, weighted by his predicted hourly wage. We measure this value
in 1993 dollars and interpret it as the amount of potential earnings that
the individual foregoes. We have used this concept to assess the levels
and trends of human capital and its utilization among U.S. working-age
males from 1975 to 1992. Overall, the time-related patterns in both
potential earnings and the utilization of this potential indicate that
underutilization of the stock of male human capital has been increasing
over the period. This trend in human capital underutilization has been
concentrated among very young and old workers, those with the lowest

1975 Level of FPE ($)
Individual
Exogenous
responses
constraints
695
3,008
424
4,174
744
2,795
385
3,093
140
2,318
340
3,126
2,740
4,181
727
4,674
636
2,777
678
2,287
778
1,321
302
4,597
379
3,778

1975 IR/EC
ratio
0.23
0.10
0.27
0.12
0.06
0.11
0.66
0.16
0.23
0.30
0.59
0.07
0.10

1992 Level of FPE ($)
Individual
Exogenous
responses
constraints
1,025
2,846
757
3,748
1,106
2,573
495
2,563
227
2,437
476
3,227
4,961
3,387
981
4,216
937
3,048
949
2,637
1,263
1,822
405
3,435
388
3,317

All working-age males
All nonwhites
All whites
Ages 18–24
Ages 25–39
Ages 40–54
Ages 55–64
High school dropouts
High school graduates
Some college
College graduate
Nonwhite dropouts, ages 18–24
Nonwhite high school graduates,
ages 18–24
Nonwhite dropouts, ages 55–65
1,042
5,906
0.18
2,674
Nonwhite high school graduates,
2,476
4,831
0.51
4,798
ages 55–64
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, March 1976–1993 CPS.
a All dollar amounts are adjusted to 1993 dollars using the CPI-U-X1 cost index.

5,008
4,843

Change in
1992 IR/EC IR/EC (%)
ratio
1975 to 1992
0.36
57
0.20
102
0.43
59
0.19
61
0.09
55
0.15
34
1.46
122
0.23
45
0.31
37
0 .36
20
0.39
17
0.12
68
0.12
17
0.53
0.99

197
94

164

Table 8 The Levels and Percent Changes in the Ratio of Individual Responses to Exogenous Constraint Sources of
Foregone Per Capita Potential Earningsa
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education levels, and nonwhites. Finally, we note that while exogenous constraints on human capital utilization outweigh individual
choices to underutilize, the relative contribution of choice-based FPE
has increased over the period.

Notes
1. A December 1, 1994, front page New York Times story inquired, “So why are so
many men—healthy men in the prime of life—working less than ever before?”
(Nasar 1994). See also Buron and Haveman (1995), Buron, Haveman, and
O’Donnell (1995), Freeman (1994), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Juhn (1992).
2. The human capital embodied in an individual is taken to be the value of the “bundle” of his characteristics—for example, schooling, skills, age, race, and health
status—when fully used in productive economic activities. The independent
effect of any one of these characteristics on the individual’s observed (or estimated) wage rate is taken as an estimate of the market valuation of the hourly
rental value of the characteristic. Hence, the market-determined “use-value” of an
hour of the individual’s work time—his wage rate—measures the economic value
of an hour’s worth of his human capital. This convention implies that the returns
to race and gender found in human capital studies reflect real productivity differences and not discriminatory treatment of these traits in the labor market.
3. We assume those working full time, full year or more are using their human capital at capacity; no credit is given for work in excess of, 2,080 hours per year.
While work patterns above 2,080 hours per year are also of interest, this chapter
concentrates on underutilization of human capital, and hence, those individuals
who work less than the full-time, full-year norm. Therefore, we cap each individual’s work hours at 2,080 and count those with 2,080 or more hours of work as
having zero unutilized hours.
4. “Whites” refers to white non-Hispanics; “nonwhites” are all others.
5. The standard method of calculating annual hours from the CPS is to multiply
weeks worked in the last year by hours usually worked in a week. If reports of the
latter correspond to modal hours rather than mean hours, as seems likely, this estimate is incorrect. In this analysis, we adopt a different convention and employ
information on weeks worked part time and hours worked last week in the estimation of annual hours for some individuals. If an individual usually works full time
(i.e., at least 35 hours per week) and does not report working part time in any
week, then annual hours are estimated in the standard way as the product of weeks
worked and hours usually worked per week. The same formula is used if an individual reports working part time throughout the year. However, individuals who
usually work full time but work part time in some weeks (or who usually work
part time but work full time in at least one week) are not asked for their hours during part-time (full-time) employment. To fill in this data gap for these workers,
we use information on individuals who worked part time in the last week (not

166

Haveman, Buron, and Bershadker

year), but who usually work full time. We regress hours worked by such individuals in the last week on race, age, education, and usual hours/week and use the estimates to obtain a conditional expectation of the part-time hours/week of usually
full-time workers. Annual hours are then calculated as the product of weeks
worked full time and hours usually worked per week, plus weeks worked part
time multiplied by the estimate of part-time hours. An analogous procedure is
used to calculate the annual hours of individuals who usually work part time but
work full time in at least one week.
6. These results are consistent with other recent studies; see Schor (1991) and Coleman and Pencavel (1993).
7. See Bound and Johnson (1992), Burtless (1990), Haveman and Buron (1994),
Karoly (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992), and Moffitt (1990).
8. In predicting individual hourly wages, we first estimate annual selectivity corrected (Heckman 1976, 1979), hourly wage functions over all wage and salary
nonwhite workers and white workers from data in the annual March CPS from
1976–1993. The independent variables are those exogenous human capital determinants of market productivity that are recorded in every CPS year. The race/
year-specific coefficient estimates are used to predict each person’s hourly wages
based on his values for each of the attributes in the wage function. A more complete description of the procedure is found in Buron, Haveman, and O’Donnell
(1995) and Haveman, Buron, and Bershadker (1997). The parameter estimates
for the two race-specific wage functions for each year are available from the
authors, as well as the probit equations that provide the basis for selectivity correction.
9. While labor market distortions may cause observed (and, hence, predicted) wages
to be an imperfect measure of the productivity of an individual’s work time, we
accept these market values as the most appropriate weighting factor available for
estimating the value of both earnings and potential earnings. We note that
changes in labor market distortions over time will be reflected in the trend of
aggregate measures of both earnings measures. For example, the presumed
reduction in the influence of labor unions on wages (associated with the fall in
union membership over the past two decades) could lead to a downward trend in
both earnings and potential earnings due to a decrease in estimated wage rates. It
should also be emphasized that the estimated wage rates used to weight actual and
potential (2,080) work hours reflect the interaction of supply and demand factors
in individual markets at a point in time. Hence, individual potential earnings estimates can only be aggregated to indicate the total, or per capita, value of potential
earnings under the assumption that the structure of wage rates would not change
in any important way if all males were to increase their annual work time to 2,080
hours, reflecting the full use of their human capital.
10. Given this convention, underutilization indicators could be calculated by comparing the actual hours that individuals work to the full capacity work hours norm of
2,080 hours. However, because we are interested in human capital utilization
rather than labor hours utilization, we account for individual productivity as mea-
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sured by the predicted wage rate in measuring both the earnings and the potential
earnings components of FPE.
It should also be noted that in these cases, new jobs will be created in place of doit-yourself activities.
Another indicator of the extent of labor underutilization is the percent of all working-age males who work less than the “full activity” norm, and hence record some
level of FPE. We have studied this indicator of the “prevalence” of FPE and
reported the results in Buron, Haveman, and O’Donnell (1995) and Haveman,
Buron, and Bershadker (1997).
Aggregate earnings is the sum of the individual earnings of working-age males,
which we described above as the product of an individual’s actual annual hours of
work and the individual-specific predicted wage rate. Dollar comparisons are in
1993 prices throughout the paper.
A regression of each of the three series in Table 2 on a time trend reveals average
annual decreases of per capita earnings and potential earnings of $154 and $152,
respectively, and an annual per capita increase in FPE of nearly $3. These findings indicate that the decrease in per capita earnings is the result of a decrease in
both the level and realization of potential earnings.
In allocating foregone work hours to these seven reasons, we first split foregone
work hours into hours per week and weeks worked deficits, and then allocated
these separate components to the categories. For individuals who worked during
the year, the unemployment reason was obtained from responses to a question
regarding the number of weeks an individual was not working but was looking for
work. In the survey, workers were then asked what they were doing for most of
the remaining weeks of the year, with the following potential responses: illness/
disability, taking care of home/family, retired, no work available, other. Any
worker responding “no work available” had the value of these hours allocated to
the discouraged worker effect. Other responses had these hours allocated as indicated. Individuals who did not work at all are also asked how many weeks they
were in the labor force looking for work and these hours are attributed to the
unemployment reason. These workers were then asked the reason for not working, with the following potential responses: illness/disability, taking care of home/
family, could not find work, other. These responses were allocated in the same
way as for workers. Individuals who report working part time for at least one
week in the last year are asked for the main reason for doing so, with the following categories indicated: 1) could only find part-time, 2) wanted part-time, 3)
slack work/material shortage, 4) other. In order to allocate foregone hours arising
from part-time work to our categories, we supplemented the information on reason for working part time last year with information on the reason for working
part time in the last week, and reason for working part year, and then proceeded to
allocate responses similar to the procedures for workers. A more detailed description of these procedures is found in Buron, Haveman, and O’Donnell (1995) and
in Haveman, Buron, and Bershadker (1997).
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16. The average annual changes described hereafter were calculated from regressions
of the relevant series on a time trends.
17. See Chirikos (1986) and Colvez and Blanchet (1981).
18. The attribution of FPE into “exogenous constraint” and “individual response” categories rests on a judgment over which people can disagree. For example, an
individual may choose not to work, but may report illness (included in our “involuntary” category) in order to indicate a more acceptable reason for not working.
The reason “other” is excluded from these estimates.
19. Tables describing the detailed subgroup patterns are available from the authors
upon request.
20. The decreasing ratio of nonwhite to white potential earnings reflects the overall
increase in wage inequality over the period. Because nonwhites are concentrated
at the lower end of the education and skill distributions, increased wage disparity
between the higher and lower end of these distributions is also reflected in
increased wage and potential earnings disparities between racial groups over the
1975–1992 period. Recall that potential earnings is the product of the individual
wage rate and a constant (2,080 hours).
21. It is possible that a growing fraction of older workers are switching from illness to
retirement as the reason for not working.
22. Surprisingly, the dropout group reported that FPE due to retirement in 1975
($770) was less than 20 percent of FPE due to illness ($4,616).
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6
The Growth of Income and
Employment Inequality
in Australian Cities
R.G. Gregory and Boyd Hunter
Australian National University

Since the early 1970s, income inequality among individuals has
been growing in most OECD countries. It has arisen from two sources:
higher levels of unemployment, especially in Europe, and widening
wage dispersions, particularly in the United States. Australia has also
been subject to these trends, and the increasing inequality has led to a
fast-growing research literature which documents the changes (Gregory 1993; Borland and Wilkins 1996; Saunders 1994).1 The evidence
seems to suggest that the change in inequality is less than in the United
States and the United Kingdom.2
This chapter begins the process of analyzing changing income inequality on a spatial basis. It utilizes census data to emphasize changes
in income and employment inequality within Australian cities over a
period from 1976 to 1991. The data cover more than one-third of the
Australian population. The analysis reveals a dramatic change in society. The shift in income inequality among individuals and families that
has occurred over the 15 years from 1976 has been magnified on a spatial basis. Average household income has increased 23 percent in the 5
percent of neighborhoods with the highest socioeconomic status (SES),
and fallen 23 percent in the 5 percent of neighborhoods from the lowest
SES. These changes have been driven predominantly by employment
changes. In 1976, employment activity of neighborhood residents was
not related to the SES ranking of the neighborhood, but by 1991 that
had changed. Employment in neighborhoods from the bottom 5 percent of neighborhoods ranked by SES status had fallen 37 percent.
The chapter is structured as follows. We begin by briefly describing the macroenvironment within which urban inequality has increased. The next section documents neighborhood changes according
171
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to the 1976 census and the 1991 census. We then demonstrate that the
increased income inequality is being generated by employment shifts
across neighborhoods. The following section conjectures as to the
causes of these changes and offers some policy comments, and concluding remarks are contained in the final section.

THE MACROENVIRONMENT AND INCREASED
NEIGHBORHOOD INEQUALITY
Some parts of the Australian labor market have performed well
over the last two decades. The more successful features include a rapid
growth of part-time jobs for women and young people. Some periods
also exhibited strong aggregate employment growth, especially during
1983 to 1989 and 1993 to 1995. In addition, after 15 years of insignificant growth, average real wages have begun to increase again.
Although there have been other good changes in the Australian labor
market, poor outcomes dominate and four adverse features stand out in
the period since 1976.
1) Employment opportunities for men and women seeking full-time
work have not kept pace with population growth rates. A slight
decrease in full-time male employment might be anticipated, as
more men seek early retirement and younger men stay longer in
education institutions. Since June 1976, however, the male fulltime employment ratio has fallen 21 percent, which is far greater
than what might have been expected (Figure 1). Unemployment
among full-time male workers at May 1997 was 8.8 percent.
Young women have also extended their involvement in education, but with the reduction in the birth rate, more divorces, postponement of marriage, and more women seeking careers in paid
employment, it might be expected that full-time employment
would increase. But at May 1997, the proportion of women
employed full time was only 5.0 percent more than at August
1976. Unemployment among female full-time workers has
increased from 4.3 percent in 1976 to 9.7 percent at May 1997.
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2) During each cycle over the last two decades, the number of welfare recipients, such as those who receive unemployment benefits,
increased quickly and failed to return to previous levels during
the recovery. This hysteresis effect suggests that much of the
full-time employment reduction was involuntary.
3) The length of the unemployment spell has increased, and Australia
has developed a long-term unemployment problem. In 1976, the
average current spell length of unemployed persons was 17.5
weeks. By May 1997, the spell length had increased to 52.6 weeks.
4) There is a significant widening of the earnings distribution among
those men who have been successful in obtaining full-time
employment. Earnings inequality also increased among women
(Gregory 1993).
These four adverse features suggest that economic and social inequality widened in Australia, and this is what most researchers find for
most periods (Saunders 1994; Harding 1995). These studies analyze
changes among individuals, and to a lesser extent changes among
households or family units. It seemed to us that there should be spatial
parallels within major cities where the rich and poor live in different
locations.
Figure 1 Full-Time Employment/Population Indexes,
1966–1995 (1966=100)
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NEIGHBORHOOD INCOME INEQUALITY
CHANGES, 1976–1991
The Data
Australia has always had neighborhoods that are clearly demarcated by income and SES. Nevertheless, the undesirability and adverse
effects of low income neighborhoods are not stamped on our national
consciousness to the same extent that they are often stamped on the
consciousness of citizens of other countries. United States citizens, for
example, are very aware of the poverty of their inner cities and are well
aware of the undesirable effects on residents (Wilson 1987; Case and
Katz 1991).
The census is the only consistent database available to trace
changes in neighborhood inequality over a significant period of time.
There are four census collections that include income data that could
be used to measure neighborhood changes. Each census—1976, 1981,
1986, and 1991—coincided with an economic recession. By some
measures, the depth of the recessions are not too dissimilar, but it is
noticeable that the unemployment rate is subject to an upward trend:
4.4, 5.6, 8.0, and 9.5 percent, respectively.3 Because unemployment is
higher at each successive date, we cannot use census data directly to
analyze income distribution effects of economic cycles; therefore, we
emphasize the trend from a comparison of 1976 with 1991.
To conduct the neighborhood analysis, the data are presented as
group averages from collection districts (CDs), which are the smallest
geographical area for which census data are available. CDs usually
contain 200–300 dwellings that are delineated by easily identifiable
boundaries. CDs tend to remain unaltered through time, and in our
sample we exclude those which were subject to boundary changes and
not comparable across the four censuses. The analysis is confined to
CDs within major urban areas with populations of more than 100,000.4
The panel consists of 9,483 CDs and about six million people in each
of the four years. There are no other comparable data sets which allow
such a rich analysis of the changing geographical distribution of economic variables. The results reported here are similar to those derived
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from post-code data, which, on average, groups CDs into population
groups of about 4,500 (see Gregory and Hunter 1995).
Although the census provides by far the best data, they are not
ideal. For example, income data are not available by source. Consequently, it is not possible to investigate directly the role of government
welfare payments or other social services. There are no data on taxes
paid. Another difficulty is that detailed geographic data are released as
grouped means for specific variables, and it is not possible for us to
reclassify the data in many ways that would improve our understanding.
The geographical analysis is based on CDs ranked by socioeconomic status (SES). We use the measure of SES calculated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics for 1986 (1990).5 Each CD preserves its
SES ranking over the 15 years. None of the results are affected by the
choice of the census year on which the SES ranking is based.6
Neighborhoods and Household Income
We believe that income and employment gaps between our best
and worst neighborhoods are not as great as the gaps in many major
OECD cities. We also believe that Australia is not in danger of creating
urban problems to the same degree as the United States.7 However, we
were surprised at the extent of the changes for the worse that have
occurred since the mid 1970s.
We begin by discussing the marked change in the dispersion of
annual household income across neighborhoods. In 1976, the ratio of
the mean household income of CDs from the lowest to the highest 5
percent of SES areas was 60.4 percent. Within the space of 15 years,
the ratio had fallen to 37.9 percent. Income distribution has become
more unequal and is well beyond that which can be ascribed simply to
changes in the structure of households. There is a significant increase
in the geographic polarization of household income across Australia.
The poor are increasingly living together in one set of neighborhoods
and the rich in another. The economic gap is widening.
Figure 2 arranges CDs from low to high SES and enables us to
identify the pattern of income change across CDs. The CDs are
ordered on the basis of their 1986 SES rankings. The first two bars on
the left measure the change in mean income over the 1976–1991 period
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Figure 2 Change in Average Household Income, 1976–1991 (1991 A$)
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for the 1 percent and 5 percent of CDs with the lowest SES. The last
two bars on the right measure the change in mean income from the top
5 percent and 1 percent of CDs. All other bars refer to the change in
annual household income averaged within each CD decile. Average
income is in 1991 prices. Each decile includes approximately 500,000
adults.
As we move across the CDs from low to high SES areas, the pattern of income changes is quite smooth. For the bottom 70 percent of
CDs, average household income has fallen in absolute terms and is
lower in 1991 than in 1976. In areas of the highest SES, household
income has increased markedly. In the top 5 percent of SES areas,
household income has increased by $12,555 (23 percent). In the lowest 5 percent of areas, household income has fallen by $7,589 (23 percent). The income gap between the top and bottom 5 percent of CDs
has almost doubled and has widened by $20,144 (92 percent).
This significant pattern indicates that the forces making for
increased income inequality across households exert a strong and systematic neighborhood effect. These forces have either impacted upon
individuals, according to the neighborhood in which they live, and/or
there is a continual geographic sorting process at work so that households which lose income are moving to poor neighborhoods, and
households which gain income are moving to high-income neighborhoods.
The narrow dispersion of neighborhood household income in
1976, and the increased inequality since then, are so notable that it is
perhaps worth reemphasizing both facts by comparing household
income from the top and bottom 1 percent of CDs ranked by SES. In
1976, the weekly income gap between average household from the bottom 1 percent of CDs and the average household in the median CD was
not large (Table 1, column 1). An additional part-time job for nine
hours per week at $12 per hour would close the gap of $116.
Facts such as this explain why most Australians believed that they
lived in a fairly equal society in terms of income and employment
opportunities. By 1991, however, an additional part-time job could
still close the gap but it would need to extend to 19 hours per week, an
increase of 10 hours. The bottom and median neighborhoods are drifting apart, and the gap has increased from $116 per week to $230 (1991
prices).
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Table 1 The Neighborhood Household Income Gap
Weekly difference 1991 A$

Change (%)
First
percentile
to median

Median
to top
percentile

Bottom
to top
percentile

625

51

–3

12

620

844

30

44

35

854

1084

1

38

28

Year

First
percentile
to median

Median
to top
percentile

Bottom
to top
percentile

1976

116

442

558

1981

175

430

1986

227

1991

230

The increased income necessary to move from the average household income in the median CD to the average household income of a
neighborhood in the top 1 percent of CDs is larger. The additional
income cannot be obtained from the usual part-time job. In 1976, the
additional weekly income needed was $442, and by 1991 this had
increased to $854 a week. This is not a small step. In 1976, the additional income might be earned from an additional job which paid a little less than average weekly earnings. In 1991, the extra annual
income required was $44,408, an income level which far exceeds average weekly earnings.
The increase in income inequality across neighborhoods continued
throughout the 15 years (Table 1, column 3) but the principal source of
change differed. Between 1976 and 1981, increased inequality was
generated by income falls in low SES neighborhoods. After 1981, the
fall in income continued in low SES neighborhoods, but most of the
increase in inequality was generated by income increases in high SES
neighborhoods. The source of the increased inequality appears to have
been shifting from large income falls in the low SES neighborhoods,
relative to the median, to large increases in the high SES areas, relative
to the median.
Neighborhoods and Male and Female Incomes
Figure 3 documents the change in the male mean annual income of
CDs ranked by SES. Between 1976 and 1991, male annual income fell
by $4,102 (1991 A$) in the 5 percent of CDs with the lowest SES. In
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Figure 3 Change in Average Male and Female Income, 1976–1991
(1991 A$)

the top 5 percent of CDs, average male income increased by $916. As
a result, the male mean income gap between CDs from the lowest and
highest SES widened by $5,019.
It is noticeable that only 20 percent of CDs from the highest SES
areas experienced male income growth over the 15 years. In 80 percent of neighborhoods there were real income falls.
The income changes for women also exhibit a smooth pattern
across CDs (Figure 3). The mean annual income substantially
increased in all but the lowest 1 percent of CDs, ranging from a fall of
$726 for the 1 percent of CDs from the lowest SES areas to an increase
of $6,321 for the 5 percent of CDs from the highest SES. Women’s
contribution to the income of a CD has offset the fall in male income,
at least in part, in all but the lowest 1 percent of CDs.
Income distribution across neighborhoods has widened for both
men and women. In 1976, the average male income in CDs from the
lowest 5 percent of SES areas was 54.9 percent of the mean income in
the highest five percent of SES areas. By 1991, this income ratio had
fallen to 42.5 percent, a change not too dissimilar from the change in
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the household income ratio. The income level of women in the lowest
to the highest 5 percent of CDs, ranked by SES, has fallen from 78.8
percent to 57.8 percent—once again, a change similar to that of the
household income ratio.

EMPLOYMENT CHANGES AND THE INCREASE IN INCOME
INEQUALITY ACROSS NEIGHBORHOODS
The Change in Male and Female Employment/Population Ratios
For most households, the principal source of income is employment. The relatively narrow income dispersion across neighborhoods
in 1976 was generated by similar employment/population ratios across
neighborhoods. For men, there was no systematic variation in employment/population ratios across CDs ranked by SES (Figure 4). For
women, the employment/population ratio in 1976 was marginally less
in low SES CDs, and the employment/population gap between the lowest and highest 5 percent of neighborhoods was small (Figure 5).
In 1976, irrespective of where they lived, Australians shared much
the same commitment and access to employment. A social observer
could walk across the best and worst parts of Australian urban areas,
and although the probability of meeting someone who was employed
differed by neighborhood, there was no systematic change by SES.
Income inequality across neighborhoods ranked by SES was generated
by different levels of income from all activities and not from differences in the proportions of the population employed.
By 1991, circumstances had changed dramatically. Australian
employment growth between 1976 and 1991 had been very poor.
Unemployment increased from 4.7 to 9.5 percent. The poor employment performance is evident in the neighborhood data. In all neighborhoods, the employment/population ratio for men had fallen—by 9
percent in CDs from the top 5 percent of SES neighborhoods, and by
37 percent in CDs from the lowest 5 percent of SES neighborhoods.
The pattern of employment change for women is similar, but the
contrast across neighborhoods is greater. For the top half of neighborhoods, the proportion of women employed increased approximately
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Figure 4 Male Average Employment/Population Ratio, 1976 and 1991

Figure 5 Female Average Employment/Population Ratio, 1976 and 1991

182

Gregory and Hunter

16.2 percent. The proportion fell 3.0 percent for the bottom half of
neighborhoods, and 17.5 percent for the bottom decile. We are so used
to seeing macrodata that indicate a rapid growth of part-time work for
women and reading about women’s increased labor force involvement,
it is a shock to see that in 1991, and for half of Australian neighborhoods, the average proportion of women employed in the labor market
is less than in 1976.
The growth in the women’s employment/population ratio is concentrated in the high SES areas. By 1991 the probability that a woman
would be employed if she lived in the top 5 percent of SES neighborhoods was 78 percent more than if she lived in the lowest 5 percent of
SES areas.
It is apparent that employment/population ratios are now a major
contributor to income variations across areas. For males, Australia has
returned to the neighborhood employment patterns of the 1930s, with
substantial pockets of non-employment. For women, however, the pattern is quite different (Gregory et al. 1987). In the 1930s, there was little variation of female employment/population ratio across
neighborhoods ranked by SES. The pattern was much the same as in
1976. The loss of women’s employment in low SES areas needs to be
better understood.
The New Face of Australian Cities
Neighborhoods in 1991 can be divided into two groups. For neighborhoods taken from the top 20 to 30 percent of CDs, ranked by SES,
the employment/population ratio of men and women does not change
significantly across neighborhoods, and there is no close relationship
between employment level changes and income changes (Figures 6 and
7). Income dispersion within this group is related more closely to variations in wages and salaries and earnings from own business rather
than variations in employment rates. For our social observer walking
through the top 20 to 30 percent of neighborhoods, the level of employment has changed since 1976 but the pattern of employment across
CDs has not. Employment/population ratios continue not to vary systematically across neighborhoods by SES and are not related to income
changes.
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Figure 6 Male Average Income and Male Employment/Population Ratios

NOTE: The points represent collector district percentiles, 1, 5, 95, and 99 and the average of male
employment/population ratios and income, for deciles 0–10, 11–20, and 89–90. Data are taken
from Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 7 Female Average Income and Female Employment/Population
Ratios

NOTE: The points represent collector district percentiles, 1, 5, 95, and 99 and the average of
female employment/population ratios and income, for deciles 0–10, 11–20, and 89–90. Data are
taken from Figures 3 and 5.
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For the remaining 70 to 80 percent of neighborhoods, employment
rates now matter. The world has changed and there is now a clear association between employment changes and income changes. Within this
group the translation of employment changes into income changes is
similar for both men and women. On average, an increase in employment of 15 percentage points adds $2,300 to male income (see Figure
6) and $2,816 to female income of a neighborhood (see Figure 7).
The widening of the income distribution across neighborhoods is
being driven by different influences at different ends of the income distribution. Employment is strongly associated with income in lowincome neighborhoods but not in high-income neighborhoods.
Joblessness in low SES areas begins with teenagers (Figure 8). In
1991, the employment rate of teenagers in low SES areas is 80 percent
of that of high SES areas, even though most teenagers in high-status
areas are attending an education institution. Within the age group of
20–24 years, the employment rate of the bottom 5 percent of CDs has
fallen to 63 percent of that of the top 5 percent of CDs, and it remains
there until the age group of 45–54 years, where the employment rate
falls further.
Figure 8 1991 Employment/Population Ratio for All Persons, by age, in
Lowest and Highest 5% of SES Areas

The Growth of Income and Employment Inequality in Australian Cities

185

Table 2 Change in Employment and Real Income in Public Housing
Neighborhoods and Other Neighborhoods in the Bottom 10%
of SES Rankings, 1976–1991
Public housinga
(%)

Neighborhoods no
public housing (%)

All (%)

Male

–29

–13

–18

Female

–2

17

13

Real Income

Personal

–19

–1

–7

Household

–34

–12

–21

Male

–42

–24

–29

Female

–30

–5

–11

Total

–37

–15

–22

Employment

a

Public housing neighborhoods: 50 percent or more of the neighborhood population
residing in public housing. There are 207 public housing neighborhoods in the sample.

The pattern is the same for men and women. It is remarkable that
in 5 percent of CDs from the low SES areas, almost one-half of the
men 25–44 years are not engaged in employment.

CONJECTURES ON CAUSES OF INCREASED URBAN
INEQUALITY AND POSSIBLE POLICY RESPONSES
Although we are concerned about the rapid growth in income inequality across neighborhoods, it is nevertheless true that there is no
“right” degree of urban inequality. Nor is it clear that policy can efficiently and effectively achieve the urban inequality we might prefer. In
the past, Australia has not placed high priority on policies specifically
directed toward reducing urban inequality, and our experience of policy
effectiveness in this area is limited. Policy has been more concerned
with income distribution and unemployment among individuals. However, what can be done if we are dissatisfied with a situation where, in
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1991, male unemployment is as high as 35 percent in many neighborhoods? How can we return to something approaching the distribution
of neighborhood income in 1976? It is not possible to answer these
questions without some understanding of the underlying causes of
urban inequality growth.
Public Housing Policy
Increased neighborhood inequality and public housing policy have
been closely intertwined. Approximately 5 percent of the Australian
population live in public housing, which is usually found in areas of
low SES. As unemployment has increased, access to public housing
has become more focused on the poor and economically disadvantaged, and the economic circumstances of the typical public housing
resident has changed considerably for the worse. Table 2 is confined to
CDs located in the bottom 10 percent of SES neighborhoods. It shows
over the 1976–1991 period the income change in public housing areas,
which we define as CDs where the proportion of the population in public housing exceeds 50 percent. It is evident that public housing neighborhoods have done much worse than other low SES neighborhoods.
Over this period, the average real income of a male in a public housing
neighborhood fell 29 percent. The average real income of a male in
nonpublic housing neighborhoods fell 13 percent. For women, average
real income fell in public housing neighborhoods by 2 percent and
increased by 17 percent in other neighborhoods.
Employment changes are also large and negative in public housing
neighborhoods. Employment of men and women fell 42 percent and
30 percent, respectively. In nonpublic housing neighborhoods,
employment fell 24 percent for men and 5 percent for women.
For most of the period, public housing policy increasingly grouped
low-income people together and contributed to the falling income in
low SES neighborhoods, but that is only a part of the story. In lowincome neighborhoods without public housing, there are also substantial but lower employment and income falls.
As falls in employment and income of public housing neighborhoods have been so substantial, these neighborhoods have come to be
seen as areas of social deprivation that are creating environments of
poverty from which public housing tenants are finding it hard to
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escape. Toward the end of the period, therefore, public housing policy
began to change and slowly attempted to disperse tenants more widely
in the community.
Manufacturing Decline
Another important influence generating increased urban inequality
seems to be the rapid decline in manufacturing employment. A glance
at the 1976 census data is sufficient to indicate that the rapid decline in
manufacturing employment has generated important spatial shocks
within cities. To illustrate this, we divide industry of employment into
12 two-digit Australian Standard Industrial Classification categories
and focus on the male labor force. Similar considerations apply to the
female labor force.
Figure 9 plots the proportion of men over 15 years of age who were
employed in manufacturing within each CD in 1976. The horizontal
axis orders CDs by their 1986 SES rankings. Individuals are classified
by area of residence and not by location of employment.

Figure 9 Proportion of Males Employed by Industry Group, 1976

NOTE: The points represent the average of collector district deciles.
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There is a distinctive pattern. In CDs from the bottom SES decile,
27 percent of all males over 15 years of age were employed in manufacturing. As the SES of the area increases, the manufacturing employment proportion falls declining to 13 percent in areas of high SES.
Figure 9 also includes 1976 male employment in finance/business and
community services. Five percent of men over 15 years of age from
the bottom SES decile are employed in these industries. In areas of
high SES, these two industries employ 21 percent of all men. Employment in the other nine industries, which we label the residual category,
exhibit no noticeable and systematic pattern across SES areas.
Between 1976 and 1991 there was a large negative macroshock to
manufacturing, as male manufacturing employment, as a proportion of
the male population over 15 years of age, fell 37 percent. Labor market changes in other industries did not help the employment adjustment
that was required. Employment in the residual industry category, as a
proportion of men over 15 years, fell 14 percent and did not provide
opportunities for net job growth. The pattern of decline was much the
same irrespective of the SES ranking of the neighborhood. The only
significant source of male employment increase, 29 percent, was in
finance/business and community services, where employment change
favored high SES areas. The net result is that the male manufacturing
employment loss in low SES areas was not offset. Men who live in low
SES areas were not able to make employment inroads into other industries.
It is perhaps not surprising that the job loss was spread unevenly
across CDs and fell disproportionately in areas where manufacturing
employees live; this is to be expected given the initial employment pattern. The interesting point is the spatial nature of the persistence of
joblessness. What could be the mechanisms generating these outcomes? At this stage we do not know. One possibility is the following:
suppose, as a rough approximation, that finance/business and community services tend to locate in the city center or in local shopping and
business areas that are easily accessible to all potential employees.
Transport routes are focused on these locations. Industries in the residual category are spread randomly throughout the community and therefore jobs are easily accessible as well. Factories, however, are
clustered and spread unevenly throughout the city but are close to low
SES areas where the majority of their workers live.
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If this description is broadly correct, when factories close they create local areas of unemployment. There are residual industry jobs
nearby but the total number is contracting. The expanding finance/
business and community services sectors are located in areas which
involve greater transport costs and, in addition, the job growth in this
sector has not been sufficient to absorb manufacturing job losses. The
persistence of the geographical dispersion of unemployment arises
because of structural changes across industries, the geographic location
of the lost jobs, and increased transport costs to gain access to new
jobs.
The persistence elements of the analysis can be reinforced by other
changes that are occurring in the economy. Suppose that at the same
time factories are closing, welfare payments for those who cannot find
employment are increasing in real terms, transport costs are increasing
in response to the movements toward less subsidies, and real wages are
falling among low-paid workers. Lower real wages offered to those at
the bottom of the wage distribution may encourage some people to
remain in a job-loss area and live on unemployment benefits—which in
Australia have no time limit—rather than to accept employment at
lower wages and incur higher transport costs. Furthermore, if house
prices and rents respond to the lack of work in particular parts of the
city, the effects of regional specific shocks will be increased. A wider
variance of rents, reflecting a change in the ease of finding employment
from each geographic base, may encourage people to stay unemployed
and pay low rents rather than move to a high-rent area, give up unemployment benefits, and accept a low-paying job.
If mechanisms similar to this are generating spatial persistence of
unemployment in areas where manufacturing workers used to live, a
number of important points follow. First, the unemployment problem
cannot be solved by macropolicies that do not create a job bias toward
those areas. Second, trends in the key variables—increased transport
costs, increased welfare payments relative to wages at the bottom of
the wage distribution, and a falling proportion of employment in manufacturing—seem unlikely to be significantly reversed. Hence, in the
absence of some intervention, unemployment may continue to persist
on a geographical basis.
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General Macro Influences
Increasing inequality may also be the result of major structural
problems in the macroeconomy—such as emerging inflation or balance
of payment difficulties—that lead to restrictive macropolicies and
insufficient job creation. Irrespective of the initial nature of the adverse
macroemployment shocks, those with more skills find jobs quickly and
displace the least skilled, who eventually become unemployed. The
unemployed gradually sort themselves geographically so that eventually more and more of the jobless live in depressed areas where the
rents are lowest.
This explanation would suggest that the correlation between the
decline in manufacturing employment and job loss by area is of no special significance. When the economy recovers and sufficient jobs are
created, the updraft draws individuals from low SES areas back into
employment and back into higher income levels.
One piece of evidence that might support this view is that, according to census data, approximately 40 percent of males living in a CD
were not resident there five years earlier. This mobility raises the possibility that males who lose their jobs in manufacturing leave the CD
and are replaced by others who are unemployed but not necessarily as a
result of manufacturing decline. To confirm this we still need to know
the SES status of the areas where individuals move to and come from,
but the census does not provide that information at the detailed level at
which this analysis is conducted. This is an important piece of missing
data.
If individuals move a small distance to an area similar to the one
they left, that might be considered as being the same as no mobility.
The economic and social environment of those that moved, and their
propensity for obtaining employment, may not have changed. If individuals leave to find jobs in better areas, we need to ask what it is about
the low status areas where manufacturing employees used to live that
leads to unemployment persistence.
It is unlikely that the unemployment increase since 1976 can be
attributed to only one cause and be fully explained by a simple model.
The facts, however, suggest that there are significant regional shocks
within cities and these shocks may lead to unemployment persistence.
If so, then a new research agenda is needed—one which combines the
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textbook macroanalysis of unemployment with regional specific
shocks and persistence.
Relative Wage Flexibility
Some may argue that the best policy response is to increase labor
market flexibility so that wages can fall in low SES areas and thereby
create jobs. It is not known how much wages might need to fall, but to
increase employment of the bottom 5 percent of SES areas back to
1976 levels, relative to high SES areas, there would need to be at least a
44 percent increase in male employment and a 70 percent increase in
female employment. It appears likely, therefore, that a substantial
wage fall might be required. This raises a number of problems. First,
it takes time to create jobs so that the short-run wage fall might be substantial—so substantial, in fact, that individuals may prefer not to work
and be supported by unemployment benefits and other welfare payments, and perhaps a range of black economy activities.
If wage reductions were to occur, yet low employment rates persisted in low SES areas, it might be expected that governments would
eventually react and reduce benefit levels, relative to low wages. Labor
market–related benefits are the main source of income for most individuals in low SES areas, and any reduction must inevitably increase
poverty and widen income distribution further. It is obvious why governments and communities are reluctant to go down the path of substantial reductions in wages and benefits, and why it is often suggested
that it might be better to try and increase the employability of individuals in low SES areas rather than reduce their potential wage.
Education Policy
Many countries, including Australia, have attempted to use an
expansion of education and skill training to offset growing income inequality and unemployment among the low paid. Students in Australia
have been offered means-tested living allowances for high school and
tertiary education and interest-free loans to pay university fees. Tertiary and high school places have increased substantially. Indeed, over
the last decade and a half, Australia has embarked upon one of the most
ambitious education programs in the OECD.
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This education expansion has had a large impact on the average
neighborhood from areas of median SES. Between 1976 and 1991, the
proportion of the population with degrees increased from 3.7 to 14.7
percent and the proportion of the population without qualifications fell
from 66 to 45 percent. Yet despite this large increase in education of
the potential workforce, male unemployment in median neighborhoods
has risen from 4.4 to 13.0 percent. In addition, average income per
adult has risen by less than one-half of 1 percent per year.
Income and employment outcomes may have been worse without
education increases, but it appears, nevertheless, that increased education levels have not been sufficient to offset significant employment
losses or to generate significant income increases for the median neighborhood. Education and skill training may primarily determine who
gets jobs and may have very little influence on the number of jobs
available or average rates of pay.
A similar sober assessment also appears inescapable from a comparison of the changing interrelationship between education levels and
income inequality among neighborhoods. Various measures of the
education levels of a neighborhood’s residents are highly correlated,
and for our analysis we use the proportion of residents 15 years and
over with a degree.
In 1976, there was a strong positive association between the average education level of a neighborhood and the income of its residents.
On average, a 1-percentage-point increase in numbers of men holding
degrees was associated with additional neighborhood income of $1,000
(Figure 10). For women, the relationship was $500 for each additional
percentage-point increase in the proportion of the female population
with degrees (Figure 11). Among neighborhoods, as among individuals, higher education brings higher income.
It is noticeable, however, that in 1976 there is no systematic relationship between employment-population ratios and education for
either men or women. More education is associated with more income
but not because employment is increased. This is a restatement of the
fact that in 1976, employment opportunities were distributed equally
across neighborhoods ranked by SES.
By 1991, the relationships have changed a great deal. For men,
more education is still positively associated with more income, but the
relationship has shifted so that for any given proportion of the popula-
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Figure 10 Male Income and Proportion of Male Population
with a Degree

NOTE: The points represent collector district percentiles, 1, 5, 95, and 99 and the average of male
income and the proportion of the male population with a degree, for deciles 0-10, 11-20 89-90.

Figure 11 Female Income and Proportion of Female Population
with a Degree

NOTE: The points represent collector district percentiles, 1, 5, 95 and 99 and the average
of female income and the proportion of the female population with a degree, for deciles 0–10,
11–20 to 89–90.

194

Gregory and Hunter

tion with degrees, the annual income level has fallen by about $8,000.
If the employment–education relationship can be thought of as a causal
one, then in order to achieve the same level of male income as in 1976,
a neighborhood needs to achieve a higher education level. Consider a
neighborhood from a low SES area: to maintain male income, this
neighborhood needed to increase the proportion of its male population
with degrees by 6 percentage points between 1976 and 1991. The
actual increase was 2.5 percentage points, hence the fall in male
income. In high SES areas, the increase needed in the proportion with
degrees was around 8 percentage points. The actual increase was 9
percentage points, hence the increase in male income.
This shift in the education–income relationship is very important.
On the basis of the 1976 relationship between the incidence of degrees
and the income of a neighborhood, the increased education attainment
of the average neighborhood within the bottom five percent of CDs
should have brought about an income increase of $3,500. In fact, there
has been a fall of $6,000. The $9,500 gap clearly illustrates the importance of the change.
The principal source of the shift in the male education–income
relationship is a shift in the employment–education relationship. For
neighborhoods from the bottom 70 percent of SES areas, the education–employment relationship has moved down but, in addition, there
is now a strong neighborhood relationship between less neighborhood
education and less neighborhood employment—a relationship that did
not exist in 1976. The lower the male education level of a neighborhood, the lower the male employment-population ratio. Education not
only affects income, as it always has, but now it also affects the
employment-population ratio. Poor neighborhoods are now twice disadvantaged by low education levels.
For neighborhoods from the top 30 percent of SES areas, further
education does not bring further employment. Nothing has changed
for these neighborhoods with respect to changes in education and
changes in employment. But the education–employment relationship
has also shifted downward, so at each neighborhood education level
there is 15 percentage points less employment.
Labor market changes for women are similar to those for men in all
but one respect—the education–income relationship has changed little
since 1976 except in areas of low SES, where additional degrees
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among residents have not brought neighborhood income increases.
But, unlike the male relationship, the large increase in women’s
income across all but the low SES areas is associated with the large
increase in education. There has been no systematic shift down in the
employment–income curve as in the male labor market.
There is a clear dichotomy between neighborhoods. For the top 30
percent of SES areas, income has fallen for each education level for
men but increased for women. The relationship between changes in
income and changes in education, however, has not shifted for this
group.
For the remaining 70 percent of neighborhoods, the lower the education level the greater the income fall. Employment and education are
now associated and hence there is less income at each education level.
To conclude, we look at the change in the distribution of education
levels across neighborhoods to assess the general impact of the large
increases in education levels of the potential workforce. In 1976, 10
percent of all residents 15 years of age and over who resided in CDs
from the top 5 percent SES possessed degrees; now the proportion is
20 percent. In the lowest 5 percent of CDs, the proportion of the population with degrees has increased from 0.5 percent to 3 percent. The
absolute gap in the degree distribution between areas has widened, and
the increased incidence of degree qualifications has been disproportionately concentrated in CDs with high SES. Neighborhoods have not
become more equal. For every 10 new degree holders in the top 5 percent of CDs, there has been an additional 3 in low SES areas. A similar
pattern is evident if different measures of education are used.
Areas of low employment and low income have not been
untouched by the expansion of education. Education levels have
increased across all neighborhoods, but two major problems have
emerged. First, the increase in education in absolute terms has been
greater in high SES areas so that inequality has increased. Second, the
relationship between employment and education levels has shifted in
low SES areas such that a given level of education now delivers much
less income and the move to a more disadvantageous relationship has
dominated the improvement in the education level.8
It is a well-known finding in education research that school outcomes are related to the education level of the parents of the students
who attend the school. The widening parental education gap across
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neighborhoods suggests that in order to expand the education opportunities for young Australians, special attention should be given to education policies directed toward schools in low SES areas.

CONCLUSION
Since the early 1970s, the Australian economy has had a major
problem with job creation. According to the census, the proportion of
men aged 15–64 employed in a median neighborhood is 19 percent less
than in 1976. The proportion of women employed is 1 percent more.
The shortage of jobs has not been rationed evenly throughout our society. Job loss and income falls are concentrated in low SES neighborhoods, and job growth and income rises are concentrated in neighborhoods of high SES.
Between 1976 and 1991, the lowest 1 percent of neighborhoods,
based on a 1986 SES ranking, have lost 45 percent of their employment
and 23 percent of their household income, and male unemployment has
increased from 6.4 to 28.1 percent. The contrast with areas of high
SES is marked: in the highest SES areas, employment has fallen marginally, household income has increased by 31 percent, and male
unemployment has increased, but only to 4.8 percent. The proportion
of women employed in high SES areas now exceeds by 20 percent the
proportion of men employed in low SES areas.
To lose employment and suffer significant income losses are bad
outcomes for anyone, but does it matter that these undesirable outcomes increasingly possess a spatial component? It is sometimes suggested that it does not and that nothing is gained by knowing that it is
people who live in poor neighborhoods who are increasingly not at
work, that part-time jobs are going to young people and women who
live in high SES neighborhoods and that income is rising in the best
SES neighborhoods but falling in poor neighborhoods. Our intuition
suggests that neighborhoods do matter.9 It seems likely that the greater
the economic polarization within our cities the less equal are the opportunities for young people and the more likely that bad neighborhood
pathologies will emerge. But there is not widespread agreement on
these matters among Australian researchers.

The Growth of Income and Employment Inequality in Australian Cities

197

But what should be done? It is not easy to know. There has not
been a strong Australian tradition of thinking about economic policy
and neighborhoods and it is not always easy to move from thought patterns that revolve around individuals or the macroeconomy to thought
patterns that stress geography. There is also not widespread agreement
as yet whether the growth of inequality across areas is just the natural
outcome of more inequality among individuals, the impact of concentration of those individuals within a location, or whether the nature of
the geographical areas is contributing to the inequality growth.
There is always more to be done. We do not know enough about
social and geographical mobility, the role of job-finding networks and
changing income, and employment opportunities over the lifetimes of
people who live in poor neighborhoods.

Notes
R.G. Gregory is Professor of Economics and Head of the Economics Program,
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University; Dr. Boyd Hunter
is Research Fellow, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian
National University. Cathy Baird and Eva Klug provided invaluable assistance in preparing the paper. This research was funded in part by the former Department of Housing and Regional Development. All dollar values in this chapter are in Australian
dollars.
1. There is no consensus, however, as to the source of these large changes. They
seem to be related to shifts in labor demand away from men and toward women
workers and away from the unskilled towards those with higher education levels.
There are some areas of agreement among researchers as to what is not driving
the increased inequality. It does not seem to be the case that inequality among
individuals is being driven primarily by the decline in manufacturing, the growth
of trade with Asia, or immigrant flows of low skilled labor. We are more agnostic.
2. While there is a general consensus in this research that market incomes have
become more unequal, the situation with respect to other measures of income is
less clear. Government intervention in Australia has a strong equalizing component. Harding (1995) has estimated that the ratio of market incomes between the
top and bottom 20 percent of the Australian population is 12.5:1. This reduces to
4.9:1 once transfer payments are taken into account, 3.8:1 after income tax, and
2.9:1 after government expenditure on services such as education and health.
3. Unemployment at August each census year taken from the Labour Force Survey.
4. CDs were omitted from the panel if the total population was less than 50 to avoid
the sampling error deliberately introduced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(ABS) to protect the confidentiality of persons in the neighborhood. In each suc-
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cessive census, new CDs are added and in some circumstances the boundaries of
CDs are changed. Our sample is a fixed number of CDs with unchanging boundaries that are to be found in each census plus a small number where the CD may
have been divided into two. We begin with a list of CDs from the 1986 Census,
and if there was more than one CD that corresponded to the 1986 CD, the first was
taken to be representative of the 1986 CD.
As a measure of socioeconomic status, we use the Urban and Rural Indexes of
Relative Advantage, published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (1990). The
Indexes are calculated by the application of principal components. The relevant
variables include data such as family income greater than $50,000, the proportion
of CD residents with degrees, the occupational distribution of the employed workforce, and the number of bedrooms per household.
In 1976, our sample of CDs represented 69 percent of all Australian CDs. By
1991, the sample had fallen to 52 percent. The average employment and income
levels in new CDs in outer suburbs are a little higher than our sample means, so
our sample understates slightly the growth in average employment and income
over the 1976–1991 period, but our estimates of increased inequality are not
affected (Hunter 1996).
The poverty of the U.S. ghettos is compounded by the concentration of disadvantaged Americans of African descent (see Wilson 1987). Another contributing factor is the U.S. Federal system that places emphasis on local taxes as a revenue
source. The Australian federal system, in contrast, is a force for equalizing
income and government services across neighborhoods.
The very large expansion of education must have affected the quality of education, and that may well have locational aspects. There is evidence indicating high
failure rates in areas of low SES.
In a recent U.K. study, Gregg and Wadsworth (1994) show that the most successful method utilized by unemployed males to find a job is through friends and contacts. The utilization rate of this method is not the highest but it has the highest
success rate. Among males, one-third of jobs are found this way; among women,
one-quarter. Montgomery (1991) estimates that 50 percent of all workers currently employed in the U.S. found their jobs through friends and relatives.
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Part III

7
Supply of Hours per Day and
Days per Week—Evidence from
the Canadian Labour Market
Activity Survey
Richard E. Mueller
The University of Lethbridge

A significant amount of research has been conducted on the determinants of the supply of labor. In these studies the quantity of labor
supplied is usually counted as the number of hours supplied per year
or per week, largely owing to the fact that most labor force surveys do
not disaggregate work hours more finely than the weekly level.1 The
number of hours per week, of course, is simply the product of days
worked per week and hours worked per day, assuming both remain
constant. Still, there is reason to believe that different workers desire
to work a different number of days per week and hours per day, even
though the number of weekly hours that each wishes to work may
remain constant. For example, many individuals in the nursing profession regularly work three 12-hour shifts per week. This is not necessarily in response to the lack of options, but rather because they
select into an occupation that offers a variety of days/hours combinations. In such cases, the use of weekly, monthly, or yearly hourly
aggregates may mask a number of interesting characteristics of labor
supply. For one, the fixed costs of supplying labor may differ depending on the unit of analysis. It is well-known that daily costs of work in
terms of child care expenses, commuting costs, etc., may affect daily
labor supply decisions. There may also exist hourly costs of employment which could likewise influence this dimension of labor supply.
Furthermore, employer constraints on the hours and days that one is
able to work could limit the optimal days/hours combination from the
employee’s point of view. To the extent that these constraints exist,
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optimal days/hours pairs may only become available as employees sort
into new positions that offer a more desirable package.
A better understanding of the desires of individuals in choosing
their hours/days combinations could ultimately lead employers to offer
competitive weekly work schedules to employees, thus reducing turnover and absenteeism rates as well as related costs. For governments,
such information may be useful in planning for future infrastructure
projects, or how best to target day care subsidies.
This chapter will investigate in some detail the days per week and
hours per day decisions of workers. The use of a unique data set allows
us to decompose the usual weekly hours aggregate into daily hours and
weekly days. The relevant literature will be discussed in the next section. The third section presents the data to be used in subsequent analyses. A preliminary look at the patterns of weekly working times for
males and females, both paid employees and self-employed workers, is
covered in the next section. A simple econometric model of supply of
hours and days is the topic of the following section. This largely serves
as a check on the data and will allow us to investigate further some of
the pertinent determinants of the hours/days labor supply decision. The
next section presents and estimates a simple model of job change
behavior. Since individuals may be constrained from working their
desired days and hours at any one job, they may change jobs in
response to these constraints. Following that is a more detailed look at
the actual hours and days changes of job-changers. The final section
concludes and offers some areas for potentially fruitful future research.
Our results show that individuals tend to be clustered around a
standard five-day, eight hours per day workweek, with men exhibiting
much less flexibility around these norms than women. The selfemployed, regardless of gender, are much less likely to work standard
hours and days compared with those engaged in paid employment. It
is well-known that women supply less labor when they have young
children. But our evidence also shows that women with young children supply less labor, in terms of both hours and days, than those
without young children, although the percentage drop in days is larger.
This is not well-known and suggests that the costs of childrearing are
borne on a daily rather than an hourly basis. In other words, women
with young children find it more cost-effective to reduce days when
reducing weekly hours.
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We also discovered that job-changers desire flexibility in their
weekly schedules. Not only do they display a larger variance in hours
and days at their initial jobs compared with those who did not change
jobs, but this variance increases further as they move into their new
positions. This suggests that employees may be constrained within
jobs from attaining their desired hours/days combination.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Previous research has addressed a variety of related time aggregation problems. Hanoch (1980a,b) distinguished between the hours per
week and weeks per year decision in a reservation wage model of
female labor supply. Blank (1988) built on this model to allow for
simultaneity of the hours and weeks decision. She also allowed for discontinuities in the labor supply decision that can occur as a result of
fixed costs of employment or if workers are constrained by firms who
will only allow a minimum number of hours per week and/or weeks
per year. She concluded that the evidence provides support for the theory that female heads face either significant fixed costs of employment
or structural barriers to low levels of yearly weeks or weekly hours of
work.2 Also, decisions regarding hours of work per week and weeks of
work per year were made independently, albeit simultaneously. The
lesson is that using aggregated annual hours in many analyses may be
inappropriate because the variable lacks the necessary detail.
The recent literature on Canadian labor supply has also analyzed
the changes in hours worked over time, usually at the aggregate of
annual or weekly hours worked, and often in the context of an explanation for earnings polarization. Morissette, Myles, and Picot (1993)
have shown that the 1980s experienced a widening in the distribution
of annual hours worked between workers. Morissette and Sunter
(1994) and Morissette (1995) showed that the distribution of weekly
hours also widened during the 1980s; fewer individuals worked 35–40
hour weeks, while the fraction working either shorter or longer hours
rose. Other research has addressed the increase in multiple job holdings and part-time work (Krahn 1995; Logan 1994; Pold 1994, 1995).
One of the lessons of this research is that aggregate measures of
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employment, such as annual hours worked, tend to obscure the fundamental underlying changes in the labor market over time, even though
aggregate means may show only modest changes.
Just as aggregated annual hours hide important details, it is plausible that weekly hours may also be an inappropriate unit of analysis
because the choice of days per week and hours per day could be related
and simultaneous decisions on the part of workers. In addition, there
can be fixed costs per day of work and even costs per hour of work.
Aggregation of work hours into hours per year and hours per week
does not allow us to investigate the complexity of the workers’ decisions.
The costs of child care are frequently used in estimating the probability of female labor force participation. Many of these studies are
nicely summarized in Cleveland et al. (1996). Blau and Robins (1988)
and Ribar (1992), for example, found that child care costs had a negative effect on female labor force participation decisions. Cleveland et
al. (1996) arrived at similar results using Canadian data. Generally,
such empirical work is supportive of economic theory in that higher
costs of child care lead to lower female labor force participation rates.
What these studies have in common is the use of female participation
as the dimension of labor supply analyzed. One exception to this is the
study by Michalopoulos et al. (1992), which used hours supplied as the
unit of analysis. They discovered that reduced child care tax credits
resulted in a reduction in hours for women currently employed. These
studies, however, did not address the impact of child care costs on the
supply of hours and days. In another example of the importance of
fixed costs on the labor supply decision, Zax and Kain (1991) showed
that increases in commuting times generally increased the probability
of employee quits.
Aside from the fixed costs of employment, employer inflexibility
could be the factor that limits the days and hours that people are able to
work, despite their preferences. Altonji and Paxson (1992) showed that
married women who changed jobs exhibited more of a change in
weekly and yearly hours compared with those who did not change
jobs. They attributed this to employers restricting hours choices, which
necessitated job change to attain the desired number of hours. Rettenmaier (1996) discovered that individuals who prefer low or high hours
of work were more likely to be self-employed because they had a lower
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probability of finding these hours in paid jobs. In a related paper, Kahn
and Lang (1995) found that over half of Canadians in 1985 were dissatisfied with the number of weekly hours they usually worked. Of these,
about two-thirds expressed the desire for more weekly hours, not
fewer. Of course, an increase in weekly hours can come from increasing days per week or hours per day or both. If fixed costs per day of
work are high relative to hourly costs, we would find that these workers
desired to put in more hours per day in increasing their hours per week.
If the hourly costs of work are higher, we would expect the opposite,
assuming that their are no employer-imposed constraints on the availability of hours and days.
There is, in fact, some evidence suggesting that the aggregation of
days and hours into weekly hours results may result in poor labor supply estimates. Hamermesh (1996) provided estimates of the reducedform correlates of days and daily hours in the absence of a formal
model. He concluded that we cannot treat weekly hours as a reliable
unit of analysis because daily hours and days per week both vary. He
found that daily hours, in both the United States and Germany, tended
to vary more than days per week in response to various exogenous
shocks such as changes in the unemployment rate. This implies that
the cost of changing days per week is higher than the cost of changing
hours per day.
We want to dissect the weekly hours decision faced by workers.
The first step will be to model this days and hours decision. If there are
significant fixed costs to the number of hours per week and the number
of weeks per year worked, fixed costs in daily and hourly terms may
also be important in determining the combination of hours per day and
days per week. The daily act of preparing for work and commuting to
and from the work site results in substantial sunk costs that are borne
by workers. In other words, are the hours per day and days per week
decision joint? Are the determinants of the two the same? Are there
significant costs per day or per hour of work which prevent people
from seeking jobs? Or is it employers who constrain the available set
of hours and days that employees may choose?
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DATA
The 1990 Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS) of 1990 will be
utilized in the empirical part of the chapter. The LMAS is a unique
data set that includes variables for days per week and hours per day
usually worked—variables which are not normally found in labor force
surveys.3 Data on up to five jobs held by each individual in 1990 are
also included. This will ultimately allow us to make inferences about
the motives behind job change. The data set also includes other variables for the reason the respondent left the job and the number of additional monthly hours the respondent desired to work. This information
will be useful in deducing whether it is fixed costs that result in various
hours/days combinations, or whether it is rigidities in the labor market
that do not make the desired combinations of hours/days available to
employees.
The sample includes those between the ages of 17 and 64 who
lived throughout the country, with the exception of the Northwest and
Yukon territories. Those who did not hold any job in 1990 were eliminated from the sample, as were those who did not work at a paid job
(i.e., the self-employed) or who attended school full-time at any time
during the year.4 Those who held more than two jobs in 1990 were
eliminated. To avoid job overlap (due to moonlighting, for example),
those who started a second job in a week preceding the completion of
the first job were dropped, as were respondents who claimed to work
more than 18 hours per day or to have earned less than $1.00 per hour
at either job. Satisfying these criteria were 16,820 males and 14,635
females.5 The sample is further disaggregated into job-stayers (14,577
males and 13,245 females) and job-changers who moved from one paid
job to another paid job (1,563 males and 1,318 females).6

WEEKLY WORK PATTERNS
An initial look at the data reveals that hours of work tend to be
more flexible than days of work. Table 1 gives the joint distribution of
hours and days for males and females. We define the standard workday
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Table 1 Joint Distribution of Hours per Day and Days per Week,
All Workers, Paid and Self-Employed Workers, Males
and Females (%)
Category/
hours per day

Days per
week

1–4

5

6–7

Total

< 4.0

0.18

0.23

0.09

0.50

4.0–5.9

0.51

00.74

0.20

1.45

6.0–7.4

0.69

4.44

0.62

5.75

7.5–8.5

1.79

58.55

3.82

64.16

8.6–9.9

0.32

5.36

1.53

7.21

> 9.9

4.06

8.56

8.32

20.94

Total

7.55

77.88

14.58

100.00

< 4.0

0.19

0.18

0.07

0.44

4.0–5.9

0.51

0.76

0.15

1.42

6.0–7.4

0.73

4.70

0.53

5.96

7.5–8.5

1.83

63.36

2.99

68.18

8.6–9.9

0.32

5.29

0.88

6.49

> 9.9

4.44

7.75

5.33

17.52

Total

8.02

82.04

9.95

100.00

< 4.0

0.15

0.63

0.24

1.02

4.0–5.9

0.54

0.59

0.54

1.67

6.0–7.4

0.34

2.34

1.32

4.00

7.5–8.5

1.56

20.31

10.45

32.32

8.6–9.9

0.24

5.96

6.64

12.84

> 9.9

1.07

14.94

32.13

48.14

Total

3.90

44.77

51.32

100.00

Males
All workers (n = 18,328)

Paid workers (n = 16,280)

Self-employed (n = 2,048)
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Table 1 (continued)
Category/
hours per day

Days per
week

1–4

5

6–7

Total

< 4.0

1.13

1.47

0.33

2.93

4.0–5.9

3.97

4.48

0.56

9.01

6.0–7.4

5.37

15.20

0.89

21.46

7.5–8.5

8.25

46.28

2.44

56.97

8.6–9.9

0.39

2.10

0.55

3.04

Females
All workers (n = 15,263)

> 9.9

2.37

2.14

2.06

6.57

Total

21.48

71.67

6.83

100.00

< 4.0

1.11

1.42

0.23

2.76

4.0–5.9

4.00

4.48

0.50

8.98

6.0–7.4

5.46

15.54

0.77

21.77

7.5–8.5

8.41

47.47

2.15

58.03

8.6–9.9

0.38

2.00

0.42

2.80

Paid workers (n = 14,635)

> 9.9

2.44

1.98

1.23

5.65

Total

21.80

72.89

5.30

100.00

< 4.0

1.75

2.55

2.71

7.01

4.0–5.9

3.34

4.46

1.91

9.71

6.0–7.4

3.35

7.32

3.66

14.33

7.5–8.5

4.29

18.63

9.39

32.31

8.6–9.9

0.64

4.46

3.50

8.60

Self-employed (n = 628)

> 9.9

0.80

5.89

21.34

28.03

Total

14.17

43.31

42.51

100.00

NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding error.
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to be in the 7.5 to 8.5 hour range and the standard workweek to be five
days. For all male workers, 78 percent normally worked the standard
five-day workweek. Only 64 percent of male workers worked the standard workday. As expected, female workers show greater diversity in
their usual hours and days, as 72 percent worked the standard five-day
week and 57 percent worked the “normal” workday.
Because we consider the self-employed as being somewhat less
constrained by the days and hours restrictions of paid employees, we
expect this group of workers to exhibit greater variance in their
observed hours and days. Further breaking down the sample into paid
workers and self-employed workers does in fact reveal this; i.e., paid
workers tended to work more standard days and hours compared to the
self-employed. Some 82 percent of paid males worked a five-day week
in 1990, compared to only 45 percent of self-employed males. In fact,
over 51 percent of self-employed males worked six- or seven-day
weeks. Usual work hours were also more standardized for paid workers, with 68 percent working normal hours. By contrast, only 32 percent of self-employed males worked between 7.5 and 8.5 hours per
day, with 48 percent working 10 hours per day or more. Both the hours
and days distributions are more heavily weighted at the top for selfemployed males. One interesting result is that over 4 percent of paid
workers worked at least 10 hours per day but less than five days per
week. This suggests that some workers were able to work longer hours
and fewer days within a standard-length workweek.
Women generally show more flexibility in their hours and days
combinations compared to men. For paid women, 73 percent worked a
standard five-day week and 58 percent worked the standard workday—
about 10 percentage points lower than the equivalent values for males.
Paid females were also much more likely to work shorter hours and
days than their male counterparts and less likely to work longer days
and hours. As with the case of males, self-employed females showed
much more variation in their hours and days; more were likely to work
larger numbers of hours and days compared to female paid workers.
They were also more concentrated in the lower tail of the hours per day
distribution. Compared to self-employed males, females were more
likely to work both shorter hours and days.
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The patterns for both genders are generally consistent with those
obtained by Hamermesh (1996) in his comparison of U.S. and German
labor supply.7

A SIMPLE MODEL OF LABOR SUPPLY
Loosely extending a standard labor supply model such as the one
found in Blank (1988), we can model the days and hours labor supply
decision and then estimate the model. Each individual is assumed to
maximize his or her utility, which is a function of the level of consumption and the amount of leisure consumed. Formally, the model can be
written as
(1) maxC,DlHlU(C,Dl,Hl)
subject to
C = Y – αDw + Dw Hw W(1 – µ)
Dl = D – Dw
Hl = Dw (H – Hw),
where C is weekly consumption and is simply the amount of exogenous income available (Y) plus the amount of labor income earned per
week. The latter is the usual number of days worked per week (Dw)
times the usual number of hours worked per day (Hw) times the usual
hourly wage (W). Finally, we subtract the costs of employment for
both days of work and hours of work. The simple act of preparing for
and commuting to work involves costs which are borne daily, regardless of the amount of time spent on the job. Other costs, however, are a
function of the amount of time per day spent on the job. Costs such as
day care and parking, for example, may be on an hourly basis. We
assume that α represents the fixed costs per day of work, and µ are the
costs per hour of work.
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Leisure is divided into days per week of leisure (Dl), which is the
number of days per week ( D ) less the number of days per week
worked, and hours of leisure (Hl), which is the weekly amount of leisure consumed on days worked and is simply the number of days per
week worked times the number of hours on these days not at work (H –
Hw). Because hours and days of leisure may be qualitatively different
for individuals, they enter the utility functions separately.
We know that solving the above problem yields Marshallian
demand functions for hours of leisure and days of leisure, which can be
transposed into labor supply functions for days per week of work and
hours per day of work. In other words, we can solve for
(2a) Dw = Dw(Y,W,δ,α,µ)
(2b) Hw = Hw(Y,W,δ,α,µ)
where δ is a vector of demographic and job-related variables that we
assume will affect supply for hours and days of work.
If we assume that leisure (in either days or hours) is a normal good,
and that the substitution effect is greater than the income effect, then an
increase in the cost of days or hours should increase the amount of leisure taken. Obversely, the number of hours and days of work supplied
should decrease as the direct costs of each increase. Thus, we assume
that ∂Dw / ∂α < 0 and ∂Hw / ∂µ < 0. Furthermore, if we assume that
hours and days are substitutes, the cross-partial derivatives will both be
positive. In other words, ∂Dw / ∂µ > 0 and ∂Hw / ∂α > 0 says that as the
fixed cost per hour (day) of work increases, the individual will increase
his or her supply of days (hours) because the opportunity cost of doing
so is now relatively less expensive.
To operationalize the model into days and hours, we assume a linear approximation of the relationship between the supply of labor and
its determinants. Thus, model (1) becomes
(3a) Dw* = X1β1 + ε1
(3b) Hw* = X2β 2 + ε 2
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where X1 and X2 are vectors of individual and job characteristics that
determine the number of days and hours supplied, β1 and β2 are the
vector of coefficients, and ε1 and ε2 are the usual white noise error
terms. Of course, Dw* and Hw* are only observed if the respondent is
actually a labor force participant; they are written in natural logarithms.
Eqs. 3a and 3b, however, are limited because they implicitly
assume that the hours and days decisions are separable. They also
implicitly assume that there are no discontinuities in labor supply
choices. It is well-established that discontinuities do in fact arise from
the fixed costs of work (hourly, daily, weekly, etc.) as well as
employer-imposed constraints which may limit the maximum or minimum hours that a person is able to work, thus narrowing the choice set
of the worker. Still, it provides a starting point to analyze the determinants of hours and days of work. From estimation of Eqs. 3a and 3b,
certain implications about daily and hourly costs of employment can be
ascertained.
The reduced-from estimates of Eqs. 3a and 3b, with and without
job controls, are presented in Table 2.8 For economy of space, only the
coefficients discussed are included (summary statistics and full results
appear in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix). At the bottom of the
table, the results from Breusch-Pagan tests allow us to reject in all four
cases the hypothesis that the days and hours regressions are independent. The correlation coefficients of the residuals are positive, underlining something we discovered in Table 1: workers who work, for
unexplained reasons, more (fewer) hours also tend to work more
(fewer) days. Still, the magnitudes of these correlation coefficients are
small. Since the dependent variables are natural logarithms, we can
compare the effect of the independent variables on hours and days.
Significance levels of pairwise t-statistics, which test the hypothesis
that the effect of the independent variable is the same on both hours
and days, are also included. The coefficients on the number of children
in the days and hours regressions, for example, are significantly different in the case of females but not in the case of males.
The results show that both men and women above 19 years of age
work more hours and days compared to the control group of individuals between 17 and 19 years of age. For males, hours and days peak at
25–34 years of age, while hours and days for females reach a maximum at 20–24 years of age. Throughout the remainder of the life-

Table 2 OLS Estimates of ln (Hours) and ln (Days), With and Without Job Controls, Males and Femalesa,b
Males
No job controls
Independent variable

Hours

Days

Females
Job controls

t

Hours

Days

No job controls
t

Hours

Job controls

Days

t

***

Hours

Days

t

***

Age
20–24 years

25–34 years

35–44 years

45–54 years

55–64 years

0.0493

0.0385

0.0501

0.0413

0.0327

0.0853

(4.067)

(3.667)

(4.239)

(3.970)

(1.441)

(3.373)

0.0549

0.0412

0.0537

0.0460

0.0225

0.0785

(4.516)

(3.918)

(4.522)

(4.392)

(1.008)

(3.156)

0.0371

0.0322

0.0427

0.0392

0.0106

0.0688

(3.006)

(3.007)

(3.518)

(3.667)

(0.467)

(2.735)

0.0227

0.0310

0.0317

0.0377

–0.0176

0.0395

(1.792)

(2.832)

(2.530)

(3.414)

(0.763)

**

*

0.0248

0.0787

(1.115)

(3.160)

***

0.0010

0.0553

(4.500)

(2.251)

***

–0.0175

0.0385

(0.787)

(1.542)

***

–0.0413

0.0118

(1.541)

(1.816)

(0.463)

–0.0165

0.0198

–0.0036

0.0269

–0.0807

–0.0362

–0.1025

–0.0637

(1.251)

(1.732)

(0.278)

(2.337)

(3.371)

(1.360)

(4.319)

(2.399)

–0.0023

–0.0031

–0.0030

–0.0035

–0.0195

–0.0163

–0.0681

(0.579)

(0.893)

(0.752)

(1.003)

(2.867)

(9.788)

(2.430)

(9.102)

–0.0320

–0.0616

(5.078)

(8.726)

***

***

***

Number of children
Ages 0–2

Ages 3–5

–.00742

0.0059

0.0005

0.0060

0.0012

–0.0332

–0.0645

(1.507)

(0.152)

(1.590)

(0.354)

(5.153)

(9.012)

*

*

*

*
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Table 2 (continued)
Males
No job controls
Independent variable
Ages > 5

Constant

Hours

Days

t

Hours

Days

No job controls
t

Hours

t

Hours

Days

t

*

–0.0167

–0.0224

***

6.843

8.206

0.0022

0.0007

0.0011

0.0005

–0.0192

–0.0277

(0.559)

(7.250)

(0.348)

(7.749)

(10.082)

2.1163

1.5883

2.1341

1.5712

0.0313

0.0086

*

(127.509) (106.577)
0.0841

0.0305

*

Job controls

Days

(1.445)

(151.034) (130.867)
R2

Females
Job controls

1.9751

1.5201

(75.150)

(52.004)

0.0276

0.0696

*

1.9535
61.491

1.4841

0.0408

0.0713

Correlation coefficient
of residuals

0.1455

0.1379

0.1545

0.1371

Breusch–Pagan test of
independence
(p-value)

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Number of
observations

16,280

16,280

14,635

14,635

a

*

(41.755)

Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.
*** = Significant at 1% level.
** = Significant at 5% level.
* = Significant at 10% level.
b
Controls for marital status, relationship to family head, education, region, mother tongue, immigrant, and visible minority were all included in
all regressions. Job control variables are firm size, industry, occupation, union coverage, tenure, and pension coverage. Age 17–19 is the omitted variable.
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cycle, labor supply in both dimensions declines slowly. For both genders, the increase in weekly hours is the result of a larger percentage
increase in days than hours, but only in the case of women are these
differences statistically significant at 10 percent.
These results are somewhat at odds with those of Hamermesh
(1996), who found that the inverse U-shaped pattern was steeper in the
case of hours than days for both U.S. and German male and female
workers. He reasoned that the steeper hours profile implied that hours
are less costly to add than days. In our case, male workers do add
hours slightly more rapidly than days until they reach their peaks
between 25 and 34 years. Thereafter, hours fall off more rapidly than
days. Because 82 percent of the males in our sample work a standard
five-day workweek, flexibility in weekly hours obviously comes from
changes in hours. For female workers, it is days that rise more rapidly
to a peak at 20–24 years, and then both days and hours decline at a similar rate. Thus females appear to be more flexible in altering both days
and hours than males.
Because women still generally hold the primary responsibility for
child care, the presence of young children should decrease their labor
supply. Indeed, the number of young children present does have a negative effect on supply of both hours and days. In the case of no job
controls, the point estimates show that the presence of a child two years
of age or less is related to a drop in hours of almost 2 percent but a drop
in days of over 7 percent. By contrast, the presence of young children
has no statistically significant effect on the male supply of hours and
days. Thus, the data show that young children are correlated with a
decline both the hours and days supplied by the mother. If the fixed
costs of child care are incurred on a daily basis versus an hourly basis,
we would expect the decline in labor supply to be borne by a larger
decline in days. This indeed is the case.

JOB-CHANGE BEHAVIOR AND HOURS PER DAY
AND DAYS PER WEEK
Insofar as hours and days combinations within jobs are less than
optimal for workers, we might expect job change to occur in order to
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attain the desired combination. Since the LMAS contains data on up to
five job changes per worker per year, we can use this information to
estimate a model of job change behavior that will help give further
insights into the daily and hourly fixed costs of labor supply.
Modifying the labor force participation model of Blank (1988), we
assume that an individual i in period j attains the utility level Uij ( Hij ,
, Dij , Eij ),) where Hij is hours of work per day at the job held in period j,
j
j
j
j
Dij is days per week at job j, and Ei = Hi ⋅ Di ⋅ Wi represent the weekly
earnings at job j, which has an hourly wage rate of Wi j . If we assume
that the individual has perfect information about all the arguments in his
or her utility function, and that job mobility is cost-free, then an individual will change jobs only if
(4) P* = Ui2 ( Hi2 , Di2 , Ei2 ) – Ui1 (Ui1 , Di1 , Ei1 ) ≥ 0.
If we further assume that P* is linearly dependent on the three arguments in the utility function, as well as other demographic and economic variables that determine job change, we can write
(5) P* = λZ + v,
where Z is the aforementioned vector of job change determinants, λ is
its corresponding vector of coefficients, and v is the white noise error
term. Utility is unobservable and therefore so is the variable P*. What
we do observe, however, is a dichotomous variable P, where
P = 1 if P* ≥ 0 and P = 0 if P* < 0.
If we assume that an individual is in equilibrium at the initial job, utility is being maximized. A shock which affects one or more arguments
in the individual’s utility function may result in the utility no longer
being maximized at that job, and job change will occur if utility can be
maximized at a new job. The birth of a child, for example increases the
fixed costs of employment along both time dimensions. If the fixed
costs of hours are more costly than the fixed costs of days, we would
expect job-changers to want to move out of jobs with longer hours.
Conversely, if days are more costly than hours, we would expect the
probability of leaving to be positively related to the days variable.
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Probit estimates of Eq. 5 appear in Table 3. Again, only the relevant coefficients are included with full results contained in Table A3 in
the appendix. Independent variables include all personal and job controls used in the previous analysis, plus variables for ln (hours) and ln
(days) at the initial job, a dummy which equals 1.0 if respondents said
that they desired more monthly hours at their initial job, and interactions of this variable with ln (hours) and ln (days). Separate probits are
also estimated without personal and job controls. Of the 16,280 males
in our sample, some 1,563 changed jobs in 1990 for a probability of
0.096. For women, the probability of moving from a first to a second
job was 0.090 (1,318 changers from a sample of 14,635).
The effects of personal and job characteristics on job change are
very similar for both genders. Probability of job change decreases as
age increases. The presence of small children also reduces the likelihood of job change for both genders, especially women. Older children have little influence on the job change behavior of men but
continue to slightly lessen female mobility. Union members tend to
exhibit less job mobility as do those with more job tenure. These
results are consistent with the literature.9
The marginal effects of hours, days, and wanting extra monthly
hours on job-change probability are presented in Table 4. For males,
the number of hours and days worked at their initial jobs have little
effect on job-change probability when control variables are included.
In the case of no controls, the coefficient on ln (hours) is twice as large
as that on ln (days), although only the former is significant. The effect
of the desire for extra hours, however, is significant in both cases,
accounting for about half of the predicted probability when controls are
not included. For females, a different pattern emerges as the ln (days)
and ln (hours) coefficients are similar in magnitude and significant in
each instance. The effect of the desire to work extra hours is significant in each case and large compared to the predicted probabilities of
each model.
These results are not supportive of the hypothesis that the addition
of days is more costly than the addition of hours, but that could simply
be a result of unobserved heterogeneity between workers, which causes
them to separate from their initial jobs if their preferences do not favor
the given hours/days combination. Regardless of the reason, this result
shows that the desire to work extra hours significantly increases the
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Table 3 Probit Estimates of Job Change Probability, Males and Femalesa,b
Males
No controls
Independent variable

Coefficient

Partial
deriv.

Females
With controls

Coefficient

Partial
deriv.

No controls
Coefficient

Partial
deriv.

With controls
Coefficient

Partial
deriv.

ln (hours per day)

0.2869
(3.442)

0.048

0.0806
(0.890)

0.010

0.3203
(4.394)

0.051

0.2358
(2.997)

0.027

ln (days per week)

0.1946
(1.832)

0.033

–0.0321
(0.296)

–0.004

0.3093
(4.522)

0.049

0.2330
(3.188)

0.027

Extra hours wanted

1.7816
(4.231)

0.548

0.5529
(1.263)

0.092

0.8750
(2.913)

0.208

0.5999
(1.919)

0.098

Extra hours wanted
× ln (hours)

–0.2810
(1.515)

–0.047

0.0388
(0.199)

0.005

–0.1086
(0.791)

–0.017

–0.0309
(0.213)

–0.004

Extra hours wanted
× ln (days)

–0.5910
(3.518)

–0.100

–0.3389
(1.950)

–0.041

–0.1856
(1.651)

–0.029

–0.2079
(1.763)

–0.024

–0.3188
(3.487)

–0.031

–0.0973
(0.836)

–0.011

Age
20–24 years

25–34 years

–0.4625
(4.925)

–0.049

–0.2862
(2.459)

–0.031

35–44 years

–0.5028
(5.145)

–0.052

–0.4378
(3.641)

–0.045

45–54 years

–0.6083
(5.852)

–0.055

–0.5785
(4.616)

–0.051

55–64 years

–0.8859
(7.612)

–0.063

–0.7840
(5.477)

–0.055

Ages 0–2

–0.1106
(2.771)

–0.013

–0.2743
(5.783)

–0.032

Ages 3–5

–0.0032
(0.085)

0.000

–0.0619
(1.425)

–0.007

Ages > 5

–0.0196
(1.242)

–0.002

–0.0345
(2.015)

–0.004

Covered by union
agreement

–0.2124
(5.768)

–0.025

–0.2854
(6.611)

–0.032

–0.1179
(18.130)

–0.014

–0.1460
(15.541)

–0.017

Number of children

Tenure at job (weeks/100)
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Table 3 (continued)
Males
No controls
Independent variable

Coefficient

Partial
deriv.

Constant

–2.2614
Covered by union agreement (9.773)
Pseudo R2

Χ2(5,

55, 5 and 54 d.f.)

0.007
69.32

Observed P

a

With controls
Coefficient

No controls
Coefficient

Partial
deriv.

With controls
Coefficient

–2.5003
(14.577)

–1.6369
(6.028)

0.124

0.012

0.119

1277.03

110.18
0.096

0.095
16,280

Partial
deriv.

–0.3095
(1.096)

0.096

Predicted P
Number of observations

Females

1055.43
0.090

0.061
16,280

0.090

0.087
14,635

Partial
deriv.

0.058
14,629

Absolute values of t-ratios are in parentheses.
are marital status, relationship to family head, education, region, mother tongue, immigrant, visible minority, firm size, industry, occupation, and pension coverage. Age 17–19 is the omitted variable.

b Controls
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Table 4 Effect of Independent Variables on Predicted Job Change
Probabilitya
Males
w/o controls

Females

w/controls

w/o controls

w/controls

Hours

0.052
(3.372)

0.010
(0.932)

0.060
(4.672)

0.032
(3.257)

Days

0.026
(1.415)

–0.008
(0.661)

0.055
(4.691)

0.029
(3.178)

Extra hours wanted

0.048
(5.388)

0.011
(1.921)

0.076
(8.222)

0.032
(4.580)

0.095

0.061

0.087

0.058

Predicted P
a

Absolute values of t-ratios are in parentheses.

probability of job change for both genders, suggesting that those who
want these hours may face hours and/or days constraints in their initial
jobs and have to change jobs to relax these constraints.
The fact that extra hours are desired indicates that the individual
may not be in equilibrium at his or her current job. The interactions of
the extra hours variable with the days and hours variables in Table 3
provide us with additional information about the reasons for job
change. If a lack of hours (or days) on the current job is the constraint
on lower-than-desired total hours and thus at least part of the motivation for seeking a new job, then we would expect a negative coefficient
on the interaction term. For example, if one wanted extra days per
week, the probability of job change should decrease as the number of
days at the current job increase. The significant negative coefficients
on the extra hours/days interaction variables in the case of males support this assertion. For the extra hours/hours interaction, however, we
cannot reject the null of no effect on job-change behavior. Thus, a
male who wants extra hours is less likely to leave his current job as
days per week increase, while hours per day have no significant effect
on job change. For females, none of the coefficients on either of the
interaction variables is statistically significant.
These results suggest that for males who do not desire extra hours,
the costs of additional hours of work are higher, at least within their
first jobs, than those of additional days of work because the increase in
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job-change probability is greater for an increase in hours relative to a
comparable increase in days. For females, increases in both days and
hours result in similar changes in job-change probabilities. For both
who want more monthly hours, a larger number of hours at the
worker’s initial job has a smaller negative effect on job-change behavior than an equivalent increase in days. Thus, the probability of job
change decreases as extra hours and days are added within the initial
job, although the negative effect of the latter is larger. This appears to
be inconsistent with the hypothesis of higher daily fixed costs,
although it may simply imply that the monetary benefits to working
extra days far outweigh the fixed costs of these days. It may also mean
that job-changers are somewhat constrained in their choices, as new
job offers are more apt to include a higher number of days rather than a
higher number of hours.10
These estimates do give us insight into what motivates job change,
but they tell us little about the changes in hours and days that result
from job change. This is addressed in the following section.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF JOB-CHANGERS
Tables 5 and 6 show the extent to which the means and variances of
ln (days) and ln (hours) vary as workers change jobs. In both these
tables, columns 1 through 4 display the means and variances of ln
(hours) and ln (days) for each of the two jobs held by job-changers, and
the one job held by job-stayers. Column 5 shows the mean changes in
log weekly hours as well as the corresponding variances. Columns 6
and 7 disaggregate weekly hours changes into changes in ln (hours)
and ln (days). Columns 8 and 9 display the test statistics for differences in the means and variances in ln (hours) and ln (days) changes.11
We also disaggregate the sample of job-changers, first into voluntary
and involuntary job-changers, and then into those who wanted extra
hours at their first job and those who did not.12 In each of these two
subsamples, significant differences exist between the two groups in
terms of mean changes and variances in almost every time dimension.
For example, both the means and variances of changes in weekly hours
are significantly different when comparing those who desired extra

Table 5 Selected Means and Variances of ln (hours) and ln (days), Jobs 1 and 2 and First Differences, for Male
Job-Stayers and Job-Changersa
Tests for
differences inb
Job 1

Job 2

First differences

Means Variance

ln (hours)

ln (days)

ln (hours)

ln (days)

∆ln (wkly.
hours)

∆ln (hours)

∆ln (days)

Job stayers
(n = 14,577)

2.116
(0.0341

1.602
(0.0234)

N/A
(N/A)

N/A
(N/A)

N/A
(N/A)

N/A
(N/A)

N/A
(N/A)

Job changers
(n = 1,563)

2.128
(0.0395)

1.596
(0.0423)

2.132
(0.0433)

1.598
(0.0394)

0.0067
(0.1497)

0.0040
(0.0578)

0.0027
(0.6640)

0.146

Voluntary
(n = 1,000)

2.119
(0.0429)

1.589
(0.0389)

2.125
(0.0412)

1.603
(0.0276)

0.0190
(0.3548)

0.0058
(0.0548)

0.0131
(0.0511)

0.709

Involuntary
(n = 563)

2.142
(0.0331)

1.607
(0.4830)

2.143
(0.0470)

1.591
(0.0602)

–0.0150
(0.1916)

0.0007
(0.0632)

–0.0158
(0.0933)

0.990

Extra hours
wanted
(n = 230)

2.045
(0.0584)

1.459
(0.0942)

2.117
(0.0379)

1.570
(0.0390)

0.1824
(0.2134)

0.0714
(0.0686)

0.1110
(0.1155)

1.400

Extra hours not
wanted
(n = 1,333)

2.142
(0.0349)

1.619
(0.0299)

2.134
(0.0442)

1.603
(0.0393)

–0.0236
(0.1326)

–0.0076
(0.0551)

–0.0160
(0.0557)

0.921

a

F

1.149**
1.072
1.476*
1.684*

1.011
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The top data row of each pair is the mean (µ) and the second row, in parentheses, is the variance (σ2).
and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

b*

z

Tests for differences
inb
Job 1

Job 2

First differences

Means

Variance

z

F

ln (hours)

ln (days)

ln (hours)

ln (days)

∆ln (wkly.
hours)

∆ln(hours)

∆ln(days)

Job stayers
(n = 13,245)

1.967
(0.0813)

1.491
(0.0100)

N/A
(N/A)

N/A
(N/A)

N/A
(N/A)

N/A
(N/A)

N/A
(N/A)

Job changers
(n = 1,318)

1.996
(0.0469)

1.520
(0.0784)

1.997
(0.0547)

1.507
(0.0909)

–0.0113
(0.2429)

0.0008
(0.0732)

–0.0121
(0.1287)

1.624

Voluntary
(n = 998)

1.991
(0.0462)

1.509
(0.0814)

1.998
(0.0453)

1.518
(0.0787)

0.0162
(0.2306)

0.0071
(0.0690)

0.0091
(0.1179)

0.146

Involuntary
(n = 320)

2.012
(0.0488)

1.553
(0.0670)

1.993
(0.0841)

1.475
(0.1280)

–0.0969
(0.2724)

–0.0188
(0.0858)

–0.0782
(0.1569)

2.157**

Extra hours
wanted
(n = 238)

1.862
(0.0814)

1.329
(0.1692)

1.985
(0.0635)

1.483
(0.0989)

0.2768
(0.3967)

0.1225
(0.1072)

0.1542
(0.2275)

0.845

Extra hours
preferred
(n = 1,080)

2.026
(0.0345)

1.562
(0.0487)

2.000
(0.0528)

1.513
(0.0891)

–0.0747
(0.1870)

–0.0260
(0.0618)

–0.0487
(0.0996)

2.299**

a

The top data row of each pair is the mean (µ) and the second row, in parentheses, is the variance (σ2).
and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

b*

1.758*
1.709*
1.829*
2.122*

1.612*
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Table 6 Selected Means and Variances of ln(Hours) and ln(Days), Jobs 1 and 2 and First Differences, for Female
Job-Stayers and Job-Changersa
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monthly hours with those who did not.13 The evidence appears to support the hypothesis that flexibility in weekly work schedules is important to employees.
Males who changed jobs worked slightly more hours per day and
marginally fewer days per week at their initial jobs compared with
those who did not change jobs, although only the former difference is
statistically significant. The variances of both ln (hours) and ln (days),
however, are significantly higher in the case of job-changers than jobstayers. Thus, although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average job-changer works the same number of daily hours as the average
job-stayer, job-changers show much more variation in their work
schedules at their initial jobs, and this variation persists as they move
into new jobs. This is generally consistent with the results of Altonji
and Paxson (1986), who found that the variance of time worked in a
number of dimensions (hours/week, weeks/year, or hours/year)
increased for people who changed jobs, relative to those who did not
change jobs.14
For all male job-changers, column 5 of Table 5 shows that jobchangers worked marginally more weekly hours at their new jobs. Disaggregating these changes into changes in hours and days, however, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the change in weekly hours was the
result of equal changes in both hours and days. The variance of days
changes, however, is higher than that of hours at the 5 percent level.
Voluntary changers had an increase in ln (weekly hours) of 0.019, with
the adjustment coming equally from increases in hours and days.
Involuntary changers, by contrast, had a decline of 0.015 in ln (weekly
hours). Although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the change came
equally from changes in hours and days, we see that the variance of the
change in days is significantly higher than the change in hours.
Males who wanted extra hours had an increase in ln (weekly hours)
of 0.182 compared to a decline of 0.024 for those who did not. Only in
the former case, however, is the variance of the change in ln (days) significantly higher than that of the change in ln (hours). The higher variances for those desiring extra hours also imply a great deal of
flexibility in finding the preferred combinations of hours and days.
Similar results are obtained by Altonji and Paxson (1988, 1992), who
found that workers who desired to work more weekly hours were more
likely to increase these hours when they changed jobs.
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The results for females are presented in Table 6 and show much
more variation in all time dimensions compared to males. Comparing
the distributions of hours and days on the first job between stayers and
changers, both means are significantly larger for job-changers. For
job-changers, the variance in log hours is significantly smaller than for
stayers while the opposite holds for the variance on ln (days). Female
job-changers find new jobs with only marginally more hours and marginally fewer days compared to their previous positions, in neither case
are the differences significant. Changers do, however, move into jobs
with significantly higher variances in both days and hours.
For all female job-changers, average total weekly hours declined
slightly following job change, although the changes in hours and days
are statistically indistinguishable. The variance of hours changes, however, is statistically much smaller than the variance of days changes.
Voluntary changers had a modest increase in weekly hours compared
to involuntary changes. Only in the latter case, however, can we say
that the bulk of this change was the result of the steep decline in days.
Those women who wanted extra hours increased their ln (weekly
hours) by an average of 0.277, the result of an equal increase in both
hours and days. Those who did not want extra hours saw their mean ln
(weekly hours) decline by 0.075, with most of this decline the result of
a drop in days. In each case, the variance of the days change is statistically larger than that of the hours change.
Both male and female job-changers experience changes in days
and hours as they change jobs. Mean differences, however, appear to
hide important details. In many cases we cannot say with certainty that
the adjustment in weekly hours is the result of either changes in days or
hours. The fact that the variance of changes in days is frequently significantly larger in the case of males, and is always significantly larger
in the case of females, shows that the changes in days are much more
flexible than changes in hours when workers change jobs. This then
implies that changes in days are less flexible than changes in hours
within jobs. These results are generally inconsistent with those
obtained by Hamermesh (1996) for German and American workers.
Only in the case of German males did the variance of the change in ln
(days) exceed that of the change in ln (hours). For German women and
American men the opposite held, while there was little difference for
American women.15
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In sum, we have seen that job-changers have a larger number of
hours and days, generally with higher variances at their initial jobs
compared with those who do not change jobs. Job change does not
increase the average number of hours or days amongst changers but,
with the exception of changes in male days, variances also increase.
Voluntary job-changers of both genders experience higher average
increases in both days and hours than those who do not change jobs
voluntarily, although the variances in the changes of log hours and log
days are larger for involuntary movers. Finally, those desiring extra
hours at their initial jobs are likely to find these extra hours in the form
of both more daily hours and more days per week, with the variances
here (i.e., on the new job) smaller for those who did not want extra
hours.
In terms of the daily and hourly costs of employment, the above
provides weak evidence that the latter may be proportionately less than
the former. Only in two cases (female involuntary changers and
females not desiring extra hours) are the differences between mean ln
(hours) and mean ln (days) changes statistically significant. In both of
these cases, the percentage decline in hours is much smaller than the
percentage decline in days. This suggests that hours of work are less
costly to eliminate than days of work as these women changed jobs.
Conversely, if we make the reasonable assumption of symmetry of
costs in adding and subtracting days or hours, then adding extra days
are more costly than adding extra hours.
The above results give us a good idea of the differences in mean
hours and days changes along with their dispersions as job-changers
move from one job to the next. This analysis, however, depends on differences in average hours and days changes between groups and thus
could cloud the direction of changes in hours and days as workers
move between jobs. Looking at the direction and magnitude of
changes in hours and days by job-changers may offer some insights
into what motivates job change. If daily fixed costs are indeed relatively high compared to hourly costs, we would expect changers to sort
into new jobs with fewer days and more hours, all other things equal.
Furthermore, we might expect these changes to be especially pronounced in the case of voluntary job-changers because they presumably are less constrained in their choices than those who change
involuntarily. In other words, the voluntarily displaced worker may
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only change jobs if the hours/days combination at the new job is sufficiently different from the original job, a choice which an involuntarily
displaced worker may not have. We might also expect those who want
extra hours to attain these hours by increasing their daily hours rather
than by increasing days. Females, who have exhibited more flexibility
in our sample, might also be more apt to change into jobs with relatively fewer days and more hours.
Tables 7 and 8 show contingency tables for days and hours changes
for male and female job-changers. In all but one case, χ2 values allow
us to reject the hypothesis that the distributions of days and hours are
independent.16 In other words, changes in hours and days between jobs
are not purely random. In each of the 10 panels in Tables 7 and 8, no
change in days is more likely than no change in hours for job-changers.
Thus, it appears that rigidities in days are more prevalent than changes
in hours. If larger fixed costs are incurred on a daily basis, these results
are what we would expect.
The second and third panels of Table 7 show that there are differences between voluntary and involuntary job-changers. If voluntary
job-changers are able to sort into a more palatable days/hours combination, and if the costs of adding a day of work are higher than adding
more hours, we would expect positive hours changes to be more likely
as workers move between jobs. If we simply look at aggregate days
and hours changes, this does not appear to be the case. Although voluntary changers are more likely to hold on to both their original days
and hours, the distributions show few other differences, if we only look
at column and row totals. What is interesting is the off-diagonal elements of each panel. In this case voluntary changers were about as
likely to increase days and decrease hours as they were to do the opposite. Involuntary changers, however, were more likely to increase
hours and decrease days than to decrease hours jointly with increasing
days. This is the opposite of what we expected, although somewhat
supportive of the higher daily fixed costs hypothesis. This also suggests that factors other than the costs of days and hours exert more of
an influence on voluntary job-changers as they sort into new jobs.
Those who said they wanted additional hours at their first jobs do,
however, display important differences compared with those who did
not want extra hours. Job-changers were more likely to have both positive hours and days changes if they wanted extra hours than if they did
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Table 7 Changes in Hours and Days for Male Job-Changers (%)
∆ Hours
∆ Days

≥ 2.0

All job-changers (n =

1563)a

0.1– 2.0

0

< 0 & >–2

≤ –2

Total

>1

2.94

0.70

1.41

0.38

0.70

6.14

1

2.82

1.15

3.20

0.90

1.60

9.66

0

4.73

5.63

49.07

5.76

4.67

69.87

–1

2.30

0.45

2.11

1.15

1.98

8.00

< –1

1.15

0.13

2.05

0.38

2.62

6.33

Total

13.95

8.06

57.84

8.57

11.58

100.00

1.10

0.50

0.80

6.10

Voluntary job-changers (n = 1000)b
>1

3.30

0.40

1

2.40

1.40

3.10

1.10

1.30

9.30

0

4.20

5.70

51.00

6.40

4.60

71.90

–1

2.30

0.40

1.40

1.20

2.10

7.40

< –1

0.80

0.10

2.20

0.50

1.70

5.30

Total

13.00

8.00

58.80

9.70

10.50

100.00

Involuntary job-changers (n = 563)c
>1

2.31

1.24

1.95

0.18

0.53

6.22

1

3.55

0.71

3.37

0.53

2.13

10.30

0

5.68

5.51

45.65

4.62

4.80

66.25

–1

2.31

0.53

3.37

1.07

1.78

9.06

< –1

1.78

0.18

1.78

0.18

4.26

8.17

Total

15.63

8.17

56.13

6.57

13.50

100.00

d

Extra hours wanted (n = 230)
>1

6.96

1.30

3.48

2.61

2.17

16.52

1

6.96

2.61

3.04

1.30

1.30

15.22

0

6.09

3.48

41.74

4.78

2.17

58.26

–1

3.04

0.00

0.87

0.87

1.30

6.09

< –1

0.87

0.00

2.17

0.00

0.87

3.91

Total

23.91

7.39

51.30

9.57

7.83

100.00
(continued)
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Table 7 (continued)
∆ Hours
∆ Days

≥ 2.0

0.1– 2.0

0

< 0 & >–2

≤ –2

Total

Extra hours not wanted (n = 1080)e

a

χ2

>1

2.25

0.60

1.05

0.00

0.45

4.35

1

2.10

0.90

3.23

0.83

1.65

8.70

0

4.50

6.00

50.34

5.93

5.10

71.87

–1

2.18

0.53

2.33

1.20

2.10

8.33

< –1

1.20

0.15

2.03

0.45

2.93

6.75

Total

12.23

8.18

58.96

8.40

12.23

100.00

(16 d.f.) = 400.33 (p = 0.000)
(16 d.f.) = 278.68 (p = 0.000)
c χ2 (16 d.f.) = 151.88 (p = 0.000)
d χ2 (16 d.f.) = 73.98 (p = 0.000)
e χ2 (16 d.f.) = 336.48 (p = 0.000)
b χ2
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Table 8 Changes in Hours and Days for Female Job-Changers (%)
∆ Hours
∆ Days

≥ 2.0

All job-changers (n =

1318)a

0.1– 2.0

0

< 0 & >–2

≤ –2

Total

>1

2.58

1.44

2.35

0.53

1.37

8.27

1

2.43

1.29

2.35

0.61

1.52

8.19

0

4.86

8.27

39.45

4.48

8.35

65.40

–1

1.21

1.29

2.50

0.46

2.43

7.89

< –1

0.91

1.21

3.19

0.46

4.48

10.24

Total

11.99

13.51

49.85

6.53

18.13

100.00

2.51

0.60

1.40

8.92

Voluntary job-changers (n = 998)b
>1

2.71

1.70

1

2.40

1.00

2.20

0.50

1.60

7.72

0

4.61

8.12

42.28

5.31

8.12

68.44

–1

1.20

1.40

2.10

0.30

1.80

6.81

< –1

0.90

0.80

2.61

0.40

3.41

8.12

Total

11.82

13.03

51.70

7.11

16.33

100.00

Involuntary job-changers (n = 320)c
>1

2.19

0.62

1.88

0.31

1.25

6.25

1

2.50

2.19

2.81

0.94

1.25

9.69

0

5.62

8.75

30.63

1.88

9.06

55.94

–1

1.25

0.94

3.75

0.94

4.38

11.25

< –1

0.94

2.50

5.00

0.62

7.81

16.88

Total

12.50

15.00

44.06

4.69

23.75

100.00

d

Extra hours wanted (n = 238)
>1

9.24

5.04

5.88

1.26

1.68

23.11

1

6.72

3.78

6.72

1.68

1.68

20.59

0

9.24

6.30

15.97

1.26

5.88

38.66

–1

2.10

2.10

3.36

0.84

2.10

10.50

< –1

2.52

0.84

0.84

0.42

2.52

7.14

Total

29.83

18.07

32.77

5.46

13.87

100.00
(continued)
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Table 8 (continued)
∆ Hours
∆ Days

≥ 2.0

0.1– 2.0

0

< 0 & >–2

≤ –2

Total

Extra hours not wanted (n = 1080)e

a

>1

1.11

0.65

1.57

0.37

1.30

5.00

1

1.48

0.74

1.39

0.37

1.48

5.46

0

3.89

8.70

44.63

5.19

8.89

71.30

–1

1.02

1.11

2.31

0.37

2.50

7.31

< –1

0.56

1.30

3.70

0.46

4.91

10.93

Total

8.06

12.50

53.61

6.76

19.07

100.00

χ2

(16 d.f.) = 209.66 (p = 0.000)
(16 d.f.) = 164.58 (p = 0.000)
c χ2 (16 d.f.) = 53.19 (p = 0.000)
d χ2 (16 d.f.) = 21.42 (p = 0.163)
e χ2 (16 d.f.) = 166.24 (p = 0.000)
b χ2

not. Again, the off-diagonal elements show that these job changes had
a higher propensity to accept more days in combination with fewer
hours rather than fewer days and more hours. These results are contrary to our expectations.
Female job-changers show more flexibility in changing work
schedules compared with males. This is reflected by the fact that they
are less likely to move between jobs with identical hours and days
pairs. Subsamples within female job-changers exhibit similar patterns
to those of male job-changers. The off-diagonal elements show that in
each of the five cases, female job-changers are marginally more likely
to move into jobs with more hours and fewer days than into jobs with
more days and fewer hours. This evidence is mildly supportive of our
hypothesis of higher fixed costs of working more days.
In sum, these results suggest that there is a great deal of rigidity in
job schedules. This is especially true of days per week since jobchangers are less likely to change days than to change hours. As we
have already discussed above (Table 1), females generally have more
flexibility in their work schedules than men. Job change simply
increases this flexibility.
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CONCLUSIONS
By disaggregating weekly labor supply into hours per day and days
per week, we have learned several interesting things. In bivariate distributions, employees tend to be clustered around standard hours and
days, with men on average exhibiting less flexibility in hours and days
worked than women. The self-employed are much less likely to work
standard hours and days. Most of the self-employed males work both
more hours and days compared to paid employees. Self-employed
females also work more hours and days, but they are also more likely
to work fewer hours per day.
The OLS estimates of hours and days supplied show that women
with young children supply less labor in both dimensions, although the
percentage drop in days is significantly larger. This implies that child
care costs are borne on a daily basis, or at least are higher on a daily
basis than an hourly basis.
Probit estimates show that a larger number of hours at the worker’s
initial job are significantly related to an increased probability of job
change for both genders. Days per week are also a significant determinant of job change for females but have little effect on male job change
behavior. For both genders, the desire for extra hours is related to
increased probability of job change. As extra days are added at the initial job, this probability declines. The addition of hours at the initial
job, however, has no significant effect on job change among those who
want extra monthly hours. These results do not generally support the
hypothesis that daily costs of employment are higher than hourly costs,
although these costs may have been outweighed by the benefits of
working more days, which may be the motivating factor behind job
change.
A more detailed analysis of hours and days changes reveals that
job-changers desire flexibility in their weekly work schedules. Not
only do job-changers show more variability in their days and hours
compared to job-stayers at their first jobs, but this carries over to their
new jobs as well. The wider distribution in days changes compared to
hours changes implies that flexibility in days is more important to jobchangers than flexibility in hours. That working standard days is more
common than working standard hours in the sample simply underlines
the importance of flexibility in days, at least amongst job-changers.
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The direction of hours and days changes suggests that there is a
great deal of rigidity in weekly work schedules, especially in terms of
days. Male job-changers are much more likely than females to move
into new jobs with the same or very similar days and hours combinations. The fact that women are marginally more likely to increase
hours and decrease days than to do the opposite, is mildly supportive of
the hypothesis of higher daily fixed costs.
On the basis of the evidence presented above, we cannot say conclusively that the daily or hourly costs of employment drive the behavior of individuals, although they do appear to be influential. We can
conclude that workers do desire more flexibility in their choice of
hours and days. This is particularly true of days. Our analysis also
points to the difficulty that workers may encounter in attaining optimal
hours and days combinations. What we can conclude with more certainty is that using weekly hours, or more aggregated labor supply
measures, hides important differences in the labor supply decisions of
individuals.
Underlying the fact that the common labor supply aggregates hide
important details are a host of policy implications. We have argued
that the costs of employment are largely incurred on a daily rather than
an hourly basis. Workers must get out of bed, go through the physical
preparations for work, prepare lunches, get the kids ready for the day
ahead and transport them to daycare or school before braving the daily
commute to the worksite. This all happens before they actually do or
are paid for work in the market. At the end of the day, this scenario is
largely reversed. Every one of these costs is incurred on a daily basis,
regardless of the number of hours actually worked. While little can be
done about most of these daily costs, child care and commuting do
have important policy implications for employers and for government.
The importance of young children in females’ labor force participation decisions is already well-known. The results above also show
that the presence of young children influences labor supply differently
along the hours and days dimensions. This suggests that policies that
reduce the daily costs of child care might be more important than those
that reduce the hourly costs. Company provision of child care facilities
at the worksite, for example, could result in significant savings to parents in terms of the time and dollar expenses of delivering children to
an outside facility before commuting to work. For the employer, a bet-
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ter understanding of workers’ time preferences could mean lower turnover rates, thus lowering associated costs. It could also mean less
absenteeism and enhanced productivity from employees if they are
able to work their desired hours/days combinations.
The increase in flexible working schedules has arguably been useful in reducing rush-hour traffic congestion in many North American
cities (although increasing the length of the “hour”). This has likely
resulted in reduced daily commute times and the costs of traveling to
and from the worksite. Increased flexibility could further reduce these
daily commuting costs. As cities continue to spread out over larger
geographical areas, commute times, and the expenses associated with
them, may also grow. A one-hour commute to the worksite in any
major urban center in Canada is no longer considered unreasonable.
The increased direct and indirect costs associated with longer commutes, along with the growth in appropriate technology, are undoubtedly reasons for the increased popularity of telecommuting. What does
having the ability to work at home imply about the desired hours/days
combination? Obviously the costs of both time dimensions decrease,
but what is the optimal combination for the employee?
Related to this are public policy decisions regarding the provision
of roadways and public transportation. Such decisions could benefit
from a better understanding of days and hours preferences. If employees prefer to have more flexible daily hours and work fewer days per
week, a large investment in public transportation facilities would not be
warranted as the number of daily trips would be reduced.
There exists a potential for fruitful research on this subject. One
option would be to estimate the costs of hours and days of work using a
hedonic wage model. In doing so, we could arrive at estimates of the
magnitude to which workers would have to be compensated to vary
their hours/days combinations. This would give a good indication of
the relative daily and hourly costs of employment. A second option
would be to use panel data to analyze the shocks to individual utility
functions that result in changes in hours and days for both job-stayers
and job-changers. Disaggregating weekly labor supply into its days
and hours components is an important, albeit first, step in analyzing a
rich variety of policy questions.
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Notes
1. Hamermesh (1996) notes that most surveys ask the question, “How many hours
did you work last week?”
2. Cogan (1980, 1981), Hanoch (1980b), and Hausman (1980) have all shown that
higher fixed costs of entering the labor force result in lower participation rates.
Since average fixed costs decline over the number of hours worked, a person must
be able to work a minimum number of hours to recoup these costs.
3. Specifically, the questions asked were 1) How many weeks per month did [the
subject] usually work at this job? 2) In those weeks, how many paid days per
week did he/she usually work? 3) On those days, how many paid hours per day
did he/she usually work?
4. In Table 1, the sample is broadened to include the self-employed, but only where
appropriate data is available. Unfortunately, the LMAS only includes data on
hours and days for a subsample of the self-employed. For this reason, the analysis
past Table 1 will be limited to paid workers only.
5. Specifically, we began with a with a sample of 30,924 males and 32,092 females.
By eliminating those who held no jobs in 1990, the male (female) sample was
reduced by 4,766 (10,326). The self-employed were also dropped (5,131 males
and 2,728 females), as were full-time students (2,985 males and 2,746 females).
Also eliminated were 179 males and 124 females who did not meet our age criteria, and 70 males and 71 females who claimed to work more than 18 hours per day
or earn less than $1.00 per hour at their first job. Another 737 males and 536
females were dropped because they held more than two jobs in 1990. An additional 821 males and 924 females did not meet our criterion of no job overlap.
Finally, 5 males (2 females) either earned less than $1.00 per hour or worked more
than 18 hours per day at their second jobs (if they held second jobs) and were
dropped. This leaves us with 16,280 males and 14,635 females.
6. An additional 140 males and 72 females who held paid jobs preceding selfemployment were removed.
7. Direct comparability is a problem because Hamermesh uses an 8-hour day as a
standard workday, whereas we define the range 7.5 to 8.5 hours to be standard.
8. The hourly wage rate is not included as a regressor because it is generally derived
from earnings per time period and the number of hours worked per time period
(the exception is for workers paid by the hour because hourly wage data was collected independently of hours and days data). Such introduction of the wage into
the regressions would result in a negative spurious correlation with the hours and
days variables.
9. Weiss (1984) found younger workers more likely to quit than older workers. Farber (1980) and Freeman (1980) discussed the lower quit probabilities of unionists
in the United States. Blau and Kahn (1981), Meitzen (1986), and Sicherman
(1996) all found a negative correlation between tenure and quit behavior.
10. Part of the reason for these inconsistent results may be as a result of our treatment
of days as a continuous variable when in fact it is an integer.
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11. Throughout this section we use the statistic
z = ( X1 = X2 ) /

(s

2
1

) (

)

/ n1 + s22 / n2 ,

where X1 , X2 are the sample means of the two distributions, s12 , s22 are the corresponding estimated variances, and n1 , n2 are the sample sizes. With large sample
sizes, this approximates a normal distribution. For testing differences in estimated variances, we use the statistic
Fn1 _ 1,n2 _ 1 = s12 / s22 ,

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

where the variables have already been defined and s12 ≥ s22 .
Those respondents who changed jobs because of a labor dispute, a layoff, a company moving or going out of business (i.e., a plant closure), or a dismissal are considered involuntary movers. Voluntary movers changed jobs because of an illness
or disability, personal or family responsibilities, to move to a new residence or
return to school, a retirement, a new job, or because of a variety of poor working
conditions.
All such pairwise comparisons are statistically different (at least the 10 percent) in
both means and variances of changes. The exceptions are the means of ln (daily)
hours at the first job between male stayers and changers, mean changes in ln
(weekly) and ln (daily) hours between male voluntary and involuntary changers,
and mean changes in ln (daily) hours between female voluntary and involuntary
changers.
This analysis suffers from censored data because we are only able to observe
hours/days changes for job-changers. Altonji and Paxson (1986) have panel data
and can use a “difference-in-difference” approach.
These comparisons are not strictly equivalent. Hamermesh uses a “difference-indifference” approach, comparing changers and stayers. Data limitations prevent
us from performing similar calculations.
The exception is in the case of females who desired extra hours. Given that the
distribution is skewed in favor of both more days and hours, the fact that we can’t
reject this hypothesis comes as little surprise.
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Table A1 Sample Mean Personal and Job Characteristics of Male and
Female Paid Workers, Job-Changers, and Job-Stayersa

Variable
Usual work schedule
(hours/day) job 1
(hours/day) job 2
(days/week) job 1
(days/week) job 2
Voluntarily left job 1
Extra monthly hours
wanted at job 1
Personal
characteristics
Age (%)
17–19
20–24
25–34
35–44
45–54
55–64
Children
Number of kids
ages 0–2
Number of kids
ages 3–5
Number of kids
ages > 5
Marital status (%)
Married
Single
Other
Relationship to
family head (%)
Head
Spouse
Other

Full
sample

Males
Jobstayers

Jobchangers

Full
sample

Females
JobJobstayers changers

8.448
N/A
5.012
N/A
N/A
0.098

8.435
N/A
5.011
N/A
N/A
0.092

8.556
8.597
5.019
5.026
0.640
0.147

7.398
N/A
4.625
N/A
N/A
0.115

7.387
N/A
4.617
N/A
N/A
0.108

7.516
7.540
4.712
4.675
0.757
0.181

0.017
0.090
0.303
0.295
0.187
0.107

0.014
0.081
0.294
0.300
0.196
0.114

0.054
0.177
0.386
0.240
0.106
0.038

0.012
0.088
0.324
0.306
0.188
0.082

0.010
0.077
0.315
0.313
0.197
0.087

0.032
0.193
0.407
0.239
0.101
0.027

0.144

0.142

0.150

0.130

0.132

0.110

0.146

0.145

0.152

0.133

0.133

0.132

0.907

0.914

0.845

0.897

0.902

0.838

0.748
0.204
0.048

0.759
0.192
0.049

0.633
0.322
0.044

0.745
0.157
0.098

0.754
0.147
0.099

0.659
0.250
0.091

0.815
0.058
0.127

0.825
0.056
0.118

0.711
0.075
0.214

0.253
0.664
0.083

0.249
0.674
0.077

0.290
0.562
0.148
(continued)
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Table A1 (continued)

Variable
Education (%)
Elementary
Some high school
Graduated high
school
Some
postsecondary
Postsecondary
diploma
University degree
Trade
Region (%)
BC
Prairies
Ontario
Quebec
Atlantic
Native language (%)
English
French
Other
Other characteristics
(%)
Immigrant
Visible minority
Job characteristics
Firm size (%)
19 or fewer
employees
20–99 employees
100–499 employees
500 or more
employees
Don’t know

Full
sample

Males
Jobstayers

Jobchangers

Full
sample

Females
JobJobstayers changers

0.094
0.224
0.227

0.095
0.221
0.227

0.088
0.250
0.230

0.054
0.180
0.272

0.054
0.179
0.271

0.047
0.181
0.285

0.093

0.091

0.107

0.099

0.097

0.124

0.126

0.128

0.109

0.191

0.192

0.175

0.139
0.097

0.142
0.096

0.105
0.111

0.131
0.075

0.134
0.073

0.096
0.092

0.105
0.269
0.205
0.160
0.261

0.104
0.266
0.208
0.161
0.261

0.115
0.291
0.183
0.152
0.259

0.099
0.289
0.210
0.149
0.252

0.097
0.287
0.210
0.154
0.252

0.113
0.305
0.216
0.105
0.260

0.722
0.187
0.092

0.720
0.187
0.093

0.744
0.184
0.072

0.738
0.175
0.087

0.733
0.179
0.089

0.789
0.144
0.067

0.097
0.032

0.099
0.032

0.079
0.030

0.093
0.034

0.094
0.034

0.078
0.027

0.218

0.203

0.345

0.260

0.254

0.309

0.156
0.122
0.363

0.151
0.124
0.379

0.198
0.106
0.220

0.149
0.126
0.326

0.149
0.127
0.333

0.149
0.115
0.263

0.141

0.143

0.131

0.139

0.137

0.165
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Variable
Industry groupb
Goods sector
Primary (01–08)
Construction
(29–30, 52)
Manufacturing
(09–28)
Service Sector
Distributive
services (31–35)
Business services
(37–39, 44)
Consumer services
(36, 43, 45–47)
Education, health
and welfare
(40–42)
Public
administration
(48–51)
Occupation groupb
Managerial and
administrative
(01–03)
Professional and
technical (04–16)
Clerical (17–22)
Sales (23–24)
Service (25–28)
Primary (29–33)
Processing (34-35)
Machining,
fabricating,
assembling, and
repairing (36–42)

Full
sample

Males
Jobstayers

Females
JobJobstayers changers

Jobchangers

Full
sample

0.091
0.098

0.089
0.089

0.107
0.175

0.031
0.016

0.031
0.015

0.029
0.019

0.239

0.244

0.194

0.103

0.102

0.108

0.182

0.187

0.146

0.069

0.069

0.062

0.058

0.057

0.062

0.115

0.112

0.144

0.144

0.135

0.214

0.286

0.275

0.386

0.095

0.101

0.050

0.303

0.316

0.178

0.093

0.097

0.052

0.078

0.078

0.074

0.133

0.137

0.087

0.104

0.103

0.112

0.128

0.131

0.106

0.225

0.234

0.143

0.056
0.059
0.084
0.064
0.063
0.161

0.056
0.057
0.084
0.062
0.064
0.163

0.061
0.077
0.087
0.087
0.050
0.141

0.308
0.086
0.167
0.018
0.034
0.030

0.309
0.085
0.163
0.018
0.032
0.031

0.309
0.098
0.203
0.022
0.050
0.029

(continued)
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Table A1 (continued)
Full
sample
0.124

Males
Jobstayers
0.117

Jobchangers
0.187

Variable
Construction
trades (43–45)
0.126
0.127
0.116
Transport
operating and
materials
handling (46–49)
Other
0.000
0.000
0.001
occupations (50)
Other
Covered by union
0.453
0.476
0.266
agreement (%)
0.043
0.038
0.086
Part-time
employment
(<120 hours per
month) (%)
Tenure at job
412
445
136
(weeks)
Covered by pension 0.396
0.395
0.409
(%)
Number of
16,280 14,577
1,563
observations
aValues may not add to 100% due to rounding.
bLMAS industry codes.

Full
sample
0.004

Females
JobJobstayers changers
0.003
0.011

0.022

0.022

0.024

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.384

0.402

0.214

0.246

0.248

0.222

296

315

114

0.328

0.327

0.336

14,635

13,245

1,318
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Table A2 Full Regression Results from Table 2a,b
Males
Independent
variable
Personal
characteristics
Age
20–24 years
25–34 years
35–44 years
45–54 years
55–64 years
Children
Number of kids
ages 0–2
Number of kids
ages 3–5

No job controls
Hours
Days

0.0493
(4.067)
0.0549
(4.516)
0.0371
(3.006)
0.0227
(1.792)
–0.0165
(1.251)

0.0385
(3.667)
0.0412
(3.918)
0.0322
(3.007)
0.0310
(2.832)
0.0198
(1.732)

–0.0023
(0.579)
0.0059
(1.507)

–0.0031
(0.893)
0.0005
(0.152)

t

**

Females

Job controls
Hours
Days

0.0501
(4.239)
0.0537
(4.522)
0.0427
(3.518)
0.0317
(2.530)
–0.0036
(0.278)

0.0413
(3.970)
0.0460
(4.392)
0.0392
(3.667)
0.0377
(3.414)
0.0269
(2.337)

–0.0030
(0.752)
0.0060
(1.590)

–0.0035
(1.003)
0.0012
(0.354)

t

*

No job controls
Hours
Days

t

0.0327
(1.441)
0.0225
(1.008)
0.0106
(0.467)
–0.0176
(0.763)
–0.0807
(3.371)

0.0853
(3.373)
0.0785
(3.156)
0.0688
(2.735)
0.0395
(1.541)
–0.0362
(1.360)

***

–0.0195
(2.867)
–0.0332
(5.153)

–0.0742
(9.788)
–0.0645
(9.012)

*

***
***
***

*

Job controls
Hours
Days

t

0.0248
(1.115)
0.0010
(0.045)
–0.0175
(0.787)
–0.0413
(1.816)
–0.1025
(4.319)

0.0787
(3.160)
0.0553
(2.251)
0.0385
(1.542)
0.0118
(0.463)
–0.0637
(2.399)

***

–0.0163
(2.430)
–0.0320
(5.078)

–0.0681
(9.102)
–0.0616
(8.726)

*

***
***
***

*

Number of kids
ages > 5
Marital status
Single
Other
Relationship to
family head
Spouse
Other
Education
Some high
school
Graduated high
school
Some
postsecondary
Postsecondary
diploma
University
degree

0.0022
(1.445)

0.0007
(0.559)

0.0011
(0.725)

0.0005
(0.348)

–0.0192
(7.749)

–0.0277
(10.082)

*

–0.0167
(6.843)

–0.0224 ***
(8.206)

–0.0216
(3.966)
0.0033
(0.477)

–0.0094 ***
(2.002)
–0.0106
(1.756)

–0.0170
(3.203)
0.0031
(0.459)

–0.0070
(1.489)
–0.0104
(1.737)

0.0062
(0.586)
0.0182
(1.648)

0.0306
(2.583)
0.0395
(3.215)

***

0.0069
(0.660)
0.0192
(1.779)

0.0317
(2.717)
0.0400
(3.304)

–0.0070
(1.115)
–0.0293
(4.697)

–0.0106
(1.951)
–0.0147 ***
(2.715)

–0.0018
(0.294)
–0.0309
(5.087)

–0.0088
(1.637)
–0.0168 ***
(3.144)

–0.0201
(2.307)
–0.0063
(0.602)

–0.0207
(2.136)
–0.0229
(1.956)

–0.0195
(2.281)
–0.0042
(0.408)

–0.0191
(1.995)
–0.0217
(1.873)

–0.0149
(2.626)
–0.0271
(4.671)
–0.0410
(5.996)
–0.0524
(8.169)
–0.0629
(10.062)

–0.0168
(3.401)
–0.0253
(5.028)
–0.0254 ***
(4.284)
–0.0194 *
(3.499)
–0.0173 *
(3.189)

–0.0047
(0.847)
–0.0048
(0.826)
–0.0128
(1.867)
–0.0204
(3.119)
–0.0098
(1.383)

–0.0140
(2.849)
–0.0205
(4.027)
–0.0208
(3.440)
–0.0167
(2.900)
–0.0171
(2.738)

0.0117
(1.033)
0.0215
(1.935)
0.0225
(1.787)
0.0603
(5.272)
0.0513
(4.274)

–0.0229
(1.808)
–0.0239
(1.933)
–0.0341
(2.440)
–0.0586
(4.605)
–0.0294
(2.200)

0.0183
(1.621)
0.0233
(2.046)
0.0195
(1.509)
0.0479
(3.954)
0.0227
(1.733)

–0.0183 **
(1.448)
–0.0292 *
(2.287)
–0.0393 *
(2.720)
–0.0475 *
(3.507)
–0.0076 ***
(0.518)

**

**
*
*
*
*

***
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Table A2 (continued)
Males
Independent
variable
Trade
Region
BC
Prairies
Quebec
Atlantic
Native language
French
Other
Other
Immigrant

No job controls
Hours
Days
–0.0243 –0.0178
(3.628)
(3.058)
0.0140
(2.568)
0.0113
(2.649)
–0.0279
(4.457)
0.0152
(3.440)

–0.0104
(2.202)
0.0035
(0.948)
–0.0022
(0.408)
0.0133
(3.469)

0.0036
(0.678)
–0.0152
(2.377)
0.0095
(1.498)

t

*

Females

Job controls
Hours
Days
–0.0037
–0.0147
(0.551)
(2.518)
0.0099
(1.851)
0.0080
(1.886)
–0.0183
(2.986)
0.0134
(3.043)

–0.0129
(2.729)
–0.0029
(0.780)
–0.0012
(0.227)
0.0080
(2.071)

–0.0041
(0.888)
–0.0042
(0.758)

–0.0021
(0.399)
–0.0191
(3.068)

–0.0034
(0.760)
–0.0030
(0.551)

0.0104
(1.906)

0.0115
(1.870)

0.0100
(1.834)

*

t

*
**
**

**

No job controls
Hours
Days
0.0343
–0.0250
(2.609)
(1.713)

t
*

Job controls
Hours
Days
0.0407
–0.0193
(3.040)
(1.290)

t
*

–0.0104
(1.176)
–0.0154
(2.331)
–0.0300
(3.006)
0.0172
(2.459)

–0.0324 ***
(3.296)
–0.0365 **
(4.965)
–0.0021 **
(0.192)
0.0255
(3.284)

–0.0010
(0.109)
–0.0041
(0.626)
–0.0294
(3.005)
0.0257
(3.672)

–0.0201
(2.056)
–0.0274 **
(3.732)
–0.0029 ***
(0.267)
0.0335
(4.282)

–0.0024
(0.287)
–0.0063
(0.640)

0.0022
(0.232)
0.0015
(0.132)

–0.0025
(0.297)
–0.0084
(0.870)

0.0065
(0.700)
–0.0005
(0.049)

–0.0019
(0.193)

0.0056
(0.515)

–0.0015
(0.155)

0.0092
(0.851)

Visible minority –0.0243
(2.767)
Job characteristics
Firm size
20–99
employees
100–499
employees
500 or more
employees
Don’t know
Industry group
Goods sector
Construction
Manufacturing
Service sector
Distributive
services
Business services

–0.0059 ***
(0.781)

–0.0153
(1.794)

–0.0025
(0.328)

0.0475
(3.446)

0.0145
(3.041)
0.0209
(3.876)
0.0147
(3.278)
0.0135
(2.671)

–0.0107
(2.547)
–0.0137
(2.899)
–0.0188
(4.756)
–0.0022
(0.488)

–0.0460
(5.366)
–0.0808
(11.254)

0.0143
(1.892)
–0.0040
(0.629)

*

–0.0926
(12.776)
–0.1093
(12.354)

0.0110
(1.719)
–0.0003
(0.041)

*

*
*
*
**

*

*

0.0765
(4.994)

0.0427
(3.159)

0.0680
(4.498)

0.0509
(6.797)
0.0515
(6.197)
0.0287
(4.298)
–0.0048
(0.629)

0.0298
(3.554)
0.0326
(3.509)
0.0329
(4.406)
0.0236
(2.746)

**

–0.0730
(2.893)
0.0266
(1.373)

0.0229
(0.812)
0.0477
(2.198)

*

–0.0285
(1.486)
–0.0171
(0.925)

0.0270
(1.257)
0.0285
(1.378)

**

*

***
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Table A2 (continued)
Males
Independent
variable
Consumer
services
Education, health
and welfare
Public
administration
Occupation group
Managerial and
administrative
Professional and
technical
Sales
Service
Primary
Processing

No job controls
Hours
Days

t

Females

Job controls
Hours
Days
–0.1133
0.0016
(14.890)
(0.232)
–0.1377
–0.0007
(16.364)
(0.100)
–0.1124
–0.0012
(14.102)
(0.165)
0.0378
(5.207)
0.0219
(2.821)
0.0321
(3.835)
0.0283
(3.599)
0.0563
(5.757)
0.0663
(7.656)

0.0389
(6.086)
0.0312
(4.575)
0.0268
(3.631)
–0.0026
(0.375)
0.0678
(7.874)
0.0079
(1.041)

t
*
*
*

*

*

No job controls
Hours
Days

t

Job controls
Hours
Days
–0.0197
–0.0059
(1.106)
(0.296)
–0.0723
–0.0310
(3.979)
(1.524)
–0.0304
0.0243
(1.588)
(1.134)
0.0768
(9.369)
0.0717
(8.896)
–0.0033
(0.359)
–0.0265
(3.442)
0.0521
(2.316)
0.0668
(4.277)

0.0610
(6.649)
–0.0427
(4.731)
–0.0409
(3.960)
–0.0163
(1.899)
0.0966
(3.837)
0.0174
(0.995)

t

**

*
*

**

Machining,
fabricating,
assembling and
repairing
Construction
trades
Transport
operating and
materials
handling
Other occupation
Other
Covered by
union
agreement
Tenure at job
(weeks/100)
Covered by
pension
Constant
R2

2.1163
1.5883
(151.034) (130.867)
0.0313
0.0086

*

0.0320
(4.522)

0.0269
(4.305)

0.0706
(4.524)

0.0172
(0.983)

0.0430
(5.326)
0.0698
(9.613)

0.0236
(3.316)
0.0153
(2.388)

0.1711
(4.468)
–0.0185
(1.150)

0.1125
(2.625)
–0.0136
(0.754)

0.1344
(1.981)

0.0720
(1.206)

–0.0233
(0.211)

–0.0521
(0.420)

–0.0161
(4.735)

–0.0184
(6.152)

0.0313
(5.281)

0.0181
(2.730)

0.0026
(3.534)
0.0105
(2.190)
1.9535
(61.491)
0.0408

0.0053
(6.316)
0.0096
(1.789)
1.4841
(41.755)
0.0713

***

–0.0001
0.0007 ***
(0.304)
(2.152)
–0.0024
0.0002
(0.849)
(0.080)
2.1341
1.5712
*
(127.509) (106.577)
0.0841
0.0305

1.9751
(75.150)
0.0276

1.5201
(52.004)
0.0696

*

**

**

*
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Table A2 (continued)
Males
No job controls
Hours
Days
0.1455

Job controls
Hours
Days
0.1379

Females
No job controls
Hours
Days
0.1545

Job controls
Independent
variable
t
t
t
Hours
Days
t
Correlation
0.1371
coefficient of
residuals
Breusch–Pagan test 0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
of independence
(p–value)
Number of
16,280
16,280
14,635
14,635
observations
a *, **, and *** denote that the pairwise t-statistics are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
b Omitted categorical variables are age 17–19, married, head of household, elementary education, Ontario, English, 19 or fewer employees, primary industry group and clerical occupation group.

Table A3 Full Probit Results from Table 3a,b
Males

Independent variable
ln (hours per day)

No controls
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
0.2869
0.048
(3.442)

With controls
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
0.0806
0.010
(0.890)

Females
No controls
With controls
Partial
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
Coefficient
deriv.
0.3203
0.051
0.2358
0.027
(4.394)
(2.997)

ln (days per week)

0.1946
(1.832)

0.033

–0.0321
(0.296)

–0.004

0.3093
(4.522)

0.049

0.2330
(3.188)

0.027

Extra hours wanted

1.7816
(4.231)

0.548

0.5529
(1.263)

0.092

0.8750
(2.913)

0.208

0.5999
(1.919)

0.098

Extra hours wanted*ln
(hours)

–0.2810
(1.515)

–0.047

0.0388
(0.199)

0.005

–0.1086
(0.791)

–0.017

–0.0309
(0.213)

–0.004

Extra hours wanted*ln
(days)

–0.5910
(3.518)

–0.100

–0.3389
(1.950)

–0.041

–0.1856
(1.651)

–0.029

–0.2079
(1.763)

–0.024

–0.3188
(3.487)

–0.031

–0.0973
(0.836)

–0.011

–0.4625
(4.925)

–0.049

–0.2862
(2.459)

–0.031

Personal characteristics
Age
20–24 years
25–34 years
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Table A3 (continued)
Males

Independent variable
35–44 years

No controls
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.

With controls
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
–0.5028
–0.052
(5.145)

Females
No controls
With controls
Partial
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
Coefficient
deriv.
–0.4378
–0.045
(3.641)

45–54 years

–0.6083
(5.852)

–0.055

–0.5785
(4.616)

–0.051

55–64 years

–0.8859
(7.612)

–0.063

–0.7840
(5.477)

–0.055

–0.1106
(2.771)

–0.013

–0.2743
(5.783)

–0.032

Number of kids ages 3–5

–0.0032
(0.085)

0.000

–0.0619
(1.425)

–0.007

Number of kids ages > 5

–0.0196
(1.242)

–0.002

–0.0345
(2.015)

–0.004

–0.0396
(0.769)

–0.005

–0.0186
(0.275)

–0.002

–0.0157
(0.212)

–0.002

0.0413
(0.553)

0.005

Children
Number of kids ages 0–2

Marital status
Single
Other

Relationship to family head
Spouse

0.1353
(2.262)

0.018

–0.0654
(1.136)

–0.008

–0.0426
(0.750)

–0.005

–0.0045
(0.070)

–0.001

0.0086
(0.147)

0.001

0.0349
(0.427)

0.004

Graduated high school

–0.0221
(0.360)

–0.003

0.0516
(0.627)

0.006

Some postsecondary

0.0860
(1.210)

0.011

0.1434
(1.581)

0.018

Postsecondary diploma

0.0010
(0.014)

0.000

0.1432
(1.637)

0.018

University degree

0.0347
(0.453)

0.004

0.1443
(1.501)

0.018

Trade

0.0977
(1.415)

0.012

0.1749
(1.859)

0.023

0.0528
(0.942)

0.007

0.0409
(0.691)

0.005

0.0300
(0.672)

0.004

0.0064
(0.142)

0.001

Other
Education
Some high school

Region
BC
Prairies
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Table A3 (continued)
Males

Independent variable
Quebec
Atlantic
Mother tongue
French
Other
Other
Immigrant
Visible minority
Job characteristics
Firm size
20–99 employees

No controls
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.

With controls
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
–0.0626
–0.007
(0.962)

Females
No controls
With controls
Partial
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
Coefficient
deriv.
–0.2722
–0.027
(3.877)

–0.0807
(1.703)

–0.009

–0.1201
(2.453)

–0.013

0.0293
(0.548)

0.004

0.0802
(1.397)

0.010

–0.0422
(0.614)

–0.005

–0.0693
(0.962)

–0.008

0.0136
(0.202)

0.002

0.0020
(0.028)

0.000

–0.1126
(1.225)

–0.012

–0.1648
(1.683)

–0.017

0.0073
(0.163)

0.001

–0.0426
(0.839)

–0.005

100–499 employees

–0.0458
(0.844)

–0.005

0.0668
(1.160)

0.008

500 or more employees

–0.1421
(3.131)

–0.017

–0.0138
(0.300)

–0.002

–0.0832
(1.667)

–0.010

0.0510
(1.005)

0.006

0.0632
(0.738)

0.008

0.1419
(0.784)

0.018

–0.0402
(0.528)

–0.005

0.1601
(1.151)

0.020

–0.0682
(0.881)

–0.008

0.2621
(1.892)

0.036

Business services

–0.0597
(0.656)

–0.007

0.3302
(2.493)

0.047

Consumer services

0.0228
(0.292)

0.003

0.2928
(2.273)

0.038

Education, health and
welfare
Public administration

–0.2051
(2.178)
–0.1125
(1.268)

–0.022

0.1318
(0.998)
0.3878
(2.813)

0.016

Don’t know
Industry group
Goods sector
Construction
Manufacturing
Service sector
Distributive services

–0.013

0.058
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Table A3 (continued)
Males

Independent variable
Occupation group
Managerial and
administrative
Professional and technical
Sales

No controls
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.

With controls
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
–0.2265
(2.878)
–0.0082
(0.100)
–0.0788
(0.942)

–0.024
–0.001
–0.009

Females
No controls
With controls
Partial
Partial
Coefficient
deriv.
Coefficient
deriv.
0.0379
(0.670)
–0.0089
(0.151)
–0.0519
(0.846)

0.005
–0.001
–0.006

Service

–0.0837
(1.028)

–0.010

0.0183
(0.353)

0.002

Primary

–0.1227
(1.222)

–0.014

0.1909
(1.248)

0.025

Processing

–0.1824
(1.942)

–0.019

0.2698
(2.685)

0.038

Machining, fabricating,
assembling and repairing
Construction trades

–0.1924
(2.573)
–0.0147
(0.174)

–0.021

0.1031
(0.959)
0.6209
(2.968)

0.013

Transport operating and
materials handling

–0.1643
(2.130)

–0.002
–0.018

0.0189
(0.174)

0.112
0.002

Other occupation
Other
Covered by union
agreement
Tenure at job (weeks/100)
Covered by pension
Constant

–2.2614
(9.773)

–0.0703
(0.110)

–0.008

–0.2124
(5.768)

–0.025

–0.2854
(6.611)

–0.032

–0.1179
(18.130)

–0.014

–0.1460
(15.541)

–0.017

0.0185
(0.621)

0.002

0.0153
(0.459)

0.002

–0.3095
(1.096)

variable dropped

–2.5003
(14.577)

–1.6369
(6.028)

Pseudo R2
0.007
0.124
0.012
0.119
χ2 (5, 55, 5 and 54 d.f.)
69.32
1277.03
110.18
1055.43
Observed P
0.096
0.096
0.090
0.090
Predicted P
0.095
0.061
0.087
0.058
Number of observations
16,280
16,280
14,635
14,629
a Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses.
b Omitted categorical variables are age 17–19, married, head of household, elementary education, Ontario, English native language, 19 or
fewer employees, primary industry and clerical occupation.
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Hours Constraints
Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications
Kevin Lang and Shulamit Kahn
Boston University

In response to persistent unemployment, particularly in Europe,
there have been calls to reduce the length of the workweek in order to
share the available work more equally. Implicitly, advocates of these
mandated hours reductions believe that the demand for hours of work
is inelastic and independent of the number of workers used to fill those
hours. Therefore overall employment can be increased by reducing the
number of hours that each individual works, a policy often referred to
as work sharing. The view that modern workers would actually like to
reduce their work hours adds to the attractiveness of this proposal.
Juliet Schor’s book The Overworked American proved enormously
popular. Despite stinging criticism from academic economists, the
book appeals to professional women, many of whom are in dual-career
families and feel caught between the high demands of their jobs and
their families.
The Canadian “Report of the Advisory Group on Working Time
and the Distribution of Work” (1994) takes a more cautious approach.
It suggests that about half of sustained reductions in overtime eventually are translated into new jobs. On the basis of this and other arguments, it recommends reducing the legislated standard workweek to 40
hours in those provinces where the legislated standard exceeds 40. In
addition, it recommends giving employees the right to refuse to work
more than 40 hours per week. Finally, it recommends allowing a maximum of 100 hours of compensated overtime per year. Additional
overtime would have to be offset by reduced hours at other times. In
effect, it therefore recommends a legislated maximum average workweek of 42 hours. We note in passing that this would be the maximum
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time spent per week on a single job. Many people hold more than one
job. Such legislation would undoubtedly increase these numbers.
It is relatively easy for economists to dismiss both the calls for
mandated hours reductions and Schor’s book. In a simple model of
hours determination, hours are set optimally. Any interference with the
market must reduce welfare. Indeed, it is trivial to produce examples
in which reducing the workweek actually reduces employment due to
decreased efficiency, suggesting that there even might not be an efficiency/equity trade-off.
Nevertheless, there are deficiencies in this simple economic argument. The models which are used implicitly or explicitly to show that
reducing the workweek need not increase employment and therefore
may not reduce unemployment are models in which the labor market
clears, employment is efficient and there is no unemployment. Having
assumed away unemployment, it is difficult to see how we can evaluate
programs designed to reduce it. Clearly, more economic analysis is
called for.
The recommendation that the workweek should be reduced contrasts with many workers’ perceptions that they are underemployed.
Most workers do not want to reduce work hours in return for a proportionate pay reduction. The overwhelming evidence from both the
United States and Canada is that far more workers would like to
increase their hours than would like to decrease them, although the
European evidence is more mixed. Thus, where some see mandated
hours reductions lowering unemployment, others see it exacerbating
underemployment.
In this chapter, we do not claim to resolve the issue of whether
mandated hours reductions are a viable mechanism for reducing unemployment; our goals are more modest. We consider, both empirically
and theoretically, workers’ survey responses regarding how many
hours they would prefer to work at the same hourly rate compared to
how much they actually do work. When preferred hours diverge from
actual hours, hours are constrained.
We have two objectives in examining hours constraints. The first is
to assess whether hours constraints are indicative of some sort of problem in the labor market, particularly one of underemployment. The
second is to use the information on hours constraints to further our
understanding of the functioning of the labor market and determination
of working hours.

Hours Constraints

263

We conclude that in the United States and Canada, the direction of
hours constraints is clear: wanting to work additional hours is more
prevalent than wanting to work fewer hours. The evidence is less clear
for Europe. The most promising avenue for explaining hours constraints is the development of models of imperfect matching in the
labor market, possibly supplemented by issues associated with longterm contracting. We develop a simple example, a model of bilateral
search, where although most workers want to work fewer hours,
imposing a legally mandated shorter workweek could worsen unemployment and reduce the well-being of workers. Thus we urge caution
regarding proposals to promote work sharing by requiring a shorter
workweek—the data suggest that more people would prefer to work
more hours than fewer hours, and even if people preferred fewer hours,
we cannot identify welfare-improving regulation without understanding why both hours constraints and unemployment exist.

THE EXTENT OF HOURS CONSTRAINTS
Survey research on whether people in the United States would like
to work more, fewer, or the same number of hours dates back to at least
1966. Since then, five surveys have asked comparable questions
regarding desired work hours.1 Table 1 gives the results of these surveys. All five surveys reveal the same general tendency: more than 40
percent of respondents would like to change their hours of work. Of
these, a clear majority want more work not less. Differences in the
samples make it difficult to draw strong conclusions about trends.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) also monitored the
relation between desired and actual hours through 1987. In the PSID,
workers were first asked whether more hours were available on any of
their jobs. Those who could not have worked more were then asked if
they would have liked to work more. Similarly, they were asked if they
could have worked less and, if not, whether they would have liked to
work less. One weakness of the PSID is that some salaried workers
responded that they could have worked more but, in a subsequent question, revealed that they would not have been paid for the work. Nevertheless, these workers were not asked if they would have liked to have
worked more in return for more pay.
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Table 1 Selected Survey Results on U.S. Workers’ Desire to Work More,
Fewer, or the Same Hours (%)
Year

More

Fewer

Same

1966

34

10

56

1978

28

11

61

1985

28

8

65

1991

33

6

62

1995

26

14

55

SOURCE: 1966: George Katona and his associates, sample of household heads (Katona
et al. 1971). The exact question was, “Some people would like to work more hours a
week, if they could be paid for it. Others would prefer to work fewer hours per week
even if they earned less. How do you feel about this?”
1978: Conducted by Louis Harris Associates, sample of employed civilians, aged 17
and over. The question was, “If you had a choice, would you prefer to work the same
number of hours and earn the same money, fewer hours at the same rate of pay and earn
less money, or more hours at the same rate of pay and earn more money?”
1985: Current Population Survey supplement, sample of employed persons, aged 17
and over (Shank 1986). Question identical to the one above.
1991: International Social Survey Programme. This survey asked, “Think of the
number of hours you work and the money you earn in your main job, including regular
overtime. If you only had one of these three choices, which of the following would you
prefer: work longer hours and earn more money; work the same number of hours and
earn the same money; work fewer hours and earn less money?” (Bell and Freeman
1995).
1995: The Gallup Poll, sample of employed persons, aged 18 and over (USA Today,
April 10, 1995). The exact question was, “If you could, which of the following
situations would you choose: fewer hours on the job but less income, the same number
of hours and income that you now have, or more hours on the job and more income?”

Despite this weakness, the PSID has the advantage of offering a
consistent time series. Moreover, work by Ham (1982) and Altonji and
Paxson (1988) shows that the responses to the constraints questions
have predictive power for behavior. In addition, Kahn and Lang (1992)
show that for wage earners, the PSID questions give results that are
similar to those obtained using the questions in the other surveys summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 presents the fractions of PSID respondents who say they
would have liked to work more or fewer hours over the period 1968–
1987. There may be some bias in time trends in these PSID figures.
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The PSID, limited to household heads, follows families through time.
While break-off families are added to the sample, there is a risk that
part of observed time trends captures changes in household heads over
the life cycle. Additionally, in the early years, the low-income population was oversampled. However, over time, regression toward the
mean in earnings has led to progressively less oversampling of the lowincome population. If these two factors introduce a bias, it should push
us toward finding a reduction in the desire to work more, because our
work shows that older workers are less likely and poorer workers more
likely to want more work.
Table 2 Desire for Different Work Hours (U.S.) 1968–1987 (%)
Men

Women

Year

Fewer

More

Fewer

More

1968

6

14

3

13

1969

6

20

6

17

1970

3

20

5

20

1971

6

20

6

21

1972

6

20

6

19

1973

6

20

6

18

1974

5

20

6

24

1975

5

18

5

23

1976

5

20

4

24

1977

9

22

7

18

1978

4

24

7

18

1979

6

22

7

18

1980

5

21

6

20

1981

7

23

5

23

1982

6

26

6

25

1983

7

26

5

23

1984

8

22

6

23

1985

8

22

7

21

1986

6

26

6

21

1987

6

21

6

22

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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In fact, there is no clear trend in the data. The 1968 numbers are
quite different from those of later years. Ignoring this first year of the
survey generates a positive correlation between time and both wanting
to work more and wanting to work less for women. For men, there is a
positive time trend for wanting to work more, but it is significant at
only the 0.1 level.
Despite the similarity of these responses to questions intended to
measure the same phenomenon, there are other ways of framing the
question that generate different answers. A 1978 survey (Best 1981)
asked workers what the largest portion of their current yearly income
they would be willing to give up for shorter workdays (shorter workweeks, more vacation). The options offered were designed to involve
proportional cuts in pay (e.g., “2 percent [1/50] of your income for 10
minutes off each workday), although given variation in the length of
the workday and number of days worked each year, these may not have
been exactly right. Nevertheless, 23 percent said they would take a pay
cut for a shorter day, 26 percent for a shorter week, and 42 percent for
more vacation. Note, however, that no similar question inquired about
possible increases in hours for additional income.
The Canadian Survey of Work Reduction (SWR), conducted in
1986, is particularly helpful for looking at the impact of question wording. While only 17.3 percent of Canadians responded that they would
take a pay cut in return for more time off, 26.7 percent were willing to
forego some or all of their anticipated pay increase for more time off.2
The Advisory Group on Working Time (1994) reports Benimadhu’s (1987) calculations from the SWR that 30.7 percent of Canadian workers preferred fewer working hours while 32.1 percent
preferred longer working hours (p. 87). The Advisory Group concludes that “[t]he survey strikingly captures Canadians’ ‘indeterminate’ mood regarding working time . . . .” (p. 25).
There are reasons for being skeptical about this conclusion. First,
the calculation of people preferring fewer hours included all workers
who answered either of the two questions positively (i.e., whether they
would be willing to take a pay cut for time off and whether they would
be willing to forego part of their pay increase for time off). In contrast,
there was only a single question asking whether people preferred to
work more hours for more pay (see note 2).
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Second, many respondents give contradictory answers to these
three different survey questions about hours constraints. In fact, only
12 percent of respondents answer all three questions in a manner consistent with wanting reduced hours.3 Twenty-seven percent, more than
twice as many, answer all three questions in a manner consistent with
wanting additional work hours.
Third, respondents who “expressed an interest” in working less
were asked why they were interested in less work. Almost half rated as
“very important” at least one of various responses that are inconsistent
with a true preference for less work: giving others a chance for work,
avoiding being laid off, starting a business, looking for other work, running an existing business, or working at a second job. In fact, more
than one-quarter rated avoiding being laid off as a “very important”
reason for wanting to work less, and more than half rated this as at least
“somewhat important.” We must therefore exercise extreme caution in
interpreting the SWR as revealing a desire for more leisure among a
large number of Canadians.
In a similar vein, people who respond that they would like more
work might actually want to cut hours at a second job but not work
additional total hours. However, so few of these respondents work at a
second job that excluding them would not change our estimates of
wanting more work.
Given the difficulties of interpreting the responses to the questions
regarding the desire for less work, and given the fact that the survey
does not inquire why individuals respond that they want to work more,
we must be somewhat guarded in our assessment of the results of the
survey. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the evidence suggests that
Canadians are far more likely to want to work additional hours than to
work fewer hours.
This view is reinforced by the results of the 1995 Survey of Work
Arrangements (Drolet and Morissette 1997), which asked, “At this job,
given the choice, would . . . , at his/her current wage rate, prefer to
work: 1) fewer hours for less pay, 2) more hours for more pay, 3) the
same hours for the same pay.” The survey found that 27 percent of
Canadians preferred, at their current wage rate, more hours for more
pay, compared with only 6 percent who preferred fewer hours for less
pay. These results are quite close to those obtained for similar questions in the United States.
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Similar questions have been asked in other countries. Unfortunately, the results of two major surveys, the first conducted by the
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the second by the
European Union, conflict quite sharply. Table 3 gives the results of the
ISSP survey, conducted in 1989. Respondents were asked, “If you had
a choice, would you prefer to work: 1) the same number of hours and
earn the same money, 2) fewer hours at the same rate of pay and earn
less money, or 3) more hours at the same rate of pay and earn more
money?”
In Table 3, the United States looks similar to other OECD countries. It has a relatively high fraction of workers who want to work
more, but this proportion is not substantially higher than in Ireland and
Italy. Similarly, relatively few people in the United States want to
work less, but that is true of most other OECD countries. In every
country more people want to work more than less, although the difference is not large in Germany.
Table 4 gives responses to the European Union survey, also conducted in 1989. The survey asked, “Assuming that your hourly rate
remained unchanged, would you like to work less, as long, or longer?”
While this question does not appear to be significantly different from the
question used by the ISSP, the survey results are dramatically different.
A large minority of workers in all countries reply that they would like to
work less. In all the European Union countries, the fraction wanting less
work is significantly higher than the fraction wanting more.
Table 3 Desire for Different Work Hours in Various Countries
Country
More
Austria
23
Germany
14
Ireland
30
Italy
31
Netherlands
18
Northern Ireland
27
Norway
24
United Kingdom
24
United States
33
SOURCE: Bell and Freeman (1995).

Fewer
8
10
5
7
12
6
7
8
6

Same
68
76
65
62
70
68
69
68
62
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Table 4 Desire for Different Work Hours in European Union
More

Less

Same

Part-time, want
full-time

Belgium

7

28

43

2

Denmark

9

29

61

1

France

9

39

52

10

Germany

4

38

55

1

Greece

15

28

57

11

Ireland

Country

11

18

65

–

Italy

8

39

50

16

Netherlands

8

31

56

2

Portugal

2

49

46

10

Spain

12

42

44

15

United Kingdom

12

33

50

2

SOURCE: Commission of the European Communities (1991, Tables 22, 23).
The first three columns give responses to the question, “Assuming that your hourly rate
remained unchanged, would you like to work less, as long, or longer?”
The last column gives the percentage of all workers who are both part-time and answer
“yes” in response to the question, “Would you rather have full-time employment?”

We note some other results in the European Union survey that
make the results in Table 4 even more surprising. The survey also
asked part-time workers whether they would prefer full-time work;
results are given in the last column of Table 4. In France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, more people are part-time and want full-time work than
say that they would prefer to work more. While this is technically feasible (e.g., if part-timers respond that they want full-time work because
full-time work is compensated at a higher hourly rate than part-time
work), the counterintuitive result is concerning.
Another surprising aspect of the European Union study is the difference between answers to the question about wanting more or fewer
hours of work at their present hourly rate and answers to a question
regarding willingness to trade pay raises for shorter hours. The correlation across countries of the percentage wanting fewer hours in the
two questions is only 0.05, although the average across countries is not
very dissimilar (34 percent versus 30 percent).
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While there is no formal contradiction among the different answers
to the different questions, we find these differences disturbing. However, the high number of Europeans desiring shorter hours in the European Union survey seems corroborated by the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS) of 1991, which asked, “Thinking about the hours you
work, assuming that you would earn the same amount per hour as at
present, would you prefer to: work fewer hours than you do now; work
more hours than you do now; or carry on working the same number of
hours?” Among male employees age 21–64, 36 percent respond fewer,
7 percent more, and 56 percent the same (Stewart and Swaffield 1995).
These results are quite similar to the European Union survey. We find
the face validity of the BHPS to be the greatest of the three surveys,
because it seems to make it clear that the hourly rate would be
unchanged. The contradictions within the European Union survey and
between the European Union and ISSP surveys remain a matter of concern.
Finally we note that older European surveys indicated that wanting
more work is more common than wanting less work. Katona et al.
(1971) report the answers to the question, “Some people would like to
work more hours per week if they could be paid for it. Others would
prefer to work fewer hours per week even if they earned less. How do
you feel about this?” In all four European countries surveyed (United
Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, and France), wanting to work more
was substantially more common than wanting to work less.
In part because of the importance of phrasing, economists are
inclined to be skeptical of answers to hypothetical questions such as
those used in all of these survey questions on preferred hours. Unfortunately, there is only limited experience in North America with organizations allowing workers to voluntarily reduce work effort in return for
a pay reduction. Nevertheless, it does not support the finding that a
large fraction of the population would give up income for more vacation. Best (1981) reports that Santa Clara County, California, faced
with severe budget cutbacks in 1976, offered workers the option of a 5,
10, or 20 percent pay reduction in return for an increase of 10.5, 21, or
42 days of vacation. We note that, given the existence of holidays and
fixed fringe benefits, this is somewhat more favorable to workers than a
proportionate reduction in compensation. Seventeen percent of workers increased their vacation. Best also reports that about 16 percent of
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lawyers in the public defender’s office take a three-month sabbatical
each year in return for a 25 percent salary reduction. Because interest
in less work is more common among higher earning workers in both
U.S. and Canadian surveys, these experiences do not suggest a large
latent demand for reduced work hours.
Perhaps the most extensive test was in New York state government,
which in 1984 adopted a system of voluntary reduction in work schedules, or V-time. This offered full-time employees the opportunity to
reduce their work schedules and salaries by 5–30 percent while
remaining in their career-path positions. Leave time and pensions were
prorated. Subject to their supervisors’ approval, employees could
reduce their workday or workweek on a regular basis, take time off
intermittently, or “bank” time for use at a later date. The official program guidelines did not specify any “acceptable reasons” for requesting V-time, nor did the application even ask for reasons. V-time was
not a once-and-forever choice. Workers could request a V-time
arrangement to last for as long or short a period as they wished. Many
employees were eligible for V-time, including professional, scientific,
technical, managerial, and “confidential” employees.
From the perspective of trying to discover a latent demand for
reduced working hours, the program could hardly have been more
ideal. Its extreme flexibility gave employees themselves the choice of
the timing and duration of cutbacks. Nevertheless, very few people
actually requested V-time. The number of participants never represented more than 2 percent of employees in the jobs covered by the
program. The most common uses of V-time were for temporary maternity and family leaves. As of October 1993, there were only 588 Vtime participants, less than 1 percent of the eligible employees.

THEORIES OF HOURS CONSTRAINTS
There is relatively little information on the actual number of hours
that individuals wish to work. Based on Kahn and Lang (1995), the
average Canadian would like to work 8 percent more hours, comparable in magnitude to the loss in work time due to unemployment.
Understanding hours constraints is therefore potentially extremely

272

Lang and Kahn

important. Below we summarize four primary theories in the literature
that may explain why workers are constrained to work more or less
than they desire.
Long-Term Contracting
Lazear (1979, 1981) has argued that long-term contracts lead to a
divergence between the wage and the value of marginal product
(VMP). This leads to a conflict between the hours that would be chosen by the worker and firm. Workers will wish to work until the marginal value of leisure equals the wage. Firms will want workers to
work until their value of marginal product for the last hour worked
equals the wage. Efficiency requires that hours be set so that the marginal value of leisure equals the value of marginal product for the last
hour worked. If the value of marginal product from an hour worked is
independent of hours worked, it follows that whenever the wage
exceeds VMP, workers will be constrained to work less than they want.
Conversely, when VMP exceeds the wage, workers will be constrained
to work more than they want.
Lazear develops his argument in the context of an agency model.
In this model, workers post a bond, in the form of a low starting wage,
that is later returned to senior workers in the form of wages that exceed
their VMP. Thus, in the agency model, junior workers should be constrained to work more than they wish while senior workers should be
constrained to work less than they wish.
In contrast, in many specific-capital models (Becker 1975), workers and firms invest jointly so that junior workers are paid more than
their VMP. The firm recoups its investment by paying senior workers
less than their VMP. Thus, in the specific-capital model, junior workers are constrained to work less than they wish while senior workers
are constrained to work more. Kahn and Lang (1992, 1995) discuss
hours constraints in the agency and specific-capital models more fully.
Other long-term contracting models also imply hours constraints.
For example, in Harris and Holmstrom (1982), firms and workers are
uncertain about how productive the worker will turn out to be. Firms
offer insurance contracts in which they promise not to reduce wages.
Information about productivity is revealed gradually to the market.
Workers who turn out to be unproductive end up being overpaid, while
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the wages of more productive workers are bid up. As with other longterm contracting models, this can be shown to imply hours constraints.
On average, low-seniority workers are paid less than their VMP,
because firms are collecting insurance premiums. However, on average high-seniority workers are paid more than their VMP, because
firms have stopped collecting insurance premiums and are making
insurance payments to low-productivity workers. Consequently, on
average more senior workers will be constrained to work less than they
wish.4 Thus, in both the Harris/Holmstrom and agency models, the
tendency to want additional hours rises with seniority.
Hedonic Models of the Wage/Hours Locus
For most people, going to work involves substantial fixed costs.
Regardless of how long the individual remains at work, she or he incurs
the cost of commuting. Once at work, there may also be set-up costs—
for example, the time it takes to boot the computer. Therefore, it is no
surprise that we observe few workers who are employed for extremely
short time periods, because workers would demand a high hourly wage
while firms would only be willing to offer a very low one. At the other
end of the spectrum, workers who worked very long hours would suffer
from fatigue. The workers would require high wages to compensate
them for working such long hours, but firms would be unwilling to pay
high wages to such workers because their productivity would be low.
More generally, if we were to plot the average hourly wage workers would require to compensate them for different weekly hours of
work (i.e., their indifference curves in wage/work-hours space), we
would expect the indifference curves to be U-shaped with moderate
hours of work requiring less average hourly compensation than very
short or very long workweeks. In contrast, if we were to plot the average hourly pay firms would be willing to pay for different weekly
hours of work (i.e., their iso-profit curves in wage/hours space), we
would expect them to be hump-shaped with moderate hours of work
more compatible with higher average hourly wages than either very
long or very short workweeks.
If all workers and all firms are identical and there is free entry,
equilibrium is at the point of tangency between the indifference curves
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and the zero-profit iso-profit curve. This point is efficient. Given the
options available, no worker or firm wants to change hours.
When workers and firms are heterogeneous, the tangencies of the
indifference and iso-profit curves will trace out a hedonic wage/hours
locus. Workers who want short hours will be matched with jobs in
which short hours are relatively advantageous to the firm. The shape of
the wage/hours locus is largely indeterminate. It may be linear, humpshaped, U-shaped, or wiggly. Regardless of the shape, each firm offers
a job with the most profitable wage/hours combination given this locus.
Each worker chooses his or her most preferred job given the same
wage/hours locus. Again, the equilibrium is efficient, and no worker or
firm wants to change hours.
The survey questions described in the previous section typically do
not ask workers whether they would prefer to move to a different spot
along the wage/hours locus. Instead they ask if workers would like to
change hours if they could work at the same hourly rate. Because
workers may not have the option of working a different number of
hours at the same hourly rate in the hedonic model, they may well prefer to change hours if given this option.
In order to know whether workers will want more or fewer hours at
their usual hourly wage, we need to examine the relation between their
marginal wage and their average hourly wage. Workers choose to work
up to the point at which the marginal wage is equal to their marginal
value of leisure. If the average wage exceeds the marginal wage, it will
therefore also exceed the marginal value of leisure, and they will desire
additional work at that wage. On the other hand, if the marginal wage
exceeds the average wage, the average wage will be less than the marginal value of leisure, and workers will prefer to reduce their hours if
they can do so at their average hourly wage.
Whenever the average hourly wage is greater than the marginal
wage, the hourly wage will be declining with hours worked. Conversely, if the average hourly wage is less than the marginal wage, the
hourly wage will increase with hours worked. Therefore, the hedonic
model predicts that workers will want more hours if they are on an
increasing section of the wage/hours locus and fewer hours if they are
on a decreasing section.
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Models with Rigid Wages
Hours constraints may arise when workers and firms sign fixedwage contracts that allow firms to set hours. While fixed-wage contracts are commonly seen empirically, they lack a theoretical foundation. Although insurance-based models would seem the logical
theoretical underpinning for fixed-wage contracts, these models suggest that salary, not wages, should be fixed. Similarly, efficiency wage
models imply efficiently set wages rather than fixed ones.
Despite its theoretical deficiencies, a fixed-wage model is attractive
because it suggests that hours constraints can be viewed as a continuum where hours fall as demand falls, and unemployment is but an
extreme. Without a formal theoretical model, it is impossible to make
firm statements as to the predictions that follow from this view of hours
constraints. Nevertheless, we would expect that in such a model, the
desire to work less would be positively correlated and the desire to
work more negatively correlated with measures of excess demand in
the labor market.
Hours as a Screening Device
Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) develop an explanation of why there
might be a shortage of short-hour jobs in certain occupations. The
motivation for their model is law associates. Rebitzer and Taylor argue
that requiring long hours is a screening device for individuals with low
disutility of effort. Because potential partners care about being part of
a firm with hard-working partners and because partner effort is difficult
to monitor, law firms benefit from requiring that associates work long
hours. Provided that disutility of effort and disutility of hours on the
job are correlated, reducing hours may create an adverse selection
problem by attracting less hard-working individuals to the firm.
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EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST THE THEORIES
Long-Term Contracts
Kahn and Lang (1992, 1995) report that in both the PSID and the
Canadian SWR, wanting to work additional hours is negatively related
to seniority. Table 5 presents some representative results from the
Canadian data. Almost half the most junior workers want more work,
compared with roughly 20 percent of the most senior workers. In contrast, only about 10 percent of the most junior workers but twice as
many senior workers want to work less. The relation between seniority
and the constraints favors models such as firm-specific capital, in
which wages grow less rapidly than VMP. On the other hand, at no
seniority level does the average worker want less work or does the
number of workers wanting less work exceed the number wanting
more. This suggests that long-term contracting cannot be the sole
explanation for hours constraints. If it were, the results would imply
that wages exceed VMP at all seniority levels which is inconsistent
with profit maximization.
The Hedonic Model
The distribution of actual hours appears to be responsive to desired
hours, suggesting that matching takes place in the labor market as predicted by a hedonic model. Kahn and Lang (1995) report that in Canada, usual hours worked increase by half an hour for every hour
increase in desired hours. This is true both for individuals and for
mean usual and desired hours across provinces. In the European Union
survey, among 11 countries, the fraction of workers wanting to work
more than 45 hours is correlated with the fraction actually working
more than 45 hours (r = 0.42) and even more so if we exclude Portugal
(r = 0.80). The correlation between the fraction wanting to work less
than 20 hours and those working less than 20 hours is even greater (r =
0.94, including Portugal).
On the other hand, the matching seems to be only imperfect inasmuch as it improves over time. In the Canadian results reported in the
first part of Table 5, the fraction of workers who do not want to change
their work hours rises from 43 percent among the lowest tenure group
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Table 5 Proportion of Workers Experiencing Binding Hours Constraints
by Job Tenure and Short/Overtime (Canada)a
Job tenure
(months)

More work

Less work

Satisfied
with hours

N

Number of
hoursb

1–3

47.9

9.2

42.9

740

5.45

4–6

46.5

11.3

42.2

360

5.30

7–9

41.5

12.2

46.3

200

4.66

10–12

41.9

17.9

40.2

259

4.00

13–24

36.6

15.9

47.4

660

3.24

25–36

35.8

18.0

46.5

435

3.28

37–48

37.5

16.9

45.5

446

3.18

49–60

35.0

18.9

46.0

472

2.98

61–120

34.9

17.7

47.4

1598

2.80

121–240

25.9

20.8

53.3

1500

1.60

> 240

22.0

20.2

57.9

574

1.21

On short-time

37.4

27.0

35.6

97

4.60

Normal hours

33.4

17.3

49.3

6167

2.88

More than usual

39.1

16.9

44.1

980

3.17

34.2

17.3

48.5

7244

2.94

Short/overtime

All

SOURCE: Kahn and Lang (1995).
a Based on the Survey of Work Reduction supplement to the Canadian Labour Force
Survey, June 1986.
b “Number of hours” is the average number of additional hours desired by members of
the group. All observations are weighted by their sampling weight.

to 58 percent among the highest tenure group. This suggests that either
workers adjust their tastes over time or that dissatisfied workers leave
for jobs with hours requirements that conform better to their tastes.
Using the PSID, Altonji and Paxson (1988) find that U.S. workers’
responses regarding desired hours help predict whether workers will
subsequently shift to longer or shorter hour jobs.
Additional evidence suggesting only imperfect hedonic matching
is found in the fact that substantial fractions of part-time workers
would prefer full-time work, and vice versa. One likely interpretation
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of these statements is that these people would prefer to be at a different
point along the wage/hours locus but cannot. Thus, although the
hedonic model may give insight into how hours and wages are determined, the empirical evidence suggests that there is substantial mismatching.
To test the hedonic model more formally, Kahn and Lang (1996)
use the June 1986 Canadian SWR to estimate the wage/hours locus and
an hours-constraints equation simultaneously. We test whether the pattern of hours constraints conforms to the hours constraints that should
be generated by the wage/hours locus under the hedonic model. A pure
hedonic model is easily rejected. We do not find that workers wanting
more hours are in the downward-sloping part of the wage/hours locus
and those wanting fewer are in the upward-sloping part.
However, when hours constraints are allowed to depend on seniority (as in the firm-specific model) as well as on the slope of the wage/
hours locus (as in the hedonic model), the empirical model fits surprisingly well. Kahn and Lang (1996) plot the actual wage/hours locus
estimated from income and hours data and the wage/hours locus predicted on the basis of hours constraints and seniority. The curves are
quite similar except in the region beyond 60 hours, and the poor fit in
this region is due to the fact that average weekly earnings actually fall
beyond 58 hours. Excluding these long-hour workers, who tend to be
low-tenure workers in managerial or administrative positions who are
presumably investing in their career, the equality of the two equations
cannot be rejected.
Thus, we cannot reject a model of hedonic matching combined
with long-term contracting due to firm-specific skills.5 This is somewhat surprising in light of the evidence of imperfect matching cited
above. It is also difficult to reconcile the sharp spike in the distribution
of hours with the pure hedonic model. To some extent, the failure to
reject the hedonic model must reflect relatively inefficient statistical
techniques forced on us by the imperfect data.
Models with Rigid Wages
Hours constraints are correlated only weakly if at all with measures of labor demand. Because the Canadian data are cross-sectional,
we measure variation in labor demand two ways. First, we utilize the
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fact that workers who respond that they are on short-time (reduced
hours) will tend to be in firms and/or industries experiencing unusually
low demand, while workers who are working more than their usual
hours will tend to be in firms and/or industries experiencing unusually
high demand. The bottom panel of Table 5 shows the hours constraints
for 1) workers working less than usual because of short-time,6 2) workers working their normal hours, and 3) workers working more than
their usual hours. The desire to work fewer hours is most common
among workers on short-time. Similarly, the desire to work more
hours is most common among those working more than their usual
hours. The results suggest that when the establishment faces low
demand, workers who want to work fewer hours take advantage of the
situation to reduce their hours. Similarly, when the establishment
needs additional hours, workers who want more hours are able to
increase their hours. Thus, hours constraints cannot be interpreted as
cyclical underemployment being imposed on unwilling workers.
We also capture labor demand from the cross-sectional Canadian
data through regional unemployment rates. Here, too, the relation is
weak. Among Canadian provinces, there is a positive relation between
average additional hours of work desired and the unemployment rate,
but it falls well short of conventional significance levels (Kahn and
Lang 1995). Similarly, in the U.S. PSID data, controlling for other factors, the local unemployment rate is positively related to the desire for
more work, but the coefficient is generally insignificant (Kahn and
Lang 1992).
Using time-series data from the PSID in Table 2, there is some evidence of a relation between the prevalence of hours constraints and the
national unemployment rate. The proportions of both men and women
wanting to work more are each positively correlated with the civilian
unemployment rate for men age 20 and over, although this result is not
robust to including a time trend in the case of women. On the other
hand, the proportion wanting to work less is not significantly related to
the unemployment rate, and the correlation is positive.
Hours constraints, however, are related to recent personal unemployment experience in both Canada and the United States, even controlling for experience and seniority (Kahn and Lang 1992, 1995). One
explanation for this result is that workers who obtained their jobs after
an unemployment spell are less well matched than those who “chose”
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new jobs and experienced no intervening unemployment. A second
explanation could be that people tend to want long hours after an
unemployment spell because they have run down their assets, but that
mismatching makes it unlikely that they actually obtain these long
hours.
Hours as a Screening Device
The Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) screening model predicts only
overemployment, rather than both overemployment and underemployment. It thus cannot explain the desire to work additional work hours
that is so common in the United States and Canada. Rebitzer and Taylor found their theory to have explanatory power for lawyers. It may
apply as well to other similar occupations. In both Canada and the
United States, people who desire to work fewer hours tend to be
higher-earning workers, i.e., more educated, in more skilled occupations, etc. (Kahn and Lang 1991; Drolet and Morissette 1997). These
may indeed be the occupations where hours are a signal of effort.

HOURS CONSTRAINTS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS,
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
In sum, it appears to us that hours constraints are best understood
in the context of a matching model in which wages do depend on hours
as in hedonic models, but in which the matching is imperfect. (There
may also be long-term contracting.) An imperfect matching model
would also allow us to evaluate hours policies in the context of a model
in which unemployment as well as vacancies can arise. In this section,
we take some tentative steps toward analyzing the impact of mandated
hours reductions in the context of such a model. The model we use is a
simple extension of the Butters (1977) equilibrium search model. We
describe it only informally.
In labor market variants of the model (Hosios 1986; Lang 1991),
each firm decides simultaneously whether or not to make an offer to a
worker and, if so, what wage to offer. Making an offer entails paying a
fixed cost. Under certain circumstances this may be interpreted as the
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cost of renting a machine prior to trying to hire a worker. The worker
chooses the firm that offers him or her the highest wage. Because some
workers may get only one offer and others may get multiple offers, the
equilibrium involves a wage distribution. Each firm recognizes that
offering a higher wage raises the probability of hiring the worker but
lowers profits conditional on getting the worker. Because some workers randomly fail to receive any offers, there is unemployment. Similarly, some firms’ offers are turned down, resulting in vacancies.
To take account of hours constraints, we extend the model in a simple way. First, we assume that firms make tied wage/hours offers. The
worker chooses the firm offering the highest utility level provided that
utility level exceeds some reservation utility level. For simplicity, we
assume that the value of marginal product per hour v is independent of
hours worked and that the utility function is given by u = log(wh) + (T
– h)/β where wh is (labor) income, h is hours worked and (T – h) is leisure. This utility function has the property that desired work hours
equal β and are independent of the wage rate.
We note that the resulting equilibrium is very much a theoretical
counterpart to Dickens and Lundberg’s (1993) study of constrained
labor supply in that workers choose from a limited and stochastic number of wage/hours offers. In contrast with that paper, we allow for
unemployment.6
The firm chooses w and h to maximize expected profits which are
given by
(1) E(π) = P(u) (v – w) h – d,
where u is the utility associated with the offer, P is the probability of
the offer being accepted, and d is the fixed cost of making an offer. The
equilibrium is characterized by a distribution of wages and hours, and
of utilities with corresponding values of P.
It is relatively straightforward to prove the following:7
1) All firms offer hours in excess of β. In other words, all workers
would respond that they would want to work less at their usual
hourly wage.
2) There is a distribution of hours and wages. The hourly wage is
monotonically declining in hours. In fact, wh is constant.
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If we were to observe the facts 1 and 2 without the perspective of
the model, the logic for mandating hours restrictions would seem compelling. The atheoretical perspective would be as follows. Workers
want shorter hours. If hours could be reduced but salaries maintained
(i.e., wh constant), this even suggests that firms are equally happy with
both situations. Moreover, the quantity of labor demanded would rise,
thereby reducing unemployment. Thus mandating a shorter workweek
to reduce unemployment would appear to be a “sure-fire winner.”
Unfortunately, within the context of the model, that policy assessment turns out to be completely wrong. Again, it can be shown [see
Appendix] that:
1) mandating lower hours increases unemployment,
2) mandating lower hours decreases wages, and
3) mandating lower hours is welfare deteriorating in the sense of
Pareto.
Thus, in contrast to the conclusion we might be tempted to draw,
mandated hours restrictions will not be desirable. The Appendix works
out a numerical example that illustrates these results.
Our choice of utility function and production function were
designed to generate an equilibrium in which workers express a desire
to work fewer hours. We chose this example because we believe that
this equilibrium would appear to provide a strong a priori case for
mandated hours restrictions when examined atheoretically. It is easy to
choose utility and production functions such that workers desire to
work more hours at their usual hourly wage.
At the cost of some complexity, Lang and Majumdar (2000) extend
this model to allow for heterogeneous preferences and thus for imperfect matching. Because each worker chooses from only a limited number of jobs, matching is imperfect. Nevertheless, workers preferring
low-hours jobs tend to end up in jobs with low hours since they take
these jobs whenever a choice is available. They find that hours restrictions can increase or decrease unemployment. The principal welfare
effect is distributional. Workers who prefer jobs with short hours are
better off while those who prefer longer hours are worse off.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR MANDATED HOURS RESTRICTIONS
Neither the empirical nor the theoretical case for mandating hours
restrictions to increase work sharing and reduce unemployment is compelling. In the United States and Canada, there is very little evidence
that workers are interested in accepting less pay in return for more leisure. The situation in Europe may be different.
In the introduction to this chapter, we argued that we cannot evaluate theoretically a policy designed to lower unemployment within the
context of a model which assumes away unemployment. Neither the
long-term contracting nor the hedonic matching model predicts any
unemployment, while “models” of rigid wages have no theoretical
underpinnings with which to evaluate policy. However, the imperfect
matching model sketched in the previous section predicts both hours
constraints and unemployment. We have established that such models
do not justify casual support for mandated hours restrictions. Indeed,
our simple model suggests that they may be welfare-deteriorating and
lead to wage losses and even more unemployment. However, mandated hours restrictions may be welfare-improving in some situations
such as law firms where hours serve as a screening device.
Moreover, any attempt to legislate a reduced workweek and promote work-sharing will undoubtedly increase the pervasiveness of dual
job-holding, at least within the United States and Canada. Whatever
theoretical model is assumed, there is also likely to be a change in the
wages paid for jobs with different levels of required hours. Any analysis of the effect of mandated hours restrictions must take these effects
into account.

Notes
We are grateful to Paul Beaudry, Randy Eberts, Thomas Lemieux, Mike McCracken,
Mark Stewart, the editors of this volume, and participants in the CIRANO summer
workshop on unemployment for helpful comments. This project was funded in part by
NSF grant SBR-9515052. The usual caveat applies.
1. We exclude proprietary surveys for which basic information on question wording
and sample design are not available and surveys with questions that do not explicitly suggest an earnings/hours trade-off. A 1993 Gallup Poll asked workers their
actual and desired hours. Mean actual hours were reported as 42.5 while desired
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hours were 36.7. However, 16 percent of workers responded that they preferred
zero hours, suggesting that these respondents were not thinking of an hours/salary
trade-off. Excluding this 16 percent of respondents, mean desired hours was 43.7.
2. The exact questions asked were
• “In the next two years, would you take a cut in pay if you received more time
off in return?” Follow-up if no: “Why not?” Follow-up if yes: “What percent
of your pay would you give up to have more time off?” Accompanying these
questions was a table and examples to help the respondent think about how
much money an x percent pay cut represents, and how much time an x percent
hours cut represents.
• “Another way to gain more time off is to trade all or some part of your pay
increase. Would you trade some of your increase in the next two years for
more time off? For example, gain 5 percent more time off instead of a 5 percent pay raise?” Follow-up if yes: “How much of your increase in the next
two years would you take as time off?”
The questionnaire proceeded with a set of questions on how the person would
prefer to reduce work time (e.g., fewer hours per day) and about reasons that person preferred to work less. The questionnaire then continued with:
• “If you continue to be paid at the same rate of pay that you are now, would you
work more hours for more pay?” Follow-up if yes: “How many more hours
per week would you want to work?”
3. Many people gave inconsistent answers. For instance, almost one-quarter of
those who said they were willing to take a pay cut for fewer hours also said they
were not willing to forego pay increases for fewer hours, and half of these actually
said they would like to work more hours for more pay.
4. Strictly speaking, only workers in the final work period have stopped paying
insurance premiums and only in this period are high productivity workers paid
exactly their marginal product. In other years, they are underpaid because of
insurance premiums.
Allowing mobility reinforces the tendency for more senior workers on average
to be paid more than their marginal product and hence to prefer more work hours.
Workers revealed to be high productivity will be indifferent among all firms while
workers revealed to be overpaid will prefer employment at their present employer.
Consequently, highly productive workers are more likely to change jobs than are
overpaid workers, further adding to the average overpayment of senior workers.
5. The fact noted earlier that seniority decreases the desire to work more hours is
also consistent with the firm-specific capital model.
6. Dickens and Lundberg (1993) is primarily an empirical paper, but it incorporates
a structural model. Because their data set included only employed people, they
did not model unemployment.
7. Differentiate Eq. 1 with respect to both w and h. Dividing one first-order condition by the other and rearranging terms gives w = βv/h. Since firms can only make
profits if w < v, this requires that h > β. Moreover, it implies that wh = βv, a constant.
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Appendix
Consider a worker who obtained utility U0 in the unconstrained equilibrium.
The firm chooses the profit-maximizing combination of wage/hours for that
U0. Let πa = (v – w)h – d be the profit obtained conditional on hiring a worker
achieving U0. (Recall that the probability of the offer being accepted P is dependent only on U.) When hours are constrained, if the firm were still to hire
a worker who received U0, the new profit must be lower than the unconstrained
profit.
The zero profit condition requires that P (v – w) = d. Therefore, when hours
are constrained, πc ≤ πa implies that Pc(U0) ≥ Pa(U0). For this to be true, the
likelihood of a worker obtaining utility greater than U0 must be lower (or equal)
when hours are constrained than when they are not.
Hence, workers are worse off (or, more formally, no better off) in the constrained equilibrium. This argument applies to all utility levels, including the
reservation utility, the lowest utility offered. If the likelihood that a worker
who is offered the reservation utility accepts the offer is greater in the constrained solution, then the likelihood of a worker receiving a utility greater than
this minimum reservation level is lower; so we will see higher unemployment
rates.
It may also be helpful to work through a numerical example. Suppose that
β equals 40 (so that workers’ desired hours equal 40 as well), v equals 10, and
d equals 20. We set the reservation utility so that in equilibrium the maximum
number of hours in any offer is 60. The following can be derived: All workers
are offered an income of 400. Hours offers range from 42 to 60; wage offers
range from 6.67 to 9.52. The unemployment rate is 10 percent. When hours
are set exogenously at 42, wage offers range from about 6.07 to about 9.52.
The unemployment rate is about 12 percent. In a standard competitive model
with this same utility function and v = 10, a profit-maximizing firm sets hours
= 42. Imposing the “competitive solution” dramatically lowers employment
and wages.
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Part IV

9
Measuring the Effects
of Short-Time Compensation
on Workforce Dynamics
Karen Needels
Mathematica Policy Research
Walter Nicholson
Amherst College and Mathematica Policy Research

This chapter examines existing research on the relationship
between short-time compensation (STC) use and patterns of labor market adjustment by firms. We note that the research often fails to model
the actual choices available to firms and their workers in which both
reductions in compensated hours and layoffs are feasible. We show
that the strategies used previously to calculate the extent to which time
on STC affects time on layoff have yielded a wide range of estimates.
We also explore new data from a recently completed evaluation of STC
programs in the United States. These data confirm the need to study
labor force adjustment strategies along multiple dimensions, but they
also illustrate the difficulties involved in assessing the precise impact
of STC use on workforce adjustment.
North American employers—particularly those in the United
States—have often been alleged to prefer layoffs to hours reductions
when responding to output or cost shocks (Burdett and Wright 1989;
Feldstein 1976, 1978). Feldstein, for example, highlighted two features of the U.S. system that encouraged firms to opt for layoffs during
cyclical downturns: 1) unemployment insurance (UI) benefits were, at
that time, nontaxable to workers who received them, and 2) the UI payroll tax was not fully “experience rated” so that firms did not incur the
full costs of benefits paid to their workers. According to Feldstein,
these features created a strong incentive for firms to use layoffs to
reduce the workforce. The author’s empirical estimates, together with
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subsequent estimates by others (for example, Topel 1983), tended to
support the notion that layoffs, especially temporary ones, were correlated with the level of the “layoff subsidy” the UI system provided.
In an effort to identify other ways in which the U.S. system of
unemployment compensation may encourage layoffs, several other
authors have focused on the way the UI systems treat hours reductions.
In many European countries, workers who are placed on reduced hours
are eligible for a prorated share of their unemployment benefits. Until
recently, however, the availability of such STC was severely limited in
both the United States and Canada.
In this chapter, we critically examine the methods that have been
used to assess the effects of STC on total workforce reductions. We
begin by briefly discussing the existing theoretical approaches to this
topic. We then describe a number of previous attempts to develop
empirical evidence on conversions between STC and layoffs. We
devote considerable attention to evaluating methodologies that have
been used for this purpose, because they have yielded widely differing
results. In the next section, we present some new empirical evidence
on the relationship between STC use and layoffs from our recently
completed evaluation of STC programs in the United States. This
research further confirms the importance of this relationship and illustrates the difficulties in measuring it precisely. Finally, in the last section, we offer some general conclusions about our state of knowledge
on the ability of STC-type programs to influence firms’ workforce
adjustment patterns.

THEORETICAL MODELING
To understand how employers’ and workers’ preferences interact
when labor input is reduced during periods of changing demand, the
development of an employment contract model is required. The
approach usually taken in the literature draws on the early implicit contracts model developed by Azariadis (1975). This model views workers and employers as engaged in a bilateral bargaining process. An
efficient outcome from the process is a set of choices that maximizes
each party’s well-being (that is, profits for firms and utility for work-
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ers), given the choice of the other party. In its most general form, this
model predicts that risk-averse workers will generally prefer hours
reductions to layoffs during economic downturns. This preference can
be altered by technical aspects of a firm’s production and cost functions. For example, if the firm’s adjustment costs are asymmetric with
respect to changes in hours and employment, different patterns may be
optimal. High fringe benefit costs, especially those that are “quasifixed,” may deter downward adjustments in hours. On the other hand,
hiring costs, such as those related to the search for workers or to training and acquiring job-specific human capital, may deter layoffs.
Choices may also be affected by imperfect substitutability between
hours and employment in the production process.
A few theoretical papers (Wright and Hotchkiss 1988; Burdett and
Wright 1989; Jehle and Lieberman 1992) have attempted to explore
how the availability of various UI and STC options may affect hours–
employment choices. Under a stylized “American” system, UI benefits
are assumed to be payable only if the worker is fully separated from the
firm. Alternatively, a stylized “European” system of compensation is
assumed to provide benefits only for reductions in normal working
hours. Models adopting this approach suggest, not surprisingly, that
the American system encourages firms to opt for layoffs during downturns in demand, whereas firms operating under a European system,
ceteris paribus, favor shortened workweeks. In both cases, the work
reduction incentives derive primarily from the incomplete experience
rating of UI benefit payments. Hence, some authors favor a move
toward more complete experience rating as the primary way to ameliorate inefficient labor input choices encouraged by UI benefits (see, for
example, Burdett and Wright 1989).
The all-or-nothing nature of the stylized UI systems in the theoretical literature makes it difficult to apply these models directly to actual
data. In Europe, the bulk of UI benefits goes to workers who are fully
laid off rather than on reduced hours, and in North America, Canada
has a national STC program, as do 18 U.S. states.1 Furthermore, most
examinations of firms’ adjustment patterns on the microeconomic
level, especially in North America, have found that individual firms use
both layoffs and work-week reductions to reduce labor utilization (Kerachsky et al. 1986; Employment and Immigration Canada [EIC]1993).
Hence, a clear first step in the development of theoretical models that
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can be estimated from real world data is to generalize the nature of
adjustment options faced by the firm.
Adapting these theoretical models to allow UI eligibility for both
hours reductions and layoffs seems straightforward, although the published literature has not attempted this adaptation in its full generality.
Presumably, such a generalized model would predict that both types of
reductions would be encouraged by the availability of benefits, with
firms choosing the type of reduction or combination of reductions on
the basis of their own cost and productivity considerations.
Differences in the generosity of benefits available under the two
unemployment options could also affect observed workforce adjustments, a point made forcefully in the recent paper by Van Audenrode
(1994). Indeed, the increased flexibility of a system that compensates
both hours reductions and layoffs might encourage additional compensated unemployment, relative to a system that provides UI eligibility
for only one type of workforce reduction.
Aggregate studies of U.S. labor market dynamics over the business
cycle provide evidence on this issue. These studies suggest that labor
hoarding may have accounted for between 4 and 9 percent of total
employment during downturns in demand, probably because of high
adjustment costs associated with layoffs (Hamermesh 1993, p. 185).
Some portion of this excess labor would probably find compensated
hours reductions attractive after STC becomes available.2 The extent
of these incentives depends on variations in fringe benefit costs available from hours reductions and the degree to which STC benefits are
effectively experience rated, among other things. Much of the existing
empirical research on STC has not, however, addressed the increasing
flexibility suggested by theoretical predictions.

EMPIRICAL STUDIES MEASURING THE EFFECT
OF STC USE ON WORKFORCE DYNAMICS
Because one of the primary goals of STC is to reduce the number
of laid-off workers, most previous researchers have tried to estimate
differences in the dynamics of workforce reductions that result from
STC usage. Although many different approaches have been taken to
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analyzing such reductions, we summarize these approaches in what we
call the “layoff conversion rate.” This measure reflects the degree to
which unemployment compensation under an STC-type program substitutes for unemployment compensation under a regular UI program.3
A conversion rate of 1.0 (a value frequently assumed in the literature)
implies perfect substitution: each hour of STC substitutes for precisely
an hour of layoff. Layoff conversion rates greater than 1.0 imply that
the compensated unemployment from layoffs avoided because of STC
exceeds the compensated unemployment from STC itself. Conversion
rates less than 1.0 imply that firms had greater total workforce reductions with STC than they would have if STC had been unavailable.
In reviewing previous research, we focus narrowly on ways in
which conversion rates have been treated. Many of the studies we discuss here have contributed significantly to an understanding of the
other important issues such as 1) the effects of STC on employer and
employee satisfaction, achievement of affirmative action goals, and
worker productivity; 2) the effects of program legislation and administration on STC participation rates; 3) the relative costs and benefits of
STC usage to employees, firms, the UI trust fund, and society; 4) seasonal, cyclical, and repeat use of STC; and 5) the use of STC by firms
undergoing structural change. We do not summarize research on these
issues here, however.4 Rather, we concentrate solely on the methodology researchers have used to examine layoff conversion rates. Hence,
we are not attempting to explore the full social costs and benefits of
STC compared to layoffs. For many issues involving STC desirability,
however, estimates of the layoff conversion rate play an important,
even central, role. For example, measuring any potential social benefit
from STC use requires some way of estimating how many layoffs
would have occurred in the absence of the program so that the analysis
can be conducted on a “per layoff equivalent” basis. Much of the prior
research on STC has not been especially careful in adopting such a
consistent basis. Our research focus on measurement of workforce
dynamics therefore serves to highlight a primary source of the differences in conclusions from previous research.
Experimental studies to determine the layoff conversion rate have
not been feasible, so researchers have typically used one of three nonexperimental approaches to estimate the workforce reduction that
would have occurred if firms had not used STC: self-reporting, the
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explicit or implicit assumption that the conversion rate is precisely 1.0,
and estimation using matched samples of firms that did and did not use
STC during some period. In the next three subsections, we discuss
these approaches and some of the research based on them. For ease of
comparison among the studies, those that we shall discuss are briefly
summarized in Table 1.
Studies Based on Self-Reporting
One way of estimating the number of layoffs avoided because of
STC usage is based on firms’ self-reports. This method uses two main
data sources: firms’ plan applications and surveys of employers. When
a firm applies for an STC plan approval, it typically has to specify the
Table 1 Studies of the Effects of Short-Time Compensation on
Workforce Dynamics
Study

Data

Method

Conversion
rate

New York Department
of Labor (1994)

New York STC Firms

Self-reporting

>1

Best (1988)

Canadian and California
STC firms, administrative
data, and simulations

Self-reporting

1.0

Vroman (1992)

Germany, 1970–1991,
administrative data

Assumed

1.0

Abraham and
Houseman (1994)

France, aggregate
manufacturing data

Assumed

1.0

Van Audenrode (1994)

Five European countries,
aggregate employment data

NAa

NA

Kerachsky et al. (1986)

Arizona, California, and
Oregon

Comparison
matching

Employment and
Immigration Canada
(1993)

Canada, worksharing and
comparison firms in 1989
and 1990

Comparison
matching, selfreporting

Berkeley Planning
Associates and
Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc. (1997)

Five states

Comparison
matching

a

NA = not applicable.

0 to 1.0
>1.0

See text
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number of layoffs that its use of the plan would avoid. Because a firm
needs administrative approval for its STC plan to become effective, it
may have an incentive to overstate the number of layoffs that would
occur if its STC plan is not approved. The validity of this counterfactual cannot be tested directly.5 EIC (1993, pp. 58–59) found that firms
typically overstate their planned workforce reductions; that is, the
actual reduction is less than the planned reduction. This study also
found that a significant number of post-STC layoffs occurred. These
factors suggest that using firms’ self-reported statements on the number of layoffs that will be averted if an STC plan is approved overestimates the effects of STC on layoffs. EIC (1984, pp. 116–118) found
that retrospective interview responses on layoffs that would have
occurred had STC not been available were 23 percent lower than firms’
self-reports of planned layoffs from STC plan applications.
A second source of self-reported information on averted layoffs is
survey data from firms that have used STC, such as those reported in
EIC (1984). These data may suffer from the same problem as selfreported data on STC plan application forms—firms are asked to
hypothesize about how many employees they would have laid off had
STC been unavailable. A firm might never have laid off any employees
(as the “labor-hoarding” literature suggests), and it might also have laid
off significantly fewer or more full-time employees than the full-time
equivalent (FTE) value of the STC reduction implemented.
Most states with STC legislation have not conducted explicit studies to estimate the number of layoffs averted by STC usage. Their
research interest has focused on other aspects of the STC adoption and
financing processes. The New York Department of Labor, however,
has estimated the number of layoffs averted in each year since 1988. In
1994, for example, 445 New York firms had a total of 9,284 employees
on STC plans, which paid out $3.6 million in benefits. These firms
reported that, because of STC use, almost 4,000 layoffs were averted.
Using average benefit levels and unemployment durations for laid-off
workers, the state estimated that about $10.8 million was saved in UI
benefits in 1994 alone. If we assume perfect experience rating, these
results suggest that, on average, firms saved three dollars in potential
UI taxes for every dollar paid out in taxes to support STC benefits. At
face value, this calculation seems implausible and is inconsistent with
the low observed utilization rates for STC in New York and elsewhere.
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As we shall see, the result also conflicts with most other empirical evidence on STC.
Studies Assuming a Conversion Rate of 1.0
A second way to estimate the number of layoffs avoided because of
STC usage is based on calculating the FTE workforce reduction
directly from administrative records (or survey data) on the number of
employees collecting STC and their workweek percentage reductions
using an assumed conversion rate of 1.0. For example, if a firm has 10
employees on a 40 percent workweek reduction for five weeks, the
researcher assumes that the STC plan averted four layoffs, each of a
five-week duration.
It is important to recognize that several assumptions are inherent in
the “one-for-one” conversion rate assumed in this type of estimation.
Most important, the calculation assumes a linearity that often does not
exist in either production technologies or employment policies. In
standard economic theory, the firm maximizes profits by adjusting
labor and other inputs. Because STC may change many factors in the
profit function—such as productivity, labor costs, and logistical constraints—it is unlikely that firms would choose the same person-hours
of labor input under both shortened workweeks and full-time layoffs.
Assuming a one-for-one conversion rate suggests that firms are not
responsive to the theoretical advantages and disadvantages the
researcher is trying to estimate (or that the advantages and disadvantages cancel each other out). In many situations, however, researchers
assume a one-for-one conversion rate primarily because data limitations prevent estimation of the rate directly.
For example, Best (1988) uses a variety of data at the firm level to
conduct a comprehensive and innovative evaluation of California’s
STC program and the old Canadian program. This study presents a
good discussion of the factors that can affect the layoff conversion rate,
such as firms’ ability to resume production more quickly after a downturn if STC is used, laid-off workers’ tendencies to leave unemployment for new jobs, and workers’ tendencies to oppose STC less than
layoffs. Because he had no administrative data on nonparticipating
employers, Best relied heavily on employer and employee survey data
and simulations to derive his estimates. Although he presented infor-
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mation on employers’ and employees’ perceptions of the work loss
from STC relative to work loss under layoffs, he suggested that these
data may be invalid because of inconsistencies between the perceptions
of the two groups within firms (p. 76). He concluded that using a onefor-one conversion rate is the most reasonable approach because the
data on actual conversion rates are mixed, and these rates may vary significantly over time and by other factors unique to an individual firm.
Best also simulated different estimates of the cost of STC relative
to the cost of layoffs for the UI system (including both benefits paid
and administrative costs). These estimates, ranging from 1.2 to 3.7,
depend on the duration of work-sharing plans, the magnitude of the
workweek reduction, and the percentage of STC participants laid off
after STC.6 Best acknowledged that most of the scenarios he presents
are uncommon, and it appears that the simulation closest to the average
workweek reduction, average duration of the reduction, and average
post-STC layoffs provides a ratio of the cost of STC to the costs of
equivalent layoffs for the UI system of around 1.6. Because this estimate is based on an underlying assumed conversion rate of 1.0, the
extra costs from STC arise from such factors as the higher weekly UI
benefits of STC recipients, differential treatment of the waiting week
under the two programs, and the additional administrative costs of
STC. The result shows that there can be a considerable difference
between conversion rate estimates based on equivalent hours of layoff
and estimates based on costs to the UI system.
Studies based on aggregate data have tended to use an assumed
conversion rate of 1.0 when attempting to estimate the impact of STC
usage.7 This is especially true for studies that have sought to evaluate
STC in the European context. For example, Vroman (1992) used
administrative data on STC usage in Germany to estimate what
employment would have been in the absence of the program during the
period 1970 to 1991. To make that calculation, he simply subtracted
“full-time equivalent layoffs” experienced by workers on STC from
actual employment data, thereby implicitly assuming a conversion rate
of 1.0. He found that the cyclical behavior of his adjusted employment
series has a closer relationship to the cyclical behavior of U.S. employment than the unadjusted series. Hence, Vroman concluded that the
greater availability of STC is an important reason for observed Euro-
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pean/American differences. The author presents no empirical evidence
to support his conversion rate assumption.
The study by Abraham and Houseman (1994) examined the ways
in which job security regulations in Belgium, France, and Germany
affect labor force adjustments in response to output shocks. The
authors devoted some discussion to the possible influence of STC programs on this adjustment process, although this was not a primary
focus of their research. Using aggregate data on hours worked and
hours on STC, they show that compensated short-time hours play an
important role in hours adjustments in Belgium and Germany. They did
not explicitly consider the layoff conversion issue for these countries.
Because aggregate data on hours worked were not available for France,
however, the authors studied only aggregate employment trends. For
France, they constructed a hypothetical employment series “assuming
that layoffs were used in lieu of short time.” This construction required
the authors to assume that layoffs and short-time could be substituted
on a one-for-one basis. In common with most of the other literature on
European STC programs that we reviewed, the authors offer no empirical support for this assumption. Hence, the issue of precisely how
widespread STC availability in Europe affects use of layoffs remains
open.
Studies Using Matching Methods
A third way of estimating the numbers of layoffs avoided because
of STC use is based on pairing firms that used STC with firms that did
not. Difference-in-differences analysis is used to compare the FTE
workforce reductions of the STC firms and non-STC firms over time.
The critical assumption in this approach is that non-STC firms do not
differ systematically from STC firms; that is, unobserved differences
between the two groups are independent of treatment status.8
A growing set of economic literature has evaluated such nonexperimental evaluation (matching) methods (see, for example, Friedlander and Robins 1995; LaLonde 1986; and Fraker and Maynard
1987). Selecting the pool of potential matches on the basis of similarities in time, geographic area, and observation-specific characteristics is
one of the most difficult aspects of matching, and the appropriateness
of various criteria for restricting the pool has been debated.9 For exam-
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ple, researchers may consider limiting the pool of potential comparison
firms to those with certain observed levels of compensated unemployment, even though firms that used STC may have chosen not to lay off
workers. Thus, researchers who use matching procedures to generate
comparison samples may have to make many decisions about what
constitutes a good match, without being able to draw on much economic theory as a guideline.
Matching procedures have several practical limitations. First,
although matching attempts to control firm-specific differences at the
outset of the research design, the variables used for matching may not
adequately represent all factors affecting workforce adjustment strategies. The financial health of firms, their labor/management relations,
the demand for their products, and their production technologies, as
well as trends in these factors, may affect whether firms consider workforce reductions.10 Data on these factors, however, are extremely hard
to obtain; most likely, the variables firms use to make their production
(and labor input demand) decisions are known only to the firms themselves. Second, the treatment variable in matching studies must be
defined carefully. Because firms change their STC status over time,
and enrollment can begin at any time, construction of this variable
requires focusing on a particular period (the study period) during
which the firm “uses” the program. But that definition must invariably
involve some ambiguity when intensity of usage varies. Finally,
because comparison firms are chosen to be as similar as possible to
STC firms, they are also likely to have participated in the STC program
at times outside the study period. Such prior participation may bias the
estimated treatment effects.
A 1986 study conducted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.,
(MPR) matched STC firms in Arizona, California, and Oregon to nonSTC comparison firms on the basis of their size, UI tax rates, and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code (Kerachsky et al. 1986). The
comparison firms in each state were chosen from among all firms in the
state not using STC during the study period. Empirical estimates from
this study found widely varying layoff conversion rates across the three
states: California’s STC program did not appear to avert any layoffs;
Arizona’s STC program averted some layoffs, although total unemployment increased for firms using the program; and Oregon’s program
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appeared to have a layoff conversion rate that approximated the 1.0
value assumed in many studies.
Although a matching process was used, STC firms seemed to be in
greater economic distress because they had somewhat higher levels of
pre-STC compensated unemployment. Although the researchers controlled for this factor in most of their analysis, concerns about their
ability to control for pre-STC differences in layoff propensities
between the STC and comparison groups resulted in some criticism of
their findings. These criticisms focused especially on the finding of no
STC impact on layoffs in California and on the possibility that the state
of California extracted the data incorrectly (Best 1988, pp. 75–76).
Still, the MPR study helped to emphasize the importance of measuring
rather than assuming the extent of layoff conversions that STC provides.
The recent Canadian evaluation used a very different methodological approach to matching (Employment and Immigration Canada
1993). In constructing the comparison group, the researchers chose a
random sample from administrative records of employees who had
been laid off in 1989 or 1990. The firms from which the employees
were laid off were screened to ensure that the comparison firms chosen
had been in existence for at least two years and that they had “considered” laying off 20 percent or more of the full-time employees in a
business unit for nonseasonal reasons.11 Eligible comparison firms
could not have used the STC program in the past, and laid-off employees had to have been recalled within 26 weeks. The analysis included a
total of 1,080 firms.
Because firms in the STC and comparison samples were not
matched according to specific characteristics (except the screening
requirement that comparison firms had to have considered laying off
employees), the two samples differed markedly along many of the
dimensions that the earlier MPR study used for matching, such as geographic location and industry. Most notably, STC firms were only
about one-third the size of comparison firms, on average. Possibly
because of these and other differences, many of the results from the
analysis of raw data were not supported when regression adjustment
techniques were used. In contrast to the MPR study, STC firms in Canada appeared to have been in less economic distress than were firms in
the comparison group because employees in these firms had signifi-
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cantly lower pre-STC compensated unemployment than comparison
firms’ employees.
Despite using a comparison group for some parts of the analyses,
the Canadian evaluation did not directly compare layoffs or total compensated unemployment for STC and comparison firms.12 To determine the number of layoffs averted because of STC, the ratio of STC
participants to plan-reported hypothetical layoffs was calculated for
1989 and 1990. Because the firms included had 177,800 employees
using STC during these years, and the firms reported that STC averted
67,500 layoffs, the overall ratio was set at 2.6, although for some simulations the 1990 rate of 2.31 was used instead. These figures, together
with information from the comparison sample, provided the basic input
into the Canadian evaluation’s estimates of UI costs.
Overall, the Canadian evaluation found that STC cost the UI system approximately 35 percent more than an equivalent layoff alternative would have. 13,14 The researchers stated that the differences
probably resulted primarily because 1) 29 percent of participating
employees were laid off after their period of STC collection; 2) STC
participation does not require the two-week waiting period, while regular UI does; 3) STC recipients were eligible for higher weekly benefit
amounts than laid-off employees; and 4) UI is not collected by all eligible laid-off employees.
In summary, the Canadian study represents a hybrid in terms of the
methodology used to measure the layoff conversion rate. The basic
conversion rate used was primarily self-reported, but many adjustments
were made to this rate with information from the study’s relatively
imperfectly matched control sample. It is interesting that the study
yielded cost comparisons that are similar to those reported in the Best
and MPR studies.

RESULTS FROM THE BPA/MPR STUDY
Our recently completed study of the STC program in the United
States sheds additional light on the layoff conversion question,
although it fails to provide a convincing numerical estimate of this
parameter (Berkeley Planning Associates and Mathematica Policy
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Research, Inc. 1997). As part of that project, we collected administrative data from a relatively large sample of firms that used STC during
1992 in five states (California, Florida, Kansas, New York, and Washington).15 A comparison sample of equal size was also selected from
these states, with firms being matched to the STC firms using three
variables: firm size, three-digit industry, and UI tax rate. Because of
the large number of non-STC firms in the states, we were able to match
quite closely along these dimensions. Table 2 provides some quantitative measures of these matches. In general, the availability of a very
large universe of firms that did not use STC made it possible to achieve
a comparison sample that was virtually identical to the STC sample as
measured by the available data. Still, as for all nonrandom evaluation
methodologies, we were concerned that STC participants may have
differed from nonparticipants along unmeasured dimensions—a concern that proved to be of crucial significance in the analysis of the data
we collected.
Table 3 summarizes our data on regular UI and STC benefits
charged to firms during the three years 1991, 1992, and 1993. To control for the large variation in firms’ sizes in our sample, these data have
been normalized by firms’ total 1991 “full-time-equivalent payrolls”
and then stated as a percent. Hence, a total normalized charges of 1.00
means that the firms’ workers collected total chargeable benefits that
amounted to 1 percent of the total 1991 payroll.16
Three general conclusions are immediately apparent from the
table. First, although overall charges to the UI system varied among
the three years, they were substantial in all three years, being somewhat larger in 1992 than in either 1991 or 1993. Second, regular UI
was the predominate form of charges incurred. That finding was, of
course, expected for firms in the comparison sample who, by definition, had no STC charges in 1992. The findings for firms in the STC
sample are important, however. They show that, in 1992, between 62
and 78 percent of all UI system charges were for regular benefits; that
is, despite their participation in the STC program, firms in 1992 appear
to have used layoffs as their primary workforce reduction strategy.
Thus, models that assume that firms follow an “either/or” approach to
such strategies clearly are inappropriate.
Finally, and most important, the values in Table 3 suggests the possible difficulties in relying on a comparison methodology for address-

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Match Quality
Californiaa

Floridab

Kansas

New Yorkc

Washingtond

Correlation between number of employees in
matched firms

0.98

0.84

0.70

0.9

0.79

Correlation between tax rates in matched firms

Match characteristic

0.99

0.98

0.98

0.99

0.98

Number (percentage) of matches at the three-digit
standard industrial classification (SIC) level

474
(93.5)

174
(82.1)

65
(63.7)

477
(94.5)

326
(87.2)

Number (percentage) of matches at the two-digit
SIC level

27
(5.3)

20
(9.4)

28
(27.5)

27
(5.3)

44
(11.8)

Number of matched pairs of firms

507

212

102

505

374

SOURCE State administrative records.
The 507 firms in California were selected from among 5,143 firms with STC plans in 1992 using sampling stratified by the number of
employees and one-digit SIC code. There are 100 matches in California that are excluded from this table since the STC and comparison
firms did not have complete information upon which a match could be made; that is, they were missing information on the number of
employees or the tax rate.
b There are eight matches in Florida excluded from this table since the STC and comparison firms did not have complete information
upon which a match could be made; that is, they were missing information on the number of employees or the tax rate.
c The 505 firms in New York were selected from among 737 firms with STC plans in 1992 using sampling stratified by the number of
employees and one-digit SIC code. Only firms with at least five employees are eligible for participation in STC; comparison firms with
fewer than five employees, therefore, were excluded from the pool of potential comparison employers.
d There are nine matches in Washington excluded from this table since the STC and comparison firms did not have complete information
upon which a match could be made; that is, they were missing information on the number of employees or the tax rate.
a
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California
Characteristics

STC

Non-STC

Florida
STC

Non-STC

Kansas
STC

Non-STC
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Table 3 Average Compensated Unemployment Charges, STC and Non-STC Firmsa,b
New York
STC

Non-STC

Washington
STC

Non-STC

1991
Normalized UI charges

0.871

0.791

1.426

1.284

0.915

0.762

1.335

1.501

3.543

3.470

Normalized STC
charges

0.277

0.007***

0.359

0.036***

0.343

0.027***

0.400

0.009***

0.368

0.039***

Normalized total
charges

1.149

0.798**

1.785

1.320**

1.258

0.788***

1.735

1.510*

3.911

3.508

Percentage of total
charges that are
UI charges

79.424

98.531

84.060

98.773

77.536

Normalized UI charges

0.936

0.964

1.825

1.153***

1.681

Normalized STC
charges

0.561

0.000***

0.847

0.000***

Normalized total
charges

1.497

0.965***

2.672

1.153***

98.387

71.393

99.433

90.275

98.519

1.206**

2.339

2.297

3.695

3.907

0.759

0.000***

0.878

0.000***

1.022

0.000***

2.440

1.206***

3.217

2.297***

4.717

3.907***

1992

Percentage of total
charges that are
UI charges

63.304 100.034c

62.078 100.000

69.030 100.000

65.146 100.000

78.456 100.000

1993
Normalized UI charges

0.788

1.009***

0.935

1.088

1.366

1.137

1.783

Normalized STC
charges

0.331

0.131***

0.181

0.021***

0.258

0.040***

Normalized total
charges

1.120

1.140

1.116

1.108

1.624

1.177*

74.999

92.423

79.442

99.564

Percentage of total
charges that are
UI charges
Sample size

431

721

191

231

85.169 98.894

90

106

3.633

4.298*

0.639 0.016***

0.893

0.084***

2.421

4.359

4.383

81.856

97.039

69.354

441

1.810

1.826***
98.438

559

314

378

SOURCE: State administrative records.
a * = Significantly different from STC firms at the 10% level, two-tailed test.
** = Significantly different from STC firms at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
*** = Significantly different from STC firms at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
b Samples restricted to firms in business throughout 1991 and 1992. Because sample sizes vary slightly per charges measured, and
because of rounding, the sum of normalized UI charges and normalized STC charges in a year may not equal normalized total charges in
a year. All charges variables are normalized by an approximation of payroll at full employment in 1991. See text for further details.
c Firms occasionally have negative STC charges for a year. In these instances, the percentage of total charges that are UI charges may
appear greater than 100%.
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ing the layoff conversion question. In two of the states (Florida and
Kansas), mean UI charges in 1992 were significantly larger in STC
firms than in comparison firms. Because no current theory suggests
that layoffs should be greater in otherwise similar firms that use STC,
the most likely explanation of this result is that STC and comparison
firms differ along dimensions that were not adequately controlled for in
the matching process—for example, those firms which opt to use STC
may have faced systematically worse economic prospects than did similar firms in the comparison group. Further support for this supposition
is reflected in the figures for total charges in 1992, which were significantly larger for STC firms than for comparison firms in all of the
states by amounts ranging from 0.53 percent of total payroll (California) to 1.52 percent (Florida).
We examined a number of statistical procedures for controlling for
these unmeasured differences between the STC and comparison firms
in models that seek to estimate the effect of STC on layoffs. For ease
of comparison we present a variety of results for one simple specification:
(1) Yt = α + βXt + γSTC + δYt–1 + ut ,
where Y is our measure of layoffs (normalized UI charges), X is a set of
individual firm characteristics, STC is a dummy variable representing
participation in the STC program, u is a random error term, and the
lagged value of Y is included as a proxy for the general economic
health of the firm in the previous year.17,18 This specification was chosen both for its overall simplicity and because it was believed that estimates of γ, if they were unbiased, would permit a direct measure of
what we have called the “layoff conversion rate.”19
Table 4 reports results for four alternative approaches to the estimation of γ. The first specification used all observations in the sample
for which we had complete data. As is immediately apparent, these
estimates take on values that cannot reasonably be interpreted in the
layoff conversion context. In three of the states, γ is estimated to be
positive; in the other two, its value is very close to zero. One interpretation of such estimates is that they arise through selectivity bias—that
is, unmeasurable characteristics that differ systematically between STC
participants and firms in the comparison group cause estimates of γ to
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Table 4 Estimated Effect of STC Participation on Normalized UI
Charges in 1992 under Alternative Specificationsa
Specificationb

California

Florida

Kansas

New
York

Washington

(1) Full sample
STC dummy

–0.094

Sample size

1,152

0.554***

0.487**

0.223

–0.075

421

196

1,000

692

0.279

0.363

–0.101

375

183

907

0.387**

0.546*

0.322*

416

194

1,000

692

0.574***

0.487*

0.233

–0.306

336

132

814

444

(2) Omit zero UI
charges
STC dummy
Sample size

–0.301***
993

–0.670**
631

(3) Include zero STC
charges
STC dummy

–0.203

Sample size

1,152

–0.110

(4) Matched pairs
STC dummy

–0.073

Sample size

502

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor Evaluation of Short-Time Compensation Programs. Administrative data.
a *Significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level, two-tailed test.
**Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test.
***Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test.
b All regressions contained an identical set of control variables for firm size and its
square, UI tax rate, industry, and normalized UI and STC charges in 1991.

be biased in a positive direction. However, the first specification does
control for some variables that might plausibly serve as proxies for the
firms’ economic health, such as their UI tax rates or their UI charges in
the prior year. Hence, such selectivity must be based on current economic factors that are not adequately controlled for by these variables.
Because we did not have extensive information on other potential
control variables, we employed a variety of sample restrictions to
determine whether the suspected biases in specification (1) might be
mitigated.20 Our first approach focused on a possible asymmetry in the
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treatment definition. The STC treatment variable requires that some
STC benefits were paid to a firm’s workers in 1992, but no similar
requirement was imposed for the comparison firms.21 As an attempt to
control for this asymmetry, we omitted from the comparison group all
firms without UI charges in 1992. Results for this omission are shown
in Table 4, as specification (2). Although this approach is admittedly
ad hoc and runs the danger of incorporating biases of its own (an STC
firm might not have made any layoffs in the absence of the program,
and that decision would not be represented in such a sample), it did
have a substantial effect on the estimates of γ. Both Kansas and Florida
samples continued to exhibit (insignificantly) positive estimates, but
estimates for the other three states were negative. In California and
Washington, they were significantly different from zero. 22 These
results clearly implied that selectivity is biasing parameter estimates in
the full sample, but we had little confidence that our sample redefinition corrected for those biases in any systematic way.
Our final two specifications yielded similar ambiguous results. For
specification (3), we redefined our STC variable to indicate only the filing of plans in 1992—it was not necessary for the firm to have experienced any benefit charges under the program. The rationale here was
the converse of that employed for specification (2)—firms filing for
STC were obviously aware of the program, but this specification
required that neither STC firms nor comparison firms had actually
incurred any charges in 1992. Again, however, this procedure yielded
several significant positive estimates of γ. Finally, in specification (4),
we returned to our original STC indicator variable but required that
only pairs of STC firms and comparison firms enter the sample
together. That procedure was intended to ensure that sample attrition
because of insufficient data was not influencing our results.23 Again,
many of the estimates for γ were implausibly positive.
Our statistical examination of the layoff conversion issue therefore
reached two primary conclusions. First, firms that use STC also make
extensive use of layoffs. Even though participation in the STC program may offer significant advantages to these firms, they still appear
to rely on compensated reductions in hours for much less than half of
their total workforce adjustments. Further analysis of this outcome
confirmed that STC use often accompanied widespread, “massive” layoffs (see Berkeley Planning Associates and Mathematica Policy
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Research 1997, Chapter 6). Thus, it seems clear that modeling of the
impact of STC-type programs on labor demand over the business cycle
must take into account the full complexities of firms’ actual workforce
reduction strategies. Considerably more empirical work is required if
we are to have reliable estimates of layoff conversion rates from STC
use in various circumstances.
Our second primary conclusion is that adoption of a comparison
methodology for the measurement of layoff conversions may be inadequate for obtaining unbiased estimates. Selectivity effects in program
participation, at least for the low levels of participation experienced in
the United States, pose major, perhaps insurmountable, problems in
statistical inference. In our experimentation with alternative specifications, we obtained a wide variety of layoff conversion rate estimates,
many of which seemed implausible on theoretical grounds. Indeed,
our results suggest that the variation in earlier estimates of layoff conversion rates using matching methodologies (Kerachsky et al. 1986)
may also be in part explained by selectivity biases. Further progress on
estimation of this parameter may well require the development of alternative statistical approaches.

CONCLUSIONS
In theory, the availability of STC benefits in addition to benefits
provided through regular unemployment compensation should affect
how firms make cyclical workforce adjustments. Understanding the
quantitative magnitude of these effects is an important component in
any evaluation of a program’s overall desirability. Given the centrality
of this issue, we find it surprising that relatively little attention has been
paid to the specification of a clear model for estimating these effects.
In our view, estimation of this type of model should be in the forefront
of economic research on STC programs.
Our review of the empirical literature on STC suggests that how
program availability affects firms’ workforce dynamics is far from
clear. Consistent with other evaluations of their type, studies based on
self-reporting have produced widely varying estimates, some of which
are implausible. Many other studies merely assume the size of an
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effect that should, in principle, be estimated. Matching methodologies
seemed to offer the best promise of obtaining estimates of the effect of
STC from microdata. Previous experiences with that methodology in
other contexts, however, suggest that its greatest drawback is the lack
of assurance that STC users and nonusers face similar economic prospects despite major efforts to assure that the firms are closely matched
on measurable variables. This possibility was confirmed by our experiences in trying to model the impact of firm use of STC in the United
States during the 1992 recession, for which we obtained a wide variety
of layoff conversion rate estimates. Hence, the suitability of other
research designs (such as innovative uses of aggregate data, randomassignment experiments, or carefully designed case studies) needs to
be considered before attempting any overall assessment of the general
desirability of STC-type programs.

Notes
The first three sections of this chapter were presented at the Conference on Changes in
Working Time in Canada and the United States, sponsored by the Canadian Employment Research Forum in cooperation with Human Resources Development Canada,
Statistics Canada, and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Ottawa.
This article has been funded at least in part with Federal funds from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration under Prime Contract number K-4722-4-00-80-30 to Berkeley Planning Associates. The content of this
publication does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of
Labor or Berkeley Planning Associates nor does mention of trade names, commercial
products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.

1. Utilization rates for STC have been low under both programs, however. UI programs in the United States also have provisions for the payment of partial benefits, but these benefits are generally unavailable to workers suffering relatively
modest workweek reductions.
2. Studies of the increase in short-time work during recessions provide additional
support for the possibility that total compensation might increase when STC
becomes available.
3. In principle, one might want to measure changes in total hours and employment in
response to STC use, not simply unemployed hours that are compensated. But the
data requirements for a more complete measurement at the level of the firm are
quite onerous, and no researcher has attempted such an evaluation. Rather, the
existing research has focused on more readily measured compensated hours, usu-
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ally by drawing data from administrative sources. Although use of the compensated data sheds light on a number of important policy questions (such as the
effect of STC adoption on overall expenditures under the UI system), the extent to
which these data accurately reflect changes in total hours and employment is not
known.
For summaries of many of the other issues that have been addressed in the STC
research, see Best (1988) or Cook et al. (1995).
A firm may choose not to use its approved plan. State agencies that approve plans
do not typically monitor whether plans are used and what happens if they are not
used.
Other assumptions pertain to the UI take-up rate of STC participants, the hazard
rate to reemployment for laid-off employees, the wages and benefit levels of STC
participants, and the costs of processing STC claims. The estimate assumes firms
operate at the average values of workweek reductions, STC durations, and postSTC layoffs.
In some cases, effects of STC on aggregate fluctuations make no use of the STC
data and therefore need no assumption about layoff conversions. For example,
Van Audenrode (1994) finds that total hours exhibit much greater flexibility in
European countries with generous STC systems (Belgium, Italy, and Sweden)
than in countries with only modest levels of compensation (France and Germany).
Although this finding does not provide a direct estimate of the extent to which
STC use deters layoffs, it suggests that the trade-off may be significant in certain
situations.
Of course, the reason firms choose not to use STC is of critical importance. Firms
that were not aware of STC might be more suitable matches than firms that knew
about it and chose not to use it.
Economic or operational criteria, such as legislative restrictions on firm characteristics that limit eligibility for STC, may suggest the need to exclude certain firms.
In addition, there may be no credible matches for a particular firm (see, for example, Kerachsky et al. 1986; and Schiff 1986).
Even if additional data were available for matching, the matching procedure is
computationally burdensome and extremely slow.
The authors made no attempt to reweight the sample to adjust for the higher probability of sampling large firms.
The analysis on pp. 148–155 indicates that STC claimants collected benefits for
fewer weeks than UI claimants, but it appears that adjustments were not made to
account for the increased number of claimants under an STC program. Furthermore, compensation under STC was only for the workweek reduction and not for
the full weekly benefit amount.
Canada’s UI system is not experience rated, so higher compensated unemployment charges are not charged to a firm. Because the U.S. system is experience
rated, albeit imperfectly and with a lag, firms with higher charges typically bear
responsibility for them. Hence, computations of the U.S. program’s “cost” to the
UI system must, of necessity, be more complex.
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14. For firms, the evaluation’s reported favorable benefit–cost estimates for STC compared to layoffs resulted largely from the significant savings derived from reduced
training and hiring costs. For society, the favorable estimates resulted largely
from the much lower stress-related costs of STC compared to layoffs. These values were calculated on a per-layoff equivalent basis using the self-reported figures
described earlier.
15. Our definition of having “used” STC was that some benefits were paid to the
firm’s workers during 1992 under this program. Implementing this definition
posed some difficulties because the only information available was on which firms
had filed STC plans at the time of sample selection. Hence, we selected our STC
sample on the basis of having filed a plan in 1992, although (as discussed later)
we primarily used a definition stressing actual use in most of our analysis.
16. 1991 full-time-equivalent payrolls were estimated by adding total wages paid during 1991 to an estimate of wages that would have been paid to the firms’ workers
who collected UI or STC during 1991 if these workers had instead been fully
employed during these periods.
17. The vector X includes firm size and its square, dummy variables for one-digit SIC
industry, and a measure of the 1991 UI tax rate.
18. Prior year normalized STC charges were also included in all regressions as a further control on the firm’s health in 1991.
19. Specifically, the average layoff conversion rate can be estimated as γ/k, where k
represents mean normalized STC charges during 1992. In this specification, the
layoff conversion rate would be in terms of dollars—STC dollars substituting for
UI dollars. We obtained substantially similar results from estimates of Y (and γ)
in terms of hours—perhaps a more natural, if less accurately measured, conversion concept.
20. We also experimented with a number of statistical methods for controlling for
sample selectivity, but these were largely unsuccessful because of our inability to
develop clear ways of identifying the selectivity equation given the limited set of
control variables we had and the fact that firms in the sample had been matched on
these variables.
21. This asymmetry was also pointed out in connection with the earlier MPR study
(Morand 1990).
22. The point estimates for California and Washington imply layoff conversion rates
of –0.55 and –0.66, respectively.
23. To ensure the integrity of the matching, pairs in which a comparison firm experienced STC charges (because of a plan filed prior to 1992) were also omitted from
the sample in some specifications. We also used this sample to implement a
“paired” regression analysis, but this did not substantially change the results.
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Short-Time Work
in the United States
Implications for Evaluation of
Short-Time Compensation Schemes
Alec R. Levenson
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and
Center for Effective Organizations,
University of Southern California

Abraham and Houseman’s (1993, 1994) calls for a systematic reorganization of U.S. job security policies have again drawn attention to
reduced-hours employment—financed through short-time compensation (STC)—as an alternative to layoffs. Under STC,1 workers receive
partial unemployment insurance (UI) benefits as compensation for
reduced working hours. While STC programs are widely used in countries such as Belgium, Canada, France, and Germany, in the United
States they have been available in only 18 states, and the usage rates
are very low (Vroman 1990, 1992).2
The literature typically assumes that workers receiving STC are
not drawn from the pool of those who would have had their hours
reduced anyway, even without an STC program. Such reduced-hours
employment with no offsetting compensation is called short-time work
(STW). There has been virtually no discussion of the role of STW in
evaluating STC programs in the existing literature. This chapter analyzes the incidence of STW in the United States for 1968–1993 and the
potential implications for evaluating the impact of STC programs.
Conventional wisdom holds that STW is not widely used in the
United States. Yet the answer depends on the measure of STW used.
In terms of incidence per worker, STW use is fairly widespread: the
STW rate ranges from about 50 to 70 percent of the layoff rate.3 However, in terms of total hours adjustment, the STW rate is dwarfed by the
layoff rate.
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The main implication for STC program evaluation is that widespread expansion of STC programs is most likely to benefit workers
already on or subject to STW, not necessarily workers on or subject to
layoffs. There is not necessarily anything wrong with this conclusion.
Just as the UI system was established to provide consumption insurance to workers subject to employment shocks, STC programs could
be expanded to insure STW workers against partial employment
shocks. However, this aspect of STC has not been a focus of previous
authors, who instead have concentrated on the spillover effects of STC
on layoffs.
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses the
existing literature on STC and related evidence on employment adjustment using layoffs versus hours; the following section presents the
empirical evidence that STW is already widely used in the United
States with particular attention paid to the prevalence of STW in STC
and non-STC states; and the last section concludes the chapter.

SHORT-TIME COMPENSATION AND SHORT-TIME WORK
Unemployment insurance was conceived as a program to insure
workers’ consumption against unexpected employment shocks. It was
presumed that the beneficiaries would be people who would suffer an
unemployment spell regardless of whether there was a UI payment system. However, an extensive literature has highlighted an unintended
side effect of the UI system in the absence of perfect experience rating:
workers get laid off who would otherwise have remained employed
because UI payments offer an implicit subsidy to layoffs (Hamermesh
1993, pp. 307–315). Many authors have attempted to measure the
number of “excess” layoffs created by imperfect experience rating.
Approximately 20–40 percent of temporary layoffs are in this category
(Topel 1983; Card and Levine 1994; Anderson and Meyer 1994). This
figure is substantial and has implications for potential overuse of STC,
as discussed below. However, the pertinent observation for this section
is that a majority of UI claimants would have been laid off even in the
absence of a UI program. This suggests that the primary beneficiaries
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of STC programs are likely to be people who would be put on STW
even in the absence of an STC program.
There are three pools of workers from which STC-compensated
employees can be drawn. Each group is denoted by the state in which
they would have been in the absence of an STC program: workers who
are laid off in response to a demand shock, workers whose hours are
not adjusted at all, and workers whose hours are cut back. The prevalent view in the literature is that only the first and second groups of
workers are tapped for inclusion in STC programs:
[S]hort time compensation (STC) represents an alternative to layoffs as a way for firms to reduce labor inputs in periods of slack
demand. Currently the standard procedure for reducing work
hours is to lay off the least senior employees. This action concentrates the reduction in hours narrowly among a small number
while leaving other workers unaffected. An alternative procedure
for reducing labor input is to retain all employees by reducing
weekly hours for a much larger fraction of the firm’s work force.
(Vroman 1990, p. 71)

Little mention is made of the existence of STW in the absence of
STC, particularly by those advocating STC programs. One exception
is Hamermesh (1978, pp. 249–250), who noted that
While the subsidy [STC] will to some extent encourage the expansion of the activity that is subsidized [STW], it will also reward
those economic agents—in this case firms and workers—that
would engage in the subsidized activity even in the absence of the
subsidy. Because of this windfall much of the payment for shorttime work under any STC scheme cannot result in increased
employment, but is instead a transfer from those whose taxes
exceed their receipts from STC to those for whom the opposite is
true.

The vast majority of authors since Hamermesh have simply
ignored this issue. One of the lone exceptions is Best (1981, p. 96),
who dismisses Hamermesh’s critique, stating that
[T]he incidence of such workweek reduction [STW] appears to be
low in the United States and commonly smaller than the 10 percent threshold reduction of worktime required before employees
are eligible to receive benefits.
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In support of this conclusion, Best cites only one source, Henle
(1978, p. 267), who stated that “the evidence seems to indicate that the
prevalence of such work sharing arrangements is quite limited.” This
conclusion was based on union contract data showing that about 20
percent of contracts provided for hours reductions in the face of slack
work, and that such provisions were generally not utilized. However,
this was the full extent of statistics provided to support these conclusions. 4 Moreover, because unionized workers account for only a
minority of the workforce, Best’s dismissal of the importance of STW
is clearly premature without additional evidence for nonunionized
workers.
Bednarzik (1980), the only other author to analyze the incidence of
STW, tracked the aggregate STW rate for 1956–1979. However, the
only comparison made with other aspects of the labor market was the
aggregate unemployment rate. This created the impression that STW
is relatively underutilized because the unemployment rate is many
times larger than the STW rate. The proper comparison for an STC
evaluation is STW versus layoffs, because both represent employer-initiated changes in hours in response to demand shocks. Moreover, layoffs typically account for only about 15 percent of unemployment in
any given year (Economic Report of the President 1996). As shown
below, the incidence of STW in fact is often comparable to the incidence of layoffs.

EMPLOYMENT VERSUS HOURS ADJUSTMENT
It has long been recognized that fixed costs of hiring and firing
workers inhibit a firm from using employment adjustment as the only
way to adjust total labor input (Oi 1962). Consequently, in the short
run firms adjust hours per worker as a substitute for adjusting the number of workers (Rosen 1968; Fair 1969; see Caballero et al. 1995 for a
recent example using data from individual manufacturing plants).
Previous research has directly compared employment and hours
adjustment for the United States versus other countries that have much
more liberal STC provisions (Abraham and Houseman 1993; Van
Audenrode 1994). Both Abraham and Houseman and Van Audenrode
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found that the adjustment of total hours in the United States is done
more through employment than through average hours per worker.
Both studies concluded that the relative lack of a generous STC subsidy plays a role in this: U.S. firms use employment adjustment relatively more than hours adjustment presumably because the former are
more heavily subsidized. However, Van Audenrode suggested that a
reduced reliance on layoffs would occur only if the proportionate subsidy to STC exceeded that for layoffs. Abraham and Houseman advocated an expansion of STC at the same time that experience rating for
layoff UI benefits is tightened. Thus, both studies did not presume that
simple changes to STC alone would necessarily reduce firms’ reliance
on layoffs.
These authors’ hesitance to advocate expansion of STC as the only
way to shift labor adjustment away from layoffs is well-founded. In
particular there are both institutional and mechanical differences
between labor markets across different countries. Though STW may
be used relatively more in countries with more liberal STC, such a correlation is not proof that changes in STC provisions would produce a
similar reliance on STW in the United States. In particular, tighter
experience rating of UI alone might eliminate the excess reliance on
layoffs without the need for a generous STC subsidy. This is precisely
the point made by Burdett and Wright (1989), who show that an STC
subsidy leads to an inefficient number of hours per worker.
The reliability of cross-country comparisons such as those above
are also limited by the nature of shocks that hit particular industries.
Aggregate net employment changes mask much larger offsetting flows
through gross job creation and destruction. In particular, there are
large differences in job reallocation rates between countries (Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996, p. 21). It is naive to presume that such
cross-country differences can be fully explained by parameters of UI
and STC alone. They undoubtedly arise due to differences in a host of
factors such as country size, population and industrial concentration,
internal migration patterns, barriers to entry for new businesses, merger
and takeover rules, bankruptcy laws, union organizing laws, the demographic makeup of the labor force, societal differences in between-job
mobility, welfare system influences on work behavior, overtime pay
rules, etc.5
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Limiting the analysis to nominally comparable, narrowly defined
industries (as do Abraham and Houseman 1993) does not negate the
role of these other factors that affect the ability and preferences of individual firms to adjust labor input. Abraham and Houseman (1994) partially address this issue by analyzing the effect of weakening
employment security laws in Germany, France, and Belgium. They
find that such changes—which presumably decreased the costs of layoffs—did not measurably increase reliance on employment (over
hours) adjustment in those countries. While informative, such evidence is not proof that expanding STC coverage in the United States
would increase reliance on hours adjustment. If anything, their results
suggest that such an expansion could easily have no measurable impact
on the use of layoffs.
Thus, there is a clear need to analyze the use of STW in the United
States as a way of predicting the impact of STC programs. Such an
analysis is better than cross-country comparisons of employment versus hours adjustment because a vast majority of between-country differences in other factors are held constant for a within-country
analysis. Moreover, the data used here allow the identification of hours
reductions below usual hours worked.6 They also allow the identification of employment adjustment through layoffs. Both of these are
more accurate measures of the relevant margins on which firms
actively decrease labor input than measures such as the relative usage
of total hours adjustment versus total employment adjustment (which
include both increases and decreases in labor input). In particular, the
latter measures include labor turnover that occurs through hiring and
voluntary separations, which are important components of labor adjustment but are not of primary importance for predicting firms’ responses
to changes in layoff versus STW subsidies.

THE USE OF STW IN THE UNITED STATES
The data used for this study are drawn from two different sets of
Current Population Survey (CPS) data: the 1968–1993 March Annual
Demographic Files, and the 1979–1993 Outgoing Rotation Group Files
(for all 12 months in the year). The sample was limited to wage and
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salary workers age 16 and older. A worker is defined to be on STW if
1) the total number of hours worked during the survey week (at all
jobs) are less than 35, 2) usual hours are greater than 35, and 3) the reason given for working less than 35 hours during the survey week is
slack demand, material shortage, or plant/machine repair. Bednarzik
(1980) included only those who indicate slack work in his measure of
STW. I include the other two because they also represent employerinitiated hours reductions, which could be induced by demand shocks.
Regardless, these two categories consistently account for less than 10
percent of STW, so excluding them would not substantively alter any
of the conclusions.
The analysis covers data through 1993 because data for 1994 and
after are not directly comparable. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(1994) introduced a major redesign of and improvement to the CPS in
1994, making comparisons with earlier years problematic. A full reconciliation of the STW rates for 1993 and earlier compared with 1994
and later is beyond the scope of this study. However, one important
difference should be noted. During 1993, the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics administered both the old and new versions of the CPS. This
allowed for a single year comparison of differences in the measured
levels of layoffs and STW.
People on STW are a subset of those who usually work full time
yet are part time during the survey week. According to the new, more
accurate survey, the actual level of this larger category of “temporary”
part-time workers—of which STW is a subset—is 25 percent lower
than recorded in the old survey. In contrast, the actual level of layoff
unemployment is 10 percent higher (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1994). Unfortunately, there is no way to determine definitively
whether these biases in the old measures (the ones used in the present
study) were consistent over time. However, there is no particular reason to believe they were not consistent. Regardless, the reader should
keep in mind the biases while reviewing the empirical evidence below.

324

Levenson

CYCLICAL PATTERNS
Figure 1 graphs the rates of STW and layoffs for 1968–1993 using
the March data. Throughout the chapter, the STW and layoff rates are
calculated using the same base for the labor force: all those employed
or on layoff. People unemployed for reasons other than layoff are
excluded from the analysis.7
The incidence of STW in Figure 1 is comparable to layoffs; the
layoff rate is appreciably higher only during the 1970s and early 1980s
recession years. Throughout the most recent recession, the STW and
layoff rates were virtually identical. Adjusting for the biases mentioned above would raise the layoff rate by 10 percent and lower the
STW rate by 25 percent. Accounting for this, the true STW rate is
approximately 50 to 70 percent of the layoff rate. The use of STW is
concentrated in industries such as construction that heavily use layoffs,
as shown in Table 1.
While the incidence of STW is comparable to layoffs, total hours
adjustment is comparable only to short-term layoffs. This can be seen
in Figure 2, which graphs the incidence of STW and layoffs in the top
panel (as a fraction of employment), and the percentage of total hours
Figure 1 The Incidence of Layoffs and Short-Time Work
for Entire Labor Force

SOURCE: Calculations based on March Current Population Surveys, 1968–1993.

Table 1 Short-Time Work Rates as a Share of Employment and of Total Hoursa (%)
Selected industries

Selected occupations
Clerical/
Durable
Public
administration
Total labor force
Construction
manufacturing
administration
support
Skilled laborers
Year
Emp.
Hrs.
Emp.
Hrs.
Emp.
Hrs.
Emp.
Hrs.
Emp.
Hrs.
Emp.
Hrs.
1979
0.96
0.33
2.65
1.08
0.84
0.31
0.15
0.05
0.38
0.12
1.78
0.64
1980
1.29
0.43
3.37
1.43
1.53
0.47
0.28
0.09
0.45
0.13
2.50
0.86
1981
1.27
0.41
3.48
1.50
1.35
0.46
0.15
0.07
0.39
0.13
2.44
0.81
1982
1.69
0.52
4.37
1.68
2.58
0.73
0.16
0.06
0.74
0.21
3.52
1.15
1983
1.30
0.40
3.37
1.27
1.50
0.42
0.11
0.04
0.52
0.15
2.71
0.88
1984
1.10
0.38
2.84
1.18
1.01
0.32
0.15
0.07
0.42
0.15
2.11
0.76
1985
1.12
0.35
2.69
1.09
1.21
0.36
0.13
0.03
0.42
0.12
2.28
0.75
1986
1.07
0.33
2.75
1.11
0.94
0.29
0.16
0.05
0.44
0.12
1.96
0.69
1987
1.01
0.33
3.17
1.25
0.79
0.25
0.15
0.05
0.41
0.11
1.79
0.66
1988
1.02
0.32
2.94
1.03
0.91
0.29
0.19
0.05
0.40
0.11
1.93
0.67
1989
1.05
0.33
3.21
1.09
0.92
0.32
0.22
0.08
0.54
0.14
1.87
0.66
1990
1.13
0.35
3.47
1.33
0.95
0.31
0.15
0.05
0.46
0.14
2.02
0.68
1991
1.38
0.43
4.81
1.86
1.48
0.43
0.12
0.06
0.65
0.19
2.61
0.91
1992
1.25
0.38
4.24
1.63
1.05
0.32
0.21
0.07
0.51
0.15
2.29
0.77
1993
1.21
0.36
3.56
1.26
0.83
0.28
0.14
0.06
0.53
0.16
1.97
0.68
a The STW rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each category using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for all
months in the year.
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Figure 2

Layoffs and Short-Time Work: Incidence versus Hours
Incidence

SOURCE: Calculations based on Current Population Surveys, Outgoing Rotation
Groups (all months), 1979–1993.
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adjusted through both channels in the bottom panel. For the bottom
panel, usual hours for persons on layoff had to be imputed because the
CPS does not record that measure for people not with a job.8 In both
panels, total layoffs are broken down into two separate groups: those of
duration less than 30 days and those of greater duration. Note that this
refers to ongoing duration as of the survey date, so a significant portion
of the short-term layoffs ex post will be longer than 30 days. But such
a division is useful because the short-duration category undoubtedly
includes a disproportionate number of layoffs that ex post will be less
than 30 days.
The data in Figure 2 and throughout the rest of the chapter, use the
Outgoing Rotation Group files so that the numbers are indicative of
employment behavior for the entire year, not just March. This limits
the time series to 1979–1993. However, Figure 1 shows that the degree
of cyclical correlation between STW and layoffs barely differs for
1968–1978 versus 1979–1993. So the analysis for the most recent
years should provide results comparable to the earlier period. Moreover, the overall pattern in the incidence of STW and layoffs in Figure
1 and the top panel of Figure 2 are virtually identical, showing that the
year-to-year movements in the two rates in Figure 1 are not contaminated by cyclical factors that are unique to March.
The graphs in Figure 2 show that 1) the incidence of STW is comparable to all layoffs, particularly since 1987, yet 2) total hours adjustment through STW is only a fraction of total hours adjustment through
layoffs. This is not surprising when one considers the likely source of
demand shocks inducing the different types of adjustment. Firms that
put workers on STW or on layoff for a short period of time probably
have been hit by what are perceived to be temporary demand shocks.
In contrast, firms with workers who have been on layoff for more than
a month probably have been hit by what are perceived to be more permanent demand shocks.
This suggests that STW is more likely a substitute for short-duration layoffs than for long-duration layoffs. If a firm needs to downsize
permanently, providing a short-term subsidy to STW through STC
should not induce the firm to retain more workers in the long run. An
STC subsidy might temporarily postpone such layoffs, if at all, but Figure 2 suggests that such a postponement may be quite short.
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STW BY INDUSTRY AND BY OCCUPATION
Tables 1–3 report the pattern of STW usage by industry and by
occupation. Tables 1 and 2 report incidence and hours measures for
select industries and occupations by year and by month, respectively.
Regardless of which measure is used, the more highly cyclical industries, such as construction and manufacturing, and the more highly
cyclical occupations, such as skilled laborers, have the highest rates of
STW. However, as seen in Table 2, there is a distinct seasonal pattern
in STW for construction, with the highest rates in the winter and early
spring.9 The seasonal pattern for durable manufacturing is much less
pronounced. This provides further evidence that usage of STW mirrors
that of layoffs.
Consolidating all the data for 1979–1993, Table 3 examines which
industries and occupations use STW the most. As foreshadowed by the
patterns in Tables 1 and 2, the highest rates are for those that are the
most cyclical and/or seasonal: the manufacturing, construction, mining
and agriculture industries, and the skilled laborer, semiskilled laborer,
and farming occupations.
Best’s comment about the rate of reduction of hours under STC
(“. . . such workweek reduction appears to be . . . commonly smaller
than the 10 percent threshold reduction of worktime required before
employees are eligible to receive benefits”) can be assessed by analyzing the STW incidence versus hours rates in Table 3. An estimate
of the average hours reduction under STW is available by taking the
ratio of the hours adjustment figure in column 5 over the employment adjustment figure in column 2.10 Doing so yields an average
reduction in hours of about 30 percent for each industry and occupation. As shown in Table 4, this figure falls well within the range necessary to trigger eligibility for STC for all states with such a program.11 So Best’s statement appears to be inaccurate by this measure, at least for current STC programs.

Table 2 Short-Time Work Rates as a Percentage of Employment and as a Percentage of Total Hours, Disaggregated
by Montha
Selected Industries

Total labor force
Month

Construction

Selected Occupations

Durable
manufacturing

Public
administration

Clerical/
administrative
support

Skilled laborers

Emp.

Hrs.

Emp.

Hrs.

Emp.

Hrs.

Emp

Hrs.

Emp

Hrs.

Emp

Hrs

Jan

1.39

0.46

3.74

1.60

1.29

0.42

0.12

0.05

0.53

0.17

2.51

0.90

Feb

1.32

0.42

3.62

1.56

1.42

0.43

0.17

0.05

0.50

0.14

2.53

0.89

Mar

1.22

0.39

3.52

1.46

1.37

0.42

0.12

0.08

0.51

0.14

2.51

0.85

Apr

1.13

0.37

3.74

1.44

1.20

0.42

0.20

0.06

0.47

0.16

2.28

0.80

May

1.16

0.37

3.26

1.31

1.36

0.41

0.11

0.05

0.46

0.14

2.31

0.79

June

1.18

0.36

3.24

1.22

1.11

0.31

0.26

0.07

0.53

0.15

2.24

0.73

July

1.20

0.37

3.12

1.21

1.07

0.32

0.17

0.06

0.56

0.16

2.10

0.70

Aug

1.11

0.34

2.66

1.00

1.12

0.34

0.16

0.05

0.47

0.14

2.08

0.66

Sept

1.04

0.32

2.84

1.04

0.98

0.33

0.28

0.08

0.42

0.12

1.87

0.66

Oct

1.10

0.34

3.25

1.20

1.13

0.35

0.21

0.07

0.40

0.11

2.05

0.69

Nov

1.18

0.36

3.52

1.23

1.27

0.39

0.07

0.02

0.44

0.14

2.30

0.78

Dec

1.28

0.42

3.96

1.54

1.19

0.36

0.13

0.06

0.50

0.14

2.39

0.85

a

The STW rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each category using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for 1979–
1993.
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Table 3 Short-Time Work and Layoff Rates by Industry and Occupation,
1979–1993a
As a % of employment
Layoffs
Layoffs
≥30 days STW <30 days

As a % of total hours
Layoffs
Layoffs
≥30 days STW <30 days

Industry
Agriculture
1.95
3.09
0.52
1.77
1.22
0.44
Mining
2.69
1.42
0.62
2.63
0.62
0.65
Construction
3.45
3.36
1.10
3.54
1.31
1.11
Durable
manufacturing
2.15
1.21
0.57
2.12
0.37
0.57
Nondurable
manufacturing
1.34
2.37
0.60
1.29
0.71
0.58
Transportation
0.80
0.88
0.22
0.80
0.36
0.22
Wholesale trade
0.72
0.74
0.18
0.68
0.26
0.16
Retail trade
0.53
1.18
0.18
0.51
0.24
0.16
Services
0.36
0.75
0.13
0.35
0.21
0.12
Public
administration
0.26
0.17
0.05
0.25
0.06
0.06
Occupation
Clerical/
administration
0.46
0.48
0.12
0.46
0.14
0.12
Skilled laborers
2.22
2.26
0.72
2.19
0.77
0.72
Educators
0.16
0.32
0.05
0.17
0.12
0.05
Farming, forestry
1.84
2.75
0.52
1.85
1.15
0.48
Medical/health
0.21
0.68
0.09
0.19
0.18
0.09
Managementrelated
0.27
0.29
0.04
0.27
0.11
0.04
Semiskilled
laborer
2.53
2.65
0.76
2.66
0.89
0.79
Profess. specialty,
not elsewhere
classified
0.33
0.37
0.09
0.34
0.13
0.08
Personal service
0.69
1.71
0.27
0.69
0.34
0.25
Private household
service
0.12
1.27
0.24
0.15
0.19
0.26
Protective service
0.38
0.40
0.11
0.37
0.12
0.09
Sales-related
0.43
0.89
0.14
0.43
0.19
0.12
a The STW and layoff rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each
category using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for all months during 1979–1993.
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Table 4 Summary of Short-Term Compensation Programsa

Participating states

Duration of plan
before new
approval required

Limits on number
of weeks

Required reduction
of work (%)

Arizona

1 year

26

10 to 40

Arkansas

1 year

26

10 to 40

California

6 month

b

6 month

26c

Connecticut

at least 10
20 to 40

Florida

1 year

26

10 to 40

Iowa

2 year

26

20 to 50

Kansas

1 year

26

20 to 40

Louisiana

1 year

26

20 to 40

Maryland

6 month

26

10 to 50d

Massachusetts

6 month

26

10 to 60

Minnesota

1 year

52

20 to 40

Missouri

1 year

26

20 to 40

New York

—

20

20 to 60

Oregon

1 year

26

20 to 40

Rhode Island

1 year

26

10 to 50

Texas

1 year

52

10 to 40

6 month

26

20 to 50

1 yeare

26

10 to 50

Vermont
Washington

e

SOURCE: National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers’ Compennsation (1996).
a As of January 1996.
b No limit on number of weeks, but total paid can not exceed 26 × weekly benefit
amount.
c 26-week extension possible.
d 50 percent maximum may be waived by Secretary.
e Or date of plan, if earlier.
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STC VERSUS NON-STC STATES AND PARTIAL UI
Are STC programs the reason for the existence of STW in the
United States? In order to provide a crude answer to this question,
Table 5 reports STW rates for states that have never had an STC program (“non-STC states”) and states that have ever had an STC program
(“STC states,” including Illinois). The answer is no, because the STW
rate has been greater for non-STC states in all years except for 1992–
1993. It is true that many STC programs have only been introduced
recently (Table 4), so the higher rates of STW in the most recent years
for the STC states may be due to the recently adopted STC programs.12
However, Figure 3 shows that that would be a premature conclusion:
both STW and layoffs have been relatively higher in STC states in
recent years, suggesting that both are correlated with other factors,
such as different industrial compositions in the two groups of states.
So it is doubtful that usage of STC explains much of the difference in
STW between STC and non-STC states. This is consistent with the
commonly held view that STC programs have been vastly underutilized in the states that have them.
One component of the UI system in each state that may explain at
least part of the cross-state variation in STW is partial UI benefits. Partial UI benefits are available in all states when earnings fall below a
particular threshold. However, the threshold is so low that the workweek has to be reduced by at least 60 percent in most states. This fact
alone indicates that the provisions for partial UI probably are not a
major factor in determining STW because the average hours reduction
is only half that needed to qualify for partial UI. Moreover, in most
states the partial UI benefit is taxed at a 100 percent rate for any earnings above a very small amount (the “disregard” amount).
Despite the fact that partial UI probably is not generous enough to
explain patterns of STW, a crude test is provided in Table 6, which
breaks the non-STC states into three groups: least generous, more generous, and most generous partial UI benefits. States in the first group
tax partial UI benefits at a 100 percent tax rate for any earnings above
either 10 percent of wages or $40 per week. States in the second group
also tax benefits at a 100 percent tax rate for earnings over the disregard, but the disregard is higher than for the first group. The third
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Table 5 Short-Time Work Rates as a Share of Employment for States
with and without STC Programsa (%)

a

STC statesb

Year

All
states

All
non-STC
states

1979

0.96

1.09

0.84

0.97

0.57

0.54

1.12

1980

1.29

1.48

1.13

1.34

0.73

0.86

1.24

1981

1.27

1.44

1.12

1.39

0.61

0.64

1.47

1982

1.69

1.99

1.44

1.78

0.78

0.99

1.55

1983

1.30

1.45

1.17

1.38

0.87

0.94

1.69

1984

1.10

1.27

0.96

1.03

0.67

0.70

1.16

1985

1.12

1.20

1.05

1.17

0.53

0.74

0.72

1986

1.07

1.13

1.02

1.13

0.66

1.19

1.07

1987

1.01

1.11

0.92

1.03

0.50

0.55

1.07

1988

1.02

1.01

1.01

1.21

0.55

1.10

1.58

1989

1.05

1.01

1.09

1.33

0.63

1.04

0.98

1990

1.13

1.18

1.09

1.57

0.69

0.56

1.13

1991

1.3

1.39

1.37

2.01

1.00

0.78

1.27

1992

1.25

1.10

1.36

2.17

0.96

0.45

1.52

1993

1.21

1.06

1.33

2.04

1.10

0.87

0.76

All

California

New
York

Kansas

Missouri

The STW rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each category
using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for all months in the year.
b The STC states category includes all states that have ever had an STC program, even
if the program was not in existence for one or more years during 1979–1993: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
Vermont, and Washington.
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Figure 3 Short-Term Work and Layoffs for STC and Non-STC States

SOURCE: Calclulations based on Current Population Surveys, Outgoing Rotation
Groups (all months) 1979–1993.

Table 6 Short-Time Work Rates for All Non-STC States and for Non-STC States with a Partial Unemployment
Insurance Program by Level of Benefit Generositya (%)
As a share of employment

As a share of total hours

Level of benefit generosity for partial UI program

Level of benefit generosity for partial UI program

Year

All non-STC
statesb

Least
generousc

More generousd

Most
generouse

All non-STC
statesb

Least
generousc

More
generousd

Most
generouse

1979

1.09

1.18

1.09

0.85

0.35

0.38

0.35

0.30

1980

1.48

1.53

1.33

1.56

0.45

0.45

0.43

0.49

1981

1.44

1.50

1.35

1.37

0.44

0.44

0.43

0.46

1982

1.99

2.18

1.82

1.72

0.56

0.60

0.55

0.51

1983

1.45

1.54

1.37

1.31

0.43

0.46

0.41

0.45

1984

1.27

1.30

1.32

1.10

0.39

0.39

0.41

0.39

1985

1.20

1.26

1.23

0.99

0.37

0.36

0.39

0.37

1986

1.13

1.08

1.33

0.97

0.36

0.33

0.42

0.32

1987

1.11

1.10

1.11

1.15

0.35

0.35

0.34

0.36

1988

1.01

1.05

0.95

0.98

0.31

0.31

0.32

0.32

1989

1.01

1.08

0.92

0.96

0.32

0.30

0.33

0.35

1990

1.18

1.28

1.05

1.11

0.34

0.37

0.33

0.29

1991

1.39

1.50

1.30

1.22

0.44

0.48

0.40

0.41
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Table 6 (continued)

a

As a share of employment

As a share of total hours

Level of benefit generosity for partial UI program

Level of benefit generosity for partial UI program

Year

All non-STC
statesb

Least
generousc

More generousd

Most
generouse

All non-STC
statesb

Least
generousc

More
generousd

Most
generouse

1992

1.10

1.11

1.21

0.93

0.33

0.33

0.35

0.31

1993

1.06

1.15

1.00

0.89

0.33

0.34

0.34

0.27

The STW rates were calculated over all workers plus unemployed in each category using CPS Outgoing Rotation Group data for all
months in the year.
b The “all non-STC states” category includes all states that have never had an STC program.
c The “least generous” category includes Alabama, D.C., Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia.
d The “more generous” category includes Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
e The “most generous” category includes Alaska, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, and Wisconsin.

Short-Time Work in the United States

337

group taxes partial UI benefits at a rate of less than 100 percent for
earnings over the disregard amount, providing the most generous
potential benefits through partial UI. If the partial UI programs influence the use of STW, then STW should be most prevalent among those
(non-STC) states that offer the most generous partial UI benefits.
An inspection of the numbers in Table 6 reveals that this is not the
case: the employment incidence of STW is virtually the same for nonSTC states that have the least generous partial UI programs compared
to those that have the most generous partial UI programs. Even though
the number of workers on STW appears unaffected by partial UI benefit generosity, there might still be greater hours adjustment due to
incentives provided by partial UI schemes to dramatically reduce the
length of the workweek. Yet total hours adjustment through STW is
the same across the different levels of partial UI benefit generosity.

USING STW TO EVALUATE THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT OF STC
The evidence presented here suggests that current patterns of STW
in the United States appear to be primarily dictated by patterns of
demand shocks and production technology, not by incentives provided
through STC or partial UI. Thus the current patterns of STW and layoffs for each state should serve as a useful benchmark for researchers
who wish to gauge the relative effect of proposed expansions in STC
on STW and layoffs. However, doing this properly requires careful
consideration of all possible factors that may affect STW, layoffs, or
both, including parameters of state STC, regular UI, and partial UI programs. For example, it is possible that current STC programs have
marginally increased the use of STW in the states that have introduced
them. But a complete answer to this requires a determination of
whether other incentives (and disincentives) to use UI and partial UI
changed at the same time. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of
this study, but should be addressed in future research.
One question that can be answered is, where should we expect to
see the highest rates of STC usage? The limited data on STC usage
shows an uneven distribution across industries (Kerachsky et al. 1985;
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Best and Mattesich 1980). This is not surprising given the patterns in
Table 3, which show the highest rates of STW among the most cyclically and seasonally sensitive occupations. However, there is another
potential explanation for the patterns in Table 3. Workers in whom the
firm has invested the most training and/or who have the highest level of
skills should be less likely to be put on STW, otherwise the worker on
STW might take that as a negative signal about future employment at
the firm and decide to look for a new job. To answer this it is necessary
to disentangle industry shocks from occupational differences in the
response to those shocks.
In order to sort out these effects, STW rates were calculated for six
major occupation groups within the seven major industries (results not
reported). Within each industry group, the more highly skilled management and professional occupations have the lowest rates of STW,
which is consistent with firms wanting to protect investment in specific
human capital. The clerical/administrative support occupation also has
very low rates of STW, though always higher than managers. This
probably reflects the fact that they embody less firm-specific human
capital, yet work side-by-side with management, and so are slightly
shielded from STW because of the direct support role they play to
those workers least likely to be subject to STW.
The highest rates of STW within each industry are among the
skilled and semiskilled laborers. The higher overall rate for laborers as
a group, relative to white-collar workers, probably reflects both differences in production technology and levels of specific human capital. In
particular, the higher rate of STW for semiskilled laborers compared to
skilled laborers is probably due to their lower levels of skill.
STW rates tend to be comparable for the same occupation in different industries (for example, the STW rate for managers is similar
across industries). However, the most cyclical industries exhibit the
highest rates of STW for almost all occupations. For example, clerical/
administrative support workers in construction have higher rates of
STW than their counterparts in services, and the same holds for each of
the other occupations within these two industries. The same is true for
nondurable manufacturing compared to services. However, the pattern
is less evident for durable manufacturing versus services.
These patterns suggest any expansion of existing STC programs
should produce the greatest STC incidence in cyclical industries such
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as construction and nondurable manufacturing. Moreover, semiskilled
laborers, skilled laborers, and, to a lesser extent, sales-related occupations should also have relatively high rates of STC usage, regardless of
the industry of employment. Obviously, analyses such as these are
only a crude first step at predicting STC take-up rates. A definitive
answer to the effects of STC at the firm level requires firm-level data
such as that used in the Mathematica evaluations (Kerachsky et al.
1985; Needels and Nicholson 1996). Yet STC predictions using CPS
data and techniques such as those in this study should serve as a useful
guide for researchers wishing to do more accurate analyses of the
impact of STC than have been done to date.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study has documented short-time work patterns in the United
States for 1968–1993. Despite very low STC take-up rates, STW is a
prevalent phenomenon. The STW rate ranges from approximately 50
to 70 percent of the layoff rate.
The primary impact of STC program expansion most likely would
be to subsidize those workers and firms that already use STW. The
important implication of this is that vast numbers of workers could be
put on the STC roles, thereby providing “evidence” that the programs
were successful at averting layoffs, without impacting the incidence of
layoffs at all. The key to determining the impact of STC program
expansion on layoffs is not to count the number of people on STC
alone, nor even to compare the number on STC relative to the number
on layoff. Rather, layoff and STW rates—in terms of both workers and
total hours—under STC must be compared to what they would have
been in the absence of STC.
If the subsidy to STC is relatively large, additional workers will be
put on STW relative to what would have happened otherwise, with a
less than equal decrease in adjustment through layoffs. For example, if
STC leads to 100 “additional” hours of STW, layoffs may be reduced
by only 50 hours, with the additional 50 hours accounted for by an
overadjustment through STW. The latter means a much greater distri-
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bution of the brunt of hours reduction across the workforce than is necessary.
In an era of tight budgets and reduced social welfare spending, this
is a significant issue. The degree of imperfect experience rating of
STC benefits is comparable to that for UI benefits. The extensive literature on excessive use of UI due to this subsidy suggests that widespread introduction and expansion of STC programs will lead to
similar overuse of STC. Whether imperfect experience rating of both
UI and STC benefits leads to a relatively greater overuse of layoffs, of
STW, or of both is an empirical question. However, the overall net
public subsidy to these two channels—layoffs and STW—would
ensure an excessive impact of demand shocks on the existing pool of
workers.
Unfortunately, the existing STC programs probably are too limited
in scope to satisfactorily quantify the impact of the current STC system
on employment versus hours adjustment in the United States. However, existing patterns of STW can be used to provide baseline estimates in future STC evaluations to determine that tradeoff. Similarly,
differences in the relative subsidy to layoffs between states could be
used to analyze how imperfect experience rating affects firms’ choice
of layoffs versus short-time work. Increased experience rating for regular unemployment insurance alone (as advocated by Hamermesh
1978, and Burdett and Wright 1989) may be sufficient to significantly
tip the scales in favor of STW over layoffs, negating one of the primary
arguments currently used by advocates for STC expansion.

Notes
I would like to thank Karen Needels for many helpful discussions, and Steve Davis,
John Haltiwanger, Susan Houseman, David Gray, and seminar participants at the
Milken Institute for helpful comments. Gina Franco provided outstanding research
support. Financial support from the Canadian Employment Research Forum is graciously acknowledged. All errors are my own.
1. STC is frequently called “shared work” or “worksharing” by both researchers
(Bednarzik 1980; Meltz and Reid 1983; Vasche 1982) and state UI agencies in the
United States (National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers’ Compensation 1996, p. 58). However, shared work is more commonly used to
refer to permanent reductions in average hours per worker (Calmfors 1985;
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Fitzroy 1981; Calmfors and Hoel 1989; Hart 1984; Riechel 1986), which is distinct from temporary reductions that are funded by partial UI benefits. The STC
name is used exclusively in this chapter because it has no alternative interpretations.
Illinois discontinued its program in 1988 (Vroman 1990).
These figures have been adjusted for the bias in the pre-1994 Current Population
Survey measures of STW and layoffs, detailed in the text.
In particular, no indication was given that the contracts were drawn from a representative sample.
Differences in overtime pay rules and related societal conventions may be particularly important unexplained factors not accounted for by Abraham and Houseman
and by Van Audenrode. Their analyses treat increases and decreases in labor
usage symmetrically, with no metric for measuring the difference between usual
hours and actual hours worked. Thus much of cross-country differences and similarities that they measure may be identified by deviations above, not below, usual
hours worked.
See note 5.
Bednarzik does not include workers on layoff when calculating the STW rate.
Consequently, the rates reported here are not directly comparable to those in his
study.
This was done by regressing usual hours on a host of demographic variables (race,
marital status, age, education) and industry and occupation dummies separately
for men and women for each year.
The seasonal pattern of STW in construction underscores the concern of STC program administrators that STC not be used to subsidize seasonal employment.
However, despite this concern it is not clear whether existing STC guidelines are
sufficient to prevent abuse by firms that experience predictable seasonal employment changes.
This estimate is perfectly accurate only if STW workers’ mean usual hours are the
same as non-STW workers’ mean usual hours. This is probably a good approximation.
Illinois is not included in the Table 4 text because its program has been discontinued. However, Illinois is included as one of the STC states in all calculations
because it did have an STC program during 1979–1993.
Note that the group of STC states includes observations for years in which some
of the included states did not have an STC program (such as Kansas for 1979–
1988 and Washington for 1979–1982).
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11
Economic Activities
and the Demand for
Work Sharing in Canada
Tom Siedule
Human Resources
Development Canada
Carol Guest
Human Resources
Development Canada
Ging Wong
Privy Council Office, Government of Canada

Work sharing refers to work-time arrangements in which all members of a work group reduce their hours of work to prevent the layoff of
some members of the group. The reduction in working time and the
associated reduction in income are thus redistributed over the entire
work unit, rather than being concentrated on a few workers. In Canada
this arrangement is formalized as the work sharing program under the
authority of the Unemployment Insurance Act. Canadian work sharing
was introduced as a pilot program in 1977 and was modeled on similar
programs in effect in Europe. In 1981, in response to growing numbers
of layoffs, the program was fully implemented and has been available
since that time.
The work sharing program is based on the premise that it is better
to keep workers employed than to have them experience a period of
unemployment. Thus, its main objective is to maintain local, regional,
and industrial employment levels during periods of short-term adverse
economic conditions. Work sharing also has secondary objectives for
both firms and employees. For firms, the program aims to assist them
in retaining intact their skilled workforces and to help them avoid the
costs associated with temporary layoffs such as recruiting and training
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new employees. For employees, the program aims to improve the level
of income for workers who would otherwise be laid off and to assist
workers in maintaining their skill levels and work motivation and
reducing dislocation and uncertainty.
Under a work sharing agreement, layoffs are averted or postponed
by reducing the workweek of employees in the designated core work
group. An employer who intended to lay off 20 percent of employees
for three months may use work sharing to reduce working hours of all
employees by 20 percent over the same three-month period. Lost
wages due to reductions of regular working hours are partially compensated by unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Approximately 60
percent of lost wages are covered by UI benefits, charged to the UI
Account. A UI-approved work sharing agreement is made between
three parties: management, a majority of the affected workers, and
Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC). Workers who apply
for UI under work sharing do not have to serve the usual two-week
waiting period for benefits. Employers must maintain fringe benefits
for the duration of the work sharing agreement. Work sharing agreements may last for 26 weeks and may be extended to 38 weeks under
special circumstances. A major evaluation of the program was completed in 1993, covering the years 1989 and 1990. The evaluation
examined a sample of firms that used work sharing. Comparison firms
were pre-screened and included in the sample if they had seriously
considered laying off at least 20 percent of the members of one of their
business units due to adverse economic circumstances. This procedure
identified a sample of comparison firms who met the work sharing eligibility criteria but did not participate in work sharing.
The evaluation found that work sharing clearly avoids layoffs.
However, in some cases layoffs may have been avoided without the
work sharing program. Analysis of comparison firms showed that 7
percent of these firms did not lay off any employees. Further, in 29
percent of the work sharing cases, layoffs which should have been
avoided by the program were merely postponed by the program, as
these employees were laid off in the six months following program participation. Of these layoffs, 75 percent were of a permanent nature.
Thus, in total, 64 percent of the layoffs that should have been averted
by participation in work sharing can be said to have been avoided as a
result of the program. Comparison with the 1984 evaluation of the
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same program found that the program was somewhat less successful in
avoiding layoffs in 1989–1990 than it was in 1983.
The evaluation also found significant benefits of work sharing participation for workers. Participants who would have most likely suffered a layoff did much better than their comparison group counterparts who were laid off, experiencing a 19 percent reduction in income
versus a 47 percent reduction of the layoff group. The work sharing
group displayed much higher levels of morale, better attitudes to work
and management, better social relations, and better physical and psychological health vis à vis those in the layoff situation.
Firms also experienced benefits from work sharing participation.
They maintained the work sharing unit intact and expended $800–
$1,800 less per layoff equivalent than comparison employers. They
also returned to full production sooner than firms that laid off employees. However, there was no longer-term profitability or productivity
advantage for these firms. This may suggest that work sharing is an
appropriate tool to help firms deal with cyclical fluctuations in demand,
but not for those firms facing fundamental, structural changes.
Work sharing was found to be more expensive for the UI fund than
the layoff alternative. Costs were 33 percent higher for work sharing
due to three factors: the waiver of the two-week UI waiting period for
work sharers, the fact that 30 percent of layoffs never collected UI, and
the incidence of layoffs in the post–work sharing period.1 However, to
balance these additional costs, there were also significant social benefits. The evaluation estimated that work sharing helped avoid costs
related to the stress of unemployment, avoidance of costs related to
unemployment scarring, and financial benefits to participating firms.
Overall, the evaluation estimates a benefit-to-cost ratio of about 2.6:1.
While the 1993 evaluation answered many of the questions about
the program, it did not examine the relationship between the potential
demand for work sharing and economic conditions. For example, if
the unemployment rates in the late 1980s were higher than the historical rates, what would have happened to the demand for UI-subsidized
work sharing? What would have been the associated cost? Could the
UI fund of the late 1980s have absorbed the additional cost?
This chapter concludes that the demand for work sharing is indeed
sensitive to changes in economic activities. If the total unemployment
rates were 1.37–1.50 percentage points higher in 1988–1990, then the
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demand for work sharing participation would have been 9 percentage
points higher than it actually was in 1990. The estimated cost for the
additional demand is $13.7 million. In relative terms, the worsening of
economic conditions would have increased work sharing’s share of
total UI program expenditure in 1990 from 0.43 percent (actual) to
0.53 percent. Obviously, within a reasonable range of demand shocks,
any increased demand for work sharing would have been too small to
create a serious financing problem for the UI account.

THE LIKELIHOOD OF PARTICIPATION IN THE
WORK SHARING PROGRAM
From our recent survey of the existing literature on work sharing,
we have learned that the theoretical development in this field is primarily concerned with work sharing’s effectiveness as a policy measure
for alleviating the unemployment problem during recession.2 In most
of the theoretical discussions, the demand for work sharing has been
taken as an inevitable phenomenon: during an economic downturn,
some firms prefer to use work sharing to layoffs as an adjustment
mechanism. Thus, other than relating demand for work sharing to
business fluctuation, the existing literature is not very helpful in providing theoretical guidelines for specifying the demand for work sharing equation. In Canada, this problem is further complicated by the
lack of useful time series for a comprehensive empirical investigation
on this topic. Although the administrative files contain some aggregate
time series on the number of work sharing applications approved, number of individuals in the program, and program expenditures, they have
hardly any information on the behavior and characteristics of work
sharing participating and nonparticipating firms. Thus, the idea of
deriving a demand for work sharing equation from existing theories
and estimating it directly from available data do not presently seem to
be a feasible approach.
Recognizing the problems mentioned above, the quantitative work
of this study circumvents the difficulty by working mainly with the
cross-sectional data collected for Employment and Immigration Canada’s 1993 evaluation.3 Because these data have certain limitations, a
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specific methodology has to be developed to deal with them. The
quantitative work includes four related components:
1) estimating a logistic equation that describes a firm’s probability
of participating in the work sharing program,
2) creating a relatively depressed scenario for the late 1980s (1987–
1990) from a full-system econometric model simulation,
3) calculating the number of firms that would have become work
sharing participants in the more depressed scenario, and
4) calculating the cost of the additional demand and its impact on
the UI account.
The Logistic (Program Participation) Equation as a
Demand Function
This study uses a logistic equation to estimate the probability of a
typical firm that would participate in the work sharing program in 1990.
The microdata are primarily from a special survey that Employment
and Immigration Canada (EIC) used to conduct its 1993 evaluation on
the work sharing program. The data consist of 310 participating and
256 nonparticipating firms in 1990.4 The participating employer sample
was selected from an administrative file that contained the names of
work sharing firms during 1990. Members of the comparison group
sample were selected from the EIC Record of Employment file; these
firms were selected on the basis of their comparability to work sharing
firms in characteristics and activity experience5 (e.g., members of the
comparison group must have laid off workers in 1990). In carrying out
the econometric estimation, the procedure requires full information (no
missing data points) for the dependent and independent variables.
Because of missing values for selected variables, 43 firms have to be
excluded from the sample. Thus, the final econometric estimation is
based on the information from 289 participating firms and 234 members of the group of comparable employers.
Ideally output or sales data for periods immediately prior to the
firm’s applying for work sharing participation (program participants)
or laying off workers (members of the comparison group) should be
used as a measure of the firm’s business fluctuation. Unfortunately, the
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survey was not designed to deal with the demand issue and did not collect any output or sales data. This forces us to search for a suitable
proxy. The proxy used is the unemployment rate of the UI region
where the firm is located. This variable is chosen for two reasons.
First, even though the UI regional unemployment rate, by definition,
cannot claim to be a unique economic activity indicator of the firm, it is
specific to the economic climate where the firm operates. Second, the
time series for this variable is available. The data are from Statistics
Canada’s Labour Force Survey unpublished worksheets. We have the
UI region data on labor force, employment, unemployment, and unemployment rate dating back to 1979. The availability of these time series
is operationally very important because it allows us to introduce a
dynamic element into the specification of the equation specification
(see the discussion below).
Even if one accepts the UI regional unemployment rate as a reasonable proxy for approximating economic downturns, proper timing
and functional form remain crucial to the specification of the probability of program participation equation. First, using the regional unemployment rate of 1990 as an explanatory variable would present a
serious technical problem. In 1990, the participating firms were
already in the work sharing program. If the program was effective in
lowering unemployment, then the UI regional unemployment rate of
1990 would also be dependent upon the extent of program participation
within the UI region. This simultaneity bias presents an interpretation
problem because the estimated equation would have mixed the program’s effects on regional unemployment with the influence of economic activities on the demand for work sharing. Second, if a firm
uses UI-subsidized work sharing as an adjustment mechanism for the
decline in the demand for its products, then the proxy variable should
probably be in the first difference form rather than level form. This line
of reasoning suggests that the proper variable for explaining a firm’s
probability for program participation should be the change in the
unemployment experience of the UI region prior to the firm’s decision
to join (or not to join) the work sharing program.6 This specification
would not have been operational if the time series for the UI regional
unemployment rate is not available. Symbolically, the specification for
the program participation equation may be summarized as follows: the
probability of firm i participating in the work sharing program is
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Probabilityi = f(∆URATEi,t – 1, Xi,t).
∆URATEi,t – 1 = URATEi,t – 1 – URATEi,t – 2, URATEi denotes the unemployment rate of the UI region where firm i is located, t refers to the
current period, and t – 1 the period prior to participating in the work
sharing program. Xi represents a vector of firm specific attributes,
including the average skill rating of the firm’s employees, percentage
of employees unionized, organization structure (whether the firm operated at one single location, multiple locations in one province, multiple
locations across Canada, or multiple locations internationally), the
firm’s industrial affiliation, the firm’s years of operation, etc.
The logistic equation, when estimated, serves certain purposes.
First, it tests the hypothesis that the demand for work sharing depends
on changes in economic activities. If the estimated coefficient for the
∆URATEi, t – 1 variable is positive and statistically significant, it would
confirm that more firms would like to become program participants as
the economic climate worsens. Second, it provides the reader with
some information on which other exogenous forces influence a firm’s
program participation decision. Third, the estimated equation provides
us a means of calculating a firm’s probability of participating in the
work sharing program under various unemployment conditions. This
last function is crucial to the theme of this study and will later become
apparent. The estimated coefficients and essential statistics are shown
in Table 1.
In addition to the explanatory variables listed above, earlier versions of the estimated equation also included type of organizations
(private sector, public or nonprofit organizations), number of full-time
workers employed by the firm, and provincial dummies on the righthand side of the equation. They were subsequently dropped for various
reasons. The effects of provincial differences were conceptually and
empirically reflected in the recent changes in the UI region unemployment rate variable.7 Therefore, it was not necessary to include provincial dummies as additional explanatory variables. The other variables
were excluded because they were statistically insignificant and their
exclusion did not noticeably affect the estimated coefficients of the
other explanatory variables.
Although our main interest is in the “recent changes in the UI
region unemployment rate” variable, the estimated coefficients of other
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Table 1 Estimated Logistic Equation
Dependent variable: employer program participation (1=Yes, 0=No)
Number of firms included in the analysis: 523
–2Log likelihood

651.791

Goodness of fit

525.196
X2

df

Significance

67.446

12

0.0000

67.446

12

0.0000

Coefficient

Standard
error

Wald

Significance

Employee’s average skill rating

0.2122

0.0710

8.9247

0.0028

Recent change in the UI region
unemployment rate

0.2777

0.1370

4.1089

0.0427

Single location

0.2517

0.2907

0.7499

0.3865

Multiple (across Canada)

0.0630

0.4005

0.0247

0.8750

Multiple (international)

–1.1829

0.5089

5.4041

0.0201

Multiple (one province)

0.0000
0.5581

2.9682

0.0849

Model

X2

Improvement
Variable

Organization operations

Type of industry
Primary
Heavy manufacturing

–0.9615
0.1080

0.2558

0.1784

0.6728

–1.3049

0.3497

13.9260

0.0002

Trade

0.4674

0.2830

2.7285

0.0986

Other

0.4110

0.3381

1.4778

0.2241

–0.0036

0.0019

3.5111

0.0610

0.0079

0.0046

2.9362

0.0866

–0.9074

0.4469

4.1226

0.0423

Construction

Light manufacturing
Percentage of employees
unionized
Years of operation
Constant

0.0000
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explanatory variables are also of some relevance. Since the estimated
coefficients of the logistic equation cannot directly tell us the effects of
the explanatory variables on a firm’s probability of program participation, as an illustrative example we have calculated the possible impact
of each explanatory variable on participation probability by holding all
other explanatory variables constant at specific values. Appendix A
reports the results.
“Employee’s average skill rating” significantly influences a firm’s
probability of using the work sharing program.8 All other things being
equal, a firm with many highly skilled workers tends to use the UI-subsidized work sharing as the demand adjustment mechanism more often
than firms that employ a relatively large number of unskilled workers.
This is consistent with the notion that the option of work sharing participation rests mostly with employers. It is the cost-minimization conditions that determine this behavior: Laid-off workers of relatively high
skills are more likely not available for subsequent rehiring when the
firm’s business starts to pick up; training new workers to fill these positions would be a relatively costly option to the firm.
The age of a firm’s establishment (in terms of their years of operation) also seems to have a positive influence on the firm’s program participation decision, but this result is not statistically persuasive. (The
estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level
but not at the 5 percent level.) How long the firm has been in business
should not greatly affect its present profit-maximization (or cost-minimization) conditions. Thus, the estimated coefficient of this variable is
meaningful only if it is an approximation of the firm’s outlook of future
business prospect. In other words, a more established firm tends to be
more optimistic of its future than the relatively new companies. Therefore, it is more willing to use work sharing to maintain its labor force
during business slow-downs. The unionization of workers exerts a
negative influence on the firm’s participation probability. The statistical result, however, is not as strong as expected. While most of the
local unions prefer work sharing to worker layoffs during economic
downturns, very few centralized unions endorse the work sharing
option because it erodes the seniority principle. These two opposite
forces are probably sufficient to prevent this variable from becoming
statistically very strong. The organization and industry dummies
present a mixed bag of results. Some are highly significant and some
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are not significant at all. As a principle, we keep all of them in the estimated equation, even though dropping the insignificant dummies
would not have noticeably affected the rest of the estimated coefficients.
The estimated coefficient for the “recent change in the UI region
unemployment rate” variable is 0.2777 and is statistically significant at
the 4 percent level. Although the estimated coefficient corresponds to
the dependent variable in a log (odds) form 9 and therefore cannot
directly tell us the impact of this variable on the probability of program
participation, the positive coefficient confirms our a priori expectation.
Later in this section we will provide some impact estimates based on
the estimated equation and simulation techniques.
Different Economic Scenarios, 1987–1990
The logistic equation by itself is still not capable of answering the
questions posed in the introductory section of this paper. For example,
the estimated logistic equation would show that if the expansion phase
of the business cycle of the 1980s ended earlier than it did, more firms
would probably have wanted to join the work sharing program. This
does not give us a quantitative estimate of the size of the additional
demand that could have resulted from a more depressed economic climate in the late 1980s. Apparently, one cannot obtain such a quantitative estimate without specifying the deterioration of economic
activities in quantitative terms. The simplest way to meet this information requirement is to assume that the total unemployment rates in the
late 1980s were higher than their historical counterparts by certain percentage points. These figures can then be distributed proportionally to
the UI regions to yield a set of hypothetical UI regional unemployment
rates, which can in turn be fed into the logistic equation for further
investigation. In this study, we prefer a more plausible hypothetical
scenario than the arbitrarily assumed one. The hypothetical (more
depressed) scenario used in this study is from the solution of a full-system econometric model,10 in which Canadian exports, including automobiles and parts but excluding other manufactured goods and mining
products,11 in 1987–1990 were assumed to be 10 percent less than they
actually were historically (see Figure 1). In this hypothetical setting,
because of the decline in aggregate demand resulting from the assumed
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Figure 1 Canadian Exports, 1987–1990

drop in exports, more individuals were expected to become unemployed. The additional unemployed individuals can then be distributed
to the UI regions according to their labor force shares. From these new
unemployment figures we may calculate the UI regional unemployment rates for the hypothetical scenario.
The end result is that, in the hypothetical scenario, more individuals would have been unemployed and the impacts on the total unemployment rates were noticeable (0.70, 1.37, 1.49, and 1.50 percentage
points higher than the historical figures in 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990,
respectively). The unemployment rates for the actual and hypothetical
scenarios are graphically presented in Figure 2.12 Furthermore, we
have distributed the additional unemployed individuals (not shown
here but available in the solutions of the model simulations) of the
hypothetical scenario across 49 UI regions, according to the labor
shares of the UI regions, and recalculated the UI regional unemployment rates for the more depressed (hypothetical) scenario.
Although this macrosimulation is not essential to the quantitative
work of this study, we have decided to use it. The model solution generates a reasonably realistic but more depressed economy than the
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Figure 2 The Unemployment Rate, 1987–1990

actual experience of 1987–1990. It also illustrates that exogenous
forces could have easily ended the expansion phase of the 1980s business cycle much earlier than it did.
Expected Number of Participating Firms under
Different Economic Scenarios
The estimated logistic equation, the actual UI regional unemployment rates, and the UI regional unemployment rates for the hypothetical scenario provide us with the required tools and information for
calculating the probability of program participation for each firm for
two scenarios (base-case and the hypothetical). First, for the base-case,
we obtain a set of probability estimates for all firms (including participants and members of the comparison group) by inserting the actual
values of all explanatory variables into the unscrambled logistic equation.13 Similarly, for the hypothetical scenario, by replacing the actual
UI regional unemployment rates with their hypothetical counterparts
while keeping the actual values of other explanatory variables
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unchanged, we may calculate a set of estimates for the firms’ chances
of participating in the work sharing program under the more depressed
economic climate. The first set of estimated figures shows each firm’s
probability of participation, with the values of all explanatory variables
identical to their actual (historical) values. This may be labelled as the
base-case probability. The second set is similar to the first, except that
the calculation replaces the actual UI regional unemployment rates
with the hypothetical scenario’s UI regional unemployment rates. In
other words, the second set shows each firm’s probability of participation under the more depressed economic conditions of the hypothetical
scenario, while holding all other things constant.
The estimated probability provides us with the information concerning a firm’s chance of becoming a program participant, but it still
does not tell us whether or not the firm would indeed be in the program. After all, even a firm with a probability of 90 percent participation still has a slim chance of not being a participant. In this study we
use the random-draw simulation technique to determine whether a firm
is in or out of the work sharing program. The procedure is identical to
drawing a “chip” randomly from a hat. For example, the participation
probability for a certain firm was usually 70 percent (the base-case),
but under the more depressed economic climate of the hypothetical
scenario its probability increased to 71 percent in 1990. To determine
whether or not this firm would become a program participant in the
base-case and in the hypothetical scenario, we create two separate hats.
The first hat would have 70 chips marked “in” and 30 marked “out,”
while the second hat would have 71 chips marked “in” and 29 chips
marked “out” to reflect its slightly higher probability of program participation. We would then randomly draw one chip from each of the
hats and record the results of the random draws. Repeat the same procedures for all firms in the sample. The difference between the total
numbers of “in” firms in the two scenarios (base-case and hypothetical)
would be taken as the estimated impacts of the more depressed economic climate on the demand for work sharing. This is, however, only
the result of one random-draw experiment. The results in Table 2 are
the averages of 10 experiments.14
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Table 2 Results of Random-Draw Simulations (based on a sample
of 523 firms)
Total number of
participating firms
(base-case)

Total number of
participating firms
(hypothetical)

Difference
(hypothetical/base-case)

277

302

25

The simulated figure for the base-case underestimates the actual
number of participants in 1990 by 12 firms (an error of 4 percent).
Since the estimated logistic equation cannot be expected to predict the
probability of participation perfectly and the random-draw experiments
have been conducted only 10 times, the goodness of fit appears to be
acceptably close.
The simulation results suggest that under the influence of a worse
economic climate, as specified by the hypothetical scenario, the
demand for work sharing participation would have been 9 percentage
points higher than it was in 1990. Since the results reported are based
on a sample of 289 participating and 234 nonparticipating firms, we
have to mark up the total number of participating firms (work sharing
applications approved) in 1990 by 9 percent to yield an estimate of participating firms for the total economy; that is,
hypothetical scenario: number of participating firms, total
economy, 1990 = 6,297 × (1 + 0.09) = 6,873,
where 6,297 is the actual total number of work sharing applications
approved in 1990. In other words, the more depressed economic climate of the hypothetical scenario would have induced 576 more firms
to participate in the work sharing program in 1990. This estimate
should, however, be taken as an illustrative example rather than a definitive answer. First, aside from the imperfection of the econometric and
simulation techniques, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample size and the data were not originally collected to test the sensitivity
of work sharing demand to economic activity fluctuation. In the future,
evaluators should probably take the demand dimension as an integral
part of the evaluation framework and revisit this topic. Second, the
estimate depends directly on the degree of activity slowdowns created
by the macromodel simulation. The deterioration outlined in the hypo-
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thetical economy is only one of the many plausible scenarios. A different hypothetical scenario would, of course, yield different results.

ASSOCIATED COSTS, IMPACTS ON THE UI ACCOUNT,
AND IMPLICATIONS
There are at least three remaining questions that we should attempt
to answer: 1) What is the cost of the additional demand for work sharing? 2) What is its impact on the UI Account? 3) How would the government have reacted to the additional applications for the work
sharing program?
Costs and Impacts on the UI Account
From the administrative data, we know that a participating firm in
1990 cost the government an average of $9,798.15 However, this would
be, a priori, a downward biased estimate for calculating the associated
costs for our purposes. It fails to account for the additional utilization
of work sharing among firms already in the work sharing program
when unemployment increases. The available data do not allow us to
calculate this downward bias accurately. In this study, we use the 1990
administrative data to approximate the relationship between UI
regional work sharing expenditure and the UI regional unemployment
rate (weighted by the region’s employment share). The estimated
equation suggests that the average cost for a participating firm would
have been about 11.9 percent higher than the actual average cost in the
hypothetical scenario.16 Based on this information, we may approximate the cost of the additional demand for program participation in the
hypothetical scenario as follows:
(i) Estimated cost of additional demand = increased cost for firms
already in the work sharing program in 1990 + cost for financing
576 additional participating firms resulting from the worsening of
economic conditions in the hypothetical scenario
($9,798 × 0.119 × 6,297) + ($9,798 × 1.119 × 576)
= $13.66 million.
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(ii) Actual work sharing program expenditure in 1990 = $61.7 million.
(iii) Total UI expenditure in 1990 = $14,355 million.
Ratio A = 100 × (i)/(iii) = 0.095%.
Ratio B = 100 × (ii)/(iii) = 0.429%
Ratio C = 100 × [(i)+(ii)]/(iii) = 0.525%.
In 1990, the total Unemployment Insurance Developmental Uses
(UIDU) were substantially below the maximum of 15 percent allowed
by law (Bill C-21). Work sharing expenditure in this year accounted
for less than 18 percent of the total UIDU expenditure. These statistics, along with the fact that work sharing was a relatively small program option,17 suggest that the government could have easily absorbed
the additional demand for work sharing of the hypothetical scenario by
a minor reallocation of UI funds while keeping the total UI program
expenditure of 1990 unchanged.
Government’s Response to the Demand for Work Sharing
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the unemployment rate
and work sharing applications approved. The correlation between
them is positive but statistically insignificant. (The simple correlation
coefficient for the variables equals 0.53, which is not even statistically
significant at the 10 percent level.18) Figure 4 presents the graph for the
change in the unemployment rate19 and work sharing applications
approved. It becomes obvious that the two variables are closely correlated with each other. The simple correlation coefficient is 0.90, which
is statistically highly significant. As contended earlier, firms’ demand
for work sharing is related to the change in economic activities rather
than the level of activities. In this examination of the aggregate time
series, we have found other indirect, circumstantial evidence to support
this contention.
If the “work sharing applications approved” series is interpreted as
the locus of the equilibrium points between the demand for and supply
of work sharing with the government adopting a 100 percent accommodative policy,20 then the data should reflect the demand and supply
information equally well. The existing data seem to suggest that government’s policy has been quite “accommodative.” In 1982–1983, the
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average change in the unemployment rate was 2.18 percent; the average number of applications approved was 8,009 per annum. From
1984 through 1989, a period of uninterrupted economic expansion, the
average change in the unemployment rate was –0.733 percent, and the
annual average of applications approved declined to 2,573 firms. In
1990–1991, the change in the unemployment rate became positive
again (the average change was 1.42 percent), and the number of work
sharing applications climbed to 8,613 per annum. This sensitivity to
changes in the unemployment rate suggests that had the economic climate in the late 1980s become worse than it actually was, the government could have probably absorbed the additional demand.
Reid and Meltz (1983) and Pal (1983) note that the Canadian government’s interest in work sharing has risen and fallen with changes in
the unemployment rate. They argue that instead of implementing policy on the basis of careful long-run planning, the use of the program as
an ad hoc response to the crisis of rising unemployment obviously
leaves a lot to be desired. Their observation on the sensitivity of work
sharing applications approved to changes in the unemployment rate has
been quite accurate. In recent years, the sensitivity seems even higher.
However, their criticism of the government’s accommodative approach
may have been too harsh. One would expect that the work sharing program, especially work sharing as a passive policy measure,21 should
always be responsive to the demand of firms. Whether or not the program could have played a more active role in the Canadian labor market is a moot question. Not only has France’s experience of using work
sharing as an active policy (job creation) not been convincingly successful, the relatively small size of the Canadian work sharing program
does not suggest that it has the potential of creating a large number of
jobs. Given the existing fiscal stance of the government, expanding the
program for the sake of testing out the effectiveness of work sharing as
a job creation policy must be rated as one of the most unlikely events in
the foreseeable future.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In the last decade in North America, corporate restructuring has
imposed some alternatives to conventional working time arrangements.
The increased use of nonstandard forms of work, including part-time,
contract, and outsourcing, is associated with such restructuring in the
context of competitive cost reduction. At the same time, the Canadian
unemployment rate increased dramatically to a 9.5 percent average in
the 1980s and the 1990s.
Policy responses to the growth of nonstandard work are now just
emerging, starting with the changes in the Canadian employment insurance scheme to make eligibility for benefits based on hours, not weeks.
An hours-based system better reflects current work patterns, particularly the rise in part-time and multiple job hours.
The other major insurance policy response is the work sharing program, which, in its current design, is clearly a countercyclical measure
to enable firms to hoard labor or for workers to share unemployment
during downturns. In its design, the program is not available to subsidize corporate restructuring. Two formal evaluations of this program
have shown that work sharing does make a difference in averting layoffs, and, despite being more expensive to the UI account than straight
layoff benefits, the economic and social benefits accruing to participating firms and workers more than offset the program costs. This chapter
extends the evaluation work by looking specifically at the relationship
between changes in economic activities and the demand for work sharing.
To examine this relationship, this study uses microsimulation as
well as macrosimulation techniques. In a full-system macrosimulation,
a 10 percent reduction of Canadian exports of nonmanufacturing/nonmining products and exports of automobiles and auto parts in 1987–
1990 would result in a 1.5 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate by 1990. This change in declining economic activity would
increase work sharing participation by 9 percent, at a cost of an additional $13.66 million in 1990 to a $14.35 billion UI account for that
year. Within the existing legislative and regulatory framework, such an
increased demand of work sharing could easily have been absorbed.
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The 1993 evaluation results suggest that the additional expenditures
could have been cost-effective as well.
This finding, of course, is relevant to the program as it currently
operates. It sheds little light on how work sharing might be extended
under current rules or how it might be used in an aggressive redesign of
working time or under different rules for active job creation purposes.
Suggestions have been made by both policymakers and academics that
work sharing agreements might reduce UI premiums to firms that create and finance new jobs to compensate for the reduction in working
time of designated employees. Under these circumstances, work sharing may create job opportunities for youth and other unemployed
groups back-filling designated positions. This chapter does not address
this policy debate directly. What it shows clearly is that work sharing
is sensitive to the change rather than the level of economic activity, and
that the probability of work sharing participation is higher among firms
with higher-level skilled workforces.
Job creation stimulation is more common at the entry skills level.
This suggests that the present program is limited in its potential as a
job creation initiative. Even if work sharing is a good investment, as
the evaluation results show, the cost of providing it to all potential layoff situations may be prohibitive. This chapter shows that an increased
demand for work sharing can be accommodated as a relatively small
program option under UIDU. In the current fiscal environment, it is
difficult to imagine a proactive use of work sharing as a job creation
mechanism without finding new monies or at least reprofiling UIDU
expenditures at the expense of the other two major UIDU activities:
UI-sponsored training and job creation partnerships. Finally, this chapter raises some questions about the appropriateness of work sharing as
a job creation stimulus directed at firms that are primarily interested in
maintaining a skilled workforce. Policymakers would need to take this
present feature of work sharing participation into consideration if they
were to redesign work sharing as both a job maintenance and job creation program. Before embarking upon this, however, it would be
instructive to study more closely the work sharing experience in France
in the 1980s and the reasons why the program reverted back from a job
creation initiative to an employment maintenance scheme.
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Notes
We are grateful to Garnett Picot of Statistics Canada and Wayne Vroman of Urban
Institute for their comments on various aspects of the work contained here. All errors
and omissions remain, of course, our responsibility.
1. The 1993 evaluation study might have overlooked two other factors that could
have contributed to the comparatively high cost of the work sharing program.
First, relative to the layoff option, work sharing tended to include a higher share
of senior workers. Since earnings and seniority are positively correlated, the average work sharing benefit would be higher than the average regular UI benefit.
Second, work sharing would be more expensive than regular UI payments if the
layoff conversion ratio was less than unity, i.e., the increase in work sharing
weeks exceeded the decrease in layoff weeks.
2. See, for example, MaCoy and Morand (1984), and Owen (1989).
3. See Employment and Immigration Canada (1993).
4. The survey also contains information for the year 1989. Because of the time constraint, we have decided not to duplicate the empirical work for 1989. In the early
stages of an economic downturn, firms are not sure whether dismissals and longterm layoffs are necessary; their demand for work sharing may be different from
those at different points of the business cycle. Future work on this topic should
probably investigate the sensitivity of work sharing demand at different points of
the business cycle as well.
5. For a detailed description of survey design and characteristics of participating
firms and members of the comparison group, see Employment and Immigration
Canada (1993).
6. Empirically, when the level of regional unemployment rate enters the right-hand
side of the equation, the coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. On
the other hand, the first difference of the regional unemployment rate is statistically significant, and the result seems quite robust. The inclusion or exclusion of
other explanatory variables in the specification does not significantly alter the
result.
7. This variable is defined as (URATEi,1989 – URATEi,1988); URATEi denotes the
unemployment rate of the UI region where firm i is located, and the second subscript refers to a specific year. When the variable is expressed in terms of relative
change, [i.e., (URATEi,1989 – URATEi,1988)/URATEi,1988], the estimated coefficient remains positive but the statistical result is substantially weakened. It is statistically different from zero only at the 12.6 percent level. The statistical results
for the other estimated coefficients remain basically the same. This finding suggests that workers and employers take the absolute change in the unemployment
rate as a change in economic conditions, but they are probably unfamiliar with the
concept of the relative change in the unemployment rate.
8. In the survey, the employer was asked to rate the firm’s employees’ literary skills,
numeracy skills, and technological literacy separately, with a rating of 1 denoting
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9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Siedule, Guest, and Wong

extremely low in the category, 4 average, and 7 extremely high. The variable used
in the logistic regression equation is the average of the three skill variables.
That is, ln [p/(1 – p)], where p denotes the probability of work sharing participation.
The econometric model consists of about 300 behavioral equations and identities.
It is a modified and extended version of the Conference Board’s PC–Canadian
Model (PCCDN). See Conference Board of Canada (1989).
The exports of other manufacturing goods and mining products are endogenously
determined in the full-system econometric model.
The difference between the base-case and the hypothetical scenario represents the
impact of the assumption on total Canadian exports. In this report, for the sake of
simplification and interpretation convenience, we add this difference to the actual
data of the variable in question. This procedure allows us to compare the hypothetical scenario figures directly to the historical data in level form.
The dependent variable for the estimated logistic equation is in the form of ln[p/(1
– p)], where p denotes the probability of program participation. Feeding the values of the explanatory variables directly into the estimated equation would give us
the ln odds rather than the probability.
The random draw process is such that a participating firm may or may not be classified as “in” the work sharing program; similarly, a nonparticipant is not necessarily out of the program in the experiment. Since the final tabulation compares
the simulated figures of the two scenarios (base-case and hypothetical), this lack
of perfect fit should not present an interpretation problem. The errors are random
and should be cancelled out in the process of calculating the differences.
This figure, which is the ratio of the total work sharing expenditures in 1990, to
the number of applications approved in 1990, is only the short-run book value. It
does not take into account the addition of UI benefits paid to work sharing workers who were laid off in the post–work sharing period. See Employment and
Immigration Canada (1993).
The estimated equation:
Work Sharing Expenditurei = 180.95 + 4170.22 × URatei × ESharei,
(0.76)
(5.31)
adjusted R2 = 0.37,

where a) figures in parentheses are t-statistics; b) i: UI region i; URatei: the unemployment rate of UI region i; Esharei: the employment share of UI region i (i.e.,
employment of UI region i/total employment).
17. Why did so few employers use the work sharing program as a means for adjusting
workers hours? The answer to this question is not obvious, and is a research topic
itself. Work sharing has always been a relatively small program in Canada. From
1982–1995, the total unemployment rate fluctuated between 6.2 and 10.7 percent,
the ratio of “work sharing weeks paid to total UI benefits weeks paid” remained in
the “0.3 to 2.9 percent” neighborhood.
18. We have only 10 observations for this calculation.

Economic Activities and the Demand for Work Sharing in Canada

367

19. That is, the first difference of the unemployment rate, URATEt – URATEt – 1.
20. This assumes that the government usually approves all legitimate applications for
work sharing participation.
21. For a discussion on active and passive work sharing, see Tremblay (1989).
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Table A1 Estimated Effects of Explanatory Variables on Program
Participation Probabilitya
Variable

Probability
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Recent change in the UI region unemployment rate

0.068

Organization operations
Single location
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Multiple (across Canada)

0.000

Multiple (international)
Multiple (one province) – reference case

-0.272
0.000

Type of industry
Primary
Heavy manufacturing
Construction

0.000
–0.295

Trade

0.113

Other

0.000

Light manufacturing – reference case

0.000

Percentage of employees unionized
Years of operation
a

–0.228

–0.001
0.002

Each value denotes the marginal effect of one additional unit of the variable on a typical firm’s program participation probability, evaluating at the mean of the variable
and holding all other explanatory variables constant at their mean values. If the variable is a 0 or 1 dummy variable, then 0 is taken as the mean in the calculation. “Organization” and “industry” variables statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level are
treated the same as their respective reference cases.
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